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Rights of appeal have become an indispensable feature of most systems of criminal procedure 
on the domestic level. Modern jurisdictions almost invariably provide for one (or multiple) 
stage(s) of appellate review of a criminal conviction for two primary reasons.1 On the one 
hand, it constitutes a mechanism for the development and homogenisation of the law. 
Appellate courts have resolved indeterminate questions of law and have conclusively settled 
conflicting output of courts in the lower echelons of the judiciary. On the other hand, 
appellate review is envisioned as a (final) safeguard against judgments possibly tainted by 
legal or factual errors. A criminal appeal allows a convicted person to seek to have his 
conviction and/or sentence mitigated or even overturned, whilst particular constructs of the 
appellate process also permit prosecutors to request an acquittal to be vacated and/or a 
sentence to be aggravated. It, thus, entails imperative individual and communal ramifications, 
considering that it attempts to contribute to the differentiation between the guilty and the 
innocent. The latter function has been entrenched in international human rights law. 2 
Following the Second World War, the right to appeal afforded to a person standing trial on 
criminal charges has been recognised in international and regional human rights instruments.3 
 
Despite its importance, appellate review may stand in tension with the principle of finality, 
which requires all litigation to come to an end. The protraction of criminal proceedings may 
call into question victims’ confidence that justice will be served.4 Furthermore, the possibility 
of seeking a renewed assessment by a higher court may convey the impression that judicial 
decisions may be called into doubt, which may lead to mistrust in the judicial process as 
opposed to reassurance that successive assessments lead to the correct outcome.5 The right to 
appeal is, thus, also characterised by a balancing exercise between the need to allow a 
conviction, sentence, or acquittal to be challenged for the sake of factual and legal accuracy 
and the need to adopt a decision that cannot be disturbed because of legal certainty. 
 
                                                 
1 Also: Part I, Chapter 1.2; Part II, Chapter 1.2. 
2 It has been famously noted that, “[i]n the real world of practice and procedure, there is no such entity as 
‘International Human Rights Law’”. I. Brownlie, Principles of Public International Law (Oxford: Oxford 
University Press, 2003), at 530. However, no legal definition has been assigned this term in this study. It is 
merely used for ease of reference. 
3 Part II, Chapter 1.1. 
4 D. Hamer, ‘Wrongful Convictions, Appeals, and the Finality Principle: The Need for a Criminal Cases Review 




However, the attention devoted to the right to appeal in international criminal law is 
incommensurate with the importance attached to this right in domestic systems and 
international human rights law. The International Military Tribunals sitting in Nuremberg and 
Tokyo, established for the trial of the leadership of Nazi Germany and Imperial Japan after 
the Second World War, envisaged a single level criminal trial. 6  Thereafter, appellate 
proceedings have commanded appreciably less interest compared to other issues in the 
foundational phases of the Ad Hoc Tribunals and the ICC. In this regard, it has been noted 
that, “[i]n drafting rules on international criminal procedure, the matter of appellate 
proceedings tends to receive scant attention”, since “it is not considered a pressing issue when 
these courts are being set up”.7 Such negotiations may involve diplomatic compromise and 
“creative ambiguity”,8 which has often been interpreted as an invitation to the judges to 
develop the law.9 However, the judges of the Appeals Chambers of the Ad Hoc Tribunals 
have not managed to generate conceptual clarity in respect of certain critical facets of the 
appellate process. Two issues are emblematic in this regard. The powers of the Ad Hoc 
Appeals Chambers to substitute an acquittal for a conviction or to impose an aggravated 
sentence without the possibility of having recourse to a higher instance has been the subject of 
an intense exchange of views between individual judges. On the one hand, it has been argued 
that such powers contravene standards of international human rights law concerning the right 
to appeal.10  On the other hand, it has been contended that such powers conform to the 
exceptions to the right to appeal recognised in international law.11 Although the Ad Hoc 
Appeals Chambers have routinely imposed convictions in lieu of acquittals and/or increased 
sentences from the outset, they only explicitly decided that they possess the powers to do so 
in the closing stages of their mandates.12 Disagreement between the judges concerning the 
                                                 
6 Art. 26 Charter International Military Tribunal (Nuremberg); Arts. 15, 17 Charter International Military 
Tribunal for the Far East (Tokyo) (omitting the possibility to appeal). 
7 L. O’Neill and G. Sluiter, ‘The Right to Appeal a Judgment of the Extraordinary Chambers in the Courts of 
Cambodia’, 10(2) Melbourne Journal of International Law 596 (2009), at 628.  
8 D. Hunt, ‘The International Criminal Court: High Hopes, ‘Creative Ambiguity’ and an Unfortunate Mistrust in 
International Judges’, 2(1) Journal of International Criminal Justice 56 (2004), at 58. 
9 C. Safferling, International Criminal Procedure (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2012), at 50-51. 
10 Dissenting and Partially Dissenting Opinions of Judge Pocar in: Rutaganda, at 2-3; Mrkšić & Šljivančanin, at 
1-13; Semanza, at 1-4; Setako, at 1-6; Gatete, at 1-5; and Popović et al., at 2. Unless otherwise stated, references 
to cases in the footnotes of this study refer to appellate judgments from first instance judgments on acquittal, 
conviction, and/or sentence adopted by Trial Chambers of the Ad Hoc Tribunals or the ICC. 
11 Separate Opinions of Judge Shahabuddeen in: Rutaganda, at 1-40; Semanza (with Judge Güney), at 1-9. 
Similar: Šainović et al., Dissenting Opinion of Judge Ramaroson, at 5; Galić, Separate and Partially Dissenting 
Opinion of Judge Schomburg, at 3. 
12 Gatete, at 265; Gotovina, at 107 (footnote 314); Đorđević, at 928; Popović et al., at 539. 
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required scope of appellate review concerning questions of fact13 and the standard of review 
applicable to errors of fact based on additional evidence 14  has further marred the 
jurisprudence of the Ad Hoc Appeals Chambers. Judges advocating for a wide approach to 
appellate review of questions of fact arising out of the record of the trial proceedings or 
additional evidence presented before the Appeals Chamber have clashed with those in favour 
of a more restrictive stance. This division reflects the aforementioned tension inherent in 
appellate proceedings between, on the one hand, factual and legal accuracy and, on the other 
hand, the principle of finality. Whilst the early appellate jurisprudence of the ICC has not 
revealed such divisions, similar issues may come to affect its appellate process too. In this 
regard, the ICC Appeals Chamber has held that it may order a “new trial or […] reverse the 
acquittal and enter a conviction”.15 Furthermore, a judge of the ICC Appeals Chamber has 
criticised the extent to which a decisive question of fact has been reviewed by the ICC 
Appeals Chamber,16 which signals a commitment to a wider scope of review. 
 
Over and above the lack of clarity in the practical application of international criminal law, 
neither the general topic of criminal appeals nor the controversial aspects of the jurisprudence 
of the Ad Hoc Appeals Chambers have received treatment proportionate to their significance 
in legal scholarship. In this regard, it has, for instance, been written that “very little scholarly 
attention has been given to the subject of criminal appeals”.17 Moreover, academic articles 
that attend to this subject matter often relegate it to secondary importance.18 
 
1. Research Question 
The preceding considerations have provided the impetus for this study. It aims to fill a void in 
respect of a subject that, despite its critical implications for international criminal process, has 
been insufficiently considered in scholarship and practice. In more specific terms, it seeks to 
contribute to the elucidation of controversial aspects of the appellate proceedings of the Ad 
                                                 
13 E.g., Muvunyi II, Dissenting Opinion of Judges Liu and Meron, at 7-8; Nchamihigo, Partly Dissenting 
Opinion of Judge Pocar, at 8; Ntabakuze, Joint Dissenting Opinion of Judges Pocar and Liu, at 2; Popović et al., 
Separate and Dissenting Opinions of Judge Mandiaye Niang, at 11 (footnote 3). 
14 Blaškić, Partial Dissenting Opinion of Judge Weinberg De Roca; Kordić & Čerkez, Separate Opinion of Judge 
Weinberg de Roca; Kvočka et al., Separate Opinion of Judge Weinberg De Roca; Kvočka et al., Separate 
Opinion of Judge Shahabuddeen. 
15 Ngudjolo, at 284 (emphasis supplied). 
16 Lubanga, Dissenting Opinion of Judge Anita Ušacka, at 50-51. 
17 P. Marshall, ‘A Comparative Analysis of the Right to Appeal’, 22(1) Duke Journal of Comparative & 
International Law 1 (2011), at 1. 
18 E.g., C. Kress, ‘The Procedural Law of the International Criminal Court in Outline: Anatomy of a Unique 
Compromise’, 1(3) Journal of International Criminal Justice 603, at 614. 
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Hoc Tribunals, which may arise in the context of the ICC’s appellate proceedings too, and 
attempts, on a broader level, to assess appellate proceedings conducted in international 
criminal law in a more comprehensive manner. Accordingly, this study may, in the main, be 
typified as “[e]valuative scholarship”, which “is in some way providing an assessment of the 
way the (legal) world is, and, either implicitly or explicitly, subjecting the law to appraisal 
[…] from the point of view of coherence with […] other areas of law, […] and where 
shortfalls are identified, suggesting how things might be improved”.19 
 
In light of the foregoing, the following research question is central to this study: “against 
which standards should the appellate proceedings of the Ad Hoc Tribunals and the ICC be 
assessed and have the Ad Hoc Tribunals and the ICC conducted and adjudicated appeals 
taken from first instance judgments and/or sentences in accordance with such standards?”  
 
This research question imposes three fundamental limitations.20 First and foremost, this study 
considers the law as it exists (that is de lege lata) as opposed to the law as it is proposed (that 
is de lege ferenda). 21  In view of the aforementioned practical ambiguities infusing the 
appellate proceedings of the Ad Hoc Tribunals and potentially the ICC, this research 
corresponds to the need to define the relevant benchmarks for such proceedings, map the law 
and practice relevant to appeals before the Ad Hoc Tribunals and the ICC, and contrast the 
former against the latter to determine possible inadequacies and, if necessary, propose 
adjustments. This also means that this study does not pretend to provide an exhaustive 
assessment of the fairness of the appellate procedures of the Ad Hoc Tribunals and the ICC. 
As set forth in more detail hereinafter,22 it will contrast these procedures against standards of 
customary international law (derived from domestic systems of criminal procedure) and/or 
                                                 
19 R. Cryer, T. Hervey, B. Sokhi-Bulley, and A. Bohm, Research Methodologies in EU and International Law 
(Oxford: Hart Publishing, 2011), at 9. It is understood that this type of research encapsulates elements of other 
types of legal research, such as “descriptive”, “comparative”, and “normative” research. These labels have been 
employed separately by others. See: e.g., Editors (prepared by S. Vasiliev), ‘Introduction’, in G. Sluiter, H. 
Friman, S. Linton, S. Vasiliev, and S. Zappalà, International Criminal Procedure - Principles and Rules 1 
(Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2013), at 9-10. However, others have rejected some of these labels. See: e.g., 
M. van Hoecke, ‘Legal Doctrine: Which Method(s) for What Kind of Discipline’, in M. van Hoecke (ed.), 
Methodologies of Legal Research. What Kind of Method for What kind of Discipline? 1 (Oxford: Hart 
Publishing, 2011), at 4-11. Accordingly, this research does not adopt a particular position in this respect, but 
employs the label of “evaluative” research for ease of reference. 
20 Additional limitations will be discussed in the section on methodology. See: Introduction, Chapter 2. 
21 Also: R. Cryer, T. Hervey, B. Sokhi-Bulley, and A. Bohm, Research Methodologies in EU and International 
Law (Oxford: Hart Publishing, 2011), at 37-39; F. Coomans, F. Grünfeld, and M. Kamminga, ‘A Primer’, in F. 
Coomans, F. Grünfeld, and M. Kamminga (eds.), Methods of Human Rights Research 11 (Antwerp: Intersentia, 
2009), at 16-17. 
22 Introduction, Chapter 2.1.1; Introduction, Chapter 2.1.2. 
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international human rights law (drawn from international and regional human rights 
instruments), which set generalizable and/or minimum touchstones of fairness in the criminal 
process.23  Second, this study exclusively considers the appellate practice of the Ad Hoc 
Tribunals24 and the ICC. Accordingly, “mixed” tribunals will not be assessed. Whilst the Ad 
Hoc Tribunals and the ICC are international in character, seeing that they were established by 
the U.N. Security Council or by treaty, the former are “national court[s] of mixed jurisdiction 
and composition”,25  which combine international and national law in various manners 26 . 
Accordingly, the standards against which the appellate proceedings of courts falling in the 
latter category are to be measured are, in part, dependent on domestic arrangements. As such, 
this category requires a dissimilar assessment.27 Finally, this research is confined to appeals 
taken from first instance judgments and/or sentences. The interlocutory appeal regime and 
post-appeal remedies of the Ad Hoc Tribunals and the ICC will therefore not be evaluated. 
The former determine contentious issues with finality during proceedings at first instance and 
could, on this basis, be seen to form part of the accused’s right to have his final conviction 
and/or sentence reviewed in respect of specific matters.28 However, international human rights 
law, as one of the pillars of international criminal procedure,29 does not acknowledge the right 
to have every decision of a hierarchically subordinate court reviewed by a superior court. 
International and regional human rights instruments explicitly limit the object of appellate 
                                                 
23 E.g., M. Fedorova and G. Sluiter, ‘Human Rights as Minimum Standards in International Criminal 
Proceedings’, 3(1) Human Rights & International Legal Discourse 9 (2009); F. Mégret, ‘The Sources of 
International Criminal Procedure’, in G. Sluiter, H. Friman, S. Linton, S. Vasiliev, and S. Zappalà, International 
Criminal Procedure - Principles and Rules 68 (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2013), at 70-71. 
24 No specific distinction will be drawn between the Ad Hoc Tribunals and the MICT. The latter operates similar 
provisions and rules of procedure and evidence relevant to appellate proceedings in comparison with the Statutes 
and RPE of the Ad Hoc Tribunals (see: Arts. 23 MICT Statute and Rules 131-145 MICT RPE). Indeed, in 
relation to appellate proceedings, the MICT Appeals Chamber has found that “[t]he Statute and the Rules of the 
Mechanism reflect normative continuity with the Statutes and Rules of the ICTR and ICTY. The [MICT] 
Appeals Chamber considers that it is bound to interpret its Statute and Rules in a manner consistent with the 
jurisprudence of the ICTR and ICTY. Likewise, where the respective Rules or Statutes of the ICTR or ICTY are 
at issue, the Appeals Chamber is bound to consider the relevant precedent of these tribunals when interpreting 
them”. See: Ngirabatware, at 6. Accordingly, for ease of reference, the ensuing sections will exclusively refer to 
the Ad Hoc Tribunals. 
25 D. Shraga, ‘The Second Generation of UN-Based Tribunals: A Diversity of Mixed Jurisdictions’, in C. 
Romano, A. Nollkaemper, and J. Kleffner (eds.), Internationalized Criminal Courts: Sierra Leone, East Timor, 
Kosovo, and Cambodia 15 (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2004), at 15. 
26 See: e.g., Arts. 5, 6(5), 14(2), 20(3) SCSL Statute; Sections 2-3 UNTAET/REG/1991/1 (Special Panel for 
Serious Crimes (East Timor)); Art. 12 ECCC Agreement; Art. 2 STL Statute; Arts. 3(2)-(3), 12-15, 25-26 Law 
on Kosovo Specialist Chambers and Specialist Prosecutor’s Office. 
27 E.g., L. O’Neill and G. Sluiter, ‘The Right to Appeal a Judgment of the Extraordinary Chambers in the Courts 
of Cambodia’, 10(2) Melbourne Journal of International Law 596 (2009), at 628; G. Boas, J. Jackson, B. Roche, 
and D. Taylor III, ‘Appeals, Reviews, and Reconsideration’, in G. Sluiter, H. Friman, S. Linton, S. Vasiliev, and 
S. Zappalà (eds.), International Criminal Procedure - Principles and Rules 939 (Oxford: Oxford University 
Press, 2013), at 943. 
28 Rules 72(B), 73(B) ICTY and ICTR RPE; Arts. 18(4), 19(6), 82 ICC Statute; Delalić et al., at 122.  
29 Introduction, Chapter 2.1.2. 
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review to either the “conviction and the sentence”30 or “the judgement”31, as confirmed by 
both the ICTY32 and the ICC33. Interlocutory appeals must, thus, be appraised against a 
different yardstick. 34  The same reasoning applies to the latter, which consist of 
reconsideration35 and review36 (or revision37).38 
 
2. Methodology 
The focus on existing law (that is de lege lata) entails that this study draws its data from the 
classical sources of law. In the context of international law, these sources are, on a general 
level, reproduced in the ICJ Statute: “a. international conventions […]; b. international 
custom, as evidence of a general practice accepted as law; c. the general principles of law 
recognized by civilized nations; d. […] judicial decisions and the teachings of the most highly 
qualified publicists of the various nations, as subsidiary means […]”.39 However, the sources 
of international criminal procedure are not “entirely aligned” with the general sources of 
international law.40 Two such discrepancies are relevant to this study. First, “actual binding 
rules of procedure typically take precedence over norms contained in any other source”, 
which are “generally contained at least in part in the charter or statute of the tribunal itself”.41 
Second, “international criminal tribunals […] will only look beyond the immediate sources 
                                                 
30 Art. 14(5) ICCPR. Art. 2(1) Protocol 7 ECHR mentions “the conviction or sentence” (emphasis supplied). 
See: Part II, Chapter 3.3.3.2; Part II, Chapter 5.1.4.7.1. 
31 Art. 8(2)(h) ACHR. 
32 Decision on Application for Leave to Appeal (Provisional Release) by Hazim Delić, Prosecutor v. Delalić et 
al., Case No. IT-96-21-T, ICTY, Appeals Chamber, 22 November 1996, at 19. 
33 Judgment on the Prosecutor’s Application for Extraordinary Review of Pre-Trial Chamber I’s 31 March 2006 
Decision Denying Leave to Appeal, Situation in the Democratic Republic of the Congo, Case No. ICC-01/04, 
ICC, Appeals Chamber, 13 July 2006, at 38. 
34 However, where the existence of an appealable issue has not been certified or where the accused decides not to 
file an interlocutory appeal during the trial at first instance, an issue may become part of the final appeal against 
the conviction and/or sentence. See: e.g., Gacumbitsi, at 11-35. Such matters have not been excluded. 
35 In any event, the ICTY Appeals Chamber has found that reconsideration is inapplicable to a final judgment 
(Decision on Zoran Žigić’s “Motion for Reconsideration of Appeals Chamber Judgement IT-98-30/1-A 
Delivered on 28 February 2005”, Prosecutor v. Žigić, Case No. IT-98-30/l-A, ICTY, Appeals Chamber, 26 June 
2006, at 7, 9) While the ICC Appeals Chamber has clarified that it may depart from previous decisions (Reasons 
for the “Decision on the ‘Request for the Recognition of the Right of Victims Authorized to Participate in the 
Case to Automatically Participate in any Interlocutory Appeal arising from the Case and, in the Alternative, 
Application to Participate in the Interlocutory Appeal against the Ninth Decision on Mr Gbagbo’s Detention 
(ICC-02/11-01/15-134-Red3)’”, Prosecutor v. Gbagbo & Blé Goudé, Case No. ICC-02/11-01/15, ICC, Appeals 
Chamber, 31 July 2015, at 14), it remains unclear whether it may reconsider decisions of conviction or acquittal. 
36 Art. 26 ICTY Statute; Art. 25 ICTR Statute. 
37 Art. 84 ICC Statute. 
38 Part II, Chapter 2.3.2; Part II, Chapter 3.3.2. 
39 Art. 38(1) ICJ Statute. 
40 F. Mégret, ‘The Sources of International Criminal Procedure’, in G. Sluiter, H. Friman, S. Linton, S. Vasiliev, 
and S. Zappalà (eds.), International Criminal Procedure - Principles and Rules 68 (Oxford: Oxford University 
Press, 2013), at 68. 
41 Ibid., at 69. 
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such as statutes and rules of procedure and evidence in cases where there is a significant 
ambiguity”, which may entail recourse to “treaty law” and “[c]ustomary international law”.42 
 
2.1. Fair Trial Standards Applicable to International Appellate Proceedings 
In light of the foregoing, the collection and analysis of data relevant to this study may, in 
general terms, be described as follows.43  The fair trial standards governing the appellate 
proceedings of the Ad Hoc Tribunals and the ICC will be defined on the basis of norms of 
customary international law and/or international human rights law.44 The legal framework 
applicable to the appellate proceedings of the Ad Hoc Tribunals and the ICC, as well as the 
manner in which appeals taken from first instance judgments of conviction or acquittal and/or 
sentences have been conducted and adjudicated, will be mapped out pursuant to the relevant 
legal texts of these institutions and the Appeals Chambers’ jurisprudence. 
 
2.1.1. Customary International Law 
Whereas the applicable law of the ICC specially refers to “the principles and rules of 
international law”,45 which refers, inter alia, “to customary international law”,46 the ICTY has 
found that “any time the Statute does not regulate a specific matter […], it falls to the […] 
[ICTY] to draw [inter alia] upon […] rules of customary international law”, since “[i]t must 
be assumed that the draftspersons intended the Statute to be based on international law”.47 
The identification of relevant rules of customary international law relevant to the appellate 
proceedings of the Ad Hoc Tribunals and the ICC is based on a comparative law approach. In 
this regard, it has been noted that “[t]he need for comparative law stems from the sources of 
international criminal law, to the extent that custom […] [is] partly based on national law”.48 
It may be added that, as a matter of institutional design, international criminal procedure 
                                                 
42 Ibid., at 70-71. 
43 The cut-off date is 28 February 2017. 
44 Similar: Editors (prepared by S. Vasiliev), ‘Introduction’, in G. Sluiter, H. Friman, S. Linton, S. Vasiliev, and 
S. Zappalà (eds.), International Criminal Procedure - Principles and Rules 1 (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 
2013), at 27-28. 
45 Art. 21(1)(b) ICC Statute. 
46 A. Pellet, ‘Applicable Law’, in A. Cassese, P. Gaeta, and J. Jones (eds.), The Rome Statute of the International 
Criminal Court: a Commentary 1051 (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2002), at 1071. 
47 Judgement, Prosecutor v. Kupreškić et al., Case No. IT-95-16-T, ICTY, Trial Chamber, 14 January 2000, at 
591. Also: A. Cassese, ‘The Influence of the European Court of Human Rights on International Criminal 
Tribunals - Some Methodological Remarks’, in M. Bergsmo (ed.), Human Rights for the Downtrodden. Essays 
in Honour of Asbjørn Eide 19 (Leiden: Brill Academic Publishers, 2003), at 19-20. 
48 M. Delmas-Marty, ‘The Contribution of Comparative Law to a Pluralist Conception of International Criminal 
Law, Journal of International Criminal Justice’, 1(1) Journal of International Criminal Justice 13 (2003), at 16. 
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coalesces elements from the major legal families of the world.49 Therefore, comparative law 
ensures, in addition, a better understanding of the origins and guiding principles of the 
appellate frameworks of the Ad Hoc Tribunals and the ICC.50 
 
The selection of jurisdictions to be compared has been inspired by three considerations. First, 
in order to achieve a fair representation of the most important families of law, 51  three 
jurisdictions belonging to the Common Law Tradition (namely England & Wales, the U.S., 
and South Africa)52 and three jurisdictions pertaining to the Civil Law tradition (namely 
France, Germany, and Argentina)53 have been studied. Second, so as to reflect the increasing 
blend between the Common Law and Civil Law traditions,54 two jurisdictions have been 
examined that have adopted far-reaching judicial reforms inspired by the opposite legal 
tradition they originally belonged to (namely Italy and Russia).55 Third, on a general level, 
eight jurisdictions have been selected to provide for a sufficiently wide and geographically 
diverse sample so as to allow for generalizable conclusions to be drawn as to the existence of 
rules of customary international law in respect of appellate review at second instance.  
 
Furthermore, the choice for the particular facets of these systems’ appellate proceedings to be 
assessed has been guided by three considerations. So as to approximate the context of the Ad 
Hoc Tribunals and the ICC, which operate a two-tier legal system,56 only appellate review in 
second instance has been examined. Similarly, the crimes within the jurisdictions of the Ad 
Hoc Tribunals and the ICC are extremely serious and, therefore, this study is restricted to a 
consideration of domestic appellate processes concerning the most serious category of crimes 
according to domestic law.57 Moreover, to allow for a meaningful comparison between the 
wide varieties of procedural systems, and to manage the scope of the research, the 
examination has been restricted to the essential features of appellate review in second 
                                                 
49 E.g., Erdemović, Separate and Dissenting Opinion of Judge Cassese, at 4. 
50 E.g., T. Weigend, ‘Criminal Law and Criminal Procedure’, in J. Smits (ed.), Elgar Encyclopaedia of 
Comparative Law 214 (Cheltenham: Edward Elgar Publishing, 2006), at 225. 
51 Similar: J. Spencer, ‘Introduction’, in M. Delmas-Marty and J. Spencer (eds.) European Criminal Procedures 
1 (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2002), at 3. 
52 Part I, Chapter 3. 
53 Part I, Chapter 2. 
54 Similar: J. Spencer, ‘Introduction’, in M. Delmas-Marty and J. Spencer (eds.) European Criminal Procedures 
1 (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2002), at 3-4. 
55 Part I, Chapter 4. 
56 Part III, Chapter 2.1.1. 
57 It is noteworthy that the appellate processes pertaining to different categories of crimes may differ in domestic 
jurisdictions. E.g., A. Ashworth and M. Redmayne, The Criminal Process (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 
2010), at 371, 377-378 (England & Wales); Sections 312, 349(5) Code of Criminal Procedure 2014 (Germany). 
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instance.58 Dependent on the context, these features are: the availability of appellate review, 
the parties entitled to a right to appeal, impediments to appellate review, the oral or written 
nature of the appellate procedure, the approaches to additional evidence on appeal, the scope 
of appellate review, the powers of appellate courts, and the functions of appellate review.59 
 
2.1.2. International Human Rights Law  
Whilst it is generally presumed that the Ad Hoc Tribunals and the ICC should adhere to fair 
trial standards developed in international human rights law,60 it has proved less obvious how 
they are bound by such standards in legal terms. Nevertheless, despite contrary views,61 the 
prevalent position among commentators is that these institutions are under a legal obligation 
to conduct their proceedings in accordance with international human rights law on the basis of 
their internal legal frameworks.62 In respect of the Ad Hoc Tribunals, the foundational report 
of the U.N. Secretary-General explicitly mentions that “internationally recognized standards 
[regarding the rights of the accused] are, in particular, contained in article 14” ICCPR.63 
Indeed, the ICTY Appeals Chamber has considered that “[t]he fair trial guarantees in Article 
14 […] [ICCPR] have been adopted almost verbatim in Article 21” ICTY Statute and “[o]ther 
fair trial guarantees appear in the [ICTY] Statute and the” RPE.64 With regard to the ICC, its 
Statute specifically stipulates that the application and interpretation of the law of the ICC 
                                                 
58 Similar: Editors (prepared by S. Vasiliev), ‘Introduction’, in G. Sluiter, H. Friman, S. Linton, S. Vasiliev, and 
S. Zappalà (eds.), International Criminal Procedure - Principles and Rules 1 (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 
2013), at 28. 
59 In line with the focus on existing law (that is de lege lata), these specific assessments draw on the classical 
sources of law on the national level, that is “legislation, custom, adjudication by other courts and legal 
institutions”. See: R. Cryer, T. Hervey, B. Sokhi-Bulley, and A. Bohm, Research Methodologies in EU and 
International Law (Oxford: Hart Publishing, 2011), at 38. 
60 E.g., U.N. Security Council, Report of the Secretary-General Pursuant to Paragraph 2 of Security Council 
Resolution 808 (1993), S/25704, 3 May 1993, at 106; G. Sluiter, ‘International Criminal Proceedings and the 
Protection of Human Rights’, 37(4) New England Law Review 935 (2002-2003), at 935. 
61 E.g., S. Zappalà, Human Rights in International Criminal Proceedings (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 
2003), at 1, 6-7; F. Mégret, ‘Beyond ‘Fairness’ Understanding the Determinants of International Criminal 
Procedure’, 14(1) UCLA Journal of International Law and Foreign Affairs 37 (2009), at 52. 
62 L. Gradoni, ‘The Human Rights Dimension of International Criminal Procedure’, in G. Sluiter, H. Friman, S. 
Linton, S. Vasiliev, and S. Zappalà (eds.), International Criminal Procedure - Principles and Rules 74 (Oxford: 
Oxford University Press, 2013), at 82-83; M. Fedorova and G. Sluiter, ‘Human Rights as Minimum Standards in 
International Criminal Proceedings’, 3(1) Human Rights & International Legal Discourse 9 (2009), at 18-20. 
63 U.N. Security Council, Report of the Secretary-General Pursuant to Paragraph 2 of Security Council 
Resolution 808 (1993), S/25704, 3 May 1993, at 106 (emphasis supplied). The Ad Hoc Tribunals have explicitly 
grounded the obligation to abide by international human rights law in the Secretary General Report. See: e.g., 
Delalić et al., at 604; ICTY, Report of the International Tribunal for the Prosecution of Persons Responsible for 
Serious Violations of International Humanitarian Law Committed in the Territory of the Former Yugoslavia 
since 1991, A/49/342 & S/1994/1007, 29 August 1994, at 22-26. 
64 Decision on the Defence Motion for Interlocutory Appeal on Jurisdiction, Prosecutor v. Tadić, Case No. IT-
94-1, ICTY, Appeals Chamber, 2 October 1995, at 46. 
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“must be consistent with internationally recognized human rights”.65 It has, moreover, been 
written that “[t]he provisions of the ICCPR have been thoroughly implemented in” the ICC 
system. 66  Besides conventional norms of international human rights law, “[d]ecisions of 
human rights jurisdictions are generally taken very seriously and their precedential value is in 
practice fully recognized” by the Ad Hoc Tribunals and the ICC, including the jurisprudence 
of the ECtHR and IACtHR.67 Although “[t]here is no reason to doubt that customary norms 
on human rights apply to international organizations”,68 this study will limit its inquiry to the 
human rights obligations of the Ad Hoc Tribunals and the ICC arising out of their internal 
legal frameworks. The reason is that this basis is wider and therefore subsumes norms of 
international human rights law amounting to customary international law. In this regard, it has 
been remarked that “[a]rticle 21(3) of the ICC Statute […] does not single out custom as the 
sole source of human rights obligations within the ICC legal system” and the reference to 
“internationally recognized” human rights standards in the Report of the Secretary General on 
the establishment of the ICTY might mean “something more than custom”.69  
 
What is more, notwithstanding discordant understandings in the literature,70 the large majority 
of commentators asserts that the human rights obligations of the Ad Hoc Tribunals and the 
ICC constitute lex superior vis-à-vis other norms. In this regard, it has been noted that, 
“[a]ccording to Article 21(3) ICC Statute, internationally recognized human rights take 
precedence over any other conflicting rule of the ICC legal system, including those laid out in 
the [ICC] Statute”.71 With regard to the Ad Hoc Tribunals, “hierarchically superior norms 
                                                 
65 Art. 21(3) ICC Statute. In addition, the ICC Appeals Chamber has found that “human rights underpin the 
[ICC] Statute; every aspect of it [and that] its provisions must be interpreted and more importantly applied in 
accordance with internationally recognized human rights”. See: Judgment on the Appeal of Mr. Thomas 
Lubanga Dyilo against the Decision on the Defence Challenge to the Jurisdiction of the Court pursuant to Article 
19 (2) (a) of the Statute of 3 October 2006, Prosecutor v. Lubanga, Case No. ICC-01/04-01/06, ICC, Appeals 
Chamber, 14 December 2006, at 37. 
66 S. Zappalà, ‘The Rights of the Accused’, in A. Cassese, P. Gaeta, and J. Jones (eds.), The Rome Statute of the 
International Criminal Court: a Commentary 1319 (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2002), at 1353. 
67 L. Gradoni, ‘The Human Rights Dimension of International Criminal Procedure’, in G. Sluiter, H. Friman, S. 
Linton, S. Vasiliev, and S. Zappalà (eds.), International Criminal Procedure - Principles and Rules 74 (Oxford: 
Oxford University Press, 2013), at 91. 
68 Ibid., at 81. 
69 Ibid., at 82-83. 
70 E.g., D. Akande, ‘Sources of International Criminal Law’, in A. Cassese (ed.), Oxford Companion to 
International Criminal Justice 41 (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2009), at 41; G. Hafner and C. Binder, ‘The 
Interpretation of Article 21 (3) ICC Statute. Opinion Reviewed’, 9 Austrian Review of International and 
European Law 163 (2004), at 169-177. 
71 L. Gradoni, ‘The Human Rights Dimension of International Criminal Procedure’, in G. Sluiter, H. Friman, S. 
Linton, S. Vasiliev, and S. Zappalà (eds.), International Criminal Procedure - Principles and Rules 74 (Oxford: 
Oxford University Press, 2013), at 81. Also: A. Pellet, ‘Applicable Law’, in A. Cassese, P. Gaeta, and J. Jones 
(eds.), The Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court: a Commentary 1051 (Oxford: Oxford University 
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may be derived either from the UN Charter [as the legal basis for their establishment] or from 
customary norms of an imperative character”.72 More broadly, such norms emanate from the 
fact that any derogations from customary international law only sort effect in States’ 
“relations inter se”, considering that they “have no power to strip individuals of their rights 
under international law”, and “the fact that international organizations have international 
obligations” beyond their creators’ control.73 
 
Despite the prominent place of international human rights law in the internal legal 
frameworks of the Ad Hoc Tribunals and the ICC, the identification of norms of international 
human rights law relevant to their appellate proceedings contends with three difficulties. 
 
First, the obligations of the Ad Hoc Tribunals and the ICC under human rights law have not 
been rigorously defined. In this regard, it has been written that the ICTY is not a “state and is 
not party to […] [human rights] instruments”.74 This applies equally to the ICTR and ICC. 
The lack of clarity as to the guiding human rights norms is exemplified by the diverging 
taxonomy employed by the Ad Hoc Tribunals, who have considered themselves bound by 
terms such as “recognised principles of human rights”,75 “internationally recognized standards 
of fundamental human rights”,76 and “generally accepted human rights norms”.77 In relation 
to the ICC, such a lack of clarity arises out of the absence of a definition of the reference to 
“internationally recognized human rights” in Article 21(3) ICC Statute.78  This is further 
confirmed by the reliance of the Ad Hoc Tribunals and the ICC on a multiplicity of human 
rights instruments without a clear rationale. Whilst the ICCPR appears to be the most 
pertinent human rights instrument in the context of international criminal law on account of 
                                                                                                                                                        
Press, 2002), at 1076-1082; G. Bitti, ‘Article 21 of the Statute of the International Criminal Court and the 
Treatment of Sources of Law in the Jurisprudence of the ICC’, in C. Stahn and G. Sluiter (eds.), The Emerging 
Practice of the International Criminal Court 285 (Leiden: Martinus Nijhoff Publishers, 2009), at 303. 
72 L. Gradoni, ‘The Human Rights Dimension of International Criminal Procedure’, in G. Sluiter, H. Friman, S. 
Linton, S. Vasiliev, and S. Zappalà (eds.), International Criminal Procedure - Principles and Rules 74 (Oxford: 
Oxford University Press, 2013), at 83. 
73 Ibid., at 84. 
74 Galić, Separate Opinion of Judge Shahabuddeen, at 25. 
75 Delalić et al., at 604. 
76 Decision on the Prosecutor’s Motion Requesting Protective Measures for Victims and Witnesses, Prosecutor 
v. Tadić, Case No. IT-94-1, ICTY, Trial Chamber, 10 August 1995, at 25. 
77 Decision on Appropriate Remedy, Prosecutor v. Rwamakuba, Case No. IT-98-44C-T, ICTR, Trial Chamber, 
31 January 2007, at 45. 
78 D. Sheppard, ‘The International Criminal Court and ‘Internationally Recognised Human Rights’: 
Understanding Article 21(3) of the Rome Statute’, 10(1) International Criminal Law Review 43 (2010), at 44; G. 
Bitti, ‘Article 21 of the Statute of the International Criminal Court and the Treatment of Sources of Law in the 
Jurisprudence of the ICC’, in C. Stahn and G. Sluiter (eds.), The Emerging Practice of the International 
Criminal Court 285(Leiden: Martinus Nijhoff Publishers, 2009), at 301. 
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its global reach and wide-spread ratification, the Ad Hoc Tribunals and the ICC have 
extensively applied regional human rights instruments too (primarily the ECHR and ACHR)79 
without explicitly defining their binding authority.80 Even so, as determined by the ICTR, 
regional human rights instruments do not bind the Ad Hoc Tribunals on their own accord.81 
This conclusion may be extended to the ICC on the basis of the same reasoning.82 
 
Second, the norms of international human rights law applicable to appellate proceedings are 
multifarious and inconsistent. International and regional human rights instruments contain 
three different conceptions of the right to appeal. 83  Article 14(5) ICCPR stipulates that 
“[e]veryone convicted of a crime shall have the right to his conviction and sentence being 
reviewed by a higher tribunal according to law”. Largely following the formulation of this 
provision, Article 2(1) Protocol 7 ECHR requires that “[e]veryone convicted of a criminal 
offence by a tribunal shall have the right to have his conviction or sentence reviewed by a 
higher tribunal” and adds, in a separate sentence, that “[t]he exercise of this right, including 
the grounds on which it may be exercised, shall be governed by law”. Dissimilarly to the 
ICCPR, however, it also sets forth exceptions to the right to appeal, which apply “in cases in 
which the person concerned was tried in the first instance by the highest tribunal or was 
                                                 
79 L. Gradoni, ‘The Human Rights Dimension of International Criminal Procedure’, in G. Sluiter, H. Friman, S. 
Linton, S. Vasiliev, and S. Zappalà (eds.), International Criminal Procedure - Principles and Rules 74 (Oxford: 
Oxford University Press, 2013), at 89; G. Bitti, ‘Article 21 of the Statute of the International Criminal Court and 
the Treatment of Sources of Law in the Jurisprudence of the ICC’, in C. Stahn and G. Sluiter (eds.), The 
Emerging Practice of the International Criminal Court 285 (Leiden: Martinus Nijhoff Publishers, 2009), at 301. 
80 N. Croquet, ‘The International Criminal Court and the Treatment of Defence Rights: A Mirror of the European 
Court of Human Rights’ Jurisprudence?’, 11(1) Human Rights Law Review 91 (2011), at 109; D. Sheppard, ‘The 
International Criminal Court and ‘Internationally Recognised Human Rights’: Understanding Article 21(3) of the 
Rome Statute’, 10(1) International Criminal Law Review 43 (2010), at 52. However, see: Decision on Appeal 
against the Trial Chamber’s Decision on the Evidence of Witness Milan Babić, Prosecutor v. Martić, Case No. 
IT-95-11-AR73.2, ICTY, Appeals Chamber, 14 September 2006, at 18. 
81 Barayagwiza, at 40. Also: A. Cassese, ‘The Influence of the European Court of Human Rights on International 
Criminal Tribunals - Some Methodological Remarks’, in M. Bergsmo (ed.), Human Rights for the Downtrodden. 
Essays in Honour of Asbjørn Eide 19 (Leiden: Brill Academic Publishers, 2003), at 50. 
82 G. Hafner and C. Binder, ‘The Interpretation of Article 21 (3) ICC Statute. Opinion Reviewed’, 9 Austrian 
Review of International and European Law 163 (2004), at 187 
83 Article 7(1)(a) ACHPR sets forth “[t]he right to an appeal to competent national organs against acts of 
violating his fundamental rights as recognized and guaranteed by conventions, laws, regulations and customs in 
force”, but, on a plain reading, this right does not directly concern a right to appeal a criminal conviction. The 
ACmHPR has significantly elucidated and expanded the fair trial norms contained in the ACHPR, including the 
right to appeal (ACmHPR, Principles and Guidelines on the Right to a Fair Trial and Legal Assistance in 
Africa, 24 October 2011, at A(2)(j), N(10)). However, this document does not constitute a regionally binding 
treaty. Furthermore, other regional human rights treaties or declarations do not recognise a right to appeal, as 
such. See: e.g., Arab Charter on Human Rights (Arts. 7-9); Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European 
Union (Arts. 47-48); and ASEAN Human Rights Declaration (Art. 20). 
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convicted following an appeal against acquittal”.84 Article 8(2)(h) ACHR sets forth “the right 
to appeal the judgment to a higher court”. This conception of the right to appeal differs from 
the ICCPR and Protocol 7 ECHR in terms of wording and embedding. It is described more 
succinctly, since it omits the qualifiers “according to law” and “governed by law”, the 
reference to the need to review the conviction and/or the sentence, and the exceptions set out 
in Protocol 7 ECHR. Furthermore, the right to appeal in Article 8 ACHR has not been 
assigned a separate paragraph in the fair trial clause, as is the case with the ICCPR, but forms 
part of the minimum guarantees applicable to a criminal trial.  
 
The fact that a guarantee specific to the appellate phase of a criminal trial has been included in 
the corpus of fair trial norms in international human rights law suggests that the remaining 
fair trial guarantees control other phases of a criminal trial. However, although not apparent at 
first sight, other fair trial guarantees may entail a regulatory effect in relation to appellate 
proceedings too. Indeed, in addition to the right to appeal, the human rights monitoring bodies 
and courts have resorted to a multiplicity of fair trial guarantees. Two examples may be noted 
in this respect. The ECtHR has found that “a Contracting Party which provides for the 
possibility of an appeal is required to ensure that persons amenable to the law shall enjoy 
before the appellate court the fundamental guarantees contained in Article 6” ECHR, even 
though it had concluded that it could not base its analysis on Article 2 Protocol 7 ECHR 
because the State in question had not ratified this instrument.85 It has been similarly remarked 
that the application of Article 6 ECHR to appellate proceedings curtails the margin of 
appreciation in respect of the right to appeal guaranteed by Protocol 7 ECHR.86 Furthermore, 
the HRC has adjusted its approach to Article 14(5) ICCPR vis-à-vis a particular facet of 
appellate proceedings on the basis of ECtHR jurisprudence regarding Article 6 ECHR.87 
 
Third, it has been noted that the extension of norms of international human rights law to the 
ICTY “has to be interpreted as itself authorising appropriate allowances to be made to reflect 
                                                 
84 Art. 2(2) Protocol 7 ECHR also foresees an exception to the right to appeal in respect of “offences of a minor 
character, as prescribed by law”, but, in light of the nature and severity of the crimes within the jurisdictions of 
the ICC and the Ad Hoc Tribunals, this exception falls outside the scope of this research. 
85 Judgment, Lalmahomed v. the Netherlands, Application No. 26036/08, ECtHR, 22 February 2011, at 34-36. 
Similar: Judgment, Castillo Petruzzi et al. v. Peru, Series C. No. 59, IACtHR, 30 May 1999, at 161. 
86 S. Trechsel, ‘Das Verflixte Siebente? Bemerkungen zum 7. Zusatzprotokoll zur EMRK’, in M. Nowak, D. 
Steuer, and H. Tretter (eds.), Fortschritt im Bewußtsein der Grund- und Menschenrechte, Festschrift für Felix 
Ermacora 195 (Kehl: N.P. Engel Verlag, 1988), at 203. 
87 Views, Larrañaga v. the Philippines, Communication No. 1421/2005, HRC, 24 July 2006, at 7.8 (footnote 
55), referring to: Judgment, Ekbatani v. Sweden, Application No. 10563/83, ECtHR, 26 May 1988, at 33. 
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the differences between the […] [ICTY] and a state”,88 which applies, by the same token, to 
the ICTR and the ICC. In other words, even though the Ad Hoc Tribunals and ICC have often 
adhered to the letter of international human rights law, such norms have also been adjusted to 
the context in which the Ad Hoc Tribunals and ICC operate.89 Such contextualisation has had 
diverse effects. For instance, in particular judgments, it has led to the adaptation of the 
meaning of facets of international human rights law to the specificities of international 
criminal law.90 In another variation, it has entailed the upwards91 or downwards92 alteration of 
norms of international human rights law in international criminal law. 
 
In light of the foregoing, this study will draw on the following norms of international human 
rights law relevant to appellate proceedings. In general, due to the inclusive approach of the 
Ad Hoc Tribunals and the ICC in respect of their obligations under international human rights 
law, both international and regional instruments, including the corresponding views and 
jurisprudence of human rights monitoring bodies and courts, will be considered. In more 
specific terms, beside the specific rights to appeal contained in international human rights 
law, this study will also address other fair trial guarantees relevant to appellate proceedings. 
These guarantees concern the general right to a fair trial applicable to criminal charges 
                                                 
88 Galić, Separate Opinion of Judge Shahabuddeen, at 25. Similar: Judgment, Prosecutor v. Kunarac et al., Case 
No. IT-96-23-T & IT-96-23/1-T, ICTY, Trial Chamber, 22 February 2001, at 471. 
89 M. Damaška, ‘The Competing Visions of Fairness: The Basic Choice for International Criminal Tribunals’ 
36(2) North Carolina Journal of International Law and Commercial Regulation 365 (2011), at 378-381; M. 
Damaška, ‘Reflections on Fairness in International Criminal Justice’, 10(3) Journal of International Criminal 
Justice 611 (2012), at 611-612; K. Zeegers, International Criminal Tribunals and Human Rights. Adherence and 
Contextualization (The Hague: T.M.C. Asser Press, 2016), at 97-103. 
90 For instance, in respect of the right to be tried by a court “established by law”, the ICTY Appeals Chamber has 
found that the interpretation afforded to this term in the case law of the ECtHR, namely as a guarantee ensuring 
“that the administration of justice is not a matter of executive discretion, but is regulated by laws made by the 
legislature”, is inapplicable on the international level, since “[i]t is clearly impossible to classify the organs of the 
United Nations into the […] divisions which exist in the national law of States”. Another meaning of this term, 
i.e. that a court’s “establishment must be in accordance with the rule of law” was found to be “the most sensible 
and most likely meaning […] in the context of international [criminal] law”, considering that, for a tribunal such 
as the ICTY “to be established according to the rule of law, it must be established in accordance with the proper 
international standards; it must provide all the guarantees of fairness, justice and even-handedness, in full 
conformity with internationally recognized human rights instruments”. See: Decision on the Defence Motion for 
Interlocutory Appeal on Jurisdiction, Prosecutor v. Tadić, Case No. IT-94-1, ICTY, Appeals Chamber, 2 
October 1995.at 43, 45. For a similar approach to equality of arms, see: Tadić, at 52. 
91 For example, comparing Article 67(1)(a) of the ICC Statute to corresponding provisions in, inter alia, Article 
6(3)(a) ECHR, Article 14(3)(a), (f) ICCPR, and Article 8(2)(a) ACHR, the Appeals Chamber of the ICC found 
that “[t]here seems to have been an intention to grant to the accused before the Court, rights of a higher degree”. 
See: Judgment on the appeal of Mr. Germain Katanga against the decision of Pre-Trial Chamber I entitled 
“Decision on the Defence Request Concerning Languages”, Prosecutor v. Katanga, ICC-01/04–01/07, ICC, 
Appeals Chamber, 27 May 2008, at 49. 
92 For example, the ICTR Appeals Chamber has found that, with regard to the right to be tried without undue 
delay, “because of the […] [ICTR’s] mandate and of the inherent complexity of the cases before the […] 
[ICTR], it is not unreasonable to expect that the judicial process will not always be as expeditious as before 
domestic courts”. See: Nahimana et al., at 1037. Also: Mugenzi & Mugiraneza, at 32. 
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(Articles 14(1) ICCPR, Article 6(1) ECHR, and Article 8(1) and 8(5) ACHR) and specific 
guarantees relevant to the determination of criminal proceedings (Article 14(3) ICCPR, 
Article 6(3) ECHR, and Article 8(2) ACHR).93 This limitation arises out of the focus of this 
study on the procedural aspects of the appellate proceedings of the Ad Hoc Tribunals and the 
ICC. It, therefore, requires the exclusion of fair trial guarantees that may bear on the 
assessment of the merits of criminal charges,94 that lack a sufficiently independent application 
in appellate proceedings,95 that have been afforded to specific categories of persons,96 or that 
regulate the post-appeal phase of criminal proceedings.97 Therefore, norms of international 
human rights law controlling appellate proceedings must be pieced together on the basis of 
dissimilar understandings of the right to appeal and associated fair trial guarantees. Moreover, 
where such norms can be identified, it is necessary, in addition, to determine whether they 
require adjustment to the particular context of the Ad Hoc Tribunals and the ICC. 
 
2.2. Appellate Proceedings before the Ad Hoc Tribunals and the ICC 
The legal framework applicable to the appellate proceedings of the Ad Hoc Tribunals and the 
ICC and the manner in which appeals taken from first instance judgments and/or sentences 
have been conducted and/or adjudicated must be determined on the basis of two factors.  
 
The former aspect necessitates a review of the legal provisions governing appellate 
proceedings before the Ad Hoc Tribunals and the ICC. This corpus of rules is, primarily, 
composed of the single and two provision(s) dedicated to this phase of the legal process in the 
                                                 
93 However, as explained infra, these provisions have been invoked to varying degrees by the human rights 
monitoring bodies and courts in the context of appellate proceedings. See: Part II. 
94 For instance, on the basis of the right to be presumed innocence enshrined in Article 14(2) ICCPR, the HRC 
has held that applicants have not been afforded the benefit of the doubt where criminal proceedings, at first 
instance and on appeal, had failed to dispel reasonable doubt as to guilt (Views, Arutyuniantz v. Uzbekistan, 
Communication No. 971/2001, HRC, 30 March 2005, at 6.4-6.6; Views, Ashurov v. Tajikistan, Communication 
No. 1348/2005, HRC, 20 March 2007, at 6.7). Arts. 6(2) ECHR and 8(2) ACHR set forth corresponding rights. 
95 This concerns, first, the right to be tried without undue delay (Art. 14(3) ICCPR, Art. 6(1) ECHR, Art. 8(1) 
ACHR), which is mainly measured from the moment a person is charged until a non-appealable conviction is 
issued and is, in general, not directly dependent on the length of appellate proceedings, as such (see: e.g., Views, 
Lubotu v. Zambia, Communication No. 390/1990, HRC, 31 October 1995, at 7.3; Judgment, Pélissier & Sassi v. 
France, Application No. 25444/94, ECtHR, 25 March 1999, at 66; Judgment, Suárez-Rosero v. Ecuador, Series 
C. No. 35, IACtHR, 12 November 1997, at 71-75). It is, second, relevant to the right not to be compelled to 
testify against oneself or to confess guilt, since such rights primarily pertain to pre-trial or first instance 
proceedings and are less directly applicable to appellate proceedings (Art. 14(3)(g) ICCPR, Art. 8(2)(g), 8(3) 
ACHR). 
96 Art. 14(4) ICCPR, which concerns “juvenile persons”. 
97 Such rights concern the right to compensation (Art. 14(6) ICCPR; Art. 3 Protocol 7 ECHR) and the right not 
to be tried or punished twice (Art. 14(7) ICCPR, Art. 4 Protocol 7; Art. 8(4) ACHR). 
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Statutes of the Ad Hoc Tribunals and the ICC respectively,98 the sets of Rules of Procedure 
and Evidence relative to appellate proceedings99 and, in the case of the ICC, Regulations of 
the Court.100 In addition, the judges of the Ad Hoc Tribunals have issued Practice Directions 
concerning appellate proceedings, 101  which address “detailed aspects of the conduct of 
proceedings”.102 The latter aspect requires an assessment of the entire body of jurisprudence 
of the Appeals Chambers, so as to evaluate how the legal framework has been operationalised. 
 
The appellate procedures of the Ad Hoc Tribunals and the ICC will be assessed in a roughly 
chronological manner. Accordingly, the following components of the appellate machineries of 
the Ad Hoc Tribunals and the ICC will be reviewed: (i) the essence of appellate review 
(pertaining to the availability of appellate review and associated matters); (ii) the manner in 
which the appellate process has been regulated; (iii) the bearers of the right to appeal; (iv) the 
legal representation of the accused on appeal; (v) the composition of the Appeals Chambers; 
(vi) access to the Appeals Chambers; (vii) the oral and written nature of the appellate 
proceedings; (viii) the scope of appellate review; (ix) the powers of the Appeals Chambers; 
and (x) the pronouncement of an appellate judgment.103 
 
3. Overview 
This study is structured as follows. Part one, which assesses the major domestic approaches to 
appellate review in second instance, and part two, which concerns the state of international 
human rights law regarding the right to appeal and associated fair trial guarantees, are devoted 
to the identification of fair trials norms that bind the Ad Hoc Tribunals and the ICC in respect 
of their appellate proceedings. Part three describes the law and practice pertaining to the 
                                                 
98 Art. 24 ICTR Statute; Art. 25 ICTY Statute; Arts. 81, 83 ICC Statute. However, more general provisions 
appearing in these documents also bear on the appellate processes of the Ad Hoc Tribunals and the ICC. See: 
Part III. 
99 Rules 107-119 ICTR RPE; Rules 107-118 ICTY RPE; Rules 149-152 ICC RPE. Furthermore, all RPE provide 
that the RPE applicable to the Pre-Trial or Trial Chambers may find application on appeal too. See: Rules 107 
ICTR and ICTY RPE; Rule 149 ICC RPE. 
100 Regulations 57-65 ICC Regulations of the Court. In addition, certain Regulations applicable to all stages of 
the legal process may bear on appellate proceedings too. See: Part III. 
101 ICTR, Practice Direction on Formal Requirements for Appeals from Judgement, 15 June 2007; ICTR, 
Practice Direction on the Length of Briefs and Motions on Appeal, 8 December 2006; ICTR, Practice Direction 
on Procedure for the Filing of Written Submissions in Appeal Proceedings before the Tribunal, 8 December 
2006; ICTY, Practice Direction on Formal Requirements for Appeals from Judgement, No. IT/201, 7 March 
2002; ICTY, Practice Direction on Procedure for the Filing of Written Submissions in Appeal Proceedings 
before the International Tribunal, No. IT/155 Rev. 4, 4 April 2012. 
102 Rules 19(B) ICTR and ICTY RPE. 
103 Issues of detention in connection with appellate proceedings, which are more closely associated with other 
aspects of the right to a fair trial, have been excluded from the scope of this study. See: Rules 99(b), 102 ICTY 
and ICTR RPE; Art. 81(3)-(4) ICC Statute.  
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appellate processes conducted by the Ad Hoc Tribunals and ICC and, on the basis of the 
benchmarks developed in part one and/or part two, examines whether particular components 
comply with or fall short of the relevant standards. The conclusion will answer the research 
question upon which this study is focused and, where necessary, explain the reasons for any 
shortcomings in the appellate procedures of the Ad Hoc Tribunals and/or the ICC and propose 




Chapter one commences with a description of the general traits of Civil Law, Common Law, 
and mixed systems, including the general role ascribed to appellate review in the legal process. 
Thereafter, the second, third, and fourth chapters continue with an account of the primary 
aspects of the appellate machineries of the selected domestic systems. The major similarities 
and dissimilarities between these systems will be evaluated in the fifth chapter. Finally, the 
interim conclusion will set forth the legal ramifications of this comparative analysis for the 
appellate systems of the Ad Hoc Tribunals and the ICC. 
 
1. Legal Families 
Civil Law 104  and Common Law 105  are the world’s most prominent legal families. 106  In 
addition, mixed systems, which have been traditionally restricted to systems that straddle the 
boundary between the Civil Law and Common Law families, have become common.107 
 
1.1. General Features 
Civil Law and Common Law are classically distinguished on the basis of the sources of law 
emphasised in these legal families.108 The latter is mainly based on judge-made law. “During 
the formative period of English legal history”, where the Common Law family originated, 
“there was no strong central legislative body, but […] the powerful king’s courts” developed 
                                                 
104 This family is also referred to as “Continental, Romano-Germanic, or Roman Law because its origins are in 
the old Roman Code of Justinian and the laws of Germanic tribes”. See: e.g., H. Dammer and E. Fairchild, 
Comparative Criminal Justice Systems (Belmont: Thompson Wadsworth, 2006), at 51. However, for the sake of 
consistency, the term “Civil Law” will be employed exclusively. 
105 This family is also referred to as the “Anglo-American” model. See: e.g., A. Orie, ‘Accusatorial v. 
Inquisitorial Approach in International Criminal Proceedings Prior to the Establishment of the ICC and in the 
Proceedings before the ICC’, in A. Cassese, P. Gaeta, and J. Jones (eds.), The Rome Statute of the International 
Criminal Court: a Commentary 1439 (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2002), at 1440. However, for the sake 
of consistency, the term “Common Law” will be employed exclusively. 
106 J. Pradel, Droit Pénal Comparé (Paris: Dalloz, 1995), at 47, who notes that the Civil Law systems, Common 
Law systems and Socialist systems constitute the “major families” of law. However, socialist systems have 
become nearly obsolete, considering the reforms undertaken in former Socialist countries and China. See: e.g., 
H. Dammer and E. Fairchild, Comparative Criminal Justice Systems (Belmont: Thompson Wadsworth, 2006), at 
51. 
107 V. Palmer, ‘Mixed Legal Systems’, in M. Bussani and U. Mattei (eds.), “The Cambridge Companion to 
Comparative Law” 368 (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2012), at 374-377. For wider takes on mixed 
jurisdictions, see: V. Palmer, Mixed Jurisdictions. The Third Legal Family (New York: Cambridge University 
Press, 2012); N. Mariani and G. Fuentes, Les Systèmes Juridiques dans le Monde (Montréal: Wilson & Lafleur, 
2000), at 17. 
108 J. Pradel, Droit Pénal Comparé (Paris: Dalloz, 1995), at 47. Also: J. Dainow, ‘The Civil Law and the 




the law.109 A decision of a court “was not only the law for those parties, but had to be 
followed in future cases of the same sort, thereby becoming a part of the general or common 
law”. 110  The stability and continuity of this system was dependent on “the doctrine of 
‘precedent’”, i.e. “[o]nce a point had been decided, the same result had to be reached for the 
same problem”.111 Conversely, in the latter, “the main source or basis of the law is legislation, 
and large areas are codified in a systematic manner”.112 Such codes are not lists “of special 
rules for particular situations”, but “a body of general principles […]”.113 
 
The nature of legal proceedings further distinguishes these legal families. Common Law 
proceedings have been labelled “adversarial”.114 In general, such proceedings are party-driven. 
The procedural aim of this model “is to settle the conflict stemming from the allegation of 
commission of crime” and the proceedings amount to “a contest”. 115  Accordingly, “the 
prosecutor’s role is to obtain a conviction; the defendant’s role is to block this effort”.116 In 
line with these general roles, the parties bear significant responsibilities. The former 
“determines which factual propositions he will attempt to prove”, marshals “evidence in 
support of his factual contentions”, carries “the burden of persuasion” with respect to the 
evidence, and bears “the burden of presenting evidence in court”.117 The latter “decides which 
facts favorable to his theses he will attempt to prove” and adduces “evidence in support of all 
his factual contentions”.118 The parties’ extensive roles necessarily limit the adjudicator’s 
responsibilities. He or she is, therefore, “an umpire who sees to it that the parties abide by the 
rules regulating their contest”. 119  However, in light of the adjudicator’s passive attitude, 
                                                 
109 J. Dainow, ‘The Civil Law and the Common Law: Some Points of Comparison’, 15(3) American Journal of 
Comparative Law 419 (1966-1967), at 424. 
110 Ibid., at 424-425. 
111 Ibid., at 425. 
112 Ibid., at 424. 
113 Ibid. 
114 M. Damaška, ‘Evidentiary Barriers to Conviction and Two Models of Criminal Procedure: a Comparative 
Study’, 121(3) University of Pennsylvania Law Review 506 (1972-1973), at 562. Furthermore, the Civil Law and 
Common Law families have also been termed “inquisitorial” and “accusatorial”, respectively. However, this 
distinction has been assigned a wide variety of meanings with different degrees of accuracy (see: e.g., J. Spencer, 
‘Introduction’, in M. Delmas-Marty and J. Spencer (eds.) European Criminal Procedures 1 (Cambridge: 
Cambridge University Press, 2002), at 7-8, 20-37; M. Damaška, The Faces of Justice and State Authority. A 
Comparative Approach to the Legal Process (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1986), at 5-6). Therefore, the 
more narrow distinction between adversarial and non-adversarial proceedings will be employed consistently. 
115 M. Damaška, ‘Evidentiary Barriers to Conviction and Two Models of Criminal Procedure: a Comparative 
Study’, 121(3) University of Pennsylvania Law Review 506 (1972-1973), at 563. 
116 Ibid., at 563. 
117 Ibid., at 563. 
118 Ibid., at 564, 565. 
119 Ibid., at 563-564. 
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intervention is only warranted when requested by the parties.120 Moreover, the adversarial 
model’s “Lockean liberal values, with distrust of the state and freedom from its restraint,” 
account for other distinctive features, such as “[j]udgment by one’s peers, ambushes as a 
result of lack of discovery, publicity, [and] emphasis on oral testimony”. 121  In 
contradistinction, Civil Law proceedings are considered “non-adversarial”. This model 
generally features judicial proceedings controlled by non-partisan officials. The procedural 
aim of such proceedings is to establish, by means of “an official and thorough inquiry”, 
whether a crime has been committed and whether criminal sanctions are justified.122 The 
“court-controlled pursuit of facts” involves a “‘unilateral’ and detached” process that 
dispenses with the need for “‘[p]arties’ in the sense of independent actors”.123 Furthermore, 
the non-adversarial model’s ideological assumptions, which emphasise “collectivistic values 
and benevolent paternalism”, explain other distinctive features, such as the non-adversarial 
presentation of evidence and lack of technical rules of evidence.124 
 
Moreover, the “linkages between politics and justice”, 125  which manifest themselves in 
respect of “[t]he organization of procedural authority”126 and “the role of government in 
society”,127 are also construed differently in the Common Law and Civil Law families. In 
respect of the “[t]he organization of procedural authority”, two ideals have been proposed. 
The first type is a “classical bureaucracy” (“the hierarchical ideal”),128 which Civil Law 
systems find “much more congenial”. 129  The other type is “defined by a body of 
nonprofessional decision makers, organized into a single level of authority which makes 
decisions by applying undifferentiated community standards” (“the coordinate ideal”), 130 
which is more readily associated with Common Law systems. 131  These features have 
significant implications for the legal process. “Hierarchical” proceedings “consist of several 
stages”, emphasise “superior review”, employ the “file of the case” to integrate the various 
                                                 
120 Ibid., at 563-564. 
121 Ibid., at 564, 565. 
122 Ibid., at 564. 
123 Ibid., at 564, 565. 
124 Ibid., at 564, 565. 
125 M. Damaška, The Faces of Justice and State Authority. A Comparative Approach to the Legal Process (New 
Haven: Yale University Press, 1986), at 9. 
126 Ibid., at 9. 
127 Ibid., at 10. 
128 Ibid., at 17 (emphasis in original). 
129 Ibid., at 18. 
130 Ibid., at 17 (emphasis in original). 
131 Ibid., at 24. 
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stages, proceed in a “piecemeal” style over different sessions, discourage “private procedural 
enterprise”, and are regulated “by an internally consistent network of unbending rules”.132 In 
the “coordinate” process, a continuous trial is the main procedural event, appellate remedies 
play a limited role, live testimony is preferred, private parties may have significant procedural 
responsibilities, and procedural rules may yield to considerations of substantive justice.133 
 
Notwithstanding the preceding typology, systems of criminal procedure are not neatly divided 
according to these lines in practice. The heavy borrowing between domestic systems, 134 
combined with (regional) integrative impulses,135 render all systems of criminal procedure 
mixed to a certain degree. For instance, as to the sources of law, “as a matter of practice, […] 
[the] highest courts [of Civil Law jurisdictions] will generally follow their previous 
decisions”.136 In addition, in the reversed situation, statutory laws have become ubiquitous in 
Common Law systems. 137  With regard to the adversarial - non-adversarial distinction, 
adversarial judges are, in practice, not completely passive138 and non-adversarial systems 
feature elements typically associated with adversarial systems, such as forms of lay-
participation and increased emphasis on oral evidence.139 Even so, these distinctions retain 
“heuristic value”, since they enable “the grand contours of real-life contrast” to be 
                                                 
132 Ibid., at 47-56. 
133 Ibid., at 57-65. 
134 E. Örücü, ‘Family Trees for Legal Systems: Towards a Contemporary Approach’, in M. van Hoecke (ed.), 
Epistemology and Methodology of Comparative Law 359 (Oxford: Hart Publishing, 2004), at 363; M. Damaška, 
‘Evidentiary Barriers to Conviction and Two Models of Criminal Procedure: a Comparative Study’, 121(3) 
University of Pennsylvania Law Review 506 (1972-1973), at 577. 
135 J. Spencer, ‘Introduction’, in M. Delmas-Marty and J. Spencer (eds.) European Criminal Procedures 1 
(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2002), at 37-65. 
136 Aleksovski, at 93. Also: J. Dainow, ‘The Civil Law and the Common Law: Some Points of Comparison’, 
15(3) American Journal of Comparative Law 419 (1966-1967), at 426-427. 
137 T. Weigend, ‘Criminal Law and Criminal Procedure’, in J. Smits (ed.), Elgar Encyclopaedia of Comparative 
Law 214 (Cheltenham: Edward Elgar Publishing, 2006), at 219; H. Dammer and E. Fairchild, Comparative 
Criminal Justice Systems (Belmont: Thompson Wadsworth, 2006), at 57-58; J. Pradel, Droit Pénal Comparé 
(Paris: Dalloz, 1995), at 47; J. Dainow, ‘The Civil Law and the Common Law: Some Points of Comparison’, 
15(3) American Journal of Comparative Law 419 (1966-1967), at 425-426. 
138 T. Weigend, ‘Criminal Law and Criminal Procedure’, in J. Smits (ed.), Elgar Encyclopaedia of Comparative 
Law 214 (Cheltenham: Edward Elgar Publishing, 2006), at 224; M. Damaška, ‘Evidentiary Barriers to 
Conviction and Two Models of Criminal Procedure: a Comparative Study’, 121(3) University of Pennsylvania 
Law Review 506 (1972-1973), at footnote 189. 
139 T. Weigend, ‘Criminal Law and Criminal Procedure’, in J. Smits (ed.), Elgar Encyclopaedia of Comparative 
Law 214 (Cheltenham: Edward Elgar Publishing, 2006), at 224-225; J. Spencer, ‘Introduction’, in M. Delmas-
Marty and J. Spencer (eds.) European Criminal Procedures 1 (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2002), 
at 10-13. In addition, for the inclusion of adversarial elements into various Latin American jurisdictions, see: M. 
Langer, ‘Revolution in Latin American Criminal Procedure: Diffusion of Legal Ideas from the Periphery’, 55(4) 
American Journal of Comparative Law 617 (2007). 
22 
 
described.140 Moreover, a more specific conception of mixed systems has been proposed. It 
has been remarked that, “[s]ince the 1980s and 1990s, internationalization of the criminal law 
has opened up a large new market for comparative criminal law”.141 Thus, in the context of 
legal reforms rooted in, for instance, efforts to eradicate corruption or the transition from 
communism to multi-party systems, many criminal procedure systems originally based on 
Civil Law have enacted Common Law inspired reforms. Therefore, whilst the borrowing 
between domestic systems mainly concerns the introduction of particular elements of one 
legal system into another, the internationalization of criminal law has yielded more 
comprehensively mixed systems of criminal procedure.142 
 
1.2. Functions of Appellate Review 
The two primary functions assigned to appellate review extend, in principle, to Common Law, 
Civil Law, and mixed systems alike.143 Such review concerns, first, “the pursuit of justice in 
the individual case”.144 Adjudication of guilt or innocence constitutes an extremely intrusive 
measure and may entail severe consequences for the defendant. It is, therefore, of paramount 
importance that the possibility of error is reduced as far as possible. Therefore, at its core, 
appellate review is a “quality-control” mechanism.145 The second goal of appellate review is 
two-fold: “consistency of verdicts, meaning that similar cases receive similar treatment, and 
orderly development of law, meaning that novel questions of law receive uniform answers 
from a single authoritative body”.146 This aim predominantly generates “systemic” effects.147  
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However, the “linkages between politics and justice” produce, as alluded to, a difference 
concerning the role of appellate review in the Common Law and Civil Law families.148 The 
coordinate structure of the Common Law family entails that appellate review is of a 
“relatively weak character”. 149  The main reason is that, “[w]hen judicial authority is 
structured as a single undifferentiated echelon, there are no […] higher officials before whom 
proceedings continue after the initial judgment has been rendered”. 150  The structures of 
authority of the legal systems in the Civil Law family ensure that the opposite effect is 
achieved. Thus, in a “vertical ordering of authority”, “the reviewing stage is conceived […] as 
a sequel to original adjudication to be expected in the normal course of events”.151 
 
2. Civil Law 
This chapter will address the appellate structures of the legal systems of France, Germany, 
and Argentina. It is well-known that the former two constitute the backbone of the Civil Law 
family.152 In line with the general orientation of Latin American countries towards the Civil 
Law tradition,153 Argentina also falls within this category.154 However, certain features of the 
Argentinian situation should be mentioned in this respect. Argentina’s 1853 Constitution was 
modelled after the U.S. Constitution and, thus, contains adversarial elements, such as the right 
to trial by jury.155 Moreover, in addition to constitutional reforms in 1994, certain Argentinian 
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provinces have enacted criminal codes infused with adversarial elements.156 Even so, the 
“inquisitorial [i.e. Civil Law] process remains the primary model” in Argentina.157 
 
2.1. France 
Appellate review forms part of an array of mechanisms by means of which judicial decisions 
may be challenged. Such mechanisms, referred to as voies de recours, may be classified in 
different manners.158 Whereas voies de recours ordinaires allow for full re-examination of 
questions of fact and law, voies de recours extraordinaires are limited to an appraisal of legal 
or, in certain circumstances, factual accuracy.159 Among the voies de recours ordinaires, a 
distinction is made between voies de rétraction, which ensure retrial before the same 
instance,160 and voies de réformation, which place a matter before a superior court.161 
 
In 2000, the French Code of Criminal Procedure was amended to replace the accused’s right 
to an appeal on questions of law162 from a judgment of a Cour d’Assises, which boasts 
jurisdiction over the most serious offences (crimes),163 to a full-blown right to appeal from 
such judgments to another Cour d’Assises.164 The pre-existing limitation was rooted in two 
considerations.165 First, extensive review of the charging decision was considered a safeguard 
against erroneous assessment by the trial court. Pursuant to the principle of second degré 
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d’instruction, a conclusion adopted by a juge d’instruction166 that the facts amount to a crime 
requires confirmation from the chambre d’instruction before the matter is referred for trial to 
the Cour d’Assises. 167  Moreover, considering that the Cour d’Assises is composed of 
professional judges and laypersons, the maxim that the jury does not err further prevented 
appellate review.168 In this regard, it has been remarked that the second degré d’instruction 
constituted a limited added value and that jury decisions have not proved immune to error.169 
 
The amendments adopted in 2000 allowed prosecutorial appeals from convictions only and, 
thus, expressed the principle that “an acquittal is final”.170 This restriction has been described 
as “illogical”, because, in respect of less serious offences, a prosecutorial appeal against an 
acquittal was permitted by law.171 Accordingly, a 2002 amendment extended the appellate 
powers of prosecutorial authorities to appeals from acquittals too.172 Such a right to appeal 
has been designated as “indispensable in practice”, since it ensures, inter alia, a full re-
examination of a case in which only certain accused appeal in a multi-accused trial.173 
 
An appellate Cour d’Assises is mandated to “re-examine the case” in full.174 This remedy is, 
thus, a voie de recours ordinaire and a voie de réformation.175 A Cour d’Assises sitting as a 
court of appeal proceeds largely in accordance with the modalities applicable to first instance 
proceedings.176 Taking account of the relevant adaptations and differences, the main features 
of appellate proceedings before a Cour d’Assises may be described as follows. Upon transfer 
to the appropriate detention facilities, the accused is questioned by the president of the Cour 
d’Assises on formal aspects.177  In comparison with a first instance jury, three additional 
members are added to the appellate jury and both the accused and the prosecution may 
challenge an additional juror.178 Subsequently, the president reads out the facts with which the 
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accused is charged and, in addition, describes the essence of the first instance decision, the 
reasoning, and, where applicable, the sentence.179 The president also leads the questioning of 
the accused and the witnesses. 180  Furthermore, the president possesses wide-ranging 
discretionary prerogatives to establish the truth, such as calling supplementary witnesses or 
ordering the production of additional pieces of evidence.181 The parties may submit new 
evidence on appeal as well.182 Thereafter, the parties may present closing arguments.183 A 
decision adverse to the accused on the merits and the pronouncement of the maximum 
sentence requires a majority of eight votes, although six votes suffice at the trial level.184  
 
Even so, several constraints on the powers of an appellate Cour d’Assises may be identified. It 
may not broaden the matter it is seized of by, for instance, extending the indictment to others 
that have not been tried at first instance or by convicting the appellant of additional 
offences.185 It may, however, requalify the facts established at first instance in legal terms, 
provided that no additional facts are encompassed by the requalification.186 Moreover, where 
the appellant curtails his or her appeal to particular elements of the first instance decision, the 
appellate assessment may not exceed these limitations.187 However, appellate jurisprudence 
has established that an appellant may not restrict his or her appeal to the sentence.188 Finally, 
appellate aggravation is disallowed in certain circumstances.189 Most importantly, where an 
appeal is only instituted by the accused, no decision to his or her detriment may be adopted.190 
 
2.2. Germany 
The German Code of Criminal Procedure grants the accused an explicit right “to file the 
appellate remedies admissible against court decisions”.191 Proceedings involving the most 
serious offences are amenable to Revision.192 In this regard, except in respect of specific 
situations, Revision from first instance judgments adopted by panels of three professional 
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judges and two lay judges of the Regional Court (Große Strafkammer of the Landgericht)193 
or before panels of three or five professional judges of the Higher Regional Court 
(Oberlandesgericht)194 lies with the Federal Court of Justice (Bundesgerichtshof).195 However, 
such an appeal is only available when an accused has been prejudiced, which depends on the 
objective assessment of the possibility of amelioration of his or her position on appeal.196  
 
The right of the prosecution “to file the appellate remedies admissible against court decisions” 
mirrors the right of appeal extended to the accused. 197  However, certain facets of the 
prosecution’s right of appeal operate, or have been restricted, in favour of the accused. In 
addition to appeals lodged to the detriment of the accused,198 the prosecution disposes of a 
distinct legal basis to file an appeal “for the benefit of the accused”. 199  In any event, a 
prosecutorial appeal “shall have the effect that the contested decision may be amended or 
revoked, also for the accused’s benefit”.200 Thus, the appellate court is required to assess the 
matter comprehensively.201 Finally, “[t]he violation of legal norms existing solely for the 
defendant’s benefit may not be invoked by the public prosecution office for the purpose of 
quashing the judgment to the defendant’s detriment”.202 
 
Detailed form requirements and time limits apply to the remedy of Revision. A notice of 
appeal must be provided, in which a statement “concerning the extent to which […] [the 
appellant] contests the judgment and is applying for it to be quashed” must be made.203 A 
limitation of the scope of Revision is, thus, permitted, although it must concern an aspect of 
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the decision that allows for independent appellate assessment.204 In addition, the notice of 
appeal must specify the grounds of appeal and, in this regard, it must be indicated “whether 
the judgment is being contested because of violation of a legal norm concerning the 
proceedings or because of violation of another legal norm”. 205  Whereas no formal 
requirements attach to the latter category, the former requires a description of “the facts 
containing the defect”. 206  These facts must be set forth in such a manner to allow the 
Bundesgerichtshof to adjudicate the appeal exclusively on the basis of the notice of appeal.207 
Errors need not be prejudicial,208 but the majority of requests are dismissed on this basis.209 
 
However, compliance with the aforementioned requirements does not guarantee a fully-
fledged appellate procedure. The Bundesgerichtshof may dispense with a main hearing and 
decide requests for Revision summarily. In practice, Revision proceedings rarely proceed 
beyond this stage.210 The Code of Criminal Procedure provides three bases for an abridged 
appellate examination. Firstly, a complaint may be found inadmissible if “the provisions on 
filing an appeal on law or on submission of the notices of appeal on law have not been 
complied with”.211 Such an assessment encompasses all grounds of inadmissibility recognised 
in law and not only the aforementioned requirements as to form.212 Secondly, upon a reasoned 
application by the prosecutor, and a response submitted by the appellant,213 a request for 
Revision may be dismissed as “manifestly ill-founded”.214 This is so when it appears to any 
expert without prolonged assessment that the impugned judgment is not erroneous in terms of 
substantive law and that the grounds of appeal do not sustain the complaint. 215  Such a 
rejection must be adopted unanimously but need not be reasoned.216 Finally, a shortened 
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procedure may also operate in favour of the accused, since a judgment may be set aside if it is 
determined that the appeal “filed for the defendant’s benefit […] [is] well-founded”.217  
 
In any other situation, the Bundesgerichtshof “shall decide on the appellate remedy in a 
judgment”.218 To this end, an appellate hearing is conducted.219 This hearing commences 
“with submissions by a rapporteur”,220 in which the contents of the impugned judgment and, 
depending on the specific grounds of appeal, related matters are presented.221 Subsequently, 
“the arguments and applications of the public prosecution office as well as of the defendant 
and his defence counsel shall be heard”.222 Since Revision is primarily decided on the basis of 
written submissions, the hearing enables a synoptic exchange of arguments.223 In addition, the 
appellate hearing does not accommodate the presentation of evidence.224 
 
The scope of review in Revision proceedings is limited in two principal manners. First, a 
proprio motu examination by the Bundesgerichtshof is precluded as the appellate parameters 
are defined by the notice of appeal. 225  Second, Revision is confined to review of legal 
issues.226 In this regard, the German Code of Criminal Procedure sets forth that “[o]nly the 
notices of appeal on law and, insofar as the appeal on law is based on defects in the 
proceedings, only the facts specified when the notices of appeal on law were submitted, shall 
be subject to review by the court hearing the appeal”.227 A “violation of the law” has been 
defined as “[f]ailure to apply a legal norm or erroneous application of a legal norm”.228 
Violations of procedural law arise when a required procedural act is not undertaken or when it 
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is executed incorrectly.229 In addition, with regard to alleged violations of substantive law, the 
Bundesgerichtshof principally examines whether: (i) the conclusions of the first instance court 
constitute a sound basis for the application of substantive law; (ii) the evidentiary evaluation 
was fraught with error because the first instance judge misunderstood the relevant legal 
standard or because it was either unclear, incomplete, contradictory or contrary to logic or 
experience; (iii) the law was correctly applied to the findings; (iv) sentencing was beset with 
error or the sentence exceeds or falls short of the degree of guilt to such an extent that it 
cannot be considered to fall within the trial judge’s discretion; and (v) the allegations have 
been exhaustively determined when a Revision has been filed against the accused. 230 
Moreover, whether or not a judgment is based on a violation of law has been liberally 
construed, considering that the possibility thereof has been considered sufficient to overturn a 
judgment.231 However, certain errors are always considered to be based on a violation of law, 
since they are seen as exceptionally grave or because a concrete effect on the judgment cannot 
be verified.232 Even though the factual basis established at first instance may not be directly 
reviewed on Revision,233 it has been remarked that appellate courts increasingly “second-
guess trial courts’ fact finding”.234 For instance, challenges to the substantive correctness of 
judgments have been granted on the basis of violations of the procedural obligation to “extend 
the taking of evidence to all facts and means of proof relevant to the decision”235 and the 
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aforementioned obligation to ensure the completeness and the logical consistency of the 
evidentiary evaluation by disregarding obvious, alternative interpretations of the evidence.236 
 
In the event that a judgment is quashed on Revision, it must be remitted to a lower court in 
most situations.237 However, in certain circumstances, the Bundesgerichtshof may dispose of 
the matter itself. This mainly occurs “[w]here the judgment is quashed solely because of a 
violation of the law occurring on its application to the findings on which the judgment was 
based, […] [and], without further discussion of the facts, the judgment is to take the form of 
an acquittal or termination of proceedings or imposition of a mandatory penalty, or if, in 
accordance with the public prosecution office’s application, the court hearing the appeal on 
law deems the statutory minimum penalty or dispensing with punishment to be 
reasonable”. 238  Although the scope of this provision seems to have been specifically 
circumscribed to the situations enumerated therein, it has been applied in other circumstances 
as well, provided that the factual findings do not require alteration or completion or that no 
evaluations or assessments reserved for the trial judge are undertaken.239 These powers may 
be employed to the accused’s detriment as well,240 as long as the Bundesgerichtshof verifies 
whether the altered basis for conviction was included in the accusation, the accused was 
informed thereof, and a different and more fruitful defence could have been presented.241 
However, where an appeal is filed only by the accused, or if the prosecution files an appeal in 
favour of the accused, the judgment may not be amended to his or her detriment. 242  A 
decision adopted on remittal remains susceptible to a second Revision.243 
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The Argentinian National Code of Criminal Procedure differentiates between casación and 
inconstitucionalidad. 244  Moreover, the Argentinian Supreme Court (Corte Suprema de 
Justicia de la Nación) has recognised the right to appeal as a constitutional principle.245 
 
The accused’s right of casación before the Cámara Nacional de Casación is explicitly 
recognised in the Argentinian National Code of Criminal Procedure. 246  The accused is, 
moreover, entitled to institute casación against a judgment of dismissal or acquittal, as long as 
a security measure has been imposed.247 Furthermore, allegations of inconstitucionalidad may 
also be raised in the context of casación proceedings.248 
 
Considering that the appellate phase is considered an integral component of the trial, the 
prosecution has been afforded broad rights of appeal.249 The Supreme Court has found, in this 
regard, that the extension of appellate rights of the prosecution is not contrary to either due 
process or double jeopardy. 250  More specifically, the prosecution may appeal from an 
acquittal where a sentence of imprisonment in excess of three years has been requested251 and 
from a conviction where the imposed sentence was less than half the requested sentence252. 
However, on the basis of such appeals, the Cámara Nacional de Casación may also modify or 
revoke the judgment to the benefit of the accused. 253  In addition to this possibility, the 
prosecution is separately empowered to appeal in favour of the accused.254 
 
Requests for casación and inconstitucionalidad must first be filed with the court that issued 
the impugned decision and must exhaustively set out each ground of appeal.255 Where a 
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request for casación and inconstitucionalidad is denied, a complaint (queja) may be directed 
to the Cámara Nacional de Casación, which may either discard the request definitively or 
determine that it was wrongly denied and hear the appeal.256 Where an appeal is admitted, an 
oral hearing is conducted, which may be supplemented by brief written arguments. 257 
Additional evidence may be admitted on appeal if it can be characterised as “new”.258 
 
The scope of the examination of the Cámara Nacional de Casación is limited in two principal 
manners. It may, first, only consider those aspects of the judgment to which the grounds of 
appeal refer.259 Second, and more importantly, the scope of review is restrained. Casación is 
confined to questions of law, which may be based, on the one hand, on an alleged failure to 
apply or a misapplication of substantive law and, on the other hand, on an alleged failure to 
apply the norms contained in the National Code of Criminal Procedure.260 In this regard, it is 
noteworthy that the 1993 amendments to the National Code of Criminal Procedure have 
replaced de novo review with review of questions of law.261 Even so, the Corte Suprema de 
Justicia de la Nación has expanded the scope of casación review. The highest Argentinian 
court has noted that, whilst a narrow interpretation of casación as limited to questions of law 
is “solely the product of […] legislative tradition and history”, the text “lends itself to both [a] 
narrow and [a] broad or liberal interpretation”.262 In addition, it has held that Article 8(2)(h) 
ACHR and Article 14(5) ICCPR “should be interpreted as requiring review of any issue not 
exclusively reserved for those judges on the bench for the oral proceedings”, which is a 
limitation that arises out of “the principle of publicity” and the fact that “cassation judges do 
not have firsthand knowledge of the oral proceedings”. 263  Accordingly, in light of the 
impossibility of differentiating between questions of law and fact in practice, it has concluded 
that casación “should be understood as enabling a full review of the judgment, one that is as 
extensive as possible, requiring that cassation judges put out [sic] the maximum review effort, 
according to the possibilities and records of each case and without making too much of those 
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issues that are reserved for the judges who were present for the oral proceedings”. 264 In 
addition, with regard to the remedy of inconstitucionalidad, it is, still more narrowly, 
concerned with constitutional matters and must be grounded in the alleged unconstitutionality 
of a statute, ordinance, decree, or regulation.265 
 
The powers of the Cámara Nacional de Casación are extensive. In respect of casación, where 
a failure to apply the substantive law or an erroneous application thereof has been found, it 
may, most notably, quash the impugned judgment and render a decision itself.266 In addition, 
if a breach of procedural rules has been established, it may annul the proceedings and remit 
the matter to the corresponding court.267 Legal errors that do not affect the judgment, as well 
as material errors concerning the designation or calculation of sentences, do not lead to 
annulment, but to correction.268 With regard to inconstitucionalidad, the Cámara Nacional de 
Casación is equally broadly empowered to repeal the contested ruling.269 The most relevant 
limitation of its powers is that, on an appeal instituted by the accused or by the prosecution in 
favour of the accused, the judgment may not be altered to the detriment of the latter.270 
 
3. Common Law 
The appellate systems of England & Wales, the U.S., and South Africa will be discussed in 
this section. England & Wales, as the birthplace of the Common Law system,271 and the U.S., 
as a former colony in which the Common Law tradition has strongly taken root, 272  are 
archetypical representatives of the Common Law family. However, the classification of South 
Africa as a Common Law jurisdiction is not as obvious. Its legal system has been described as 
“‘mixed’ on the basis that it has been influenced substantially by Roman-Dutch civil law and 
English common law”.273 Nevertheless, in respect of criminal procedure, its Common Law 
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& Lafleur, 2000), at 10. 
272 H. Dammer and E. Fairchild, Comparative Criminal Justice Systems (Belmont: Thompson Wadsworth, 
2006), at 58, 77. Also: N. Mariani and G. Fuentes, Les Systèmes Juridiques dans le Monde (Montréal: Wilson & 
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tradition overshadows the Civil Law influence. Following the introduction of a Civil Law 
inspired system of criminal procedure by Dutch colonisers in the seventeenth century, a set of 
legal reforms led to “the anglicisation of the law of criminal procedure and evidence […], 
putting an end to the inquisitorial [i.e. Civil Law] system and replacing it with the accusatorial 
[i.e. Common Law] English procedure” at the end of the eighteenth and the beginning of the 
nineteenth century.274 These reforms have established “the foundation of” its modern criminal 
procedure, thus ensuring a Common Law orientation.275 
 
3.1. England & Wales 
In England & Wales, the right to appeal was introduced relatively late. Following opposition 
in legal and political circles in the nineteenth century, the Court of Criminal Appeal, the 
predecessor of the current Court of Appeal (Criminal Division) (“CACD”), was established in 
1907 as a response to notorious miscarriages of justice.276 Nowadays, a defendant convicted 
by the Crown Court, which has jurisdiction over serious offences,277 is separately entitled to 
appeal either his conviction278 or sentence279 to the CACD.  
 
In comparison with defendants, the prosecution disposes of more limited appellate rights. 
The most important manifestation of this inequality is the fact that the double jeopardy rule 
prevents prosecutorial appeals against acquittals pronounced by a jury.280 Commentators have, 
however, questioned the propriety of such a limitation. 281  In addition, the prosecution’s 
appellate rights have been noticeably expanded over the years. Three relatively limited legal 
reforms were enacted from 1972 to 1996. First, the attorney-general has been given the power 
to seek the opinion of the CACD on a point of law in relation to an acquittal.282 Such a 
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referral has limited effects, however, since it cannot “affect the trial in relation to which the 
reference is made or any acquittal in that trial”.283 Second, the attorney-general has been 
endowed with the right to refer cases in which sentencing appears unduly lenient to the 
CACD.284 Unlike the aforementioned change, the CACD has been empowered to “quash any 
sentence passed […]” and “[…] pass such sentence as they think appropriate for the case and 
as the court below had power to pass […]”.285 Finally, the possibility has been created for the 
prosecution to apply for a retrial for “tainted” acquittals. This concerns the situation “[w]here 
a person has been convicted of an administration of justice offence involving interference 
with or intimidation of a juror or a witness (or potential witness) in any proceedings which led 
to the acquittal”.286 In 2001, reforms went further.287 Prosecutorial rights to challenge rulings 
during trials on indictment were introduced. In this regard,288 “the prosecution have the power 
to appeal practically any ruling in a trial on indictment in the Crown Court up to the point of 
the summing up”, even though it was originally envisaged that such appeals would only 
concern “terminatory rulings”, i.e. rulings that bring a trial to an end.289 Most notably, such 
powers encompass “no case to answer” rulings,290 which concern acquittals directed by a 
judge instead of the jury.291 Considering that these powers may, in effect, lead to an acquittal 
being overturned, they constitute a significant inroad into the double jeopardy principle. The 
most important constraints in this regard292 concern the need for leave to appeal and the 
agreement of the prosecution that the defendant will be acquitted should leave to appeal be 
denied or should the appeal be abandoned before it is determined.293 Furthermore, in respect 
of certain serious offences,294 the prosecution has been empowered to apply for the quashing 
of an acquittal and a re-trial upon the discovery of “new and compelling evidence”.295 
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The appellate system of England & Wales discourages the exercise of appellate rights.296 First, 
both appeals against conviction and sentence require leave to appeal from either the trial 
judge or the CACD.297 Such an application is first heard by a single judge and, should it be 
rejected, a renewed application may be made to the “full court”.298 In deciding whether to 
grant leave to appeal, the court assesses whether it “feels the need to hear the prosecution on 
the merits”.299 Unless permission of the CACD is obtained, a defendant does not have a right 
to be present and the procedure is conducted without oral submissions,300 although a renewed 
application following rejection by the single judge proceeds in open court.301 This filtering 
function has been widely accepted as necessary to alleviate the legal system,302 but it has also 
been described as “perverse” since appeal against convictions for less serious crimes lies of 
right.303 Second, the “loss of time rule” additionally dissuades appeals. Usually, in case of the 
denial of an appeal, the time spent in custody until such a denial counts towards the sentence. 
However, judges may rule that this period is not to be subtracted.304 In such circumstances, a 
“loss of time” ruling aggravates the sentence. This mechanism has also met with criticism, as 
it “discourages defendants from pursuing their legal rights”.305 Finally, a guilty plea normally 
precludes a successful appeal, unless it can be shown that “a mistaken decision by a judge left 
the accused with no alternative in law but to plead guilty”.306 
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If these hurdles are overcome, argument before the CACD is conducted mainly orally.307 
CACD judges arrive at an appeal hearing informed, considering that they are provided with 
relevant documents and conceive of the hearing as an opportunity to test their views against 
those of counsel.308 CACD appellate proceedings carry over the adversarial features of trial 
proceedings, since, for example, the defence present arguments to which the prosecution 
responds.309 Whereas the CACD is empowered to order the production of “any document, 
exhibit or other thing connected with the proceedings”, the attendance of any witness for 
examination, and investigations into any matter,310 it has been reluctant to do so.311 
 
Contrary to appeals concerning less serious offences, the CACD does not conduct a trial de 
novo and confines its scrutiny to factual and legal errors. 312  The CACD “freely reviews 
decisions for errors of law”, 313  which mainly concern the formulation, interpretation, or 
application of the law.314 However, “the appellant has to contend with a policy of deference 
towards findings of fact by the judge or jury”.315 Such reticence seems to result mainly from 
the following circumstances: (i) the trial court directly appreciates the evidence and the 
CACD only has access to the trial record; (ii) the jury does not provide reasons; (iii) the 
hesitance to undermine the central role of the jury through appellate intervention; (iv) the 
emphasis placed on the finality of decisions; and (v) consciousness of the criminal justice 
system’s finite resources.316 Even so, the CACD retains several bases to intervene in the 
factual determination of a jury. The CACD has continued the approach of its predecessor, the 
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Court of Criminal Appeal, in respect of “inconsistent verdicts”, which involve “multiple 
charges or multiple defendants and apparently contradictory outcomes for which the only 
rational explanation is jury confusion or a wrong approach”. 317  Moreover, following the 
simplification of the statutory criterion for quashing convictions from “unsafe and 
unsatisfactory” to “unsafe”, 318  the “lurking doubt” test was introduced for other appeals 
concerning factual elements of a jury verdict.319 This test involves a subjective assessment as 
to whether there remains a lurking doubt in the minds of the judges that an injustice was done, 
although such a determination need not be based strictly on the evidence but may be produced 
by the general feel of the case.320 However, hitherto, such appeals have been exceptional.321 In 
addition, when fresh evidence has become available post-conviction, the CACD has further 
possibilities to challenge factual aspects of a jury verdict. The CACD “may, if they think it 
necessary or expedient in the interests of justice […] receive any evidence which was not 
adduced in the proceedings from which the appeal lies”.322 A question has arisen as to the 
appropriate standard for assessing fresh evidence – should the CACD assess whether it might 
have had an impact on the trial jury or should it determine its own view of such evidence?323 
This matter has not been fully settled. Whereas the former test appeared to have been rejected 
by the CACD, references to the impact of the fresh evidence on the jury still appear.324 
 
The CACD exercises broad statutory prerogatives. In addition to allowing or dismissing an 
appeal, it may substitute a conviction for an alternative offence, “where the appellant has been 
convicted of an offence and the jury could on the indictment have found him guilty of some 
other offence”.325 The CACD may further order a retrial if the interests of justice so require.326 
Nevertheless, its powers remain equivocal to a certain degree. Two such issues may be 
mentioned. First, in respect of the aforementioned criterion of “unsafe”, the CACD has held 
that “if, for whatever reason, the court concluded that the appellant was wrongly convicted of 
the offence charged, or was left in doubt as to whether he was rightly convicted of that 
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offence, […] it must of necessity quash the conviction”.327 Evidently, this definition does not 
exhaustively set the parameters of the notion of “unsafe”. Second, with respect to legal errors, 
a controversial matter has emerged concerning the appropriate outcome of an appeal 
establishing a failure of due process at trial in respect of those who are factually guilty. The 
CACD has found, at one point, that it does not have the power to quash a conviction if it does 
not believe that the conviction is unsafe, but is dissatisfied about the conduct of the trial in 
some way.328 Thereafter, it appears to have departed from this line of reasoning through 
subsequent findings that, irrespective of guilt or innocence, an abuse of process may result in 
the quashing of a conviction.329 In this regard, there is also ambiguity as to the question when 
unfairness that does not amount to abuse of process may produce such an outcome.330 
 
3.2. United States 
A right to appeal does not feature in the U.S. Constitution.331 In 1894, the U.S. Supreme Court 
has held that “[i]t is wholly within the discretion of the state to allow or not allow […] review” 
of a conviction. 332  Nevertheless, regarding more serious offences (felonies), most U.S. 
jurisdictions vest defendants with relatively broad appellate rights as of right, which 
encompass appeals from felony convictions and resultant sentences, but also separate rights of 
appeal from the sentence in some jurisdictions.333  
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The appellate rights of U.S. prosecutors are subject to more limitations, however. According 
to the U.S. Supreme Court, the Fifth Amendment to the U.S. Constitution, which reads, in the 
relevant part, that no person shall “be subject for the same offence to be twice put in jeopardy 
of life or limb”, bars U.S. prosecutors from appealing acquittals pronounced by juries.334 This 
interpretation proceeds from the proposition that a second trial upon a prosecutorial appeal 
places the defendant twice in jeopardy, since an acquittal terminates the initial jeopardy.335 
Directed acquittals entered by judges have been equated to jury acquittals concerning double 
jeopardy protection, even when such acquittals go against relevant procedures.336 In addition, 
a remand to a lower court is precluded where an appellate court overturns a conviction based 
on the insufficiency of evidence,337 since it does not matter whether the reviewing court or the 
trial court deemed the evidence insufficient.338  
 
Nonetheless, several exceptions have been carved out or may otherwise be discerned. 339 
Firstly, where a defendant moves for dismissal on grounds unrelated to the determination of 
factual guilt, but on the basis of, e.g., procedural defects, no claim arises under the double 
jeopardy doctrine.340 In this regard, the U.S. Supreme Court has held that double jeopardy 
protection only attaches to “acquittals”, which concern rulings that resolve some or all of the 
factual elements of the offences charged in favour of the defendant.341 Secondly, the U.S. 
Supreme Court has found that “a defendant has no legitimate claim to benefit from an error of 
law when that error could be corrected without subjecting him to a second trial”.342 Strictly 
construed, this exception only covers the situation in the case in question, which concerned an 
appeal from a dismissal by a judge on account of excessive pre-trial delay after a jury had 
entered a conviction. It has, nevertheless, been suggested that acquittals could be covered in 
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general, as, relying on the aforementioned ruling, the U.S. Supreme Court has subsequently 
held that, “[w]here the jury returns a verdict of guilt, but the trial court thereafter enters a 
judgment of acquittal, an appeal is permitted”.343 Thirdly, a clear exception to the double 
jeopardy rule is reflected in statutory rights afforded to the prosecution to seek a higher 
sentence on appeal.344  According to the U.S. Supreme Court, the essential protection of 
double jeopardy is to prevent a retrial on guilt and a sentence appeal does not amount to a 
retrial.345 Finally, fraudulently obtained acquittals could constitute another exception. In a 
case involving an acquittal pronounced by a bribed judge, an appellate court held that the 
person concerned was never in jeopardy and, subsequently, the U.S. Supreme Court refused 
to exercise its discretion to review the impugned ruling.346 
 
Even though appellate review usually is granted as of right, appellate courts may refuse to 
grant appellate review in a number of situations. This may be done where the party concerned 
has failed to raise and preserve an error at trial.347 The “raise-or-waive rule” advances, in the 
main, judicial economy by pre-empting unnecessary reversals and appeals. 348  The most 
relevant exception to this rule concerns the authority of appellate courts to grant relief on the 
basis of a plain error that was not preserved,349 although the errors amenable to such review 
differ in the various U.S. jurisdictions. The U.S. Supreme Court has defined a four-pronged 
test, according to which there must be an error, that is plain, that affects “substantial rights”, 
and that “seriously affects the fairness, integrity, or public reputation of judicial 
proceedings”.350 In addition, appeals will also not be considered where events have rendered 
the claim moot or where the right to appeal has been waived, implicitly or explicitly, by 
defendants entering a plea deal or those who are fugitives from justice.351 However, in certain 
U.S. jurisdictions, reduced appellate rights from a guilty plea are available too.352 
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Despite a variety of procedural systems, the appellate procedure set forth in the Federal Rules 
of Appellate Procedure, which govern appellate practice in federal courts of appeal,353 most 
closely approximate the appellate rules of the different U.S. states.354 An appeal permitted as 
of right may be taken only by filing a notice of appeal, which specifies the formal elements, 
such as the party or parties instituting the appeal, the judgment being appealed, and the court 
to which the appeal is taken.355 The record on appeal consists mainly of the original papers 
and exhibits filed in the first instance court and the transcript of proceedings.356 Submission of 
additional evidence on appeal is, thus, not permitted. 357  The appellate process is mainly 
conducted in writing and is made up of the appellant’s brief, the appellee’s brief, and the 
appellant’s reply brief.358 Except in certain circumstances,359 oral argument must be allowed 
in every case, although it is frequently dispensed with in practice.360 It has been remarked that, 
commonly, appellate “judges use the allotted time for incisive questioning of counsel”.361 
 
In respect of the scope of appellate review, the degree of deference afforded to the trial court 
is a critical element of U.S. appellate procedure. In general, three categories may be 
distinguished.362 Firstly, decisions considered to amount to “abuse of discretion” by the trial 
court are reviewed by enquiring whether there is a “definite and firm conviction that the […] 
court committed a clear error of judgement”.363 This standard constitutes the most deferential 
form of appellate review, mainly because the trial judge is considered to be in a better 
position to assess the circumstances surrounding such decisions.364 Examples of decisions 
subject to “abuse of discretion” review concern the admission or exclusion of evidence, 
motions for mistrial or a new trial, and sentencing.365 Secondly, factual findings of trial judges 
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are subject to “clearly erroneous” review.366 The exact ambit of this standard has not been 
clarified, although it has been found that a factual finding is clearly erroneous when “a court 
is left with a firm and definite conviction that a mistake has been committed”.367 Decisions as 
to, for instance, the presence or absence of discriminatory intent or the competency of a 
defendant are reviewed against this standard.368 Moreover, in respect of findings of guilt by a 
jury or judge, the appellate court asks “whether, after viewing the evidence in the light most 
favorable to the prosecution, any rational trier of fact could have found the essential elements 
beyond a reasonable doubt”. 369  The deference afforded to trial courts may mainly be 
explained by their institutional advantages vis-à-vis appellate courts. Whilst the latter must 
confine their examination to the written record, the former, whether constituted by a judge or 
a jury, observe witnesses first-hand and are, thus, considered to be better placed to assess their 
credibility.370 However, the deferential attitude of appellate courts has been criticised on the 
basis that it has contributed to the appellate system’s failure to prevent miscarriages of 
justice.371 Thirdly, in respect of questions of law, appellate courts do not afford any deference 
to lower courts and provide de novo review.372 Strict boundaries between these categories are, 
of course, hard to draw. The delimitations between questions of law and fact are especially 
elusive and, accordingly, so-called “mixed questions of law and fact”, which require the 
application of legal principles to historical facts, are also reviewed de novo.373 Such questions 
concern, for example, whether or not there was probable cause to justify a warrantless search 
or whether or not a defendant has received effective assistance by counsel.374  
 
Where an appellate court does not affirm a judgment, it may either reverse the judgment, 
which entails nullification and prevents retrial, or, as it usually does, reverse and remand for 
retrial.375 However, an error revealed by the appellate process need not affect the judgment 
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appealed from. The “harmless error” doctrine has not been fully elucidated, but, in simplified 
terms, it demands that any error that does not affect substantial rights must be disregarded.376 
 
3.3. South Africa 
Until 1879, appeal from decisions in criminal cases tried before South African superior courts 
was non- existent.377 Thereafter, appellate rights were somewhat extended, but it was not until 
1948 that the Appellate Division, the predecessor of the current Supreme Court of Appeal, 
began hearing appeals.378 Presently, South African appellate procedure is mainly regulated by 
the Constitution, which includes a right “of appeal to […] a higher court”,379 and statutes, the 
most important of which is the 1977 Criminal Procedure Act.380 Accordingly, defendants may 
appeal a criminal conviction and/or a sentence imposed by the High Court, which deals with 
the most serious offences,381 to the Supreme Court of Appeal.382 
 
The rights of appeal of South African prosecutors are more restricted and they may exercise 
these rights in two manners. First, questions of law may be “reserved” upon request of the 
prosecutor for determination by the appellate court.383 This procedure is available: “(1) where 
there has been an acquittal […], which is a finding whereby the accused is set completely free 
[…]; (2) where a court quashes an indictment […]; (3) where there has been a conviction and 
the question of law may be to the advantage of the accused […]; [and] (4) where the question 
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of law may have a bearing upon the validity of the sentence imposed […]”.384 Second, a 
prosecutor may appeal “against a sentence imposed upon an accused in a criminal case”.385 A 
challenge to this provision on constitutional grounds has been rejected, on the basis that a 
sentence appeal does not amount to a trial de novo, the procedure is not unfair, and the 
accused’s right to a fair trial must be interpreted in the context of the rights and interests of 
the law-abiding persons in society.386 It follows that a prosecutorial appeal from acquittal on 
questions of fact is disallowed, in conformity with the double jeopardy principle.387 However, 
the South African Law Commission has recommended that such a ban ought to be dispensed 
with.388 In the view of the Commission, this right “should be limited to those cases where a 
miscarriage of justice occurred on the evidence before the court”.389 This proposal was mainly 
grounded in the public interest to prevent judicial error, the absence of a prohibition on state 
appeals in human rights instruments, the possibility of such appeals in some Common Law 
and Civil Law systems, and the consideration that such appeals do not contravene the double 
jeopardy clause since appellate proceedings are an extension of the original proceedings.390 
Nevertheless, hitherto, no such reforms have been implemented.391 
 
Access to the Supreme Court of Appeal is circumscribed for both the defendant and 
prosecutor, however. First, an appeal against conviction and sentence resulting from a plea 
agreement is granted only exceptionally.392 Second, and more importantly, recourse to its 
appellate jurisdiction does not lie of right, i.e., leave to appeal must be acquired.393 Such leave 
may only be granted “where the judge or judges concerned are of the opinion that […] the 
appeal would have a reasonable prospect of success or […] there is some other compelling 
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reason why the appeal should be heard, including conflicting judgments on the matter under 
consideration”.394 Where leave to appeal is refused, “the accused may by petition apply to the 
President of the Supreme Court of Appeal” to renew the application.395 The Constitutional 
Court has confirmed the constitutionality of this procedure, since the requirements of fairness 
were satisfied and “[i]t cannot be in the interests of justice and fairness to allow unmeritorious 
and vexatious issues of procedure, law or fact to be placed before” the appellate tribunal.396 
 
Proceedings before the Supreme Court of Appeal consist of written submissions and oral 
argument, although the latter may be set aside.397 The Supreme Court of Appeal decides on 
the basis of the record of the proceedings before the High Court, “including copies of the 
evidence, whether oral or documentary, taken or admitted at the trial, and a statement of the 
grounds of appeal”.398 However, the appellate record may be expanded. An application for 
leave to appeal to the High Court “may be accompanied by an application to adduce further 
evidence”, which “must be supported by an affidavit stating that (i) further evidence which 
would presumably be accepted as true, is available; (ii) if accepted the evidence could 
reasonably lead to a different verdict or sentence; and (iii) there is a reasonably acceptable 
explanation for the failure to produce the evidence before the close of the trial”.399 In addition, 
where further evidence comes to light after leave to appeal has been granted, the Supreme 
Court of Appeal has the power to “receive further evidence”.400 It may also remit the case “for 
further hearing, with such instructions as regards the taking of further evidence or otherwise” 
as it deems necessary.401 Additional evidence is admitted only exceptionally, although the 
Supreme Court of Appeal may exercise a degree of flexibility in this regard, provided that it is 
satisfied that, upon admission of the evidence, there is a reasonable probability that the person 
concerned would not be convicted in a further hearing.402 
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Since the defendant’s right to appeal is “concerned with the substantive correctness of the 
decision based on the facts or merits of the case on the record and the law relevant to such 
facts”,403 the scope of review of the Supreme Court of Appeal has both a factual and legal 
component. In relation to an appeal on the facts, it has been remarked that the Supreme Court 
of Appeal is “usually loath to interfere with the findings of the trial court”, which is especially 
the case if the finding is based on the impressions made by witnesses, as the trial court 
directly appreciates the evidence. 404  However, in respect of “inferences, other facts and 
probabilities”, the Supreme Court of Appeal is more likely to intervene since it is not in a 
disadvantageous position compared to the trial court.405 There is a presumption that “the trial 
court’s evaluation of the evidence as to the facts is correct” and appellate interference is, thus, 
only justified “if it is convinced that the evaluation is wrong”.406 A different test governs 
appeals in respect of questions of law. In comparison with a question of fact, the Supreme 
Court of Appeal does not ask whether “it would have made the same finding but whether the 
trial court could have made such a finding”.407 It is unsurprising that the distinctions between 
questions of law and fact have proved difficult to delineate.408 Nevertheless, the meaning 
afforded to questions of law by the Supreme Court of Appeal has been termed “narrow”, so as 
to prevent prosecutorial appeals on questions of facts to be presented under the guise of 
questions of law.409 In this regard, it found that appellate review based on a question of law 
assesses “whether the proven facts in the particular case constitute the commission of the 
crime”, which is “not raised by asking whether the evidence establishes one or more of the 
factual ingredients of a particular crime where there is no doubt or dispute as to what those 
ingredients are”.410 Finally, considering that the trial court is vested with discretion in respect 
of sentencing, the Supreme Court of Appeal intervenes only when such discretion has not 
been exercised judicially.411 Thus, a sentence may only be subject to appellate adjustment: 
“(a) when the sentence is vitiated by an irregularity […]; (b) when the trial court misdirects 
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itself (e.g., by taking into consideration irrelevant factors) […]; [or] (c) when the sentence is 
so severe that no reasonable court would have imposed it […]”.412  
 
The Supreme Court of Appeal may adopt a number of decisions. Firstly, with regard to “an 
appeal against a conviction or of any question of law reserved”, it may: “(a) allow the appeal 
if it thinks that the judgment of the trial court should be set aside […]; or (b) give such 
judgment as ought to have been given at the trial or impose such punishment as ought to have 
been imposed at the trial; or (c) make such other order as justice may require”.413 Thus, for 
instance, where a reserved question of law is answered in favour of the State, an acquittal may 
be substituted with a conviction and a sentence may be imposed.414 Secondly, in relation to 
sentencing appeals, the Supreme Court of Appeal “may confirm the sentence or may delete or 
amend the sentence and impose such punishment as ought to have been imposed at the 
trial”.415 Although it could not do so prior to 1963, the Court now possesses “the power to 
impose a punishment more severe than that imposed by the court below […]”. 416  The 
Supreme Court of Appeal may even increase the sentence when no appeal against sentence is 
taken, as long as it provides notice to the appellant that it contemplates an aggravation.417 
Finally, where it sets aside a conviction and sentence on the ground that “the court […] was 
not competent” to convict the accused, that “the indictment […] was invalid or defective”, or 
that “there has been any other technical irregularity or defect in the procedure”, the Supreme 
Court of Appeal is empowered to institute de novo proceedings.418 In respect of the latter 
category, the Constitutional Court has clarified that an irregularity or defect is of a technical 
nature where it prevents an assessment of the merits and that, in such circumstances, the 
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double jeopardy doctrine does not bar a retrial.419 Furthermore, de novo proceedings may also 
be ordered if a prosecutorial appeal against an acquittal is granted.420 
 
4. Mixed Systems 
The Italian and Russian appellate systems will be considered as examples of Civil Law 
jurisdictions that have adopted far-reaching Common Law inspired reforms, even though 
some continue to classify these countries as Civil Law systems.421 
 
The 1989 Italian Code of Criminal Procure replaced the 1930 Code of Criminal of Criminal 
Procedure, which had been described as “a relic of the Fascist era”.422 Italy’s reforms were, 
inter alia, motivated by “the staggering inefficiency of the former system” and a desire “to 
‘open up’ its criminal justice system, both to reflect its status as a modern democratic society 
and to make a dramatic break with past reliance on closed pretrial hearings”.423 The reforms 
of the criminal process along adversarial lines has been labelled “[s]o radical” that they “have 
no modern precedent”.424 A wealth of commentaries has depicted the trials and tribulations of 
the introduction of adversarial elements into a predominantly non-adversarial setting.425 It has 
been remarked that “[t]he result is a system caught between two traditions”.426 
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Post-Soviet Russia has introduced comprehensive reforms too. As part hereof, a new Code of 
Criminal Procedure was enacted in 2001, in order to remedy, primarily, the lack of 
independence of pre-trial investigators, the “minimal rights and protections [afforded to the 
defence] during the pre-trial phase”, and the general pro-state bias in criminal proceedings.427 
The 2001 Code of Criminal Procedure breaks with Russia’s non-adversarial legal tradition 
and incorporates adversarial elements into criminal proceedings. As expressed by this Code, 
in addition to protecting persons who “have suffered from […] crimes”, criminal proceedings 
aim to shield persons from “unlawful and ungrounded accusations and conviction, and […] 
restriction of […] rights and freedoms”. 428  To this end, criminal proceedings “shall be 
conducted on the basis of the adversarial nature of the parties [sic]”.429 However, the degree to 
which the system has, in reality, abandoned its non-adversarial tradition has been debated.430 
Like the Italian system, the Russian reforms have been described as “incomplete in practice”, 
since the 2001 Code is not “sufficiently concrete and specific in setting out the new 
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adversarial responsibilities of the participants, combined with a lack of training to develop the 
skills and traditions necessary to discharge those responsibilities”.431 
 
However, these reforms have not affected the appellate processes of the Italian and Russian 
systems of criminal procedure. In respect of Italy, it has been remarked that “[a]ppellate 
review attracted little discussion during the debates leading up to the reform of criminal 
procedure” and “[c]ommentators are only now asking whether the new adversarial trial 
procedures provide sufficient protection from judicial error to make such extensive appeal 
rights unnecessary”.432 Similarly, as concerns Russia, it has been claimed that “while some 
parts of the new Code [of Criminal Procedure] set out adversarial features, other parts of the 
Code work against them”,433 which arguably extends to its style of appellate review. 
 
4.1. Italy 
The accused may appeal judgments of conviction pronounced by a court of assizes (corte di 
assise), which is competent for offences punishable by life sentence or by, at least, twenty-
four years’ imprisonment and certain other serious offences, by means of appello before the 
assize court of appeal (corte di assise di appello).434 This remedy encompasses judgments of 
dismissal as well, which includes a judgment of non-prosecution, different types of judgments 
of acquittal, and a declaration concerning the extinguishment of the offence.435 The prosecutor 
has been endowed with identical rights of appeal.436 
 
Appello may be invoked by means of a written application, which, in addition to certain 
formal requirements, must indicate: “the sections or subsections of the [impugned] decision to 
which the appellate remedy refers; […] the requests; [and] […] the arguments, with the 
                                                 
431 W. Burnham and J Kahn, ‘Russia’s Criminal Procedure Code Five Years Out’, 33(1) Review of Central and 
East European Law 1 (2008), at 5. 
432 W. Pizzi and L. Marafioti, ‘The New Italian Code of Criminal Procedure: The Difficulties of Building an 
Adversarial Trial System on a Civil Law Foundation’, 17(1) Yale Journal of International Law 1 (1992), at 
footnote 83. Also: M. Gialuz, ‘The Italian Code of Criminal Procedure: a Reading Guide’, in M. Gialuz, L. 
Lupária, and F. Scarpa (eds.), The Italian Code of Criminal Procedure. Critical Essays and English Translation 
17 (Lavis: Wolters Kluwer Italia, 2014), at 47-48; S. Freccero, ‘An Introduction to the New Italian Criminal 
Procedure’, 21(3) American Journal of Criminal Law 345 (1994), at 380. 
433 W. Burnham and J Kahn, ‘Russia’s Criminal Procedure Code Five Years Out’, 33(1) Review of Central and 
East European Law 1 (2008), at 5. 
434 Arts. 593(1), 596(2) Code of Criminal Procedure 1988 (Italy). 
435 Ibid., Arts. 529-531, 593(2). Pursuant to Art. 597(2)(b) Code of Criminal Procedure 1988 (Italy), the corte di 
assise di appello enjoys a corresponding prerogative to “dismiss the accused for a reason other than that referred 
to in the appealed judgment”. Also: R. Van Cleave, ‘Italy’, in C. Bradley (ed.), Criminal Procedure – A 
Worldwide Study 303 (Durham: Carolina Academic Press, 2007), at 348. 
436 Arts. 570, 593 Code of Criminal Procedure 1988 (Italy). 
53 
 
specification of the de jure and de facto reasons sustaining each request”.437 Failure to comply 
with these requirements leads to inadmissibility.438 
 
Since appello comprises both questions of fact and law, the proceedings before the corte di 
assise di appello have been termed “a trial proceeding of second instance (secondo grado di 
giudizio)”.439 These proceedings are conducted in accordance with the rules concerning first 
instance proceedings, if applicable, 440  supplemented by specific rules. In the event of 
particular appello applications of a limited scope, such as those concerning the type or extent 
of the sentence, hearings may be held in closed session.441 In other situations, an “[a]ppeal 
trial” is conducted.442 Such a trial commences with an oral report of the case by the president 
or another judge.443 During the trial, documents pertaining to preceding phases of the trial 
may be read out within the applicable limitations.444 Subsequently, a “debate” is conducted, 
which allows the prosecutor and the accused to present their conclusions and to respond to 
each other’s arguments.445 Furthermore, a first instance evidentiary hearing may be renewed 
on appello.446 Such a hearing shall be conducted upon a party’s request “that evidence already 
gathered during the first instance trial be taken anew or that new evidence be gathered”, 
provided that the judge considers that “he is unable to decide on the basis of the available 
elements of evidence”.447 In addition, the evidentiary hearing may also be renewed if new 
evidence emerges448 or if it is considered “absolutely necessary” by a judge.449 
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The corte di assise di appello may adopt a wide array of decisions. In general, a judgment 
confirming or amending the impugned decision shall be adopted. 450  With respect to 
prosecutorial appeals, more specific possibilities have been laid down. Most notably, in 
relation to a judgment of conviction, an appello judge “may, within the limits of competence 
of the first instance judge, provide a more serious legal definition for the criminal acts […] 
[and] change the type or increase the length or amount of penalty”. 451  Furthermore, a 
judgment of dismissal may be converted into a judgment of conviction and it may be 
aggravated in the same manner as a judgment of conviction. 452  Nevertheless, appellate 
aggravation of the impugned judgment is disallowed if the accused is the sole appellant, 
although this limitation does not affect the court’s aforementioned powers to assign a more 
serious legal qualification to the act(s) in question.453 
 
4.2. Russia 
The right to appeal a criminal conviction is explicitly set forth in the Constitution of the 
Russian Federation 454  and the 2001 Russian Code of Criminal Procedure. 455  The latter 
provides elaborate procedural rules concerning the various appellate remedies. 
 
Persons tried by Subject-Level Courts, whether they have been acquitted or convicted, may 
institute apelliatsia before the Criminal Chamber of the Supreme Court (“the Supreme 
Court”).456 Russian prosecutors enjoy a right to appeal equivalent to the person acquitted or 
convicted at first instance without additional restrictions.457 In this regard, it is noteworthy 
that the 2001 Russian Code of Criminal Procedure was subject to a major overhaul in 2013. 
Previously, offences for which the sentence did not exceed three years, were subject to 
apelliatsia,458 whereas more serious offences were only reviewable by means of kassatsia, a 
form of appeal limited to questions of law.459 The 2013 reforms extended apelliatsia to more 
serious offences too. In this regard, it has been considered that the various appellate 
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procedures should be harmonised and that kassatsia suffered from certain drawbacks.460 In 
addition, European experts urged for the introduction of a “‘double-trial’ form of appeal”.461 
 
Seeing that apelliatsia involves a verification of the legality, reasonableness and fairness of a 
judgment, 462  which amounts to a “complete review de novo of all facts and law”, 463 
proceedings before the Supreme Court proceed, in the main, according to the rules applicable 
to first instance proceedings.464 More specific elements of such appellate proceedings are 
regulated separately. Upon the formal opening of the hearing by the presiding judge, the 
“judicial investigation” commences with a brief presentation of the contents of the impugned 
judgment or decision, the apelliatsia, the counterarguments, and the additional materials by 
the presiding judge.465 Following completion of the judicial investigation, the parties provide 
oral arguments. 466  Thereafter, the Supreme Court proceeds with the examination of the 
evidence, which may include additional materials filed by the parties and, if deemed 
necessary, the examination of first instance witnesses.467 In addition, the parties may file 
motions for the examination of evidence that was not considered at first instance.468 
 
The Supreme Court has been endowed with broad powers, the most important of which 
concern the following. First, it may expand the remit of the case before it. In this regard, the 
2001 Russian Code of Criminal Procedure stipulates that the Supreme Court is not restricted 
to the grounds of appeal advanced by the parties and that it may review the entire proceedings 
instead.469 However, apelliatsia proceedings must be limited to the original charges.470 An 
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exception has been made to allow the prosecution to amend the charges to the benefit of the 
person concerned, provided that the Supreme Court ensures that the latter has been provided 
with additional time to prepare a new defence strategy.471 Second, in line with the extensive 
scope of review, the Supreme Court has broad powers to reverse or alter a judgment. It may 
do so in the following circumstances:472 (i) non-compliance of the conclusions of the court of 
first instance with the facts;473 (ii) a major violation of the rules of criminal procedure;474 (iii) 
incorrect application of the criminal law;475 and (iv) imposition of an unfair sentence.476 
However, non-compliance of the conclusions of the first instance court with the facts has been 
excluded as a ground of reversal for judgments rendered with the participation of a jury.477 
Third, unless a violation committed by the court of first instance may be remedied by the 
Supreme Court, the matter must be remitted to a different panel of the court of first 
instance.478 In case of remittal, the Supreme Court may not pre-determine the following issues: 
(i) whether or not a charge has been proved; (ii) the reliability or unreliability of a piece of 
evidence; (iii) the precedence of certain pieces of evidence over others; and (iv) the type of 
penalty and the extent thereof.479 Finally, the Russian Code of Criminal Procedure specifies 
that appellate aggravation of the first instance judgment is permitted. However, the 
aggravation of a judgment of conviction, or the reversal and transfer for new trial of a 
judgment of acquittal based on its unlawfulness or unreasonableness, is only allowed upon 
appeal by the prosecution480  and, therefore, not applicable to appeals filed solely by the 
accused. The reference to a “new trial” also entails that a judgment of acquittal may not be 
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vacated in favour of a judgment of conviction on appeal. 481  In addition, more stringent 
conditions attach to the appellate modification of acquittals pronounced in jury trials. Such a 
judgment may only be reversed on appeal in the following circumstances: (i) the violations of 
the criminal procedure were such to have restricted the right of the prosecution, the aggrieved 
party, or of a legal representative to present evidence or to have influenced the questions 
posed to the jury or the answers provided by the jury; and (ii) the presiding judge of the court 
of first instance has failed to denote the ambiguous and contradictory nature of a judgment 
and has not proposed to the jury to specify the question list.482 
 
5. Synthesis 
The various approaches to appellate review have been described as one of “the major 
differences” between existing Common Law and Civil Law systems.483 It has, nevertheless, 
also been suggested that their appellate procedures have converged as a result of factors like 
“historical events, technological changes, the emergence of the right to appeal as a human 
right, and the increasing emphasis on orality in continental criminal procedure”. 484 
Accordingly, this chapter will take stock of the major similarities and dissimilarities between, 
on the one hand, Common Law systems and, on the other hand, Civil Law and mixed 
systems485. It will, thereafter account for the similarities and/or dissimilarities. 
 
5.1. Similarities and Dissimilarities 
 
5.1.1. Availability of Appellate Review 
Commencing with the major similarity between the systems, appellate review at second 
instance has become ubiquitous in both contemporary Common Law systems486 and Civil 
Law systems.487 Historically, this has not been the case. It has been written, in general, that 
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“essential characteristics of the accusatorial type [of criminal procedure] [i.e. Common Law] 
include elements such as […] possibly even the absence of appellate procedure”.488  The 
remnants of this characterisation are indeed visible in the aforementioned Common Law 
jurisdictions. The early criminal procedural systems of neither England & Wales nor South 
Africa contained a right to appeal a conviction, 489  whilst the U.S. Supreme Court has 
explicitly confirmed this right had not been conceived of as a constitutional guarantee by the 
framers of the U.S. Constitution.490 However, this description has become obsolete nowadays. 
Notwithstanding their belated introduction or unequal legal status, the evolution of modern 
Common Law jurisdiction has introduced significant rights of appeal. 
 
5.1.2. Parties’ Right to Appeal 
The first major dissimilarity arises in respect of the extent of the right to appeal afforded to 
the parties in a criminal trial. In Common Law jurisdictions, appellate rights are markedly 
asymmetrical in favour of defendants, while Civil Law jurisdictions do not draw such a 
distinction. The double jeopardy doctrine bars prosecutorial appeals from first instance 
acquittals on questions of fact in Common Law jurisdictions.491 On the other hand, Civil Law 
systems have placed the appellate rights of the prosecution on par with those of the accused, 
including in respect of first instance acquittals.492 In the development of its appellate system 
concerning serious offences, France has even repealed an initial ban on such appeals.493 In 
addition, these systems conceive of prosecutorial rights of appeal in a broader manner, 
considering that prosecutorial authorities may also appeal in favour of the accused.494  
 
However, this division is not absolute. Whereas prosecutorial appeals based on questions of 
law and matters of sentencing have been traditionally permitted,495 significant exceptions to 
double jeopardy protection have been carved out in Common Law jurisdictions. Furthermore, 
the reduction of prosecutorial rights of appeal has come under strain, mainly as a result of the 
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rebalancing of criminal justice systems towards victims’ interests.496 England & Wales have 
adopted legal reforms to broaden prosecutorial rights of appeal in relation to questions of law 
and, to a certain degree, fact. In South Africa, a significant limitation of this facet of double 
jeopardy protection has been proposed, but not implemented hitherto.497  
 
5.1.3. Impediments to Appellate Review 
A further divergence between Common Law and Civil Law jurisdictions exists in relation to 
the impediments erected in respect of appellate review. Common Law systems employ 
various disincentives to dissuade the parties from entering the appellate process. All three 
systems discussed restrain the possibility of appellate review regarding guilty pleas, either by 
considering rights of appeal forfeited498 or attaching additional requirements to such appellate 
review 499 . Considering the pervasiveness of plea-bargaining in Common Law systems, 
especially in the U.S.,500  this element heavily restricts access to the appellate process in 
practice. Moreover, England & Wales and South Africa require leave to appeal,501 which 
seeks to prevent “appellate courts from being flooded”.502 Finally, impediments to appellate 
review particular to specific Common Law jurisdictions may be identified. England & Wales 
make use of the “loss of time” measure503 and the U.S. employs the “raise or waive” doctrine 
and disentitles absconders of appellate rights 504 . Conversely, Civil Law jurisdictions 
guarantee, in general, access to appellate review in second instance as of right.505  
 
Nevertheless, there is no perfect dichotomy in this regard. On the one hand, despite the 
aforementioned restrictions to access to appellate review, U.S. jurisdictions widely disavow a 
requirement of leave to appeal at second instance,506 which reflects the “principle that errors 
will always be committed at trial level and that appellate judges must detect and correct 
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them”.507 On the other hand, certain Civil Law jurisdictions have put mechanisms in place 
that effectively limit access to appellate review. Germany’s rigorous formal requirements and 
its abridged appellate procedure ensure that appellate complaints are, in the main, either 
rejected in limine or adjudicated summarily.508 Moreover, in Argentina, a first instance court 
may deny an application for appellate review, although such a denial may be set aside.509 
 
5.1.4. Oral or Written Argument 
Common Law and Civil Law jurisdictions also differ in respect of the type of argument on 
appeal. As to Common Law jurisdictions, the U.S. and South Africa emphasise written 
arguments, although oral proceedings may form part of the appellate process too,510 even 
though the appellate system of England & Wales is primarily oral.511 With the exception of 
the German appellate process,512 Civil Law appellate jurisdictions are characterised by the 
opposite preference. France, Italy, and Russia conduct an (adjusted) rerun of proceedings at 
first instance,513 which necessarily prioritises oral argument, although Argentinian appellate 
proceedings, which do not amount to a trial de novo, are also mainly of an oral nature.514 
 
5.1.5. Additional Evidence 
Diverging approaches to additional evidence in appellate proceedings have been adopted by 
Common Law and Civil Law systems. The former adopt, on balance, a more restrained stance 
than the latter. Whereas Common Law systems either deny the admission of such evidence515 
or admit it in exceptional circumstances only516, certain Civil Law jurisdictions boast wide 
possibilities to present additional evidence on appeal, 517  even though German appellate 
proceedings proceed on the basis of the trial record exclusively.518 
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5.1.6. Scope of Appellate Review 
Whereas both Common Law and Civil Law appellate systems permit de novo review of 
questions of law,519 a more diverse picture appears in relation to questions of fact. In general, 
Common Law courts of second instance have traditionally been considered to exercise 
relatively limited powers in reviewing questions of fact. Indeed, deference is owed to courts 
of first instance, which are in a position to directly observe witness testimony.520 However, a 
trend towards widening these powers has emerged. England & Wales have enacted reforms to 
ensure more intensive appellate intervention, such as the simplification of the standard for 
appellate review and more intensive interference in the context of fresh evidence,521 whereas 
mechanisms such as the doctrine of “mixed questions of law and fact” have rendered almost 
any issue “appropriate for appellate intervention” in the U.S.522 Civil Law systems display 
even more diversity in this regard. France, Italy, and Russia allow for a trial de novo on 
questions of fact.523 France and Russia have even introduced de novo review for the most 
serious crimes at the expense of appellate review of questions of law. 524  However, the 
appellate systems of Germany and Argentina are more equivocal. In the former, appellate 
proceedings are, in principle, reserved for questions of law, but, at the same time, the scope of 
appellate review has been broadened to better accommodate questions of fact. 525 
Similarly, having first scaled down the scope of review in appellate proceedings in second 
instance from de novo review to review of questions of law, the courts of the latter, spurred on 
by human rights obligations, have expanded it to a certain degree.526 
 
5.1.7. Appellate Courts’ Powers 
The powers of appellate courts throughout the Common Law and Civil Law world differ in 
scope and application. The first such distinction is that, whilst all reviewed jurisdictions allow 
appellate courts to resolve appellate matters instantaneously, as opposed to a remittal to a 
lower court,527 Common Law systems are more restrained than Civil Law systems. Civil Law 
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jurisdictions more readily allow appellate courts to requalify decisions adopted by first 
instance courts in legal terms than Common Law jurisdictions,528 even though this possibility 
is, at least, available to the appellate courts of England & Wales too 529 . Moreover, 
instantaneous appellate resolution to the detriment of the accused has been invariably applied, 
although the main restriction imposed by Common Law jurisdictions is the need for an appeal 
on grounds of law 530  and, in Civil Law jurisdictions, such a course of action is most 
commonly excluded for appeals instituted by the accused only.531 The second distinction is 
that Common Law and Civil Law jurisdictions permit appellate courts to remit a case for 
renewed adjudication to a lower court,532 but the extent to which this power is applied varies. 
U.S. appellate courts prioritise remittal over instantaneous resolution, 533  which may be 
interpreted to extend to England & Wales and South Africa too, at least in respect of appeals 
on matters of fact, because of the deferential attitude of Common Law appellate courts in this 
regard.534 The Common Law jurisdictions are joined by Germany on this matter, probably as 
a result of the same limitation applied to its appellate system.535 On the other hand, Civil Law 
systems, in particular those permitting de novo review, divulge the opposite preference.536 
 
5.1.8. Functions of Appellate Review 
Common Law and Civil Law systems further differ as to the emphasis placed on the 
particular functions of appellate review. The former prioritise the “systemic” function of 
appellate review over its “quality-control” function to a greater degree than the latter.  
 
This distinction may be deduced from the differing treatment of questions of law and 
questions of fact in these systems. Appellate review of questions of law primarily engage the 
“systemic” function of appellate review, since the ramifications of such questions are more 
generalizable to other situations. Questions of fact, on the other hand, are predominantly 
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concerned with the “quality-control” function of appellate review, as their effects remain 
principally confined to the specific situations under consideration. The appellate systems of 
Common Law and Civil Law jurisdictions espouse, as mentioned, diverging approaches in 
this regard. Whereas appellate review of questions of fact in Common Law systems is more 
restrained, questions of law are invariably reviewed de novo at second instance.537 There are 
also more specific indications of the prevalence of questions of law over questions of fact in 
Common Law settings. For instance, in England & Wales, the powers of the CACD to quash 
a factually correct conviction that has been tainted by procedural irregularities are mired in 
ambiguity.538 Thus, the need to correct a question of law as an exercise of the “systemic” 
functions of the CACD is uncontested, but there is a clear reluctance to assign “quality-
control” effects to such a decision. On the other hand, the appellate systems of Civil Law 
countries,539 even those that nominally restrict appellate review to questions of law,540 provide 
for more room for appellate review of matters of fact. In such constructions, the “systemic” 
function of appellate review is mainly engaged after the “quality-control” function. 
 
5.2. The Dissimilarities Explained 
The preceding assessment indicates that, beyond the fact that Common Law systems have 
come to approximate Civil Law systems in respect of the availability of appellate control at 
second instance and that tentative signs of convergence in respect of other facets of appellate 
review may be distinguishable, the dissimilarities significantly outweigh the similarities. 
Common Law and Civil Law systems pursue widely divergent approaches regarding 
prosecutorial rights of appeal, access to appellate review, the conduct of appellate proceedings 
(i.e. preferences for oral or written arguments, additional evidence, and the scope of appellate 
review), appellate courts’ powers, and the functions of appellate review. 
 
Some of the aforementioned differences have been explained by particular aspects of the 
internal configurations of Common Law and Civil Law systems. However, aside from the 
question whether such explanations encompass the remaining differences, they do not account 
for the specific differentiation in full. Accordingly, after discussing the two main arguments 
raised in this respect, more structural reasons will be presented. 
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5.2.1. Internal Configurations 
The divergences between Common Law and Civil Law in respect of the rights of appeal held 
by the main parties in the criminal process and the scope of appellate review have been 
explained on the basis of the systems’ internal configurations. 
 
5.2.1.1. Lay Participation 
The differences in appellate rights afforded to prosecutorial authorities and the accused have 
been linked to the extent of lay participation permitted in criminal justice.541 Many Civil Law 
systems do not leave room for such participation at all.542 In the Civil Law systems that do, 
lay participation is usually confined to the appointment of lay assessors alongside professional 
judges in the decision-making process.543 Many Common Law systems, on the other hand, 
entrust fact-finding prerogatives exclusively to juries.544 Lay participation has been assigned a 
pivotal role in Common Law systems, since “juries […] legitimise the criminal justice system 
by making the decision of guilt one for a randomly selected group of the defendant’s 
peers”.545 An appeal by the prosecution on the basis of alleged errors of fact concerning a jury 
decision of acquittal would, thus, distort this rationale. It would allow a peers’ assessment of 
not-guilty to be second-guessed by detached bureaucrats. This has been expressed as “the veto 
power that the jury enjoy over the prosecutorial power of the state”.546  A more specific 
element of the jury’s role in criminal proceedings also militates against such prosecutorial 
rights. Juries “inject humanity into the criminal process”, since they may acquit against the 
dictates of the law on the basis of, for instance, moral or ethical considerations (“jury equity” 
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or “jury nullification”).547 Appellate judges are, on the other hand, bound by the law and may 
not be led by such concerns. A prosecutorial appeal could, thus, also thwart this aspect of a 
jury trial.548 Hence, the enhanced emphasis on lay participation in Common Law systems 
warrants a commensurate reduction in the appellate rights of prosecutorial authorities. At the 
same time, the absence or reduced degree of lay participation in Civil Law jurisdictions is 
conducive to broad rights of appeal held by prosecutors. 
 
Nevertheless, the adequacy of this line of argumentation may be questioned. Commencing 
with the latter aspect, “jury equity” (or “jury nullification”) appears to constitute an 
inadequate basis for the removal of a component of the prosecution’s right to appeal. 
Opponents advance that this notion seems “irreconcilable with any intelligible notion of the 
rule of law” and that it “ignores the established fact that, at least occasionally, juries behave 
with astonishing irresponsibility”.549 Thus, even if it could sustain a controlled approach to 
appeals from acquittals by the prosecution, an across-the-board exclusion demands too much 
from a mechanism that primarily seeks to humanise criminal justice. In addition, more 
generally, lay participation in the criminal process is not completely determinative for double 
jeopardy protection. France has provided for lay participation in its system of criminal justice 
together with the attendant restriction of prosecutorial rights of appeal but subsequently 
rescinded the latter aspect.550 Similarly, lay participation was never matched with restrained 
appellate rights of the prosecution in Russia.551 Therefore, from a comparative perspective the 
two notions do not exclude each other. However, it could, of course, be objected that such a 
combination is ill-conceived. Those critical of injecting adversarial elements into a non-
adversarial setting might argue that the uncontrolled transplant of lay participation 
misconstrues the relevant notions or overlooks related fair trial aspects. Nevertheless, the 
Common Law approach is not coherent in respect of this matter. Many Common Law 
jurisdictions also prevent the prosecution from appealing an acquittal on the facts in judge-
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only proceedings.552 Thus, even from an internal perspective, lay participation is not decisive 
for the removal of prosecutorial rights of appeal. 
 
5.2.1.2. Fact-Finding 
It has, furthermore, been contended that the differing scopes of appellate proceedings in 
Common Law and Civil Law systems result from the inferior fact-finding position of 
adversarial appellate courts vis-à-vis their non-adversarial counterparts. In this regard, the 
variations concerning lay participation at first instance entail further consequences for 
subsequent phases of a criminal trial. In the Common Law setting, juries do not provide, in 
general, a reasoned judgment 553  and, in respect of a trial by judge alone, the need for 
reasoning may be limited. 554  Civil Law judges, on the other hand, generally provide a 
reasoned opinion at first instance. 555  Therefore, lacking access to the specific reasons 
underlying a verdict of guilt or innocence, Common Law appellate courts’ review would be 
necessarily more restrained than the review performed by Civil Law appellate courts. More 
importantly, the disparate approaches are considered logical corollaries of the types of 
appellate proceedings in these systems. As discussed, Common Law appellate courts have 
developed a deferential attitude concerning trial courts’ findings of fact, as they are generally 
constrained to a review of the record and rarely admit additional evidence or rehear first 
instance evidence.556 Conversely, in the Civil Law context, a deferential stance is, in general, 
less compatible with appellate proceedings involving either a complete de novo trial or a more 
flexible approach to first instance evidence and additional evidence.557 Accordingly, Civil 
Law judges are said to be in a better position to exercise far-reaching appellate control than 
Common Law judges, considering that they face fewer fact-finding constraints. 
 
However, these arguments also fail to fully explain the relevant dissimilarities. The systems 
of Italy and Russia demonstrate that trial proceedings instilled with Common Law elements 
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can be combined with intensive appellate scrutiny,558 including in respect of jury trials.559 
However, as discussed, such amalgamations may be subject to criticism. Even so, it is not 
undisputed that the aforementioned factors must necessarily result in narrow appellate 
decision-making in the adversarial context either. The conventional account of the reduced 
ability of Common Law appellate courts to deal with questions of fact has been rejected on 
two grounds. First, it has been argued that, contrary to conventional wisdom, appellate courts 
may enjoy institutional advantages over first instance judges and juries in relation to fact-
finding. The ephemeral nature of witness testimony renders information retention difficult and, 
in addition, it “encourages an intuitive and emotional thought process”, as opposed to abstract 
and logical thinking.560 Transcript-based review is, on the other hand, lasting, which allows 
for more systematic and rational evaluation of different sources of evidence.561 Moreover, 
experimental evidence suggests that observing demeanour may be of limited value in 
assessing credibility and that reading a transcript is more effective in detecting lies.562 As 
repeat players, appellate judges are also “likely to have greater experience” vis-à-vis jurors.563 
Furthermore, appellate courts are “at least as well equipped as trial-level fact finders to assess 
documentary and circumstantial evidence”.564 Second, technological innovation has tempered 
the institutional differences between first instance and appellate courts. “Video technology 
refutes the rhetoric of necessity that has long been invoked to defend traditional standards of 
appellate court deference to trial court decisionmaking”.565 Accordingly, “[a]ppellate courts 
[…] now can have access via video to the same ‘data’ that presumably inform the 
discretionary decisions of trial judges”.566 These arguments similarly weaken the justification 
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for limited appellate intervention on the basis of the lack of reasons for a jury verdict. 
Transcripts, in conjunction with video-recordings or other means, may adequately replace a 
reasoned opinion provided by a first instance court as a basis for appellate decision-making. 
 
5.2.2. Structural Differences 
A more comprehensive explication of the divide between the systems’ appellate procedures 
must be sought elsewhere. In this respect, the relationship between the types of decision-
making in the legal process, the extent of judicial truth-seeking, and the relationship between 
the sources of law and appellate review will be discussed. 
 
5.2.2.1. Decision-Making 
Common Law and Civil Law systems operate according to dissimilar processes of decision-
making in the legal process. It has been remarked, for instance, that, in the coordinate 
variation on the administration of justice encountered in Common Law systems, “[a]n 
essentially homogeneous single level of authority spawns proceedings that center around the 
original […] adjudicator”.567 In other words, such a system “concentrates on the trial as the 
relevant locus for fact-finding”.568 In this regard, the U.S. Supreme Court has revealingly held 
that a first instance trial should be “the ‘main event’ […] rather than a ‘tryout on the road’”.569 
On the contrary, the hierarchical model of Civil Law systems does not focus to the same 
extent on the trial stage in relation to decision-making. It allows “participants at several stages” 
to shape the fact-finding process, including on the appellate level(s). 570  Therefore, the 
coordinate model employs “concentrated” decision-making, which is limited to a large extent 
to a single stage of the legal process, and the hierarchical model is characterised by 
“pluralistic” decision-making, which persists throughout sequential stages of a trial. These 
different types of decision-making entail obvious ramifications for the operation of the 
principle of finality in the different systems. Although it may be considered for both systems 
that “[t]here is value to the parties, and to society as a whole, in accepting that a contested 
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issue has been resolved,” 571  the principle of finality manifests itself differently in these 
contexts. In Common Law systems, “concentrated” decision-making logically implies that the 
“original” adjudicator is also the “presumptively final” one, 572  which suggests that first 
instance decisions are awarded a high degree of finality. “Pluralistic” decision-making in 
Civil Law systems entails that the finality of a first instance judgment is postponed until all 
appellate remedies have been exhausted,573 thus entailing a decreased degree of finality. 
 
While the systems’ differently structured pre-trial procedures have been explained on the 
basis of this distinction, 574  they also account, in part, for the diverging conceptions of 
appellate proceedings in Common Law and Civil Law systems. Proceedings employing 
“concentrated” decision-making and increased first instance finality necessarily seek to 
insulate first instance adjudication, to a high degree, from extraneous adjustment. Therefore, 
access to appellate review is hampered to ensure that only those claims that have a reasonable 
chance of success are admitted, appellate proceedings are of a comparatively limited nature 
(which entails a preference for written argument, a constrained approach to additional 
evidence, and a reduced scope of appellate review), and appellate courts shy away from 
instantaneous decision-making. On the other hand, in systems utilising a “pluralistic” 
decision-making process and reduced first instance finality, appellate review is conceived of 
broadly and constitutes an important factor in the overall factual and legal assessment. Thus, 
lowered obstacles to appellate access ensure that appellate courts routinely review first 
instance decisions and extensive appellate structures supplement the initial decision-making 
process, which explains the predilection for oral argument, the broadened approach to 
additional evidence, a wide scope of appellate review, and an aversion from remittal. 
 
5.2.2.2. Truth-Seeking 
Whereas the establishment of the truth seems (one of) the primary aim(s) of any system of 
criminal procedure, it has been contended that the Civil Law “system of procedure is more 
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committed to the search for truth than is the […] adversary system”.575 Thus, in respect of the 
latter, the primary concern is to ensure that “parties abide by the rules regulating their ‘battle’” 
and “[t]he judgment itself is not so much in the nature of a pronouncement on the true facts of 
the case; it is, rather, a decision between the parties”.576 U.S. judges have remarked, along 
these lines, that the “adversary system rates truth too low among the values that institutions of 
justice are meant to serve”577 and that “storm clouds linger over […] the capacity of the 
adversarial process to promote effectively the search for truth”.578 Where proceedings are 
structured like an official enquiry, as in Civil Law systems, “the concern for ascertaining the 
facts of the case is much more central”.579 
 
This distinction has been deduced from the uneven distribution of “evidentiary barriers to 
conviction” faced by prosecutorial authorities in Common Law and Civil Law systems in first 
instance proceedings. 580  However, this characterisation equally applies to the differing 
conceptions of appellate review in Common Law and Civil Law systems. For instance, in a 
general criticism of the importance of appeals in the U.S. system, a U.S. Supreme Court 
justice derided “the legal community’s ‘obsessive concern that the result reached in a 
particular case be the right one’”.581 Indeed, the aforementioned aspects of restrained access to 
appellate review and the more limited nature of appellate proceedings in Common Law 
systems clearly reflect the diminished importance attached to the material truth.582 In addition, 
the more limited rights of appeal provided to prosecutorial authorities regarding acquittals on 
questions of fact in Common Law systems may also be explained on this basis. At least to a 
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certain degree,583 Common Law prosecutors are deprived from the opportunity to redress 
wrongful acquittals, which prevents the establishment of the material truth in such situations. 
On the other hand, the reduced obstacles to appellate review and the more expansive nature of 
appellate review disclose a heightened dedication to the promotion of judicial accuracy in 
Civil Law systems. Similarly, the fact that the rights of appeal of the prosecution and the 
defendant have been equated in such systems further reflects the need to correctly appraise 
relevant facts. Unlike in most Common Law systems, Civil Law prosecutors may appeal for 
the benefit of the accused, which adds to this commitment.584 
 
5.2.2.3. Sources of Law  
As indicated, Common Law systems emphasise judicial precedent.585 On this basis, questions 
of law assume a central role in appellate proceedings. As to “consistency” in the formulation 
and application of the law, 586  inferior courts may produce contradictory and erroneous 
interpretations of the law. In order to preserve the centrality of precedent, Common Law 
appellate courts must, thus, act as a harmonising factor. With regard to the “development” of 
the law,587 Common Law judges retain primary responsibility for the discovery of the law. 
Since they are located in the upper echelons of judicial hierarchy, Common Law appellate 
judges, thus, necessarily have far-reaching developmental responsibilities. Conversely, the 
central role of codified law in Civil Law systems moderates the adherence to precedent.588 
Codified law is more unyielding than a system relying on interpretations by a host of courts, 
although it remains susceptible to conflicting readings, and emerges mainly from political-
legislative processes. Accordingly, the appellate judges of such systems assume a far more 
limited role in respect of the homogenisation and discovery of the law.  
 
The different sources of law, thus, engender differing dynamics in appellate proceedings. The 
predominance of unwritten rules stresses the creation of legal certainty and the discovery of 
the law on appeal, which, in turn, leads to a prioritisation of questions of law and the 
                                                 
583 Those opposing double jeopardy reform invoke the increased risk of abuse and, thus, wrongful convictions on 
appeal. Even so, whether the debate is framed in respect of the possibility of a reduction of wrongfully acquitted 
persons or the possibility of an increase of wrongfully convicted persons, the required empirical data for such an 
assessment is lies “beyond our mortal reach”. In this regard, see: P. Roberts, ‘Double Jeopardy Law Reform: A 
Criminal Justice Commentary’, 65(3) Modern Law Review 393 (2002), at 397-401. 
584 Part I, Chapter 2.1; Part I, Chapter 2.2; Part I, Chapter 2.3. 
585 Part I, Chapter 1.1. 
586 Part I, Chapter 5.1.8. 
587 Part I, Chapter 5.1.8. 
588 Part I, Chapter 1.1. 
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“systemic” function of appellate review in Common Law systems. On the other hand, the 
application of more stable codified rules of law creates more latitude for factual assessments 
on appeal and the “quality-control” function of appellate review in Civil Law jurisdictions. 
 
6. Interim Conclusion: Norms of Customary International Law 
As suggested by Article 38(1)(b) of the ICJ Statute, two requirements must be fulfilled for a 
norm to attain the status of customary international law: “a general practice” that must be 
“accepted as law” (opinio juris). In the words of the ICJ, “[i]t is of course axiomatic that the 
material of customary international law is to be looked for primarily in the actual practice and 
opinio juris of States”.589 As regards the second element, a particular complication arises in 
relation to the systems of criminal procedure adopted by States domestically. In this regard, it 
has been noted that the choice for a particular legal system “is very unlikely to be a 
manifestation of opinio juris, except in relation to international human rights”, since such a 
choice “falls well within the province of sovereignty”.590 However, it is not necessary to 
address whether and to what extent States have arranged their appellate systems on the basis 
of an understanding that they were obliged to do so as a matter of law. This is because the 
first requirement does not permit norms of customary international law to be formulated 
regarding the aforementioned elements of appellate review in second instance. 
 
The requirement of State practice requires both uniformity/consistency and generality.591 The 
leading pronouncement of the ICJ regarding the former element declares that it must be 
established that “the rule invoked […] is in accordance with a constant and uniform usage”.592 
However, it is not necessary that the “corresponding practice must be in absolutely rigorous 
conformity with the rule”.593 In this regard, the ICJ has held that “the conduct of states should, 
in general, be consistent with such rules, and […] instances of state conduct inconsistent with 
a given rule should generally have been treated as breaches of that rule, not as indications of 
                                                 
589 Judgment, Case Concerning the Continental Shelf (Libyan Arab Jamahiriya/Malta), I.C.J. Reports 1985, p. 
13, ICJ, 3 June 1985, at 27. 
590 F. Mégret, ‘The Sources of International Criminal Procedure’, in G. Sluiter, H. Friman, S. Linton, S. Vasiliev, 
and S. Zappalà (eds.), International Criminal Procedure - Principles and Rules 68 (Oxford: Oxford University 
Press, 2013), at 71. As discussed, this study will consider norms of international human rights law concerning 
appellate proceedings on the basis of the internal frameworks of the Ad Hoc Tribunals and ICC. 
591 I. Brownlie, Principles of Public International Law (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2003), at 7-8. 
592 Judgment, Asylum Case (Colombia / Peru), I.C.J. Reports 1950, p. 266, ICJ, 20 November 1950, p. 14. 
593 Judgment, Case Concerning Military and Paramilitary Activities in and against Nicaragua (Nicaragua v. 
United States of America), I.C.J. Reports 1986, p. 14, ICJ, 27 June 1986, at 186. 
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the recognition of a new rule”.594 With respect to the latter element, “[c]ertainly universality 
[of State practice] is not required”.595 The ICJ has, for instance, considered whether State 
practice reveals “an increasing and widespread acceptance” of a particular concept.596 
 
In general, it has been noted that the practice of States in relation to criminal procedure “is 
likely to be so divergent and so difficult to analyse out of context that it would provide very 
little clue as to emerging […] norms” of customary international law. 597  The preceding 
analysis confirms this assertion in relation to appellate review at second instance in Common 
Law and Civil Law systems. The practice of Common Law and Civil Law systems is uniform 
in that such review is invariably made available to the person convicted at first instance and, 
at least to a certain degree, prosecutorial authorities. Furthermore, the inclusion of the right to 
appellate review into the Constitutions of several of the jurisdictions reviewed and numerous 
other jurisdictions constitutes evidence in support of the assertion that this practice arises out 
of a legal obligation.598 However, although there is no complete dichotomy, Common Law 
and Civil Law systems adopt, on balance, contrasting approaches with regard to: (i) the extent 
of the parties’ right to appeal; (ii) impediments to appellate review; (iii) preferences for an 
oral or written appellate procedure; (iv) additional evidence presented on appeal; and (v) the 
functions of appellate review. Moreover, despite signals of convergence in relation to the 
scope of appellate review and appellate courts’ powers, the dissimilarities continue to 
outweigh the similarities between the approaches pursued by these systems.  
 
Such State practice does not reveal an absence of “absolutely rigorous conformity”.599 Rather, 
such State activity discloses “so much uncertainty and contradiction, so much fluctuation and 
                                                 
594 Ibid. 
595 I. Brownlie, Principles of Public International Law (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2003), at 7. 
596 Judgment, Fisheries Jurisdiction Case (United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland v. Iceland), 
I.C.J. Reports 1974, p. 3, ICJ, 25 July 1974, at 58. 
597 F. Mégret, ‘The Sources of International Criminal Procedure’, in G. Sluiter, H. Friman, S. Linton, S. Vasiliev, 
and S. Zappalà (eds.), International Criminal Procedure - Principles and Rules 68 (Oxford: Oxford University 
Press, 2013), at 71. Similar: Editors (prepared by S. Vasiliev), ‘Introduction’, in G. Sluiter, H. Friman, S. Linton, 
S. Vasiliev, and S. Zappalà (eds.), International Criminal Procedure - Principles and Rules 1 (Oxford: Oxford 
University Press, 2013), at 28-29. 
598 S. Bassiouni, ‘Human Rights in the Context of Criminal Justice: Identifying International Procedural 
Protections and Equivalent Protections in National Constitutions’, 3(2) Duke Journal of Comparative & 
International Law 235 (1992-1993), at 287-288. More generally, it has been noted that, “[a]s an increasing 
number of States provide for a right to an appeal, there is clearly a trend towards such a customary right”. See: L. 
Doswald-Beck, ‘Fair Trial, Right to, International Protection’, in R. Wolfrum (ed.) The Max-Planck 
Encyclopedia of Public International Law 1104 (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2013), at 1111. 
599 Judgment, Case Concerning Military and Paramilitary Activities in and against Nicaragua (Nicaragua v. 
United States of America), I.C.J. Reports 1986, p. 14, ICJ, 27 June 1986, at 186. 
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discrepancy […] that it is not possible to discern in all this any constant and uniform 
usage”.600 The lack of sufficient State practice mandates the conclusion that no norms of 
customary international law may be formulated in relation to these elements of appellate 
review at second instance. As a consequence, it is not possible to define, on this basis, 
yardsticks that should govern the appellate procedures of the Ad Hoc Tribunals and the ICC. 
                                                 




Chapter one will describe the inception of the right to appeal in the ICCPR, ECHR, and the 
ACHR, as well as the rationale underlying this right. Subsequently, the second, third, and 
fourth chapters will address the different conceptions of the right to appeal in detail. 
Thereafter, in chapter five, the various approaches espoused by the human rights monitoring 
bodies and courts will be systematised and the causes of the similarities and dissimilarities 
will be laid out. Finally, the interim conclusion will set forth the legal consequences of the 
state of international human rights law regarding fair trial norms relevant to appellate 
proceedings for the appellate processes of the Ad Hoc Tribunals and the ICC. 
 
1. International Human Rights Law 
The efforts to codify human rights following World War II commenced in 1946, when the 
U.N. Economic and Social Council established a Commission on Human Rights and 
“instructed it to submit proposals, recommendations and reports regarding, inter alia, an 
international bill of human rights”.601  This process led to the adoption of the UDHR in 
1948602 and, following extensive preparatory work,603 the ICCPR in 1966. However, although 
the ECHR was negotiated, in part, concurrently with the ICCPR,604 the former was the first 
instrument to enshrine certain rights enumerated in the UDHR in binding form, since it was 
adopted in 1950. Whilst the process of negotiations concerning the ACHR was also conducted 
in parallel to the ICCPR, this instrument was adopted only in 1969. 
 
1.1. Inception of the Right to Appeal 
It has been noted that the right to appeal is “one of the more recent human rights of the so-
called ‘first generation’”.605 The primary reason for this is that such a right did not feature in 
the first drafts of the ICCPR.606 It was not until 1959 when, upon an Israeli motion, the 
                                                 
601 U.N. General Assembly, Draft International Covenants on Human Rights, Annotation Prepared by the 
Secretary-General, A/2929, 1 July 1995, at 1 (emphasis in original). 
602 U.N. General Assembly, Universal Declaration of Human Rights, A/RES/3/217, 10 December 1948. The 
UDHR does not contain a right to appeal, as such. 
603 D. Weissbrodt, The Right to a Fair Trial under the Universal Declaration of Human Rights and the 
International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (The Hague: Kluwer Law International, 2001), at 35-75. 
604 ECmHR, Preparatory Work on Article 6 of the ECHR, DH(56)11, 8 October 1956, at 9-10, 26. 
605 M. Nowak, U.N. Covenant on Civil and Political Rights: CCPR Commentary (Kehl: N.P. Engel Verlag, 
2005), at 348. 
606 D. Weissbrodt, The Right to a Fair Trial under the Universal Declaration of Human Rights and the 
International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (The Hague: Kluwer Law International, 2001), at 43-69. 
Also: e.g., U.N. General Assembly, Annotations on the Text of the Draft International Covenants on Human 
Rights, A/2929, 1 July 1955, at 73–92. 
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proposal to include a right to appeal in the ICCPR was tabled.607 Such a right was considered 
by most representatives “as an important guarantee” and it “was pointed out that it expressed 
a principle which should be applied by States according to the methods they considered 
appropriate”.608 The initial proposal set forth that “[e]veryone convicted of a crime – other 
than petty offences – shall have the right to appeal against conviction and sentence to a higher 
court” as “only a higher court could decide whether a trial had been conducted in accordance 
with the principles formulated in Article 14” ICCPR.609 Upon an inquiry whether “the right to 
appeal involved merely a review of the case by another court or if new evidence had to be 
introduced”, the Israeli delegate explained that he “only intended to provide for some sort of 
appeal” and, to clarify his intention, the phrase “appeal against conviction and sentence to a 
higher court” was replaced with “have his conviction and sentence reviewed by a higher 
tribunal”. 610  In addition to its belated development, the right to appeal did not attract 
significant attention after the entry into force of the ICCPR in 1976. In 1984, in its General 
Comment 13 on “[e]quality before the courts and the right to a fair and public hearing by an 
independent court established by law”, the HRC illustratively noted that “not enough 
information has been provided concerning the procedures of appeal” by States Parties.611 The 
contours of this guarantee only became somewhat clearer after more widespread consideration 
of this right by the HRC in the ensuing years, as summarised in General Comment 32 in 
2007.612 It has, nevertheless, been remarked that the HRC’s views reveal “many aspects of the 
right to appeal which the […] [HRC has] not yet” decided.613 
 
After the ICCPR had been signed, a Committee of Experts on Human Rights was tasked to 
“study and report on the problems arising from the co-existence of the European Convention 
on Human Rights and the United Nations Covenants”. 614  This Committee concluded, in 
                                                 
607 M. Bossuyt, Guide to the “Travaux Préparatoires” of the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights 
(Dordrecht: Martinus Nijhoff Publishers, 1987), at 310. 
608 Ibid., at 310. 
609 D. Weissbrodt, The Right to a Fair Trial under the Universal Declaration of Human Rights and the 
International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (The Hague: Kluwer Law International, 2001), at 74. 
610 Ibid. 
611 HRC, General Comment No. 13: Equality before the Courts and the Right to a Fair and Public hearing by an 
Independent Court established by Law, 13 April 1984, at 17. 
612 HRC, General Comment 32, Article 14: Right to Equality before Courts and Tribunals and to a Fair Trial, 
CCPR/C/GC/32, 23 August 2007, at 45-51. 
613 J. Möller and A. de Zayas, United Nations Human Rights Committee Case Law 1977 – 2008 - A Handbook 
(Kehl: N.P. Engel Verlag, 2009), at 308-309. 
614 Council of Europe, Report of the Committee of Experts on Human Rights to the Committee of Ministers, 
Problems arising out of the Co-Existence of the United Nations Covenants on Human Rights and the European 
Convention on Human Rights, H(70)7, September 1970, at 2.  
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relation to the right to a fair trial, that, inter alia, the right to appeal clearly involves an 
obligation “additional to those set out in the” ECHR”.615 Such a right had not been raised in 
relation to Article 6 ECHR in the drafting history616 and, following the adoption of the ECHR, 
the ECmHR specifically concluded that the right to appeal could not be deduced from Article 
6 ECHR. 617  However, the Committee of Experts on Human Rights also found that the 
implications of including such a right “may be very far-reaching”, considering that “[i]t might 
require a third degree of jurisdiction if a person acquitted in the first instance is convicted by a 
higher tribunal”, “there are some cases in which a convicted person does not have a right to 
his conviction or sentence being reviewed by a higher tribunal according to law […]”, and 
“[i]t is also not clear whether such a review procedure must allow for the review of both the 
law and the facts”.618 Following a recommendation by the Parliamentary Assembly of the 
Council of Europe to the Committee of Ministers to, inter alia, “endeavour to insert as many 
as possible of the substantive provisions of the […] [ICCPR] in the” ECHR619 and further 
preparatory work,620 the work of this Committee culminated in the adoption of Protocol 7 
ECHR. This Protocol has not addressed all the differences between the ICCPR and the ECHR, 
since “the committee of experts kept in mind in particular the need to include in the […] 
[ECHR] only such rights as could be stated in sufficiently specific terms to be guaranteed 
within the framework of the system of control instituted by the” ECHR. 621  However, it 
enshrines, inter alia, a “[r]ight of appeal in criminal matters”, accompanied by certain 
exceptions.622 Even so, following the adoption of Protocol 7 ECHR, this version of the right 
to appeal has, like Article 14(5) ICCPR, been applied in a relatively limited manner in the 
jurisprudence of the Strasbourg organs. Whereas complaints based on Article 2 Protocol 7 
ECHR began to be assessed more intensively towards the mid-1990s, the first judgment on 
the merits was only delivered in the early 2000s.623 
 
                                                 
615 Ibid., at 3. 
616 ECmHR, Preparatory Work on Article 6 of the ECHR, DH(56)11, 8 October 1956. 
617 Judgment, Köplinger v. Austria, Application No. 1850/63, ECmHR, 29 March 1966, referring to an earlier 
decision of 20 December 1957 (Application No. 277/57) with the same outcome. 
618 Council of Europe, Report of the Committee of Experts on Human Rights to the Committee of Ministers, 
Problems arising out of the Co-Existence of the United Nations Covenants on Human Rights and the European 
Convention on Human Rights, H(70)7, September 1970, at 144.  
619 Parliamentary Assembly of the Council of Europe, Protection of Human Rights in Europe, Recommendation 
791 (1976), 17 September 1976, at 12(c). 
620 Council of Europe, Explanatory Report Protocol No. 7 to the Convention for the Protection of Human Rights 
and Fundamental Freedoms, E.T.S. No. 17, 22 November 1984, at 3, 5. 
621 Ibid., at 3. 
622 Art. 2 Protocol 7 ECHR. 
623 Judgment, Krombach v. France, Application No. 29731/96, ECtHR, 13 February 2001. 
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Like its European counterpart, questions have arisen as to the co-existence and coordination 
between the proposed ACHR and the ICCPR. 624  After the adoption of the latter, “a 
comparative study of the Draft Convention on Human Rights prepared by the Inter-American 
Council of Jurists, the international covenants on human rights of the United Nations, and the 
changes proposed by the Inter-American Commission on Human Rights to the draft 
convention prepared by the Inter-American Council of Jurists” similarly noted certain 
differences between the provisions on the right to a fair trial in the ICCPR and ACHR,625 but 
ultimately concluded that the systems could coexist. 626  Thereafter, the IACmHR was 
requested “to draw up a revised and completed text of a preliminary draft convention” and to 
ensure “harmony with the Covenants of the United Nations”.627 
 
However, as with the ICCPR, the right to appeal was not considered a priority in the context 
of the ACHR and it was shaped at a relatively advanced stage of its travaux préparatoires. 
Aside from the draft of the Government of Chile, the right to appeal was not foreseen in other 
proposals for an ACHR.628 In its study of these drafts, the IACmHR “decided to take into 
special consideration the experience of the European countries that approved the […] [ECHR] 
and the discussions that took place during the preparation of the draft United Nations 
Agreements on Human Rights”. 629  Consequently, the IACmHR suggested several 
amendments,630  proposing, inter alia, that Article 6(2) of the Inter-American Council of 
Jurists’ draft should be modified to include a right to appeal: “[d]ue process in penal matters 
should cover the following minimum guarantees: […] h. the right of appeal to a higher court 
of the decision handed down in the first instance”. 631  Thereafter, the aforementioned 
comparative study noted certain differences between the provisions on the right to a fair trial, 
                                                 
624 IACmHR, Report on the Work Accomplished during its Seventeenth Session, OEA/Ser.L/V/11 18, Doc. 25, 
30 July 1968, at 4, 14. 
625 IACmHR, Inter-American Yearbook on Human Rights, 1968, at 197. 
626 Ibid., at 211, 385-387. 
627 IACmHR, Report on the Work Accomplished during its Nineteenth Session, OEA/Ser.L/V/II.19, Doc. 52, 11 
February 1969, at 30. 
628 IACmHR, Comparative Study of the Draft Convention on Human Rights Prepared by the Inter-American 
Council of Jurists (Approved at its Fourteenth Meeting, Santiago, Chile, 1959) and those Presented by Uruguay 
and Chile at the Second Special Inter-American Conference (Rio de Janeiro 1965), OEA/Ser.L/V/II.14 Doc. 7, 7 
April 1966, at 9-13. 
629 IACmHR, Report on the Work Accomplished during its Fourteenth Session, OEA/Ser.UV/ii.15, Doc. 29, 14 
March 1967, at 52. 
630 Ibid., at 56; IACmHR, Report on the Work Accomplished during its Fifteenth Session, OEA/Ser.L/V/II,16, 
Doc. 20, 26 July 1967, at 28-33, Appendix I. 
631 IACmHR, Report on the Work Accomplished during its Fourteenth Session, OEA/Ser.UV/ii.15, Doc. 29, 14 
March 1967, at 56; IACmHR, Report on the Work Accomplished during its Fifteenth Session, 
OEA/Ser.L/V/II,16, Doc. 20, 26 July 1967, Appendix I. 
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but did not assess the right to appeal.632 The subsequent preparatory work did not subject the 
right to appeal to meaningful alteration either. Article 7(2)(i) of the 1968 draft prepared by the 
IACmHR enshrined “the right to appeal a first instance judgment to a higher court”.633 
Thereafter, during the Inter-American Specialised Conference on Human Rights, 634  the 
reference to “a first instance judgment” was deleted upon an Ecuadorian amendment, on the 
basis that some countries have two instances, but perhaps others may have as many as 
three.635 A further reorganisation of the text ensured that the current version of the right to 
appeal was laid down in Article 8(2)(h) ACHR. Nevertheless, no different from the views of 
the HRC and the judgments of the Strasbourg organs, the IACtHR’s jurisprudence concerning 
Article 8(2)(h) ACHR has been restrained. Above and beyond general institutional difficulties 
in its early functioning,636 it has addressed a limited aspect of the right to appeal in 1999637 
and commenced considering it in a more extensive manner only as of 2004.638 
 
1.2. Functions of the Right to Appeal 
The rationale underlying the right to appeal has not attracted significant attention. In respect 
of the ICCPR, it has been remarked that appeals generally “function as a mechanism whereby 
parties can obtain a more favourable outcome to the proceedings” and “promote ideals such as 
consistency and fairness and regulate uniform interpretation of the law” but, “[w]ithin the 
framework of human rights, only the first of these aspects can be of relevance”.639 Similarly, 
the IACtHR advanced that such a right “seeks to protect the right of defense, to the extent that 
it offers the possibility of bringing an action to prevent a decision adopted in a flawed process 
and one that contains errors from becoming final”.640 International human rights law, thus, 
establishes minimum touchstones for the “quality-control” function of appellate review.641 
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633 IACmHR, Report on the Work Accomplished during its Nineteenth Session, OEA/Ser.L/V/II.19, Doc. 52, 11 
February 1969, at 41, Appendix I. 
634 Ibid., at 30. 
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In light of its specific subject matter, the HRC has mainly invoked Article 14(5) ICCPR in its 
views in relation to the fairness of appellate proceedings. However, it has not limited its 
assessment entirely to this provision, but has resorted to Article 14(1) and 14(3) ICCPR in 
certain situations too. These legal bases will, accordingly, be assessed separately. 
 
2.1. Article 14(1) ICCPR 
The first paragraph of Article 14(1) contains three distinct guarantees. It mandates that: (i) 
“[a]ll persons shall be equal before the courts and tribunals”; (ii) “everyone shall be entitled to 
a fair and public hearing by a competent, independent and impartial tribunal established by 
law”; and (iii) “[t]he press and the public may be excluded from all or part of a trial […] but 
any judgment rendered in a criminal case […] shall be made public […]”. 
 
2.1.1. Equality 
The HRC has found that “[t]he right to equality before courts and tribunals, in general terms, 
guarantees […] equal access and equality of arms, and ensures that the parties to the 
proceedings in question are treated without any discrimination”.642  
 
Considering that “[t]he right of equal access to a court […] does not address the issue of the 
right to appeal”,643 the HRC has mainly considered “equality of arms” in connection with 
appellate proceedings. This aspect of the right to equality “means that the same procedural 
rights are to be provided to all the parties unless distinctions are based on law and can be 
justified on objective and reasonable grounds, not entailing actual disadvantage or other 
unfairness to the defendant”.644 Thus, the exclusion of defendants from appellate hearings, 
whilst the prosecution is permitted to attend, contravenes equal treatment.645 
                                                 
642 HRC, General Comment 32, Article 14: Right to Equality before Courts and Tribunals and to a Fair Trial, 
CCPR/C/GC/32, 23 August 2007, at 8. 
643 Ibid., at 12. 
644 Ibid., at 12. 
645 Views, Dudko v. Australia, Communication No. 1347/2005, HRC, 23 July 2007, at 7.3-7.4; Views, Quliyev v. 
Azerbaijan, Communication No. 1972/2010, HRC, 16 October 2014, at 9.3. Similar: Views, Aliev v. Ukraine, 
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2.1.2. Public Hearing 
According to the HRC, “[a]ll trials […] must in principle be conducted orally and publicly”, 
although this requirement “does not necessarily apply to all appellate proceedings which may 
take place on the basis of written presentations”.646 On this basis, it has found that “the 
absence of oral hearings in the appellate proceedings […] [raises] no issue under article 14” 
ICCPR,647 provided that the tribunal “can look at the factual dimensions of the case”.648 
 
However, oral hearings on appeal have been required in particular circumstances. For 
instance, an appellate court had admitted that a first instance judge ought to have been 
disqualified, but ruled, on the basis of a review of the written evidence, that the verdict had 
not been affected by the judge’s participation. In this regard, the HRC held that only oral 
proceedings “would have enabled the Court [of Appeal] to proceed with the reevaluation of 
all the evidence submitted by the parties”.649 Pursuant to this precedent, and in conjunction 
with a reference to the corresponding jurisprudence of the ECtHR, the HRC has considered 
that, as an appellate court “had to examine the case as to the facts and the law, and in 
particular had to make a full assessment of the question of the author’s guilt or innocence, it 
should have used its power to conduct hearings” when imposing additional convictions.650 
 
2.1.3. Impartial Tribunal 
Impartiality entails that “judges must not allow their judgment to be influenced by personal 
bias or prejudice, nor harbour preconceptions about the particular case before them, nor act in 
ways that improperly promote the interests of one of the parties to the detriment of the other” 
and that “the tribunal must also appear to a reasonable observer to be impartial”.651 
 
In respect of appellate proceedings, the HRC’s views have, based on Article 14(1) ICCPR, 
mainly focused on the involvement of the same judges in the appellate process and the 
preceding stages of a criminal trial. For instance, the participation of two appellate judges in 
                                                 
646 HRC, General Comment 32, Article 14: Right to Equality before Courts and Tribunals and to a Fair Trial, 
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preliminary proceedings, which “was such as to allow them to form an opinion on the case 
prior to the […] appeal proceedings” and which was “necessarily related to the charges 
against the author and the evaluation of those charges”, has been deemed incompatible with 
the impartiality requirement.652 However, the involvement of a judge in, on the one hand, an 
appeal involving the quashing of an acquittal and ordering a retrial and, on the other hand, the 
appeal instituted by the author after he had been convicted on retrial, is not contrary to this 
exigence. In this regard, the HRC noted that “the subject matter of the author’s cassation 
appeal should have related only to his second retrial by the jury, and not to the decision […] 
quashing his acquittal” and, therefore, “the author’s cassation appeal de jure does not affect 
the decision […] quashing his acquittal.653 
 
2.2. Article 14(3) ICCPR 
Supplementing the general safeguards contained in Article 14(1) ICCPR, Article 14(3) 
ICCPR applies specifically to criminal proceedings. This provision lays down several 
“minimum guarantees”, to which “everyone shall be entitled […], in full equality”. In the 
context of appellate proceedings, the HRC has mainly assessed issues pertaining to legal 
assistance, which have been enshrined in Article 14(3)(b) and 14(3)(d) ICCPR, and, to a more 
limited extent, the rights set forth in Article 14(3)(a) and (d) ICCPR. 
 
2.2.1. Article 14(3)(a) ICCPR 
Article 14(3)(a) ICCPR lays down the right “[t]o be informed promptly and in detail in a 
language which he understands of the nature and cause of the charge against him”. In relation 
to an aggravation of a first instance conviction on appeal, the HRC concluded that no 
violation had been committed, since the basis of the author’s aggravated conviction had been 
included in the charges levelled against him and this conviction was subsequently reviewed 
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cases, in which a defendant may contest issues concerning arrest, probable cause, and the rendering of charges 
for trial. The idea of prejudice in a judge usually refers to some extraneous matter that might bias him against a 
particular party. It does not refer to his review of the case in prior proceedings. Indeed, some court systems 
choose to assign any related criminal cases to the same judge, in order to benefit by the judge’s familiarity with 
the issues. It would be radical, indeed, to suggest that because a judge had passed on an issue of bail or remand, 
or the adequacy of an indictment, that he was thereafter barred from any further participation in the case. There 
is no suggestion of why, in this particular case, there was any prejudice formed from the earlier judgments 
undertaken in prior professional review”. See: Views, Larrañaga v. the Philippines, Communication No. 
1421/2005, HRC, 24 July 2006, Individual Opinion by Committee Member Ms. Ruth Wedgwood.  
653 Views, Babkin v. Russian Federation, Communication No. 1310/2004, HRC, 3 April 2008, at 13.3. 
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by a third instance.654 Even though the HRC did not specify the legal basis, it is implicit in 
this consideration that the aggravation of a conviction on appeal, pursuant to an aspect 
extrinsic to the original charge, and without the possibility of further appellate review, 
contravenes paragraphs 3(a) and (5) of Article 14 ICCPR. 
 
2.2.2. Article 14(3)(b) ICCPR 
The HRC has applied the right to “have adequate time and facilities for the preparation of his 
defence”655 in connection with the information provided to the person concerned as to the date 
of consideration of his appeal. In this respect, it concluded that, “although not effectively 
informing him of the date […], the State party did not deprive him of the right to apply for the 
postponement of the hearing”, which meant that no violation could be established.656 
 
In relation to the right “to communicate with counsel of his own choosing”, the HRC held that 
“[a] State party is not to be held responsible for the conduct of a defence lawyer, unless it 
was, or should have been, manifest to the judge that the lawyer’s behaviour was incompatible 
with the interests of justice”.657 It, indeed, found violations of the right to effective legal 
assistance on appeal on several occasions and, in particular, where counsel failed to put 
forward appellate arguments and/or conceded that there is no merit in the appeal.658 However, 
the legal basis for the views of the HRC has fluctuated considerably. It has mainly found 
violations of Article 14(3)(b) ICCPR and Article 14(d) ICCPR taken together,659 but it has 
also found a violation of Article 14(3)(d) ICCPR in conjunction with a rejection of the need to 
consider Article 14(3)(b) ICCPR.660 Moreover, it has also found a breach of Article 14(3)(b) 
ICCPR combined with Article 14(5) ICCPR.661 
 
                                                 
654 Views, Kulomin v. Hungary, Communication No. 521/1992, HRC, 22 March 1996, at 11.7. 
655 Also: Part II, Chapter 2.3.7. 
656 Views, Babkin v. Russian Federation, Communication No. 1310/2004, HRC, 3 April 2008, at 13.4. 
657 HRC, General Comment 32, Article 14: Right to Equality before Courts and Tribunals and to a Fair Trial, 
CCPR/C/GC/32, 23 August 2007, at 32. 
658 Views, Graham & Morrison v. Jamaica, Communication No. 461/1991, HRC, 25 March 1996, at 10.5; 
Views, Steadman v. Jamaica, Communication No. 528/1993, HRC, 2 April 1997, at 10.3; Views, McLeod v. 
Jamaica, Communication No. 734/1997, HRC, 3 June 1998, at 6.3; Views, Daley v. Jamaica, Communication 
No. 750/1997, HRC, 3 August 1998, at 7.5; Views, Burrell v. Jamaica, Communication No. 546/1993, HRC, 18 
July 1996, at 9.3. 
659 Views, Graham & Morrison v. Jamaica, Communication No. 461/1991, HRC, 25 March 1996, at 10.5; 
Views, Steadman v. Jamaica, Communication No. 528/1993, HRC, 2 April 1997, at 10.3; Views, McLeod v. 
Jamaica, Communication No. 734/1997, HRC, 3 June 1998, at 6.3. 
660 Views, Daley v. Jamaica, Communication No. 750/1997, HRC, 3 August 1998, at 7.5. 




2.2.3. Article 14(3)(d) ICCPR 
Paragraph (d) of Article 14 ICCPR is a multi-faceted provision. It concerns the right “[t]o be 
tried in his presence, and to defend himself in person or through legal assistance of his own 
choosing; to be informed, if he does not have legal assistance, of this right; and to have legal 
assistance assigned to him, in any case where the interests of justice so require, and without 
payment by him in any such case if he does not have sufficient means to pay for it”. 
 
Although the HRC predominantly dealt with the presence of the accused under Article 14(1) 
ICCPR,662  it has also invoked Article 14(3)(d) ICCPR. In this regard, it found that this 
provision was applicable “as the court examined the case as to the facts and the law and made 
a new assessment of the issue of guilt or innocence”.663 It considered, furthermore, that it 
“requires that accused persons are entitled to be present during their trial and that proceedings 
in the absence of the accused are only permissible if this is in the interest of the proper 
administration of justice, i.e. when accused persons, although informed of the proceedings 
sufficiently in advance, decline to exercise their right to be present”.664 In addition, the HRC 
took into account that the person concerned “did not have the opportunity to consult with his 
lawyer regarding the submissions that the prosecutor made”.665 
 
Turning to “the right of all accused of a criminal charge to defend themselves in person or 
through legal counsel of their own choosing and to be informed of this right”,666 several issues 
have arisen in the views of the HRC. For instance, regarding the conduct of an appellate 
hearing in the absence of both the accused and his counsel, the HRC found violations of 
Article 14(3)(d) ICCPR in isolation667 or in conjunction with Article 14(5) ICCPR.668 This 
guarantee further implies that the defendant must be informed of his right to request the 
presence of his lawyer during appellate hearings.669 Furthermore, where an accused’s request 
for counsel to be replaced is denied, a violation of Article 14(3)(d) ICCPR may ensue if 
                                                 
662 Part II, Chapter 2.1.1. Also: HRC, General Comment 32, Article 14: Right to Equality before Courts and 
Tribunals and to a Fair Trial, CCPR/C/GC/32, 23 August 2007, at 36. 
663 Views, Dorofeev v. Russia, Communication No. 2041/2011, HRC, 11 July 2014, at 10.6. 
664 Ibid. 
665 Ibid. 
666 HRC, General Comment 32, Article 14: Right to Equality before Courts and Tribunals and to a Fair Trial, 
CCPR/C/GC/32, 23 August 2007, at 37. 
667 Views, Aliev v. Ukraine, Communication No. 781/1997, HRC, 7 August 2003, at 7.3. 
668 Views, Lumley v. Jamaica, Communication No. 662/1995, HRC, 31 March 1999, at 7.4. 
669 Views, Y.M. v. Russia, Communication No. 2059/2011, HRC, 31 March 2016, at 9.7. 
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insufficient justification is provided “why it was necessary for the administration of justice to 
restrict the author’s right to replace the lawyer or why it was not possible to assign a public 
defender to him”.670 Finally, as highlighted in respect of Article 14(3)(b) ICCPR, ineffective 
assistance by counsel on appeal may also engender a violation of Article 14(3)(d) ICCPR.671 
However, the HRC has found separate violations of Article 14(3)(d) ICCPR in these 
circumstances as well.672 Pursuant to a combined assessment of, on the one hand, Article 
14(3)(d) ICCPR and, on the other hand, Article 14(3)(b) and/or Article 14(5) ICCPR, it has 
further clarified that no ineffective assistance is provided when: counsel abandons one or 
several grounds of appeal in the exercise of professional judgment;673 legal aid counsel fails to 
seek instructions from the client in relation to the appeal;674 or issues that have not been raised 
by counsel at trial cannot be raised anew on appeal according to domestic law.675  
 
Under “the right to have legal assistance assigned to accused persons whenever the interests 
of justice so require, and without payment by them in any such case if they do not have 
sufficient means to pay for it”,676 the HRC has considered that “[a] denial of legal aid by the 
court reviewing the death sentence of an indigent convicted person constitutes […] a 
violation” of this provision.677 This interpretation extends to additional instances of appellate 
review too.678 However, this right is not limited to capital punishment cases, but applies to 
other types of criminal proceedings as well. 679  The HRC has further established that a 
limitation of this right on the basis of the prospect of success on appeal may be justified.680  
 
  
                                                 
670 Ibid., at 9.5. 
671 Part II, Chapter 2.2.2. 
672 Views, Little v. Jamaica, Communication No. 283/1988, HRC, 1 November 1991, at 8.4; Views, Campbell v. 
Jamaica, Communication No. 248/1987, HRC, 30 March 1992, at 6.6; Views, Collins v. Jamaica, 
Communication No. 356/1989, HRC, 25 March 1993, at 8.2; Views, Jones v. Jamaica, Communication No. 
585/1994, HRC, 25 May 1998, at 9.5; Views, Morrison v. Jamaica, Communication No. 663/1995, HRC, 25 
November 1998, at 8.6. 
673 Views, Marshall v. Jamaica, Communication No. 730/1996, HRC, 3 November 1998, at 6.5; Views, Bailey v. 
Jamaica, Communication No. 709/1996, HRC, 21 July 1999, at 7.2. 
674 Views, Teesdale v. Trinidad & Tobago, Communication No. 677/1996, HRC, 1 April 2002, at 9.7. 
675 Views, Berry v. Jamaica, Communication No. 330/1988, HRC, 26 April 1994, at 11.6. 
676 HRC, General Comment 32, Article 14: Right to Equality before Courts and Tribunals and to a Fair Trial, 
CCPR/C/GC/32, 23 August 2007, at 38. 
677 Ibid., at 51. 
678 Views, LaVende v. Trinidad & Tobago, Communication No. 554/1993, HRC, 29 October 1997, at 5.8. 
679 Views, Z.P. v. Canada, Communication No. 341/1988, HRC, 11 April 1991, at 2.3-2.5, 5.4. 
680 Ibid., at 4.4, 5.4. 
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2.2.4. Article 14(3)(e) ICCPR 
Article 14(3)(e) ICCPR, which enshrines the accused person’s right “[t]o examine, or have 
examined, the witnesses against him and to obtain the attendance and examination of 
witnesses on his behalf under the same conditions as witnesses against him”, is more limited 
than meets the eye. In general, it does not “provide an unlimited right to obtain the attendance 
of any witness requested by the accused or their counsel, but only a right to have witnesses 
admitted that are relevant for the defence, and to be given a proper opportunity to question 
and challenge witnesses against them at some stage of the proceedings”.681 
 
Whilst this right may have some relevance to appellate proceedings, the HRC’s views are not 
entirely clear in this respect. For instance, it has neglected to explicate how the refusal of a 
court of first instance to order expert testimony of crucial importance constitutes a 
simultaneous violation of Articles 14(3)(e) and 14(5) ICCPR, in view of the fact that the 
author had complained about the delays affecting the appellate process, as a result of which he 
was forced to abandon the appeal.682 Moreover, it has, in a conclusory manner, stated that the 
impossibility of examining witnesses on appeal does not infringe Article 14(3)(e) ICCPR, 
since the author indicated that he did not desire to call witnesses in his leave to appeal.683 
 
2.3. Article 14(5) ICCPR 
The HRC has identified several issues encompassed by Article 14(5) ICCPR, which may be 
categorised as follows: (i) the extension of the right to appeal to convicted persons;684 (ii) the 
obligation to ensure appellate review, as such;685 (iii) the modalities of appellate review;686 
(iv) the provision of (additional) appellate review when an acquittal pronounced by a lower 
instance is succeeded by an appellate conviction;687 (v) the provision of (further) appellate 
review when a person is directly brought before the highest domestic court;688 (vi) the scope 
of appellate review;689 (vii) the effective exercise of the right to appeal;690 and (viii) legal 
                                                 
681 HRC, General Comment 32, Article 14: Right to Equality before Courts and Tribunals and to a Fair Trial, 
CCPR/C/GC/32, 23 August 2007, at 39. 
682 Views, García Fuenzalida v. Ecuador, Communication No. 480/1991, HRC, 12 July 1996, at 3.6, 9.5. 
683 Views, Lumley v. Jamaica, Communication No. 662/1995, HRC, 31 March 1999, at 7.2. 
684 HRC, General Comment 32, Article 14: Right to Equality before Courts and Tribunals and to a Fair Trial, 
CCPR/C/GC/32, 23 August 2007, at 45. 
685 Ibid., at 45-46, 50. 
686 Ibid., at 45. 
687 Ibid., at 47. 
688 Ibid., at 47. 
689 Ibid., at 48. 
690 Ibid., at 49. 
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assistance on appeal.691 Moreover, in its views, the HRC has, on this basis, also assessed the 
rights to a reasoned opinion by an appellate court and to be present at appellate hearings.692 
 
2.3.1. Convicted Persons 
Due to the reference to “convicted” in Article 14(5) ICCPR, the HRC has inescapably 
rejected a communication alleging a violation of Article 14(5) ICCPR in respect of first 
instance proceedings resulting in acquittal.693 
 
The wording of Article 14(5) ICCPR may suggest that appellate review in criminal matters is 
an obligatory affair, considering that it states that everyone convicted on criminal charges 
“shall” have such a right. However, the views of the HRC have established otherwise. For 
instance, when one insists upon being tried in first instance before the highest domestic court, 
even though the regular avenue would have a guaranteed a right of appeal, this right has been 
considered forfeited.694 A similar conclusion is implied in the findings that the right to appeal 
had not been violated where counsel had not initiated an appeal after informing the person 
concerned that there were no appealable grounds695 or where the right to appeal had been 
withdrawn on the basis of seemingly dubious advice by counsel696. 
 
2.3.2. Availability of Appellate Review 
The plain absence of a higher instance constitutes, of course, the emblematical violation of 
Article 14(5) ICCPR. For instance, in one of its first views on the right to appeal, the 
exclusion by law of the possibility of review of a criminal conviction imposed by a military 
court was deemed a transgression of Article 14(5) ICCPR.697 Only one State Party to the 
ICCPR appears to have made a general reservation to this provision.698 
 
                                                 
691 Ibid., at 51. 
692 Also: Part II, Chapter 2.1.1; Part II, Chapter 2.2.3. 
693 Views, L.N.P. v. Argentina, Communication No. 1610/2007, HRC, 18 July 2011, at 12.4. 
694 Views, Pascual Estevill v. Spain, Communication No. 1004/2001, HRC, 25 March 2003, at 6.2. 
695 Views, Robinson v. Jamaica, Communication No. 731/1996, HRC, 29 March 2000, at 10.5-10.6. 
696 Views, Devgan v. Canada, Communication No. 948/2000, HRC, 30 October 2000, at 2.2-2.3, 4.2. 
697 Views, Salgar de Montejo v. Colombia, Communication No. 64/1979, HRC, 24 March 1982, at 9, 11. 
698 Trinidad and Tobago (“The Government of the Republic of Trinidad and Tobago reserves the right not to 
apply paragraph 5 of article 14 in view of the fact that section 43 of its Supreme Court of Judicature Act No. 12 
of 1962 does not confer on a person convicted on indictment an unqualified right of appeal and that in particular 
cases, appeal to the Court of Appeal can only be done with the leave of the Court of Appeal itself or of the Privy 




In addition, when domestic law excludes regular appellate review of a conviction by a higher 
court, but allows for alternative remedies, the HRC has assessed whether the latter may be 
characterised as an “appeal” for the purposes of Article 14(5) ICCPR. For instance, “[a] 
system of supervisory review that only applies to sentences whose execution has commenced 
does not meet the requirements of article 14, paragraph 5 [ICCPR], regardless of whether 
such review can be requested by the convicted person or is dependent on the discretionary 
power of a judge or prosecutor”.699 Initially, the HRC had rejected such remedies as they were 
considered of an extraordinary character and their application was dependent on the exercise 
of discretionary powers by judicial officials.700 Subsequently, the HRC emphasised that such 
review “only applies to already executory decisions and thus constitutes an extraordinary 
means of appeal which is dependent on the discretionary power of judge or prosecutor”.701 
Furthermore, whereas Article 14(5) ICCPR does not extend to post-conviction remedies,702 
the possibility of applying for review on the basis of new evidence is also an inadequate 
substitute for an appeal in the event that regular appellate review is not available. According 
to the HRC, “[t]he possibility of applying to a Court to review a conviction on the basis of 
new evidence is by definition something other than a review of an existing conviction, as an 
existing conviction is based on evidence which existed at the time it was handed down”.703  
 
Moreover, the HRC clarified that a multi-level appeal was not foreseen by the drafters of the 
ICCPR. Article 14(5) ICCPR “does not require States parties to provide for several instances 
of appeal”. 704  Thus, a summary dismissal of an appeal, instituted after a first instance 
conviction had been affirmed by an appellate court, was not considered a violation.705 This 
does not detract from the fact that, if domestic law allows for multi-level appellate review, 
effective access must be provided under Article 14(5) ICCPR.706 
 
                                                 
699 HRC, General Comment 32, Article 14: Right to Equality before Courts and Tribunals and to a Fair Trial, 
CCPR/C/GC/32, 23 August 2007, at 50. 
700 Views, Gelazauskas v. Lithuania, Communication No. 836/1998, HRC, 17 March 2003, at 7.2, 7.6; Views, 
Saidova v. Tajikistan, Communication No. 964/2001, HRC, 8 July 2004, at 6.5; Views, Ratiani v. Georgia, 
Communication No. 975/2001, HRC, 21 July 2005, at 11.2. 
701 Views, Bandajevsky v. Belarus, Communication No. 1100/2002, HRC, 28 March 2006, at 10.13; Views, 
Kovalev v. Belarus, Communication No. 2120/2011, HRC, 29 October 2012, at 11.6. 
702 Views, Litvin v. Ukraine, Communication No. 1535, HRC, 19 July 2011, at 9.4; Views, Minogue v. Australia, 
Communication No. 954/2000, HRC, 2 November 2004, at 2.2, 6.4. 
703 Views, Ratiani v. Georgia, Communication No. 975/2001, HRC, 21 July 2005, at 11.3. 
704 HRC, General Comment 32, Article 14: Right to Equality before Courts and Tribunals and to a Fair Trial, 
CCPR/C/GC/32, 23 August 2007, at 45. 
705 Views, Rouse v. the Philippines, Communication No. 1089/2002, HRC, 25 July 2005, at 2.20, 2.21, 7.6. 
706 Part II, Chapter 2.3.7. 
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2.3.3. Modalities of Appellate Review 
According to the HRC, the expression “according to law” in Article 14(5) ICCPR “is not 
intended to leave the very existence of the right of review to the discretion of the States 
parties, since this right is recognised by the […] [ICCPR], and not merely by domestic 
law”.707 In connection with the preceding discussion on the availability of higher review,708 it, 
thus, rejected the interpretation that these words leave “it to national law to determine in 
which cases […] application may be made to a court of higher instance”.709 This term “rather 
relates to the determination of the modalities by which the review by a higher tribunal is to be 
carried out, as well as which court is responsible for carrying out a review”.710 
 
Furthermore, the HRC has found, in the context of the possibility of restricting rights 
contained in the ICCPR on the basis of domestic law, that “a norm, to be characterized as a 
‘law’, must be formulated with sufficient precision to enable an individual to regulate his or 
her conduct accordingly and it must be made accessible to the public”.711 Since Article 14(5) 
ICCPR refers to “law” and appellate modalities may similarly entail a restriction of (aspects 
of) the accused’s right to appeal, the requirements of sufficient precision and foreseeability 
must be complied with in the regulation of appellate proceedings too. 
 
2.3.4. Appellate Conviction Revoking Acquittal 
According to the HRC, “[a]rticle 14, paragraph 5 [ICCPR] is violated […] where a conviction 
imposed by an appeal court or a court of final instance, following acquittal by a lower court, 
according to domestic law, cannot be reviewed by a higher court.”712 The rationale underlying 
this approach is that Article 14(5) ICCPR “not only guarantees that the judgement will be 
placed before a higher court […] but also that the conviction will undergo a second 
review”.713 It subsequently noted that, “[a]lthough a person acquitted at first instance may be 
                                                 
707 HRC, General Comment 32, Article 14: Right to Equality before Courts and Tribunals and to a Fair Trial, 
CCPR/C/GC/32, 23 August 2007, at 45. 
708 Part II, Chapter 2.3.2. 
709 Views, Salgar de Montejo v. Colombia, Communication No. 64/1979, HRC, 24 March 1982, at 3.2. 
710 HRC, General Comment 32, Article 14: Right to Equality before Courts and Tribunals and to a Fair Trial, 
CCPR/C/GC/32, 23 August 2007, at 45. 
711 Ibid., at 25. Also: HRC, General Comment 35, Article 9 (Liberty and Security of Person), CCPR/C/GC/35, 16 
December 2014, at 22; HRC, General Comment No. 27, Freedom of Movement (Article 12), 
CCPR/C/21/Rev.1/Add.9, 1 November 1999, at 13. 
712 HRC, General Comment 32, Article 14: Right to Equality before Courts and Tribunals and to a Fair Trial, 
CCPR/C/GC/32, 23 August 2007, at 47. Also: M. Nowak, U.N. Covenant on Civil and Political Rights: CCPR 
Commentary (Kehl: N.P. Engel Verlag, 2005), at 351. 
713 Views, Gomaríz Valera v. Spain, Communication No. 1095/2002, HRC, 22 July 2005, at 7.1. 
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convicted on appeal by the higher court, this circumstance alone cannot impair the 
defendant’s right to review of his conviction and sentence by a higher court”.714  
 
At the same time, the appellate affirmation of an inferior conviction, accompanied by 
increased sentences, has not necessarily given rise to violations of Article 14(5) ICCPR on 
this basis. According to the HRC, many domestic legal systems allow appeal courts “to lower, 
confirm, or increase the penalties imposed by the lower courts” and the finding of the second 
instance “did not change the essential characterization of the offence but merely reflected […] 
[its] assessment that the seriousness of the circumstances of the offence merited a higher 
penalty”.715 Likewise, the appellate aggravation of a sentence, on account of the first instance 
having “miscalculated the number of years of imprisonment applicable to an offence 
committed with aggravating circumstances”, was permitted for largely the same reasons.716 
 
However, several States have made reservations to Article 14(5) ICCPR, which stipulate that 
it neither conflicts with internal regulations allowing for the substitution of an acquittal for an 
appellate conviction nor the appellate increase of a sentence without a further appeal.717  
 
                                                 
714 Ibid., at 7.1. Also: Views, Larrañaga v. the Philippines, Communication No. 1421/2005, HRC, 24 July 2006, 
at 2.9-2.10; Views, Conde v. Spain, Communication No. 1325/2004, HRC, 31 October 2006, at 2.3, 2.5, 7.2; 
Views, Calderón Bruges v. Colombia, Communication No. 1641/2007, HRC, 23 March 2012, at 7.3. 
715 Views, Pérez Escolar v. Spain, Communication No. 1156/2003, HRC, 28 March 2006, at 9.2. 
716 Views, J.A.B.G. v. Spain, Communication No. 1891/2009, HRC, 29 October 2012, at 2.6, 8.5. 
717 Austria (“[P]aragraph 5 [of Article 14 ICCPR]is not in conflict with legal regulations which stipulate that 
after an acquittal or a lighter sentence passed by a court of the first instance, a higher tribunal may pronounce 
conviction or a heavier sentence for the same offence, while they exclude the convicted person’s right to have 
such conviction or heavier sentence reviewed by a still higher tribunal”); Belgium (“Paragraph 5 of … article [14 
ICCPR] shall not apply to persons who, under Belgian law, are convicted and sentenced at second instance 
following an appeal against their acquittal of first instance); Denmark (“A right to a further appeal does not have 
to be instituted in cases where the accused person, having been acquitted by a lower court, is convicted for the 
first time by a higher court hearing an appeal of the acquittal”); Germany (“A further appeal does not have to be 
instituted in all cases solely on the grounds the accused person having been acquitted by the lower court-was 
convicted for the first time in the proceedings concerned by the appellate court [sic]”); Luxemburg (“The 
Government of Luxembourg declares that it is implementing article 14, paragraph 5 [ICCPR], since that 
paragraph does not conflict with the relevant Luxembourg legal statutes, which provide that, following an 
acquittal or a conviction by a court of first instance, a higher tribunal may deliver a sentence, confirm the 
sentence passed or impose a harsher penalty for the same crime. However, the tribunal’s decision does not give 
the person declared guilty on appeal the right to appeal that conviction to a higher appellate jurisdiction”); 
Norway (“[The Government of Norway declares that] the entry into force of an amendment to the Criminal 
Procedure Act, which introduces the right to have a conviction reviewed by a higher court in all cases, the 
reservation made by the Kingdom of Norway with respect to article 14, paragraph 5 of the … [ICCPR] shall 
continue to apply only in the following exceptional circumstances: … If the appellate court convicting the 




2.3.5. First Instance Trial before Highest Court 
The HRC has also determined that a trial by the highest court sitting in first instance is 
incompatible with Article 14(5) ICCPR. Such proceedings are usually reserved for high-
ranking public officials, 718  but may affect others as well, such as when their cases are 
connected to those who, on account of their office, are subject to such constructions.719 
According to the HRC, “the absence of any right to review by a higher tribunal is not offset 
by the fact of being tried by the supreme tribunal of the State party concerned”.720 More 
specifically, it has either found that the very existence of the right to appeal may not be left to 
the discretion of States Parties721 or that there is an obligation to provide appellate review 
even in the absence of a system of automatic appeal.722 Various States have made reservations 
to Article 14(5) ICCPR to allow for first instance trials conducted by their highest courts.723 
 
2.3.6. Scope of Appellate Review 
As to the scope of review required under Article 14(5) ICCPR, two issues arise. First, this 
provision requires superior review of “conviction and sentence”. In addition, in the views of 
the HRC, it has been clarified that appellate review must encompass legal and factual matters. 
                                                 
718 E.g., Views, Terrón v. Spain, Communication No. 1073/2002, HRC, 5 November 2004, at 7.4. 
719 E.g., Views, Fanali v. Italy, Communication No. 75/1980, HRC, 31 March 1983, at 11.8; Views, Oliveró 
Capellades v. Spain, Communication No. 1211/2003, HRC, 11 July 2006, at 7. 
720 HRC, General Comment 32, Article 14: Right to Equality before Courts and Tribunals and to a Fair Trial, 
CCPR/C/GC/32, 23 August 2007, at 47. 
721 Views, Terrón v. Spain, Communication No. 1073/2002, HRC, 5 November 2004, at 7.4; Views, Oliveró 
Capellades v. Spain, Communication No. 1211/2003, HRC, 11 July 2006, at 7; Views, Serena & Rodríguez v. 
Spain, Communications Nos. 1351/2005 and 1352/2005, HRC, 8 March 2006, at 9.3. Also: Part II, Chapter 
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v. Tajikistan, Communication No. 985/2001, HRC, 18 October 2005, at 6.5. 
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Government of Luxembourg further declares that article 14, paragraph 5 [ICCPR], shall not apply to persons 
who, under Luxembourg law, are remanded directly to a higher court or brought before the Assize Court”); the 
Netherlands (“The Kingdom of the Netherlands reserves the statutory power of the Supreme Court of the 
Netherlands to have sole jurisdiction to try certain categories of persons charged with serious offences 
committed in the discharge of a public office”); Norway (“[The Government of Norway declares that] the entry 
into force of an amendment to the Criminal Procedure Act, which introduces the right to have a conviction 
reviewed by a higher court in all cases, the reservation made by the Kingdom of Norway with respect to article 
14, paragraph 5 of the … [ICCPR] shall continue to apply only in the following exceptional circumstances: … 
According to article 86 of the Norwegian Constitution, a special court shall be convened in criminal cases 
against members of the Government, the Storting (Parliament) or the Supreme Court, with no right of appeal”). 
In 2005, Italy withdrew its reservation to Article 14(5) ICCPR in respect of one-level “proceedings instituted 
before the Constitutional Court in respect of charges brought against the President of the Republic and its 
Ministers”. Available at: http://treaties.un.org/Pages/ViewDetails.aspx?src=TREATY&mtdsg_no=IV-
4&chapter=4&lang=en#35. The HRC previously condoned such convictions in the Italian context. See: Views, 




2.3.6.1. Conviction and Sentence 
The HRC has found that appellate review of both the conviction and sentence is not 
obligatory. Thus, more limited appellate review, performed by two instances on three 
occasions, did not violate Article 14(5) ICCPR, as the author had appealed the judgment 
“only in respect of the sentence imposed” and the totality of the reviews was satisfactory.724 
 
2.3.6.2. Evidence and Law 
The HRC has considered, in general, that this provision imposes “a duty to review 
substantively, both on the basis of sufficiency of the evidence and of the law, the conviction 
and sentence, such that the procedure allows for due consideration of the nature of the 
case”.725 It has further clarified that “[a] review that is limited to the formal or legal aspects of 
the conviction without any consideration whatsoever of the facts is not sufficient”, but article 
14, paragraph 5 [ICCPR] does not require a full retrial or a ‘hearing’, as long as the tribunal 
carrying out the review can look at the factual dimensions of the case”.726 It continued to note 
that, “for instance, where a higher instance court looks at the allegations against a convicted 
person in great detail, considers the evidence submitted at the trial and referred to in the 
appeal, and finds that there was sufficient incriminating evidence to justify a finding of guilt 
in the specific case, the […] [ICCPR] is not violated”.727 This statement extends to leave to 
appeal proceedings too, which do not necessarily violate Article 14(5) ICCPR, as long as the 
appellate review provided in such proceedings is of sufficient scope.728 
 
Nonetheless, the practical application of these facets of the scope of appellate review required 
by Article 14(5) ICCPR has not proved undemanding. The HRC has, indeed, dismissed 
appellate procedures explicitly confined to matters of law as irreconcilable with Article 14(5) 
                                                 
724 Views, Bryhn v. Norway, Communication No. 789/1997, HRC, 29 October 1999, at 2.3, 7.2. 
725 HRC, General Comment 32, Article 14: Right to Equality before Courts and Tribunals and to a Fair Trial, 
CCPR/C/GC/32, 23 August 2007, at 48. 
726 Ibid., at 48. E.g., Views, Romanov v. Ukraine, Communication No. 842/1998, HRC, 30 October 2003, at 6.5; 
Views, Korolko v. Russian Federation, Communication No. 1344/2005, HRC, 25 October 2010, at 6.6; Views, 
Sevostyanov v. Russia, Communication No. 1856/2008, HRC, 1 November 2013, at 7.3. 
727 HRC, General Comment 32, Article 14: Right to Equality before Courts and Tribunals and to a Fair Trial, 
CCPR/C/GC/32, 23 August 2007, at 48. 
728 Views, Lumley v. Jamaica, Communication No. 662/1995, HRC, 31 March 1999, at 7.3; Views, Rogerson v. 
Australia, Communication No. 802/1998, HRC, 3 April 2002, at 7.5; Views, Juma v. Australia, Communication 
No. 984/2001, HRC, 28 July 2003, at 7.5. Implicit in: Views, Lovell v. Australia, Communication No. 920/2000, 
HRC, 24 March 2003, at 8.4. 
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ICCPR on various occasions.729 It has, however, also taken care to consider whether appellate 
courts have, in reality, considered matters of fact, despite jurisdiction ostensibly limited to 
matters of law. If so, it has considered such review to comply with Article 14(5) ICCPR.730 
Be that as it may, the line between appellate review of sufficient and insufficient scope 
appears thin, as demonstrated by the HRC’s views concerning the Spanish appellate system. 
 
In a watershed communication, alleging that the second instance had rejected the application 
for judicial review on the basis that “evidence has to be evaluated exclusively by the court ad 
quo” and “re-evaluating the evidence [on appeal] […] is […] not admissible”,731 the HRC 
concluded that “the lack of any possibility of fully reviewing the author’s conviction and 
sentence […] means that the guarantees provided for in article 14, paragraph 5, […] [ICCPR] 
have not been met”.732 In ensuing communications, it has confirmed the incompatibility of a 
complete exclusion of factual matters with Article 14(5) ICCPR733 and it has further specified 
that appellate review limited to an examination as to whether the inferior decision amounts to 
arbitrariness or denial of justice does not satisfy the requirements of this provision either.734  
 
Thereafter, however, the HRC abandoned this line of views in respect of the Spanish appellate 
system. In what would be the first in a string of comparable views, it found that the scope of 
the appellate review complied with Article 14(5) ICCPR, as the second and third instance had 
“thoroughly addressed the author’s allegation that circumstantial evidence was insufficient to 
convict him”. 735  Numerous views rejecting such complaints either as inadmissible or 
congruent with Article 14(5) ICCPR ensued, as the HRC found that, in actual fact, the 
appellate review extended beyond a mere examination of matters of law.736 Nonetheless, it 
                                                 
729 Views, Domukovsky et al. v. Georgia, Communications Nos. 623/1995, 624/1995, 626/1995 & 627/1995, 
HRC, 6 April 1998, at 18.11; Views, Saidova v. Tajikistan, Communication No. 964/2001, HRC, 8 July 2004, at 
6.5; Views, Bandajevsky v. Belarus, Communication No. 1100/2002, HRC, 28 March 2006, at 10.13; Views, 
Kovalev v Belarus, Communication No. 2120/2011, HRC, 29 October 2012, at 11.6. 
730 Views, Perera v. Australia, Communication No. 536/1993, HRC, 28 March 1995, at 6.4; Views, Werenbeck 
v. Australia, Communication No. 579/1994, HRC, 27 March 1997, at 9.10; Views, Judge v. Canada, 
Communication No. 829/1998, HRC, 5 August 2003, at 7.7; Views, Weiss v. Austria, Communication No. 
1086/2002, HRC, 3 April 2003, at 9.3. 
731 Views, Gómez Vázquez v. Spain, Communication No. 701/1996, HRC, 20 July 2000, at 3.2. 
732 Ibid., at 11.1. 
733 Views, Semey v. Spain, Communication No. 986/2001, HRC, 30 July 2003, at 9.1; Views, Sineiro Fernández 
v. Spain, Communication No. 1007/2001, HRC, 7 August 2003, at 7. 
734 Views, Alba Cabriada v. Spain, Communication No. 1101/2002, HRC, 1 November 2004, at 7.2–7.3; Views, 
Martínez Fernández v. Spain, Communication No. 1104/2002, HRC, 29 March 2005, at 7. 
735 Views, Parra Corral v. Spain, Communication No. 1356/2005, HRC, 29 March 2005, at 4.3. 
736 Views, Cuartero Casado v. Spain, Communication No. 1399/2005, HRC, 25 July 2005, at 4.4; Views, 
Carvallo Villar v. Spain, Communication No. 1059/2002, HRC, 28 October 2005, at 9.5; Views, Herrera Sousa 
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continued to find sporadic violations of Article 14(5) ICCPR too. Constitutional review was 
not considered an appropriate remedy in relation to trials by the highest court sitting in first 
instance.737 In addition, certain specific instances of second instance review have also been 
deemed of insufficient scope. 738  According to the HRC, Spanish cassation review is, in 
general, “not a substitute for an appeal before a court of second instance, although, in certain 
particular cases, an appeal in cassation might include a reconsideration of the trial court’s 
decisions that […] [is] sufficient to meet the requirements of the” ICCPR.739 
 
The HRC’s assessment of the scope of appellate review under Article 14(5) ICCPR is not 
exclusively informed by the legal modalities in place, however. The conduct of the parties has 
been taken into account too. For instance, the fact that counsel had failed to initiate regular 
appellate proceedings, leading to automatic appellate review of more limited scope, did not 
lead to an admissible claim under Article 14(5) ICCPR.740 In addition, a party instituting 
                                                                                                                                                        
v Spain, Communication No. 1094/2002, HRC, 27 March 2006, at 6.3; Views, Johnson v. Spain, 
Communication No. 1102/2002, HRC, 27 March 2006, at 6.6; Views, Pérez Escolar v. Spain, Communication 
No. 1156/2003, HRC, 28 March 2006, at 9.3; Views, De Dios Prieto v. Spain, Communication No. 1293/2004, 
HRC, 25 July 2006, at 6.4; Views, García González v. Spain, Communication No. 1441/2005, HRC, 25 July 
2006, at 4.3; Views, Oubiña Piñeiro v. Spain, Communication No. 1387/2005, HRC, 25 July 2006, at 6.2; 
Views, Amador Amador & Amador Amador v. Spain, Communication No. 1181/2003, HRC, 31 October 2006, 
at 9.2; Views, Villamon Ventura v. Spain, Communication No. 1305/2004, HRC, 31 October 2006, at 6.6; 
Views, Conde Conde v. Spain, Communication No. 1325/2004, HRC, 31 October 2006, at 6.4; Views, 
Guardiola Martínez v. Spain, Communication No. 1098/2002, HRC, 31 October 2006, at 6.8; Views, Gonzalez 
Roche & Munoz Hernandez v. Spain, Communication No. 1370/2005, HRC, 24 July 2007, at 6.6; Views, 
Gueorguiev v. Spain, Communication No. 1386/2005, HRC, 24 July 2007, at 6.6; Views, Rodrigo Alonso v. 
Spain, Communication No. 1391/2005, HRC, 24 July 2007, at 6.6; Views, Subero Beisti v. Spain, 
Communication No. 1375/2005, HRC, 1 April 2008, at 6.4; Views, Rodríguez Rodríguez v. Spain, 
Communication No. 1489/2006, HRC, 30 October 2008, at 6.4; Views, Pindado Martínez v. Spain, 
Communication No. 1490/2006, HRC, 30 October 2008, at 6.5; Views, De Leon Castro v. Spain, 
Communication No. 1388/2005, HRC, 19 March 2009, at 9.2; Views, Piscioneri v. Spain, Communication No. 
1366/2005, HRC, 22 July 2009, at 9.2; Views, Rodriguez Dominguez & Neira Fernandez v. Spain, 
Communication No. 1471/2006, HRC, 23 November 2009, at 6.4; Views, Suils Ramonet v. Spain, 
Communication No. 1555/2007, HRC, 27 October 2009, at 6.4; Views, Alfonso Sanjuán &-Rafael Blázquez v. 
Spain, Communication No. 1869/2009, HRC, 26 July 2010, at 6.3; Views, L.G.M. v. Spain, Communication No. 
1617/2007, HRC, 26 July 2011, at 6.5; Views, J.A.B.G. v. Spain, Communication No. 1891/2009, HRC, 29 
October 2012, at 8.5; Views, J.J.U.B. v. Spain, Communication No. 1892/2009, HRC, 29 October 2012, at 7.5; 
Views, H.P.N. v. Spain, Communication No. 1943/2010, HRC, 25 March 2013, at 7.7; Views, M.R.R. v. Spain, 
Communication No. 2037/2011, HRC, 21 July 2014, at 4.2; Views, S.S.F., S.S.E., & E.J.S.E v. Spain, 
Communication No. 2105/2011, HRC, 28 October 2014, at 8.5. 
737 Views, Hens Serena & Corujo Rodriguez v. Spain, Communications Nos. 1351-1352/2005, 25 March 2008, 
at 9.3. Implicit in: Views, Oliveró Capellades v. Spain, Communication No. 1211/2003, HRC, 11 July 2006, at 
2.3, 7. 
738 Views, Gayoso Martínez v. Spain, Communication No. 1363/2005, HRC, 19 October 2009, at 9.3. Similar: 
Views, Carpintero Uclés v. Spain, Communication No. 1364/2005, HRC, 22 July 2009, at 11.2-11.3. 
739 Views, Possemiers v. Spain, Communication No. 1398/2005, HRC, 20 October 2009, at 6.4. 
740 Views, Kurbanova v. Tajikistan, Communication No 1096/2002, HRC, 6 November 2003, at 6.7. 
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appeal without explicitly seeking full review did not have an admissible claim under Article 
14(5) ICCPR on account of the alleged limited scope of review.741 
 
2.3.7. Effective Exercise of the Right to Appeal 
As to the effective exercise of the right to appeal, the HRC has, in general, emphasised the 
availability of relevant documents enabling recourse to a higher judicial instance. In this 
respect, it has held that Article 14(5) ICCPR “can only be exercised effectively if the 
convicted person is entitled to have access to a […] written judgement of the trial court, and, 
at least in the court of first appeal where domestic law provides for several instances of 
appeal, also to other documents, such as trial transcripts, necessary to enjoy the effective 
exercise of the right to appeal”.742  Provided that it has been established that the person 
concerned has suffered harm,743 violations of Article 14(5) ICCPR have been found for the 
lack of: trial transcripts; 744  a written appellate judgment; 745  a copy of a first instance 
judgment;746 and the failure to notify the person concerned of a first instance judgment747. 
Nevertheless, a written appellate judgment may be replaced by notes of an oral judgment, 
even when less elaborate than desirable.748 
 
In addition to its mere availability, the HRC has also indicated that a first instance judgment 
must be “duly reasoned”.749 Whereas this requirement is closely affiliated with the obligation 
to substantially review the conviction and sentence,750 it has been invoked in the context of 
the effective exercise of the right to appeal, in particular in multi-tiered appellate systems. As 
indicated, Article 14(5) ICCPR “does not require States parties to provide for several 
instances of appeal”,751 but “the reference to domestic law in this provision is to be interpreted 
to mean that if domestic law provides for further instances of appeal, the convicted person 
                                                 
741 Views, Lovell v. Australia, Communication No. 920/2000, HRC, 24 March 2003, at 8.4. 
742 HRC, General Comment 32, Article 14: Right to Equality before Courts and Tribunals and to a Fair Trial, 
CCPR/C/GC/32, 23 August 2007, at 49. 
743 Views, Ruiz Agudo v. Spain, Communication No. 864/1999, HRC, 31 October 2002, at 9.3. 
744 HRC, Lumley v. Jamaica, Communication No. 662/1995, 31 March 1991, at 3.2-3.3, 7.5; Views, Timmer v. 
the Netherlands, Communication No. 2097/2011, HRC, 24 July 2014, at 7.2. 
745 Views, Little v. Jamaica, Communication No. 283/1988, HRC, 1 November 1991, at 8.5. 
746 Views, Musaeva v. Uzbekistan, Communications Nos. 1914, 1915 & 1916/2009, HRC, 21 March 2012, at 
9.5; Views, Timmer v. the Netherlands, Communication No. 2097/2011, HRC, 24 July 2014, at 7.2. 
747 Views, J.O. v. France, Communication No. 1620/2007, HRC, 23 March 2011, at 9.7. 
748 Views, Bailey v. Jamaica, Communication No. 709/1996, HRC, 21 July 1999, at 7.4.  
749 HRC, General Comment 32, Article 14: Right to Equality before Courts and Tribunals and to a Fair Trial, 
CCPR/C/GC/32, 23 August 2007, at 49. 
750 Part II, Chapter 2.3.6. 
751 HRC, General Comment 32, Article 14: Right to Equality before Courts and Tribunals and to a Fair Trial, 
CCPR/C/GC/32, 23 August 2007, at 45. 
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must have effective access to each of them”.752 This formulation was explicitly invoked in 
several communications in which the failure of an appellate court to issue a written judgment 
hampered further appellate recourse and, thus, contravened Article 14(5) ICCPR.753  
 
2.3.8. Legal Assistance 
In General Comment 32, the HRC considered that, besides a violation of Article 14(3)(d) 
ICCPR,754 “[a] denial of legal aid by the court reviewing the death sentence of an indigent 
convicted person constitutes […] a violation of […] article 14, paragraph 5 [ICCPR], as in 
such cases the denial of legal aid for an appeal effectively precludes an effective review of the 
conviction and sentence by the higher instance court”.755 
 
Nevertheless, this aspect of the right to appeal has not been limited to the need to provide 
legal aid for appellate review of cases involving capital punishment. The HRC has, in respect 
of other types of criminal proceedings, also assessed the need for legal representation on 
appeal, as such, and the requirement of effective legal assistance on appeal. As to the former 
issue, it has found that an appeal had not been effectively considered, as no lawyer was 
available to submit grounds of appeal756 and that, due to a lack of information on whether the 
author was informed of the date of the hearing for application for leave to appeal and of the 
representative appointed to him on appeal, it was “unclear whether the author was at all 
represented on appeal”.757 As to the latter issue, General Comment 32 sets forth that the right 
to appeal “is also violated if defendants are not informed of the intention of their counsel not 
to put any arguments to the court, thereby depriving them of the opportunity to seek 
                                                 
752 Ibid., at 45. Also: Views, Werenbeck v. Australia, Communication No. 579/1994, HRC, 27 March 1997, at 
9.11. 
753 Views, Henry v. Jamaica, Communication No. 230/1987, HRC, 1 November 1991, at 8.4; Views, Reid v. 
Jamaica, Communication No. 355/1989, HRC, 8 July 1994, at 14.4; Views, Bailey v. Jamaica, Communication 
No. 709/1996, HRC, 21 July 1999, at 7.4; Views, Aboushanif v. Norway, Communication No. 1542/2007, HRC, 
17 July 2008, at 7.2. Similar: Views, Pratt & Morgan v. Jamaica, Communications Nos. 210/1986 & 225/1987, 
HRC, 6 April 1989, at 13.5; Views, Kelly v. Jamaica, Communication No. 253/1987, HRC, 8 April 1991, at 
5.12; Views, Little v. Jamaica, Communication No. 283/1988, HRC, 1 November 1991, at 8.5; Views, Francis 
v. Jamaica, Communication No. 320/1988, HRC, 24 March 1993, at 12.2; Views, Collins v. Jamaica, 
Communication No. 356/1989, HRC, 25 March 1993, at 8.3; Views, Smith v. Jamaica, Communication No. 
282/1988, HRC, 31 March 1993, at 10.5; Views, Hamilton v. Jamaica, Communication No. 333/1988, HRC, 23 
March 1994, at 9.1; Views, Currie v. Jamaica, Communication No. 377/1989, HRC, 29 March 1994, at 13.5; 
Views, Champagnie v. Jamaica, Communication No. 445/1991, HRC, 18 July 1994, at 7.3; Views, Morrison v. 
Jamaica, Communication No. 663/1995, HRC, 3 November 1998, at 8.5. 
754 Part II, Chapter 2.2.3. 
755 HRC, General Comment 32, Article 14: Right to Equality before Courts and Tribunals and to a Fair Trial, 
CCPR/C/GC/32, 23 August 2007, at 51. 
756 Views, Hill & Hill v. Spain, Communication No. 526/1993, HRC, 2 April 1997, at 14.3. 
757 Views, Lumley v. Jamaica, Communication No. 662/1995, HRC, 31 March 1999, at 7.4. 
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alternative representation, in order that their concerns may be ventilated at the appeal 
level”. 758  As mentioned, such matters have been adjudicated with reference to, or in 
conjunction with, Article 14(3)(b) and Article 14(3)(d) too, 759  but the HRC has invoked 
Article 14(5) ICCPR on its own in these circumstances as well.760 
 
2.3.9. Reasoned Opinion 
In close connection with the scope of appellate review under Article 14(5) ICCPR, a slightly 
distinct strand of views of the HRC has addressed the need to provide sufficient reasoning on 
appeal. The HRC has, namely, considered an allegation of the lack of “a duly reasoned 
written judgement” against the “duty to review substantively, both on the basis of sufficiency 
of the evidence and of the law, the conviction and sentence, such that the procedure allows for 
due consideration of the nature of the case”.761  
 
This matter has mainly arisen in respect of leave to appeal proceedings. In this regard, the 
HRC has found that the absence of reasoning762 or the provision of reasoning that does not 
reflect sufficient consideration of the legal and factual matters pertinent to the case falls short 
of Article 14(5) ICCPR.763 However, the provision of concise reasoning, which nevertheless 
reflected sufficient consideration of the issues at stake, has been deemed acceptable.764 
 
2.3.10. Presence 
As discussed, the exclusion of a defendant and/or his lawyer from appellate hearings may 
amount to a violation of the right to equal treatment under Article 14(1) ICCPR765 or the right 
to be present under Article 14(3)(d) ICCPR766. However, the ICCPR has also found that 
Article 14(5) ICCPR has been violated in the same situation, i.e. “the examination of the 
                                                 
758 HRC, General Comment 32, Article 14: Right to Equality before Courts and Tribunals and to a Fair Trial, 
CCPR/C/GC/32, 23 August 2007, at 51. 
759 Part II, Chapter 2.2.2.; Part II, Chapter 2.2.3. 
760 Views, Gallimore v. Jamaica, Communication No. 680/1996, HRC, 23 July 1999, at 7.4. 
761 Views, T.L.N. v. Norway, Communication No. 1942/2010, HRC, 16 July 2014, at 9.2. 
762 Views, Reid v. Jamaica, Communication No. 355/1989, HRC, 8 July 1994, at 14.3. 
763 Views, Mennen v. the Netherlands, Communication No. 1797/2008, HRC, 27 July 2010, at 8.3; Views, 
Timmer v. the Netherlands, Communication No. 2097/2011, HRC, 24 July 2014, at 7.3. Also: Part II, Chapter 
2.3.6.2. 
764 Views, T.L.N. v. Norway, Communication No. 1942/2010, HRC, 16 July 2014, at 9.3; Views, H.K. v. 
Norway, Communication No. 2004/2010, HRC, 16 October 2014, at. 9.4-9.6. 
765 Part II, Chapter 2.1.1. 
766 Part II, Chapter 2.2.3. 
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author’s case under the supervisory […] procedure by the Supreme Court […] in his and in 
his lawyers’ absence, although with the participation of a prosecutor”.767 
 
3. ECHR 
As indicated, 768  prior to the adoption of Protocol 7 ECHR, the ECtHR had already 
emphasised that “criminal proceedings form an entity” 769  and that, therefore, appellate 
proceedings do not escape the scrutiny of Article 6 ECHR. In more specific terms, after the 
ECmHR had already assessed aspects of appellate proceedings against Article 6 ECHR,770 the 
ECtHR declined to declare this provision inapplicable to appellate proceedings on matters of 
law, on the basis that such proceedings would not determine the criminal charge as required 
by the words “bien-fondé de toute accusation” in the French version of this Article. In this 
regard, it noted that: (i) cassatory proceedings continue to affect the person concerned; (ii) the 
reference to “bien-fondé” requires the accusation to be well-founded in law and not only in 
fact; and (iii) the English version of Article 6 ECHR mentions the “determination of […] any 
criminal charge”, which is not determined as long as it is not “final”.771 It, accordingly, 
concluded that the ECHR does not compel States Parties to set up appellate or cassatory 
courts but, if established, such courts must function in accordance with Article 6 ECHR, 
“dependent on the special features of such proceedings”. 772  Therefore, the pertinent 
components of Article 6 ECHR and Article 2 Protocol 7 ECHR will be considered in relation 
to the ECtHR’s assessment of appellate proceedings. 
 
3.1. Article 6(1) ECHR 
Article 6(1) lays down a right “to a fair and public hearing […] by an independent and 
impartial tribunal established by law” and the right to public pronouncement of a judgment. 
                                                 
767 Views, Kulov v. Kyrgyzstan, Communication No. 1369/2005, HRC, 19 August 2010, at 8.8. The HRC 
considered the exact same claim under Article 14(5) ICCPR in another communication, although it ultimately 
concluded that “the author has failed to substantiate that his inability to attend the proceedings at the Court of 
Appeal resulted in a violation of his rights under article 14 (5) of the Covenant”. See: Views, E.Z. v. Kazakhstan, 
Communication No. 2021/2010, HRC, 1 April 2015, at 7.6. 
768 Introduction, Chapter 2.1.2. 
769 E.g., Judgment, Delcourt v. Belgium, Application No. 2689/65, ECtHR, 17 January 1970, at 24-25; Judgment, 
Monnell & Morris v. the United Kingdom, Applications Nos. 9562/81 & 9818/82, ECtHR, 2 March 1987, at 54; 
Judgment, Ekbatani v. Sweden, Application No. 10563/83, ECtHR, 26 May 1988, at 24; Judgment, Belziuk v. 
Poland, Application No. 23103/93, ECtHR, 25 March 1998, at 37; Judgment, Assanidze v. Georgia, Application 
No. 71503/01, ECtHR, 8 April 2004, at 182. 
770 E.g., Judgment, Ofner & Hopfinger v. Austria, Applications Nos. 524/56 & 617/59, ECmHR, 23 November 
1962, at 46-49; Judgment, Pataki & Dunshirn v. Austria, Applications Nos. 596/59 & 789/60, ECmHR, 28 
March 1963, at 36. 
771 Judgment, Delcourt v. Belgium, Application No. 2689/65, ECtHR, 17 January 1970, at 24-25. 




3.1.1. Fair Hearing 
Article 6 ECHR has, no different from the remaining provisions, been subject to a teleological 
interpretation. In this regard, the ECtHR has found that the ECHR is intended to “guarantee 
not rights that are theoretical or illusory but rights that are practical and effective”.773 It has, 
on this basis, developed a number of rights and principles not explicitly set forth under Article 
6 ECHR. The effects of this interpretation of Article 6 ECHR have most clearly manifested 
themselves in relation to the general reference to “a fair […] hearing” in Article 6(1) ECHR. 
A number of them have been applied in respect of appellate proceedings too, namely the 
rights to access to court, adversarial proceedings, equality of arms, and a reasoned opinion. 
 
According to the Strasbourg organs, Article 6(1) ECHR “secures to everyone the right to have 
any claim […] brought before a court or tribunal” and, in this way, it “embodies the ‘right to a 
court’”.774 As part of this right, “[t]he right of access, that is the right to institute proceedings 
before courts […], constitutes one aspect”.775  Two main issues have been considered in 
relation to appellate proceedings on this basis. First, even though Article 6 ECHR does not 
guarantee a right to appeal, 776  the standing to bring an appeal in systems providing for 
appellate review has been assessed with reference to the right of access to a court. In this 
regard, the main outcome of the Strasbourg jurisprudence is that the refusal to entertain an 
appeal, on account of the person concerned having absconded, has been deemed an excessive 
restriction of the right of access to a court.777 On the other hand, no violation of Article 6(1) 
ECHR has been found when there was “no obligation to surrender to custody as a 
precondition” for appeal and “the path to the court of cassation opened itself to the applicant 
once he chose to be present”.778 Moreover, in line with the general jurisprudence of the 
ECtHR, which has established that the procedural safeguards guaranteed by the ECHR may 
                                                 
773 E.g., Judgment, Artico v. Italy, Application No. 6694/74, ECtHR, 13 May 1980, at 33; Judgment, Imbrioscia 
v. Switzerland, Application No. 13972/88, ECtHR, 24 November 1993, at 38; Judgment, Hermi v. Italy, 
Application No. 18114/02, ECtHR, 18 October 2006, at 95. 
774 Judgment, Golder v. The United Kingdom, Application No. 4451/70, ECtHR, 21 February 1975, at 36. 
775 Ibid., at 36. 
776 E.g., Judgment, Delcourt v. Belgium, Application No. 2689/65, ECtHR, 17 January 1970, at 25-26; Judgment, 
Crociani et al. v. Italy, Application No. 8603/79, ECmHR, 18 December 1980, para 16-17. 
777 E.g., Judgment, Poitrimol v. France, Application No. 14032/88, ECtHR, 23 November 1993, at 36-38; 
Judgment, Omar v. France, Application No. 43/1997/827/1033, ECtHR, 29 July 1998, at 40-44; Judgment, 
Guérin v. France, Application No. 25201/94, ECtHR, 29 July 1998, at 43-47; Judgment, Khalfaoui v. France, 
Application No. 34791/97, ECtHR, 14 December 1999, at 40-54; Judgment, Papon v. France, Application No. 
54210/00, ECtHR, 25 July 2002, at 99-100; Judgment, Skondrianos v. Greece, Application No. 74291/01, 
ECtHR, 18 December 2003, at 27. 
778 E.g., Judgment, Eliazer v. the Netherlands, Application No. 38055/97, ECtHR, 16 October 2001, at 33-34. 
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be waived, provided that such waivers are “unequivocal”, “attended by minimum safeguards” 
and do “not run counter to any important public interest”,779 the right of access to an appellate 
court may be renounced as a result of, for instance, a plea-bargaining deal.780 Second, the 
Strasbourg organs have evaluated whether practical or procedural impediments have thwarted 
access to an appellate court. In general, such limitations are permitted, “since the right of 
access by its very nature calls for regulation by the State”, but they “must not restrict the 
access […] in such a way or to such an extent that the very essence of the right is 
impaired”.781 For example, insufficient safeguards to prevent a misunderstanding as to the 
appellate jurisdiction competent to examine an appeal,782  incorrect information as to the 
specific time-limits for the filing of an appeal, 783  the effective shortening of time-limits 
concerning an appeal,784 and the lack of a voluntary and unequivocal waiver of the right to 
legal assistance, which served as a precondition for filing an appeal,785 have been found 
incompatible with this right. Conversely, fines for vexatious appeals,786 the requirement to be 
represented by a lawyer (as opposed to the facility of defending oneself in person),787 the 
unequivocal waiver of the right to appeal accompanied with procedural safeguards,788 and a 
sufficient degree of reasoning789 have not been deemed to transgress Article 6(1) ECHR. 
 
Furthermore, the adversarial principle has been deduced from the general right to a fair trial 
contained in Article 6(1) ECHR. This requirement entails “the opportunity for the parties to a 
criminal […] trial to have knowledge of and comment on all evidence adduced or 
observations filed […] with a view to influencing the court’s decision”.790 In this regard, the 
Strasbourg organs have found fault with the outright non-communication of relevant 
                                                 
779 Judgment, Litwin v. Germany, Application No. 29090/06, ECtHR, 3 November 2011, at 37. 
780 Ibid., at 38-49. 
781 Judgment, Khalfaoui v. France, Application No. 34791/97, ECtHR, 14 December 1999, at 35-36. 
782 Judgment, Hajiyev v. Azerbaijan, Application No. 5548/03, ECtHR, 16 November 2006, at 34-46. 
783 Judgment, Korgul v. Poland, Application No. 35916/08, ECtHR, 17 April 2012, at 27-31. 
784 Judgment, Viard v. France, Application No. 71658/10, ECtHR, 9 January 2014, at 37-39. 
785 Judgment, Nalbandyan v. Armenia, Applications Nos. 9935/06 and 23339/06, ECtHR, 31 March 2015, at 
146-150. 
786 Judgment, G.L. v. Italy, Application No. 15384/89, ECmHR, 9 May 1994, at 8. Although the ECtHR did not 
use the same terminology, it adopted a similar conclusion in respect of the possibility of an additional loss of 
liberty in the context of meritless applications for leave to appeal, considering that the overall procedure had 
been fair: Judgment, Monnell and Morris v. the United Kingdom, Applications Nos. 9562/81 & 9818/82, 
ECtHR, 2 March 1987, at 64. Also: Part I, Chapter 3.1. 
787 Judgment, Philis v. Greece, Application No. 16598/90, ECmHR, 11 December 1990, at 1. 
788 Judgment, Litwin v. Germany, Application No. 29090/06, ECtHR, 3 November 2011, at 37-49. 
789 Judgment, Nedzela v. France, Application No. 73695/01, ECtHR, 27 July 2006, at 55-59. 
790 Judgment, Reinhardt & Slimane-Kaïd v. France, Applications Nos. 21/1997/805/1008 and 22/1997/806/1009, 
ECtHR, 31 March 1998, at 103. 
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documents to defendants,791  unless such non-communication could not have affected the 
outcome of the process. 792  Moreover, a different strand of jurisprudence concerning the 
adversarial principle in appellate proceedings is apparent too. Violations of Article 6(1) 
ECHR have been found where appellate courts, mandated to review matters of facts and law, 
have reversed first instance acquittals on the basis of the same evidence that had led to 
acquittal at first instance, without rehearing the person concerned and/or witnesses testifying 
at first instance. Although the adversarial principle has been stressed implicitly or explicitly, 
the Strasbourg organs’ reasoning fluctuates slightly. First, the lack of a public hearing with a 
view to adversarial argument has been noted as the underlying reason of the violation.793 
Second, a breach has been established on account of the deprivation of the right to put 
forward a defence in the context of adversarial proceedings. 794  Finally, the plain non-
compliance with the right to a fair trial has been emphasised, which has been combined with 
an observation that the rights of the defence have been limited in certain instances.795 
 
In addition, the right to a fair hearing encompasses the principle of equality of arms, which 
“requires that each party be afforded a reasonable opportunity to present its case under the 
conditions that do not place it at a substantial disadvantage vis-à-vis another party”.796 This 
right substantially overlaps with the adversarial principle.797 Indeed, as with the latter, the 
                                                 
791 E.g., Judgment, Brandstetter v. Austria, Application No. 11170/84, 12876/87, 13468/87, ECtHR, 28 August 
1991, at 66-69; Judgment, Reinhardt & Slimane-Kaïd v. France, Applications Nos. 21/1997/805/1008 and 
22/1997/806/1009, ECtHR, 31 March 1998, at 105-107; Judgment, Meftah v. France, Application No. 32911/96, 
ECtHR, 26 April 2001, at 40-43; Judgment, M.S. v. Finland, Application No. 46601/99, ECtHR, 22 March 2005, 
at 33-37. 
792 E.g., Judgment, Verdu Verdu v. Spain, Application No. 43432/02, ECtHR, 15 February 2007, at 25-27. 
793 E.g., Judgment, Popovici v. Moldova, Applications Nos. 289/04 & 41194/04, ECtHR, 27 November 2007, at 
70-72; Judgment, Marcos Barrios v. Spain, Application No. 17122/07, ECtHR, 21 September 2010, at 6-15, 41; 
Judgment, García Hernández v. Spain, Application No. 15256/07, ECtHR, 16 November 2010, at 32-35. 
794 E.g., Judgment, Lacadena Calero v. Spain, Application No. 23002/07, ECtHR, 22 November 2011, at 49-51; 
Judgment, Serrano Contreras v. Spain, Application No. 49183/08, ECtHR, 20 March 2012, at 35-42; Judgment, 
Vilanova Goterris & Llop Garcia v. Spain, Applications Nos. 5606/09 & 17516/09, ECtHR, 27 November 2012, 
at 33-37; Judgment, Roman Zurdo et al. v. Spain, Applications Nos. 28399/09 and 51135/09, ECtHR, 8 October 
2013, at 31-41. 
795 E.g., Judgment, Manolachi v. Romania, Application No. 36605/04, ECtHR, 5 March 2013, at 44-52; 
Judgment, Flueraş v. Romania, Application No. 17520/04, ECtHR, 9 April 2013, at 57-62; Judgment, Hanu v. 
Romania, Application No. 10890/04, ECtHR, 4 June 2013, at 34-42; Judgment, Hogea v. Romania, Application 
No. 31912/04, ECtHR, 29 October 2013, at 46-54; Judgment, Tudor v. Romania, Application No. 14364/06, 
ECtHR, 17 December 2013, at 23-29; Judgment, Cipleu v. Romania, Application No. 36470/08, ECtHR, 14 
January 2014, at 33-41; Judgment, Văduva v. Romania, Application No. 27781/06, ECtHR, 25 February 2014, at 
41-50; Judgment, Mischie v. Romania, Application No. 50224/07, ECtHR, 16 September 2014, at 35-41; 
Judgment, Moinescu v. Romania, Application No. 16903/12, ECtHR, 15 September 2015, at 36-41; Judgment, 
Marius Dragomir v. Romania, Application No. 21528/09, ECtHR, 6 October 2015, at 21-28. 
796 D. Vitkauskas and G. Dikov, Protecting the Right to a Fair Trial under the European Convention on Human 
Rights, Council of Europe Human Rights Handbooks (Strasbourg: Council of Europe, 2012), at 48. 
797 Ibid., at 48. 
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non-communication of documents to the defence has been found to constitute a breach of the 
principle of equality of arms.798 In addition, the fact that a party was entitled to be present at 
appellate proceedings, whereas the defence was not, has also been considered a violation.799 
 
In addition to its interrelationship with the right of access to a court, the sufficiency of judicial 
reasoning has been reviewed under a more general reference to Article 6(1) ECHR. In this 
regard, the ECtHR has considered that, “reflecting a principle linked to the proper 
administration of justice under Article 6 § 1 […] [ECHR], the judgments of courts and 
tribunals should adequately state the reasons on which they are based, and which should be 
void of manifest arbitrariness, in order to show that the parties were duly heard and ensure 
public scrutiny of the administration of justice”.800 This aspect of Article 6(1) ECHR “cannot 
be understood as requiring a detailed answer to every argument raised by the parties”, but “the 
injured party can expect a specific and express reply from the court to those submissions 
which are decisive for the outcome of the proceedings in question”.801 Such an assessment 
must be carried out in the circumstances of each case.802 For instance, violations have been 
found where appellate courts have failed to provide “any meaningful consideration” to 
determinative matters of fact and/or law803 or where unreasoned jury decisions on appeal had 
not been accompanied with sufficient safeguards,804 especially where a first instance acquittal 
had been converted into an appellate conviction.805 Conversely, neither limited reasoning in 
appellate jury trials compensated with sufficient safeguards806 nor the complete absence of 
reasons concerning the rejection of applications for leave to appeal807 amount to a breach of 
this requirement according to the Strasbourg organs. 
 
                                                 
798 E.g., Judgment, Borgers v. Belgium, Application No. 12005/86, ECtHR, 30 October 1991, at 27-29; 
Judgment, Zahirović v. Croatia, Application No. 58590/11, ECtHR, 25 April 2013, at 44-50. 
799 E.g., Judgment, Borgers v. Belgium, Application No. 12005/86, ECtHR, 30 October 1991, at 28; Judgment, 
Eftimov v. The Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia, Application No. 59974/08, ECtHR, 2 July 2015, at 38-
42. Contra: Judgment, Monnell and Morris v. the United Kingdom, Applications Nos. 9562/81 & 9818/82, 
ECtHR, 2 March 1987, at 62; Judgment, Sibgatullin v. Russia, Application No. 32165/02, ECtHR, 23 April 
2009, at 42. 
800 Judgment, Tchankotadze v. Georgia, Application No. 15256/05, ECtHR, 21 June 2016, at 102. 
801 Ibid., at 103. 
802 Ibid., at 103. 
803 E.g., Judgment, Tchankotadze v. Georgia, Application No. 15256/05, ECtHR, 21 June 2016, at 107-109. 
804 E.g., Judgment, Oulahcene v. France, Application No. 44446/10, ECtHR, 10 January 2013, at 47-55. 
805 E.g., Judgment, Agnelet v. France, Application No. 61198/08, ECtHR, 10 January 2013, at 63-73; Judgment, 
Fraumens v. France, Application No. 30010/10, ECtHR, 10 January 2013, at 41-52. 
806 E.g., Judgment, Legillon v. France, Application No. 53406/10, ECtHR, 10 January 2013, at 59-67; Judgment, 
Bodein v. France, Application No. 40014/10, ECtHR, 13 November 2014, at 37-42. 
807 E.g., Judgment, E.M. v. Norway, Application No. 20087/92, ECmHR, 26 October 1995, at 2; Judgment, 




3.1.2. Public Hearing 
The right to a public hearing arising out of Article 6(1) ECHR is a multi-faceted concept. 
According to the ECtHR, it is “an additional guarantee that an endeavour will be made to 
establish the truth”, it helps to ensure that the accused “is satisfied that his case is being 
determined by a tribunal whose independence and impartiality he may verify”, it “protects 
litigants against the administration of justice in secret without public scrutiny”, and it is “one 
of the means whereby confidence in the courts, superior and inferior, can be maintained”.808  
 
In connection with appellate proceedings, the Strasbourg organs have, primarily, assessed 
whether or not cases decided without a hearing have been in keeping with this right. The 
absence of such hearings is not inherently incompatible with this element of Article 6 ECHR. 
For instance, “leave-to-appeal proceedings and proceedings involving only questions of law 
[…] may comply with the requirements of Article 6 […] [ECHR], although the appellant was 
not given an opportunity of being heard in person by the appeal or cassation court”.809  
 
However, violations have been found where appellate courts have had to make a full 
assessment of the guilt or innocence of the person concerned without conducting a public 
hearing.810 In certain cases, the ECtHR has emphasised the fact that the applicants in question 
had been convicted for the first time in appellate proceedings. 811  This approach of the 
Strasbourg organs closely approximates the aforementioned component of the right to 
adversarial proceedings concerning the rehearing of the person concerned and/or witnesses 
testifying at first instance.812 The ECtHR has stressed that the lack of a public hearing entailed 
                                                 
808 Judgment, Tierce et al. v. San Marino, Applications Nos. 24954/94, 24971/94, & 24972/94, ECtHR, 25 July 
2000, at 92. 
809 Judgment, Ekbatani v. Sweden, Application No. 10563/83, ECtHR, 26 May 1988, at 31. E.g., Judgment, 
Sutter v. Switzerland, Application No. 8209/78, ECtHR, 22 February 1984, at 30; Judgment, Pérez Martínez v. 
Spain, Application No. 26023/10, ECtHR, 23 February 2016, at 35-41. 
810 E.g., Judgment, Ekbatani v. Sweden, Application No. 10563/83, ECtHR, 26 May 1988, at 32; Judgment, 
Botten v. Norway, Application No. 16206/90, ECtHR, 19 February 1996, at 49-51; Judgment, Tierce et al. v. San 
Marino, Applications Nos. 24954/94, 24971/94, & 24972/94, ECtHR, 25 July 2000, at 96-102; Judgment, 
Dondarini v. San Marino, Application No. 50545/99, ECtHR, 6 July 2004, at 28-29; Judgment, Moreira 
Ferreira v. Portugal, Application No. 19808/08, ECtHR, 5 July 2011, at 32-35.  
811 See: e.g., Judgment, Constantinescu v. Romania, Application No. 28871/95, ECtHR, 27 June 2000, at 54-61; 
Judgment, Arnarsson v. Iceland, Application No. 44671/98, ECtHR, 15 July 2003, at 31-38; Judgment, Dănilă v. 
Romania, Application No. 53897/00, ECtHR, 8 March 2007, at 38-43; Judgment, Spînu v. Romania, Application 
No. 32030/02, ECtHR, 29 April 2008, at 56-64; Judgment, Igual Coll v. Spain, Application No. 37496/04, 
ECtHR, 10 March 2009, at 37-38; Judgment, Gómez Olmeda v. Spain, Application No. 61112/12, ECtHR, 29 
March 2016, at 33-40. 
812 Part II, Chapter 3.1.1. 
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the absence of “a direct assessment of the evidence given in person by the applicant”.813 Such 
an assessment has been primarily referred to in the context of matters of a predominantly 
factual nature, such as the use of the appropriate equipment in a rescue operation,814 the 
clarification of witness statements,815 the credibility of decisive witnesses,816 and the conduct 
of a medical nurse concerning the death of a patient.817 Accordingly, in line with its function 
as “an endeavour […] to establish the truth”,818 the determinative consideration was, thus, the 
impossibility of sufficiently assessing evidence on appeal and not the public nature of the 
hearing, as such. Importantly, the ECtHR has specifically rejected a deleterious effect of 
Protocol 7 ECHR on Article 6(1) ECHR. In this regard, it had been argued that “only the 
fundamental guarantees of Article 6 […] [apply] in […] appeal proceedings and that these did 
not include further oral hearings before courts of second instance”, in support of which 
“Article 2 of Protocol 7 […] and the statement in the Explanatory Report […] that the 
‘modalities for the exercise of the right [of appeal] and the grounds on which it may be 
exercised [are] to be determined by domestic law’” had been invoked. 819  The ECtHR 
dismissed such an interpretation, characterising Protocol 7 ECHR as an addition to the ECHR, 
as opposed to a limitation of the rights contained therein.820 However, although the reference 
to a “full rehearing” in early jurisprudence creates some ambiguity in this regard, 821  the 
ECtHR’s intention has not been to demand a rerun of the entire trial at first instance on this 
basis. The preceding examples concern specific matters of a factual nature. This entails that a 
circumscribed widening of the scope of appellate proceedings is required so as to ensure 
proper determination of decisive issues. 
 
                                                 
813 E.g., Judgment, Ekbatani v. Sweden, Application No. 10563/83, ECtHR, 26 May 1988, at 32. Similar: 
Judgment, Botten v. Norway, Application No. 16206/90, ECtHR, 19 February 1996, at 52; Judgment, 
Constantinescu v. Romania, Application No. 28871/95, ECtHR, 27 June 2000, at 59; Judgment, Tierce et al. v. 
San Marino, Applications Nos. 24954/94, 24971/94, & 24972/94, ECtHR, 25 July 2000, at 102; Judgment, 
Arnarsson v. Iceland, Application No. 44671/98, ECtHR, 15 July 2003, at 38; Judgment, Dănilă v. Romania, 
Application No. 53897/00, ECtHR, 8 March 2007, at 42; Judgment, Spînu v. Romania, Application No. 
32030/02, ECtHR, 29 April 2008, at 64; Judgment, Igual Coll v. Spain, Application No. 37496/04, ECtHR, 10 
March 2009, at 37; Judgment, Moreira Ferreira v. Portugal, Application No. 19808/08, ECtHR, 5 July 2011, at 
34; Judgment, Gómez Olmeda v. Spain, Application No. 61112/12, ECtHR, 29 March 2016, at 35. 
814 Judgment, Botten v. Norway, Application No. 16206/90, ECtHR, 19 February 1996, at 49. 
815 Judgment, Spînu v. Romania, Application No. 32030/02, ECtHR, 29 April 2008, at 62. 
816 Judgment, Marcos Barrios v. Spain, Application No. 17122/07, ECtHR, 21 September 2010, at 39-40. 
817 Judgment, García Hernández v. Spain, Application No. 15256/07, ECtHR, 16 November 2010, at 33. 
818 Judgment, Tierce et al. v. San Marino, Applications Nos. 24954/94, 24971/94, & 24972/94, ECtHR, 25 July 
2000, at 92. 
819 Judgment, Ekbatani v. Sweden, Application No. 10563/83, ECtHR, 26 May 1988, at 26 (emphasis supplied). 
820 Ibid., at 26-33. 
821 Ibid., at 32. 
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3.1.3. Impartial Tribunal 
According to the ECtHR, “[t]he requirement of impartiality concerns the questions of whether 
the court is “subjectively free of personal prejudice or bias” and whether it offers “sufficient 
guarantees to exclude any legitimate doubt” in this regard.822 
 
The issues raised in the context of appellate proceedings primarily concern the accumulation 
of different judicial functions in pre-appeal proceedings and appeal proceedings. Whereas 
such matters need not be in contravention of the impartiality requirement, as such, 823 
particular combinations of such functions have been found to divulge a lack of impartiality. 
Examples concern the involvement of the same judges in: (i) the appellate remittal of a first 
instance discontinuance of criminal proceedings and the appellate proceedings against the 
renewed trial at first instance, which was not allowed under domestic law;824 (ii) the appellate 
confirmation that there was sufficient evidence for the offence with which the applicant was 
charged and the first instance proceedings;825  and (iii) a decision concerning provisional 
detention, in which it had been concluded that the person concerned had probably committed 
the acts charged, and the appellate proceedings.826 In addition, the ECtHR has extended this 
principle to interrelated appellate proceedings. In this respect, it has found a violation of the 
impartiality requirement, because, in an appellate judgment concerning one couple, numerous 
references to the criminal responsibility of another couple in the crimes under consideration 
appeared and, subsequently, the latter couple was convicted by the same judge in a separate 
appellate judgment containing numerous extracts from the initial judgment.827 
 
3.1.4. Public Pronouncement of Judgment 
This requirement shares common features with the need for a public hearing. As held by the 
ECtHR, “[t]he principle of the public nature of court proceedings entails two aspects: the 
holding of public hearings and the public delivery of judgments”.828 Even so, these matters 
                                                 
822 Judgment, Findlay v. the United Kingdom, Application No. 22107/93, ECtHR, 25 February 1997, at 73. 
823 E.g., Judgment, Ionuţ-Laurenţiu Tudor v. Romania, Application No. 34013/05, ECtHR, 24 June 2014, at 81. 
824 Judgment, Oberschlick v. Austria, Application No. 11662/85, ECtHR, 23 May 1991, at 50. 
825 Judgment, Castillo Algar v. Spain, Application No. 28194/95, ECtHR, 28 October 1998, at 46-51. 
826 Judgment, Ionuţ-Laurenţiu Tudor v. Romania, Application No. 34013/05, ECtHR, 24 June 2014, at 77-87. 
827 Judgment, Ferrantelli & Santangelo v. Italy, Application No. 19874/92, ECtHR, 7 August 1996, at 26, 30, 59, 
60. 
828 Judgment, Tierce et al. v. San Marino, Applications Nos. 24954/94, 24971/94, & 24972/94, ECtHR, 25 July 
2000, at 93. 
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have distinct fields of application, considering that, beyond the distinction drawn in the 
wording of Article 6(1) ECHR, the ECtHR has assessed them separately.829 
 
According to the ECtHR, a lowered standard is applicable to appellate proceedings. Whereas 
the words “‘judgment shall be pronounced publicly’ […] might suggest that a reading out 
aloud of the judgment is required”,830 “many member States of the Council of Europe have a 
long-standing tradition of recourse to other means […] for making public the decisions of all 
or some of their courts, and especially of their courts of cassation”, which “[t]he authors of 
the […] [ECHR] cannot have overlooked”. 831  Thus, “the form of publicity given to the 
‘judgment’ […] must be assessed in the light of the special features of the proceedings in 
question and by reference to the object and purpose of” Article 6(1) ECHR.832 For instance, 
the possibility to obtain a copy of a judgment upon application, coupled with the publication 
of judgments in an official publication, was considered sufficient for these purposes.833 
 
3.2. Article 6(3) ECHR 
The specific guarantees for those charged with a criminal offence in Article 6(3) ECHR have 
been applied extensively in the Strasbourg organs’ assessment of the fairness of appellate 
proceedings, with the exception of paragraph (e), which pertains to the right “to have the free 
assistance of an interpreter if he cannot understand or speak the language used in court”. 
 
3.2.1. Article 6(3)(a) ECHR 
The right “to be informed promptly, in a language which he understands and in detail, of the 
nature and cause of the accusation against him” points “to the need for special attention to be 
paid to the notification of the ‘accusation’ to the defendant”, which encompasses detailed 
information “not only of […] the acts he is alleged to have committed and on which the 
accusation is based, but also the legal characterisation given to those acts”.834 The protection 
proffered by this guarantee may be prompted in appellate proceedings if the offence is subject 
to legal recharacterisation or where the facts are, as such, subject to reappraisal.835 
                                                 
829 E.g., Judgment, Sutter v. Switzerland, Application No. 8209/78, ECtHR, 22 February 1984, at 29-34. 
830 Ibid., at 32. 
831 Ibid., at 33. 
832 Ibid., at 33. 
833 Ibid., at 34. 
834 Judgment, Pélissier & Sassi v. France, Application No. 25444/94, ECtHR, 25 March 1999, at 51. 
835 At times, the ECtHR has assessed these issues in conjunction with Article 6(1) ECHR and Article 6(3)(b) 




As to the former matter, the ECtHR has found a violation of Article 6(3)(a) ECHR, where, 
without sufficient notice836 to the person concerned: (i) a first instance acquittal for a crime 
had been recharacterised into aiding and abetting that crime;837 (ii) a conviction for attempt to 
commit a crime had been altered into complicity in an attempt to commit that crime, 
notwithstanding the consequential alleviation of the sentence;838 or (iii) the conviction for a 
crime at trial had been substituted for conviction for another crime carrying a reduced 
sentence on appeal.839 Conversely, no violations have been found by the Strasbourg bodies 
where: (i) appeals by prosecutorial authorities or defendants explicitly seek requalification of 
inferior judgments;840 (ii) requalifications of acquittals or convictions by inferior instances 
precede appeals to higher instances endowed with jurisdiction over relevant legal and factual 
aspects;841 (iii) higher instances take account of elements not explicitly addressed by lower 
instances but intrinsic to the original accusation;842 or (iv) defendants are allowed to comment 
before appellate courts (of final instance) on a possible requalification.843 
 
As to the second matter, the ECtHR has considered Article 6(3)(a) ECHR breached where an 
appellate court had modified the mode of liability established at first instance and lowered the 
sentence imposed, because “the description of the factual situation set out in the indictment 
[…] changed during the proceedings”, which “did not constitute an element intrinsic to the 
initial accusation”. 844  Moreover, notwithstanding the fact that the applicant anticipated a 
                                                                                                                                                        
an essential prerequisite for ensuring that the proceedings are fair” (Judgment, Pélissier & Sassi v. France, 
Application No. 25444/94, ECtHR, 25 March 1999, at 52). Furthermore, Arts. 6(3)(a) and 6(3)(b) ECHR “are 
connected and […] the right to be informed of the nature and the cause of the accusation must be considered in 
the light of the accused’s right to prepare his defence” (Judgment, Pélissier & Sassi v. France, Application No. 
25444/94, ECtHR, 25 March 1999, at 54). However, for the sake of convenience, and considering that Article 
6(3)(a) ECHR is the most specific legal basis, these matters will be exclusively assessed under this provision. 
836 The sufficiency of the notification is dependent on the specific circumstances. It can even be provided on 
appeal. See: e.g., Judgment, Bäckström & Andersson v. Sweden, Application No. 67930/01, ECtHR, 5 
September 2006, at 8-10. 
837 Judgment, Pélissier & Sassi v. France, Application No. 25444/94, ECtHR, 25 March 1999, at 55-63. 
838 Judgment, Mattei v. France, Application No. 34043/02, ECtHR, 19 December 2006, at 38-44. 
839 Judgment, Varela Geis v. Spain, Application No. 61005/09, ECtHR, 5 March 2013; at 45-55. 
840 E.g., Judgment, Ramos Ruiz v. Spain, Application No. 65892/01, ECtHR, 19 February 2002, at 5-6; 
Judgment, Kwiatkowska v. Italy, Application No. 52868/99, ECtHR, 30 November 2000, at 6-8. 
841 E.g., Judgment, Dallos v. Hungary, Application No. 29082/95, ECtHR, 1 March 2001, at 48-53; Judgment, 
Sipavičius v. Lithuania, Application No. 49093/99, ECtHR, 21 February 2002, at 29-34; Judgment, Feldman v. 
France, Application No. 53426/99, ECtHR, 6 June 2002, at 6-9; Judgment, Balette v. Belgium, Application No. 
48193/99, ECtHR, 24 June 2004, at 7-8. 
842 Judgment, Salvador Torres v. Spain, Application No. 21525/93, ECtHR, 24 October 1996, at 30-33. 
843 E.g., Judgment, Bäckström & Andersson v. Sweden, Application No. 67930/01, ECtHR, 5 September 2006, at 
8-10; Judgment, Pérez Martínez v. Spain, Application No. 26023/10, ECtHR, 23 February 2016, at 26-29. 
844 Judgment, Juha Nuutinen v. Finland, Application No. 45830/99, ECtHR, 24 April 2007, at 32. 
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possible appellate requalification, he “was denied the possibility to argue his defence in 
adversarial proceedings insofar as the element introduced by the […] [second instance] […] 
was concerned”845 and, as the third instance denied leave to appeal, the applicant “did not 
have sufficient opportunity to defend himself before the highest court”. 846  An appellate 
requalification of the factual basis defined at first instance appears to carry more weight in the 
assessment of the ECtHR than a legal requalification. For instance, in addition to the fact that 
the persons concerned were allowed a limited opportunity to comment on a possible 
requalification on appeal, no violation was found in a particular case, since it did not “alter the 
description of events, but only changed the legal characterisation of the offence”.847 
 
3.2.2. Article 6(3)(b) ECHR 
With reference to the right “to have adequate time and facilities for the preparation of his 
defence”, 848  the ECtHR has, in the context of appellate proceedings, mainly considered 
whether the reasoning provided by a court has sufficiently enabled applicants to seek recourse 
to a higher court. In this regard, it has found that courts must “indicate with sufficient clarity 
the grounds on which they based their decision” and that “this, inter alia, […] makes it 
possible for the accused to exercise usefully the rights of appeal available to him”.849 This 
right, thus, reveals an overlap with the right of access to a court.850 
 
Violations of this provision have arisen when the provision of limited reasoning in an oral 
hearing, coupled with the absence of the timely deliverance of a written judgment, has 
constrained the rights of appeal of the persons concerned.851 Subsequently, the ECtHR has 
found that, even assuming that a judgment had been read out in full at first instance, “not 
being able to consult a judgment when preparing for an appeal against it could considerably 
undermine the effectiveness of such an appeal”, which occasioned a violation of Article 
6(3)(b) ECHR.852 However, a judgment rendered in abridged form need not be contrary to this 
safeguard, as such. The ECtHR has held that a judgment contained sufficient information to 
                                                 
845 Ibid., at 32. 
846 Ibid., at 32-33. 
847 Judgment, Bäckström & Andersson v. Sweden, Application No. 67930/01, ECtHR, 5 September 2006, at 10. 
848 The ECtHR has assessed these matters in conjunction with Article 6(1) ECHR, but, for the sake of clarity, 
only the most specific legal basis will be mentioned in this respect. 
849 Judgment, Hadjianastassiou v. Greece, Application No. 12945/87, ECtHR, 16 December 1992, at 33. 
850 Part II, Chapter 3.1.1. 
851 E.g., Judgment, Hadjianastassiou v. Greece, Application No. 12945/87, ECtHR, 16 December 1992, at 34-
37; Judgment, Baucher v. France, Application No. 53640/00, ECtHR, 24 July 2007, at 43-51. 
852 Judgment, Chorniy v. Ukraine, Application No. 35227/06, ECtHR, 16 May 2013, at 42-43. 
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make an informed assessment of the possible outcome of any appeal, considering that the 
arguments of the applicant had been addressed, the applicant’s conviction was not based on 
issues unaddressed in the abridged judgment, and the relevant appellate procedure involved a 
reestablishment of the facts and a reassessment of the law.853 
 
3.2.3. Article 6(3)(c) ECHR 
Article 6(3)(c) ECHR protects the defendant’s right to “[t]o defend himself in person or 
through legal assistance of his own choosing or, if he has not sufficient means to pay for legal 
assistance, to be given it free when the interests of justice so require”. 
 
The plain wording of this right concerns, first and foremost, the right to legal assistance. In 
the context of appellate proceedings, the ECtHR has concluded that this provision has been 
breached in relation to the conduct of appellate proceedings without legal representation.854 
Furthermore, according to the ECtHR, an absconder should not have been deprived of the 
right to legal assistance, since, in relation to the second-instance appellate proceedings, “his 
only chance of having arguments of law and fact presented at second instance in respect of the 
charge against him” was taken away from him and, in respect of the third-instance appellate 
proceedings, “the signal importance of the rights of the defence and of the principle of the rule 
of law in a democratic society” was highlighted.855 A similar outcome has been reached 
regarding the refusal of legal aid for the purpose of instituting an appeal, usually following an 
assessment of the nature of the proceedings, the powers of the appellate court, the complexity 
of the issues involved, the ability of the applicant to represent himself or herself, and/or the 
importance of the issues at stake.856 In addition, breaches of this provision have been found in 
respect of the inadequacy of court-appointed legal assistance, such as with regard to declaring 
an appeal inadmissible on the basis that it “contained no submissions and did not indicate in 
what way the legal provisions whose breach it alleged should have been interpreted and 
                                                 
853 Judgment, Zoon v. the Netherlands, Application No. 29202/95, ECtHR, 7 December 2000, at 46-51. 
854 E.g., Judgment, Pakelli v. Germany, Application No. 8398/78, ECtHR, 25 April 1983, at 36-41; Judgment, 
Eduard Rozhkov v. Russia, Application No. 11469/05, ECtHR, 31 October 2013, at 21-26; Judgment, 
Khodzhayev v. Russia, Application No. 21049/06, ECtHR, 12 November 2015, at 85-89. 
855 Judgment, Poitrimol v. France, Application No. 14032/88, ECtHR, 23 November 1993, at 35, 38. 
856 E.g., Judgment, Granger v. the United Kingdom, Application No. 11932/86, ECtHR, 28 March 1990, at 42-
48; Judgment, Boner v. the United Kingdom, Application No 18711/91, ECtHR, 28 October 1994, at 38-44; 
Judgment, Twalib v. Greece, Application No. 24294/94, ECtHR, 9 June 1998, at 51-57; Judgment, Krylov v. 
Russia, Application No. 36697/0, ECtHR, 14 March 2013, at 42-49; Judgment, Shekhov v. Russia, Application 
No. 12440/04, ECtHR, 19 June 2014, at 40-46; Judgment, Volkov & Adamskiy v. Russia, Applications Nos. 
7614/09 & 30863/10, ECtHR, 26 March 2015, at 56-61; Judgment, Shumikhin v. Russia, Application No. 
7848/06, ECtHR, 16 July 2015, at 23. 
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applied”857 or the failure to lodge an appeal and/or to appear at the appellate hearing.858 
Finally, the ECtHR has indicated that the right to self-representation may be limited on 
appeal. Thus, the obligatory requirement of legal representation by counsel on appeal need 
not infringe the right to defend oneself in person.859 
 
Furthermore, the ECtHR has held that, “[a]lthough this is not expressly mentioned in 
paragraph 1 of Article 6 […] [ECHR], the object and purpose of the Article taken as a whole 
show that a person ‘charged with a criminal offence’ is entitled to take part in the hearing” 
and “it is difficult to see how he could exercise […] [the rights guaranteed by Article 6(3)(c), 
(d), and (e) ECHR] without being present”.860 Whereas the presence of the accused has been 
mentioned in respect of the adversarial principle, the right to equality of arms, and the right to 
a public hearing under Article 6(1) ECHR too,861 it has, most specifically, been addressed 
under the heading of “the right to defend himself in person” set forth in Article 6(3)(c) 
ECHR.862 According to the ECtHR, “the personal attendance of the defendant does not take 
on the same crucial significance for an appeal hearing […] as it does for the trial hearing […]” 
and, consequently, “regard must be had, among other considerations, to the specific features 
of the proceedings in question and to the manner in which the applicant’s interests were 
actually presented and protected before the appellate court, particularly in the light of the 
nature of the issues to be decided by it”.863 However, an “appellate court cannot examine the 
case properly without having heard the applicant directly and gaining a personal impression 
of him” where it: (i) “has to examine a case as to the facts and the law and make a full 
assessment of the issue of guilt or innocence”; (ii) “is called upon to examine whether the 
applicant’s sentence should be increased and when the appeal proceedings are capable of 
raising issues including such matters as the applicant’s personality and character, which 
makes such proceedings of crucial importance for the applicant since their outcome could be 
of major detriment to him”.864 Findings of non-violation have mainly been entered in respect 
                                                 
857 Judgment, Czekalla v. Portugal, Application No. 38830/97, ECtHR, 10 October 2002, at 28, 65-66, 68. 
858 E.g., Judgment, Siyrak v. Russia, Application No. 38094/05, ECtHR, 19 December 2013, at 29-33; Judgment, 
Vamvakas v. Greece (No. 2), Application No. 2870/11, ECtHR, 9 April 2015, at 38-43. 
859 Judgment, Meftah v. France, Application No. 32911/96, ECtHR, 26 April 2001, at 47. 
860 Judgment, Colozza v. Italy, Application No. 9024/80, ECtHR, 12 February 1985, at 27. 
861 Part II, Chapter 3.1.1; Part II, Chapter 3.1.2. 
862 The ECtHR has assessed these matters in conjunction with Article 6(1) ECHR, but, for the sake of clarity, 
only the most specific legal basis will be mentioned in this respect. 
863 Judgment, Zahirović v. Croatia, Application No. 58590/11, ECtHR, 25 April 2013, at 54-55. 
864 Ibid., at 56-57. E.g., Judgment, Kremzow v. Austria, Application No. 12350/86, ECtHR, 21 September 1993, 
at 67-69; Judgment, Cooke v. Austria, Application No. 25878/94, ECtHR, 8 February 2000, at 42-44; Judgment, 
Sibgatullin v. Russia, Application No. 32165/02, ECtHR, 23 April 2009, at 39-50; Judgment, Talabér v. 
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of the absence of persons from appellate proceedings not involving a reassessment of factual 
matters combined with legal representation,865 including in leave to appeal proceedings866. 
 
Finally, the ECtHR has ascribed a wider function to Article 6(3)(c) ECHR in the context of 
leave to appeal proceedings. Whereas it had found, in an assessment of the overall fairness of 
such proceedings, that Article 6 ECHR had not been breached because, inter alia, “a full and 
thorough evaluation of the relevant factors” had been carried out,867 it subsequently expanded 
this line of reasoning. It considered Article 6(3)(c) ECHR violated as, following in absentia 
proceedings at first instance, “the denial of leave to appeal […] [was] not […] based on a full 
and thorough evaluation of the relevant factors”, since a ground of appeal put forward by the 
applicant was dismissed as implausible, even though the information was part of the official 
record and the appellate court ought, thus, to have been aware thereof.868 
 
3.2.4. Article 6(3)(d) ECHR 
The right “to examine or have examined witnesses against him and to obtain the attendance 
and examination of witnesses on his behalf under the same conditions as witnesses against 
him” mainly “enshrines the principle that, before an accused can be convicted, all evidence 
against him must normally be produced in his presence at a public hearing with a view to 
adversarial argument”. 869  This definition, thus, reveals a clear overlap with several 
aforementioned aspects of the right to a fair trial, such as the rights to adversarial 
proceedings, 870  a public hearing, 871  and to defend oneself in person. 872  Moreover, 
                                                                                                                                                        
Hungary, Application No. 37376/05, ECtHR, 29 September 2009, at 28-30; Judgment, Popa & Tănăsescu v. 
Romania, Application No. 19946/04, ECtHR, 10 April 2012, at 48-55; Judgment, Abdulgadirov v. Azerbaijan, 
Application No. 24510/06, ECtHR, 20 June 2013, at 41-48; Judgment, Henri Rivière et al. v. France, 
Application No. 46460/10, ECtHR, 25 July 2013, at 28-34; Judgment, Kozlitin v. Russia, Application No. 
17092/04, ECtHR, 14 November 2013, at 58-73; Judgment, Lonić v. Croatia, Application No. 8067/12, ECtHR, 
4 December 2014, at 94-102. 
865 E.g., Judgment, Kamasinski v. Austria, Application No. 9783/82, ECtHR, 19 December 1989 at 107-108; 
Judgment, Kremzow v. Austria, Application No. 12350/86, ECtHR, 21 September 1993, at 63; Judgment, 
Umnikov v. Ukraine, Application No. 42684/06, ECtHR, 19 May 2016, at 60-61. 
866 E.g., Judgment, Monnell & Morris v. the United Kingdom, Applications Nos. 9562/81 & 9818/82, ECtHR, 2 
March 1987, at 66-68; Judgment, E.M. v. Norway, Application No. 20087/92, ECmHR, 26 October 1995, at 2; 
Judgment, Peterson Sarpsborg As et al. v. Norway, Application No. 25944/94, ECmHR, 27 November 1996, at 
2. 
867 E.g., Judgment, Monnell & Morris v. the United Kingdom, Applications Nos. 9562/81 & 9818/82, ECtHR, 2 
March 1987, at 69; Judgment, E.M. v. Norway, Application No. 20087/92, ECmHR, 26 October 1995, at 2; 
Judgment, Peterson Sarpsborg As et al. v. Norway, Application No. 25944/94, ECmHR, 27 November 1996, at 
2. 
868 Judgment, Lalmahomed v. the Netherlands, Application No. 26036/08, ECtHR, 22 February 2011, at 41-48. 
869 Judgment, Al-Khawaja & Tahery v. the United Kingdom, Applications Nos. 26766/05 & 22228/06, ECtHR, 
15 December 2011, at 118. 
870 Part II, Chapter 3.1.1. 
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“[e]xceptions to this principle are possible but must not infringe the rights of the defence, 
which, as a rule, require that the accused should be given an adequate and proper opportunity 
to challenge and question a witness against him”.873  
 
The Strasbourg organs have, in general, held that it cannot be excluded “that situations may 
occur where the appeal proceedings before a court with jurisdiction as to both the facts and 
the law require that an accused’s guilt or innocence could only, as a matter of fair trial, be 
properly determined with a direct assessment of the evidence given by a witness, namely 
where the crucial question concerns the credibility of the person involved”.874 However, in 
appellate proceedings, this guarantee mainly comes into play in relation to the need for 
additional witness examination in the context of appellate reversals of first instance acquittals. 
In these circumstances, the ECtHR initially found, without further specification, that Article 6 
ECHR had been violated because “both appellate courts [pronouncing a conviction] had very 
limited additional evidence at their disposal in comparison with the court of first instance that 
had pronounced an acquittal and the second appellate court had provided no reasons for an 
implicit rejection of a request by the applicant to hear additional witnesses”.875 Subsequently, 
it found violations of Article 6(3)(d) ECHR where applicants had been found guilty on appeal 
on the basis of the same witness statements that underlay acquittals entered by lower instances 
without rehearing these witnesses on appeal in spite of explicit requests to this effect by the 
defendants concerned.876 However, no violation of Article 6(3)(d) ECHR arises in the absence 
of a specific request to this end and provided that sufficient safeguards have been put in place, 
such as the possibility to examine witnesses at first instance, the provision of thorough 
reasoning, and the facility of further appellate review.877 
 
                                                                                                                                                        
871 Part II, Chapter 3.1.2. 
872 Part II, Chapter 3.2.3. 
873 Judgment, Al-Khawaja & Tahery v. the United Kingdom, Applications Nos. 26766/05 & 22228/06, ECtHR, 
15 December 2011, at 118. 
874 Judgment, Einarsson v. Iceland, Application No. 22596/93, ECmHR, 5 April 1995, at 2. 
875 Judgment, Vidal v. Belgium, Application No. 12351/86, ECtHR, 22 April 1992, at 8-20, 34-35. 
876 E.g., Judgment, Destrehem v. France, Application No. 56651/00, ECtHR, 18 May 2004, at 46-47; Judgment, 
Dănilă v. Romania, Application No. 53897/00, ECtHR, 8 March 2007, at 60-63. 
877 Judgment, Kashlev v. Estonia, Application No. 22574/08, ECtHR, 26 April 2016, at 51. 
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3.3. Article 2 Protocol 7 ECHR 
 
3.3.1. Convicted Persons 
In light of the reference to those “convicted of a criminal offence”, Article 2(1) Protocol 7 
ECHR removes the protection of the right to appeal from proceedings of a non-criminal 
nature878 and from criminal proceedings concluded without a formal conviction.879 
 
Although the use of “shall have the right” may, similar to the ICCPR, suggest mandatory 
appellate review in criminal cases, the ECtHR has determined that this is not the case. On the 
basis of the same reasoning set forth in respect of the right of access to a court,880 the right to 
appeal may be waived because of, for instance, a plea-bargaining arrangement.881 
 
3.3.2. Availability of Appellate Review 
In line with its primary rationale, violations have been found in cases in which the right to 
appeal of persons convicted at first instance has been removed altogether,882 whereas the 
opposite conclusion has been reached where a conviction has been reviewed.883 
 
The Strasbourg organs have also assessed whether, in the absence of regular appellate relief, 
alternative mechanisms satisfy the requirements of Article 2 Protocol 7 ECHR. For instance, a 
review procedure that “could only be initiated by a prosecutor or by a motion of the president 
of the higher court” was “not a sufficiently effective remedy” for the purposes of the ECHR 
as it “was not directly accessible to a party to the proceedings and did not depend on his or 
her motion and arguments”.884 The ECtHR added that “the mere fact that the review initiated 
by the Prosecutor’s Office had some positive, albeit temporary, impact on the applicant’s 
                                                 
878 E.g., Judgment, Sjöö v. Sweden, Application No. 37604/97, ECmHR, 21 October 1998, at 2. 
879 E.g., Judgment, T.A. v. Sweden, Application No. 15513/89, ECmHR, 29 June 1992, at 2; Judgment, Settarov 
v. Ukraine, Application No. 1798/03, ECtHR, 16 March 2010, at 1. 
880 Part II, Chapter 3.1.1. 
881 E.g., Judgment, Natsvlishvili & Togonidze v. Georgia, Application No. 9043/05, ECtHR, 29 April 2014, at 
92-98. 
882 E.g., Judgment, Grecu v. Romania, Application No. 75101/01, ECtHR, 30 November 2006, at 83-84. 
883 E.g., Judgment, C.P.H. v. Sweden, Application No. 20959/92, ECtHR, 2 September 1994, at 3; Judgment, 
Lantto v. Finland, Application No. 27665/95, ECtHR, 12 July 1999, at 2; Judgment, De Lorenzo v. Italy, 
Application No. 69264/01, ECtHR, 12 February 2004, at 4. 
884 E.g., Judgment, Gurepka v. Ukraine, Application No. 61406/00, ECtHR, 6 September 2005, at 60. Similar: 
Judgment, Zaicevs v. Latvia, Application No. 65022/01, ECtHR, 31 July 2007, at 54; Judgment, Kamburov v. 
Bulgaria, Application No. 31001/02, ECtHR, 23 April 2009, at 24; Judgment, Stanchev v. Bulgaria, Application 
No. 8682/02, ECtHR, 1 October 2009, at 46; Judgment, Zhelyazkov v. Bulgaria, Application No. 11332/04, 
ECtHR, 9 October 2012, at 43-44. 
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situation […] was not in itself sufficient to conclude that the extraordinary appeal was an 
effective remedy”. 885  Similarly, a comparable procedure has been rejected because, in 
addition to the discretion bestowed on judicial officers to seek review, it lacked “any clearly 
defined procedure or time-limits and consistent application”.886 
 
3.3.3. Exercise of the Right to Appeal 
The Explanatory Report to Protocol 7 ECHR explicates that Article 2 Protocol 7 ECHR 
“leaves the modalities for the exercise of the right and the grounds on which it may be 
exercised to be determined by domestic law”.887 These issues will be discussed in turn. 
 
3.3.3.1. Modalities 
Notwithstanding the leeway afforded to States signatories, the ECtHR has established limits 
as to the permissible modalities of appellate review. In this regard, a parallel between the right 
of access to a court and the right to appeal has been drawn: “any restrictions [to the right to 
appeal] […] must, by analogy with the right of access to a court embodied in Article 6 § 1 
[…] [ECHR], pursue a legitimate aim and not infringe the very essence of that right”.888 On 
this basis, several conditions attached to appellate review have been declared incompatible 
with Article 2 Protocol 7 ECHR, such as: the exclusion from the appellate process of those 
who refused or were unable to surrender to the authorities;889  the appellate review of a 
decision after a first instance sentence had been served in full;890 and, following the expiry of 
the sentence imposed at first instance, the unspecified extension of detention as a result of the 
exercise of the right to appeal the conviction.891  
 
                                                 
885 Judgment, Gurepka v. Ukraine, Application No. 61406/00, ECtHR, 6 September 2005, at 61. 
886 Judgment, Galstyan v. Armenia, Application No. 26986/03, ECtHR, 15 November 2007, at 125-126. E.g., 
Judgment, Karapetyan v. Armenia, Application No. 22387/05, ECtHR, 27 October 2009, at 73-74; Judgment, 
Ashughyan v. Armenia, Application No. 33268/03, ECtHR, 17 July 2008, at 108-109; Judgment, Mkhitaryan v. 
Armenia, Application No. 22390/05, ECtHR, 2 December 2008, at 85-86; Judgment, Tadevosyan v. Armenia, 
Application No. 41698/04, ECtHR, 2 December 2008, at 79-80; Judgment, Hakobyan et al. v. Armenia, 
Application No. 34320/04, ECtHR, 10 April 2012, at 140-141. Similar: Judgment, Kakabadze et al. v. Georgia, 
Application No. 1484/07, ECtHR, 2 October 2012, at 97. 
887 Council of Europe, Explanatory Report Protocol No. 7 to the Convention for the Protection of Human Rights 
and Fundamental Freedoms, E.T.S. No. 17, 22 November 1984, at 18 (emphasis in original). 
888 E.g., Judgment, Krombach v. France, Application No. 29731/96, ECtHR, 13 February 2001, at 96; Judgment, 
Gurepka v. Ukraine, Application No. 61406/00, ECtHR, 6 September 2005, at 59. 
889 E.g., Judgment, Krombach v. France, Application No. 29731/96, ECtHR, 13 February 2001, at 100; 
Judgment, Mariani v. France, Application No. 43640/98, ECtHR, 31 March 2005, at 45-46. 
890 E.g., Judgment, Shvydka v. Ukraine, Application No. 17888/12, ECtHR, 30 October 2014, at 53-55. 
891 E.g., Judgment, Yakovenko v. Ukraine, Application No. 5425/11, ECtHR, 4 June 2015, at 80-83. 
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Moreover, the ECtHR has determined that the concept of law in the ECHR “implies 
qualitative requirements, notably those of accessibility and foreseeability”, although a degree 
of generality is accepted.892 Although the ECtHR has not found so in the context of Article 2 
Protocol 7 ECHR, the reference to “law” necessarily prompts these requirements too. 
 
3.3.3.2. Scope of Appellate Review 
As with the ICCPR, the scope of appellate review required under Protocol 7 ECHR extends, 
on the one hand, to the question of whether both conviction and sentence must be reviewed 
and, on the other hand, whether appellate review must encompass factual matters as well. 
 
As to the former issue, contrary to the ICCPR, Article 2 Protocol 7 ECHR mentions 
“conviction or sentence”. As put by the ECmHR, the use of “conviction or sentence” could, 
on the one hand, “be understood to imply that the States under this provision have a choice 
and may limit the review guaranteed for everyone either to concern the sentence alone or 
conviction and sentence” or, on the other hand, “as referring to the possible choice by the 
individual concerned”. 893  However, subsequently, the ECmHR explicitly discarded any 
additional discretion on the part of the States. It found that the Explanatory Report to Protocol 
7 ECHR merely mentions an example of a guilty plea, implying a lack of choice on the part of 
the State, and, in addition, that a margin of discretion in the regulation of the appellate process 
is expressly foreseen by the use of “governed by law”, which excludes additional discretion 
inherent in the disjunctive formulation of “conviction or sentence”.894 
 
As to the latter issue, in light of the fact that European appellate systems vary in scope, 
ranging from appellate review limited to questions of law to appellate review encompassing 
both questions of fact and law, the Explanatory Report to Protocol 7 ECHR also leaves the 
grounds on which the right to be appal may be exercised to the discretion of Member States of 
the Council of Europe. In its early decisions, the ECmHR has demonstrated a degree of 
caution in respect of this matter, finding that it did not consider it “necessary to determine the 
                                                 
892 Judgment, Del Río Prada v. Spain, Application No. 42750/09, ECtHR, 21 October 2013, at 91-92; Judgment, 
Coëme et al. v. Belgium, Applications Nos. 32492/96, 32547/96, 32548/96, 33209/96, & 33210/96, ECtHR, 22 
June 2000, at 145. 
893 Judgment, Nielsen v. Denmark, Application No. 19028/91, ECmHR, 9 September 1992, at 2; Judgment, 
Jakobsen v. Denmark, Application No. 22015/93, ECmHR, 30 November 1994, at 2. 
894 Judgment, Nielsen v. Denmark, Application No. 19028/91, ECmHR, 9 September 1992, at 2; Judgment, 
Jakobsen v. Denmark, Application No. 22015/93, ECmHR, 30 November 1994, at 2. Also: S. Trechsel, Human 
Rights in Criminal Proceedings (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2005), at 367-368. 
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scope of Article 2 of Protocol No. 7 […] [ECHR] in general” and that, “[a]ssuming that a 
review within the meaning of this provision guarantees to everyone the right to bring before a 
higher tribunal his conviction or sentence or both such examination by this tribunal may be a 
limited review, provided the limitations under the law would not make such a review 
meaningless.”895 Subsequently, however, the Strasbourg organs have, on numerous occasions, 
declared appellate review limited to a control of the application of the law, procedural defects, 
and/or the arbitrariness of the inferior judgment, compatible with Article 2 Protocol 7 
ECHR.896 In addition, they have clarified that a refusal by an appellate court to take further 
evidence, despite the legal prerogative to do so, does not necessarily entail a violation of this 
provision either.897 The ECtHR has also specified that a complaint alleging that the appellate 
court concurring with the reasoning of a lower court denied adequate appellate review did 
“not disclose any appearance of a violation”.898 Furthermore, in the context of an increased 
sentence imposed on appeal, appellate review limited to issues of procedure and sentence has 
been deemed satisfactory.899 Despite the rather clear language in the Explanatory Report, 
certain States have appended specific reservations to Protocol 7 ECHR to emphasise the 
possibility of appellate review confined to matters of law.900 
                                                 
895 E.g., Judgment, Nielsen v. Denmark, Application No. 19028/91, ECmHR, 9 September 1992; Judgment, 
Jakobsen v. Denmark, Application No. 22015/93, ECmHR, 30 November 1994; Judgment, Altieri v. France, 
Cyprus, and Switzerland, Application No. 28140/95, ECtHR, 15 May 1996; Judgment, Planka v. Austria, 
Application No. 25852/94, ECmHR, 15 May 1996. 
896 E.g., Judgment, N.W. v. Luxemburg, Application No. 19715/92, ECmHR, 8 December 1992, at 3; Judgment, 
Nielsen v. Denmark, Application No. 19028/91, ECmHR, 9 September 1992; Judgment, Jakobsen v. Denmark, 
Application No. 22015/93, ECmHR, 30 November 1994; Judgment, Saussier v. France, Application No. 
35884/97, ECmHR, 20 May 1998; Judgment, Emmanuello v. Italy, Application No. 35791/97, ECtHR, 31 
August 1999, at 11; Judgment, Pesti & Frodl v. Austria, Application No. 27618/95, ECtHR, 18 January 2000, at 
12; Judgment, Loewenguth v. France, Application No. 53183/99, ECtHR, 30 May 2000, at 2; Judgment, 
Deperrois v. France, Application No. 48203/99, ECtHR, 22 June 2000, at 5; Judgment, Krombach v. France, 
Application No. 29731/96, ECtHR, 13 February 2001, at 97; Judgment, Waridel v. Switzerland, Application No. 
39765/98, ECtHR, 12 April 2001, at 11; Judgment, Hannak v. Austria, Application No. 70883/01, ECtHR, 9 
July 2001, at 3; Judgment, I.H. et al. v. Austria, Application No. 42780/98, ECtHR, 23 October 2001, at 8; 
Judgment, Guala v. France, Application No. 64117/00, ECtHR, 18 March 2003, at 4; Judgment, De Lorenzo v. 
Italy, Application No. 69264/01, ECtHR, 12 February 2004, at 4; Judgment, Müller v. Austria, Application No. 
12555/03, ECtHR, 5 October 2006, at 25; Judgment, Hauser-Sporn v. Austria, Application No. 37301/03, 
ECtHR, 7 December 2006, at 52; Judgment, Vitzthum v. Austria, Application No. 8140/04, ECtHR, 26 July 
2007, at 35. The same conclusion has been reached in relation to Article 6(1) ECHR. E.g., Judgment, Taxquet v. 
Belgium, Application No. 926/05, ECtHR, 13 January 2009, at 83; Judgment, Lhermitte v. Belgium, Application 
No. 34238/09, ECtHR, 26 May 2015, at 45. 
897 Judgment, Dür v. Austria, Application No. 22342/93, ECmHR, 16 January 1996, at 3.  
898 Judgment, Kibermanis v. Latvia, Application No. 42065/06, ECtHR, 17 January 2012, at 41, 47. 
899 Judgment, Pesti & Frodl v. Austria, Application No. 27618/95, ECtHR, 18 January 2000, at 4. 
900 Reservations by: France (“The Government of the French Republic declares that, in accordance with the 
meaning of Article 2, paragraph 1 [Protocol 7 ECHR], the review by a higher court may be limited to a control 
of the application of the law, such as an appeal to the Supreme Court”) and Germany (“The Federal Republic of 
Germany applies Article 2.1 [Protocol 7 ECHR] to convictions or sentences in the first instance only, it being 




Seeing that various Member States of the Council of Europe operate appellate proceedings 
requiring leave to appeal, the Explanatory Report to Protocol 7 ECHR separately addresses 
the scope of review required in such procedures. It indicates that “[t]he right to apply to a 
tribunal or an administrative authority for leave to appeal is itself to be regarded as a form of 
review within the meaning of” Article 2 Protocol 7 ECHR,901 which entails that the mere fact 
that leave to appeal must be sought is not in breach of the scope of review required under this 
provision. Accordingly, cases involving leave to appeal procedures have been decided in 
accordance with this interpretation.902 Moreover, the jurisprudence of the ECtHR has added 
that a refusal by an appellate court to deal with a complaint, in full or in part, may be equated 
with a decision given on an application for leave to appeal in certain circumstances.903  
 
3.3.4. First Instance Trial by Highest Tribunal 
The situation addressed by the second exception to the right to appeal envisaged by Article 2 
Protocol 7 ECHR had already been addressed prior to the entry into force of this Protocol. 
The ECmHR has found no violation in respect of a first instance trial involving high-ranking 
officials and non-dignitaries before the highest domestic court without the possibility of 
appeal, since Article 6 ECHR does not guarantee such a right.904 Subsequently, an exception 
to the right to appeal “in cases in which the person concerned was tried in the first instance by 
the highest tribunal” was expressly included in Article 2(2) Protocol 7 ECHR, although this 
provision has not been applied directly in Strasbourg jurisprudence hitherto. 
 
                                                                                                                                                        
http://conventions.coe.int/Treaty/Commun/ListeDeclarations.asp?NT=117&CM=8&DF=16/05/2013&CL=ENG
&VL=1. 
901 Council of Europe, Explanatory Report Protocol No. 7 to the Convention for the Protection of Human Rights 
and Fundamental Freedoms, E.T.S. No. 17, 22 November 1984, at 19. 
902 E.g., Judgment, Näss v. Sweden, Application No. 18066/91, ECmHR, 6 April 1994, at 2; Judgment, C.P.H. v. 
Sweden, Application No. 20959/92, ECtHR, 2 September 1994, at 3; Judgment, E.M. v. Norway, Application 
No. 20087/92, ECmHR, 26 October 1995; Judgment, Peterson Sarpsborg As et al. v. Norway, Application No. 
25944/94, ECmHR, 27 November 1996, at 3; Judgment, Lantto v. Finland, Application No. 27665/95, ECtHR, 
12 July 1999, at 14-15. 
903 E.g., Judgment, Hauser v. Austria, Application No. 26808/95, ECmHR, 16 January 1996; Judgment, H.S. v. 
Austria, Application No. 26510/95, ECmHR, 28 February 1996, at 1; Judgment, Horst v. Austria, Application 
No. 25809/94, ECmHR, 28 February 1996; Judgment, Hubner v. Austria, Application No. 34311/96, ECtHR, 31 
August 1999, at 5-6; Judgment, Weh & Weh v. Austria, Application No. 38544/97, ECtHR, 4 July 2002, at 13; 
Judgment, Hauser-Sporn v. Austria, Application No. 37301/03, ECtHR, 7 December 2006, at 52; Judgment, 
Stempfer v. Austria, Application No. 18294/03, ECtHR, 26 July 2007, at 49-51. 
904 Judgment, Crociani et al. v. Italy, Application No. 8603/79, ECmHR, 18 December 1980, para 16-17. 
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3.3.5. Appellate Conviction Revoking Acquittal 
Article 2(2) Protocol 7 ECHR sets forth that the right to appeal may be subject to an 
exception “in cases in which the person concerned […] was convicted following an appeal 
against acquittal”. Several states have, nevertheless, attached corresponding reservations to 
Protocol 7 ECHR.905 Accordingly, the Strasbourg organs have dismissed such complaints 
straightforwardly. The ECmHR has applied this exception to a conviction imposed by a court 
of second and final instance following a first instance acquittal, notwithstanding the argument 
that the exception was inapplicable as the second instance was “competent to examine only 
points of law and alleged procedural errors”.906 Similarly, it has also invoked this exception in 
relation to an appellate conviction rendered in absentia after a first instance acquittal had been 
pronounced in absentia. 907  However, this exception has not been strictly limited to 
convictions replacing acquittals. The ECtHR has clarified that it also covers the appellate 
aggravation of a lower conviction following a fresh hearing on appeal.908 
 
4. ACHR 
The IACtHR has applied aspects of Article 8(2) ACHR beyond Article 8(2)(h) ACHR to 
appellate proceedings. Like the Strasbourg organs, it has declared that, “from first to last 
instance, a criminal proceeding is a single proceeding in various stages” and “the principle of 
due process […] must be observed in all the various procedural instances”.909 
 
4.1. Article 8(1) ACHR 
As is the case with Article 14(1) ICCPR and Article 6(1) ECHR, Article 8(1) ACHR 
commences with a general clause. It stipulates that “[e]very person has the right to a hearing, 
with due guarantees and within a reasonable time, by a competent, independent, and impartial 
tribunal, previously established by law”. However, in comparison with its counterparts in the 
ICCPR and ECHR, Article 8(1) ACHR is of a more limited scope. Most pertinently, it lacks a 
                                                 
905 Reservations by: Germany (“The Federal Republic of Germany applies Article 2.1 [Protocol 7 ECHR] to 
convictions or sentences in the first instance only”) and the Netherlands (“The Netherlands Government 
interprets paragraph 1 of Article 2 [Protocol 7 ECHR] thus that the right conferred to everyone convicted of a 
criminal offence to have conviction or sentence reviewed by a higher tribunal relates only to convictions or 
sentences given in the first instance by tribunals which, according to Netherlands law, are in charge of 
jurisdiction in criminal matters”). Available at: 
http://conventions.coe.int/Treaty/Commun/ListeDeclarations.asp?NT=117&CM=8&DF=16/05/2013&CL=ENG
&VL=1. 
906 Decision, Botten v. Norway, Application No. 16206/90, ECmHR, 17 January 1994. 
907 Decision, Partouche v. France, Application No. 25906/94, ECmHR, 17 May 1995. 
908 Decision, Šimšić v. Bosnia and Herzegovina, Application No. 51552/10, ECtHR, 10 April 2012, at 28. 
909 Judgment, Castillo Petruzzi et al. v. Peru, Series C. No. 59, IACtHR, 30 May 1999, at 161. 
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general clause guaranteeing a fair trial. Accordingly, the jurisprudence of the IACtHR in 
respect of appellate proceedings has been confined to the impartiality requirement. The 
definition of this requirement has been explicitly adopted from the ECtHR.910 
 
On this basis, the IACtHR has considered the involvement of the same judges in different 
stages of a criminal trial. In this regard, it has noted that judges who had allowed an appeal 
against an acquittal, ruling that “[t]he bases of the judgment are not sufficient to reasonably 
discard the presence of actual or possible malice (with regard to the crimes charged)”, were 
the very same judges who had examined the merits of this person’s appeal against conviction 
upon retrial and “did not confine themselves to the reasons of law”.911 These judges, thus, 
“did not meet the impartiality requirement”, in violation of Article 8(1) IACHR.912 
 
4.2. Article 8(2) ACHR 
Although the minimum guarantees applicable to criminal proceedings in Article 8(2) ACHR 
have not arisen frequently in the jurisprudence of the Inter-American bodies in relation to 
appellate proceedings (except for the right to appeal), the rights to “prior notification in detail 
[…] of the charges”913 and “to be assisted by counsel provided by the state, paid or not as the 
domestic law provides, if the accused does not defend himself personally or engage his own 
counsel”, as set forth in Article 8(2)(b) and 8(2)(e) ACHR, have been invoked. 
 
4.2.1. Article 8(2)(b) ACHR 
In relation to the dismissal by two military instances of charges against a person and the 
subsequent conviction by a military court of third instance to life imprisonment and the denial 
of a special appeal seeking review of that conviction,914 the IACtHR has found a violation of 
Article 8(2)(b) ACHR. It held, inter alia, that the applicant had been convicted “in the court 
of last instance, based on new evidence that his defense attorney had not seen”.915 
 
  
                                                 
910 Judgment, Herrera-Ulloa v. Costa Rica, Series C. No. 106, IACtHR, 2 July 2004, at 170. Also: Part II, 
Chapter 3.1.3. 
911 Judgment, Herrera-Ulloa v. Costa Rica, Series C. No. 106, IACtHR, 2 July 2004, at 174. 
912 Ibid., at 175. 
913 This right has been invoked in conjunction with Article 8(2)(c) ACHR, which enshrines the right to “adequate 
time and means for the preparation of his defense”. 
914 Judgment, Castillo Petruzzi et al. v. Peru, Series C. No. 59, IACtHR, 30 May 1999, at 86.21-86.26. 
915 Ibid., at 140. 
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4.2.2. Article 8(2)(e) ACHR 
The IACmHR has found that the refusal to assign legal aid to a person convicted at first 
instance for the purpose of preparing an appeal may simultaneously violate Article 8(2)(e) 
and 8(2)(h) ACHR. In this regard, it noted that the petitioner in question was the subject of 
serious proceedings, the issues of potential pertinence on appeal involved substantively and 
procedurally complex issues of fact and law, and two relevant matters had not even been 
raised on appeal.916 Accordingly, the lack of counsel on appeal contravened “the inalienable 
right to be assisted by counsel provided by the state”, as it “affected the fairness of the 
proceedings against […] [the petitioner] by hindering his ability to effectively raise and argue 
serious deficiencies in the proceedings against him”.917 Moreover the IACmHR concluded 
that the absence of counsel affected the applicant’s “right to a fair hearing before the Court of 
Appeal and therefore undermined his right to appeal his judgment to a higher court”.918 
 
4.3. Article 8(2)(h) ACHR 
In respect of the right to appeal, “considering that the […] [ACHR] must be interpreted taking 
into account is object and purpose, which is the effective protection of human rights, the […] 
[IACtHR] has determined that it must be an ordinary, accessible and effective remedy that 
permits a comprehensive review or examination of the appealed ruling, that is available to 
anyone who has been convicted, and that observes basic procedural guarantees”.919 
 
4.3.1. Ordinary 
As to the requirement of “ordinary”, the IACtHR has specified that “the right to file an appeal 
against the judgment must be guaranteed before the judgment becomes res judicata, because 
it seeks to protect the right of defense by avoiding the adoption of a final decision in flawed 
proceedings involving errors that unduly prejudice the interests of an individual”.920 
 
On this basis, the IACtHR has, for instance, declared the possibility of applying for review, 
which is “a special remedy that is appropriate against final judgments in certain 
circumstances”, incompatible with the need for an “ordinary” appellate mechanism.921 
                                                 
916 Report, Tracey v. Jamaica, Report No. 61/06, IACmHR, 20 July 2006, at 41. 
917 Ibid., at 42. 
918 Ibid., at 42. 
919 Judgment, Catrimán et al. v. Chile, Series C. No. 279, IACtHR, 29 May 2014, at 270. 
920 Ibid., at 270. 





According to the IACtHR, the requirement of “accessible” ensures that “the filing of the 
appeal should not be so complex that it makes this right illusory”, which means that “[t]he 
formalities for its admission must be minimal and should not constitute an obstacle for the 
remedy to comply with its purpose of examining and deciding the errors claimed”.922  
 
4.3.3. Effective 
An “effective” appeal requires that, “[r]egardless of the appeal regime or system adopted […] 
and the name given to the means of contesting the adverse judgment, it must constitute an 
appropriate mechanism to rectify an erroneous conviction”.923  
 
It appears, however, that an overlap with the requirement of “ordinary” has arisen in the 
jurisprudence of the IACtHR. It has concluded that a right to appeal had been “created when 
the conviction had already become res judicata” and that “the possibility to file an appeal […] 
against a penalty that had already been served meant nothing more than the mere formal 
existence of the process of appeal because the effects of the judgment had already 
materialized”.924 Although this language is identical to the definition of “ordinary”,925 the 
IACtHR has concluded that this remedy was “neither adequate nor effective”.926 
 
Moreover, although it does not directly arise out of the general description of the requirement 
of “effective”, the IACtHR has assessed the provision of adequate reasoning by appellate 
courts on this basis. In this regard, it has found that “[t]he simple description of the lower 
court’s arguments, without the higher court that decided the appeal setting out its own 
reasoning […], means that the latter did not comply with the requirement of an effective 
remedy”.927 Similarly, in relation to a finding that “permitted evidence that the appellants 
considered relevant to support their defense not to be assessed” and that merely indicated “the 
                                                 
922 Judgment, Catrimán et al. v. Chile, Series C. No. 279, IACtHR, 29 May 2014, at 270. In similar terms, the 
IACtHR previously considered that, as Article 8(2)(h) IACHR seeks to enable a party to “turn to a higher court 
for revision of a judgment that was unfavorable to that party’s interests”, States possess “a margin of discretion 
in regulating the exercise of that remedy … [but] they may not establish restrictions or requirements inimical to 
the very essence of the right to appeal a judgment”. See: Judgment, Barreto Leiva v. Venezuela, Series C. No. 
206, IACtHR, 17 November 2009, at 90. 
923 Judgment, Catrimán et al. v. Chile, Series C. No. 279, IACtHR, 29 May 2014, at 270. 
924 Judgment, Alibux v. Suriname, Series C. No. 276, IACtHR, 30 January 2014, at 110. 
925 Part II, Chapter 4.3.1. 
926 Judgment, Alibux v. Suriname, Series C. No. 276, IACtHR, 30 January 2014, at 110. 
927 Judgment, Catrimán et al. v. Chile, Series C. No. 279, IACtHR, 29 May 2014, at 279. 
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reasons why it was ‘rejected’”, the IACtHR emphasised that an appellate court “must ensure 
that the guilty verdict provides clear, complete and logical grounds in which, in addition to 
describing the content of the evidence, it sets out its assessment of this and indicates the 
reasons why it considered – or did not consider – it reliable and appropriate to prove the 
elements of criminal responsibility”.928 
 
4.3.4. Comprehensive Review 
The requirement of “effective” “is closely related to” the requirement of “[a]llowing a 
comprehensive review or examination of the judgment appealed”.929 
 
4.3.4.1. The Judgment 
Contrary to the ICCPR and Protocol 7 ECHR, Article 8(2)(h) ACHR does not specify 
whether the conviction and/or the sentence must be reviewed on appeal, but refers only to 
“the judgment”. However, the generic wording of this provision appears to encompass both 
the conviction and the sentence imposed by a lower court. Moreover, although not stated in 
relation to the scope of appellate review, the IACtHR has clarified that the right to appeal 
must be “[a]vailable to anyone who has been sentenced and convicted”.930 This reference 
further supports the interpretation of “the judgment” as encompassing both components. 
 
4.3.4.2. Factual, Probative, and Legal Issues 
As stated by the IACtHR, an appellate remedy “must permit an analysis of the factual, 
probative and legal issues on which the contested judgment was based because, in 
jurisdictional activities, the determination of the facts and the application of the law are 
interdependent, so that an erroneous determination of the facts entails an erroneous or 
inappropriate application of the law”.931 On this basis, the IACtHR has found that appellate 
proceedings limited to the following matters run afoul of the right to appeal: (i) control of the 
observation or misapplication of “some principle of the law” by the inferior court and the 
impossibility of introducing evidence to “prove whether or not the crime was committed”;932 
(ii) an assessment of “issues relating to the validity of a law, treaty, or constitutional 
provision, or the arbitrariness of a judgment, factual and evidentiary issues, as well as those of 
                                                 
928 Ibid., at 288. 
929 Ibid., at 270. 
930 Ibid., at 270 (emphasis in original). Also: Part II, Chapter 4.3.5. 
931 Judgment, Catrimán et al. v. Chile, Series C. No. 279, IACtHR, 29 May 2014, at 270. 
932 Judgment, Herrera-Ulloa v. Costa Rica, Series C. No. 107, IACtHR, 2 July 2004, at 150, 152, 167. 
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a non-constitutional legal nature”; 933  (iii) a review of the “erroneous application of the 
substantive law to the facts of the case, and […] violation of any of the procedural rules”, 
which makes “it impossible for a higher court to review matters of fact and/or evidence”;934 
and (iv) an evaluation of “whether the judgment […] was sufficient in itself; whether it had 
made an appropriate assessment of the evidence on which its conclusions were founded, and 
whether it indicated the reasons why it rejected the evidence that had not been assessed, 
without reviewing the facts that were established therein”.935 
 
The IACtHR has ascribed a wide reach to this aspect of Article 8(2)(h) ACHR. After finding 
a violation of the obligation to ensure a comprehensive review on appeal, it also held that it 
was not “necessary to issue an additional ruling on the alleged violation of the rights to 
defense, the right to be heard, the duty to substantiate the decision and the right to a simple 
and prompt remedy”. 936  In this regard, it noted that “the alleged damages […] are 
encompassed within the violation of the right to appeal the judgment”, since “[i]t was 
precisely the absence of a comprehensive integrated appeal under the terms of Article 8(2)(h) 
[…] [ACHR], which would have guaranteed the possibility of challenging the conviction in 
second instance”.937 It has further specified that “the failure to guarantee the right to appeal 
the judgment prevents the exercise of the right to defense […] and implies the lack of 
protection of other basic guarantees of due process that must be assured to the appellant, as 
applicable, so that a higher judge or court may rule on the grievances argued”.938 However, 
despite the lack of a need to rule separately on “the duty to substantiate the decision”, the 
IACtHR, subsequently, separately considered this matter with reference to the requirement of 
“effective” after finding a violation of the obligation to provide comprehensive review.939 
 
  
                                                 
933 Judgment, Mohamed v. Argentina, Series C. No. 255, IACtHR, 23 November 2012, at 103-111, 113. 
934 Judgment, Mendoza et al. v. Argentina, Series C. No. 260, IACtHR, 14 May 2013, at 253, 256, 257. 
935 Judgment, Catrimán et al. v. Chile, Series C. No. 279, IACtHR, 29 May 2014, at 283 (emphasis in original). 
However, the appellate framework, as such, did not make it impossible “to contest matters relating to the factual 
framework of the judgment by examining the assessment of the evidence in it”. See: Judgment, Catrimán et al. 
v. Chile, Series C. No. 279, IACtHR, 29 May 2014, at 297. 
936 Judgment, Mohamed v. Argentina, Series C. No. 255, IACtHR, 23 November 2012, at 120. 
937 Ibid., at 119. 
938 Ibid., at 120. 




4.3.5. Anyone Sentenced and Convicted 
With regard to the need to ensure that appellate review is “available to anyone who has been 
sentenced and convicted”, the IACtHR has found that “[i]t must be ensured even to the 
individual who has been sentenced in a judgment that revokes an acquittal”.940 According to 
the IACtHR, this right “assists the convicted person”, in respect of which it has invoked 
Article 14(5) ICCPR, “which, in referring to the right to appeal the judgment, expressly states 
that this is a guarantee of ‘[e]veryone convicted of a crime’” and is “‘very similar’ to Article 
8(2)(h)” ACHR.941 It has also rejected the applicability of the exception foreseen in Article 
2(2) Protocol 7 ECHR, since the ACHR does not provide for such exceptions.942 However, 
the specific violation found in this situation was not that the second-instance conviction 
imposed after a first instance acquittal could not be appealed, but that, as mentioned, the 
remedies against the second-instance decision did not allow for comprehensive review.943 
 
Moreover, although not mentioned in the general description of this aspect of the right to 
appeal, both the IACmHR944 and the IACtHR945 have confirmed that trial by the highest court 
sitting in first instance without additional appellate avenues falls short of Article 8(2)(h) 
ACHR. In this regard, the IACtHR has engaged in comparative research of the procedural 
constructs adopted by ACHR Member States, in respect of which it has concluded that “the 
majority of the State Parties […] allow high-ranking officials the possibility to appeal the 
judgment in the context of criminal proceedings”.946 This conclusion was supported with an 
acceptance of the relevant interpretation provided by the HRC and a rejection of the 
possibility of applying an exception by analogy to Article 2(2) Protocol 7 ECHR. 947 
Furthermore, the IACtHR has noted that a first instance trial before the highest domestic court 
need not necessarily infringe the right to appeal, provided that a remedy is available, such as 
“when the plenary or a chamber within the same superior body, but of a different composition 
[…], decides the appeal filed with powers to revoke or amend the judgment of conviction”.948 
                                                 
940 Judgment, Catrimán et al. v. Chile, Series C. No. 279, IACtHR, 29 May 2014, at 270. 
941 Judgment, Mohamed v. Argentina, Series C. No. 255, IACtHR, 23 November 2012, at 92 (emphasis in 
original). 
942 Ibid., at 95. 
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Judgment, Alibux v. Suriname, Series C. No. 276, IACtHR, 30 January 2014, at 103-104. 
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4.3.6. Minimal Procedural Guarantees 
The final component of Article 8(2)(h) ACHR identified by the IACtHR is that “appeal 
regimes must respect the minimum procedural guarantees that, pursuant to Article 8 of the 
[…] [ACHR], are pertinent and necessary to decide the errors asserted by the appellant, 
without this entailing the need to conduct a new oral trial”.949 Considering that the findings as 
to the aforementioned violations of Article 8(2)(b) and 8(2)(e) ACHR had been adopted prior 
to this pronouncement,950 there are no specific examples of the application of the need to 
respect minimum procedural guarantees on appeal. 
 
However, preceding observations made by the IACmHR on the basis of the views of the HRC 
may serve to illustrate this aspect of the IACtHR jurisprudence. In this regard, the IACmHR 
has found that, in relation to “the opportunity to have the full acts of the file, including trial 
acts in the case of oral systems”, and “access to adequate counsel”, “the right to appeal the 
judgment is part of the body of procedural guarantees that ensures the due process of law, 
which are inextricably interlinked” and this right must, therefore, “be interpreted together 
with other procedural guarantees if the characteristics of the case require it”.951 
 
5. Synthesis 
This chapter will systematise the similarities and dissimilarities between the different 
conceptions of the right to appeal and associated fair trial guarantees in international human 
rights law. In light of the diversity of legal bases relied on by human rights monitoring bodies 
and courts, the relevant norms have been mired in ambiguity. However, a reversal of the 
analysis, which adopts the subject matter evaluated by the HRC, ECtHR, and IACtHR (as 
opposed to the legal basis) as the point of departure, yields a more well-defined assessment. 
On the basis of the output of the human rights monitoring bodies and courts, these matters 
may be structured as follows: (i) the essence of the right to appeal; (ii) the bearer of the right 
to appeal; (iii) the regulation of appellate machineries; and (iv) the conduct of appellate 
proceedings. Subsequently, the similarities and/or dissimilarities will be explained. 
 
                                                 
949 Judgment, Catrimán et al. v. Chile, Series C. No. 279, IACtHR, 29 May 2014, at 270.  
950 Part II, Chapter 4.2. 
951 Report, Mohamed v. Argentina, Report No. 173/10, IACmHR, 2 November 2010, at 95; Report, Mendoza et 
al. v. Argentina, Report No. 172/10, IACmHR, 2 November 2010, at 193. 
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5.1. Similarities and Dissimilarities 
 
5.1.1. Essence of the Right to Appeal 
The essential function of the right to appeal revolves around the question whether or not 
appellate structures have been put in place. Closely associated matters have also arisen in the 
views of the HRC and the jurisprudence of the ECtHR and IACtHR. These concern the 
adequacy of alternative mechanisms, exceptions to the right to appeal, and the remit of the 
essence of the right to appeal as encompassing either single-level or multi-level review. 
 
5.1.1.1. Availability of Appellate Recourse 
The right to appeal in all three human rights instruments seeks to ensure, first and foremost, 
the availability of appellate recourse, so as to provide a forum for the review of a first instance 
decision.952  This may appear an obvious conclusion. However, especially in the case of 
Article 14(5) ICCPR and Article 2 Protocol 7 ECHR, it is not. Both provisions stipulate that 
this right is to be exercised according to (or governed by) domestic law. Shortly after the 
adoption of the ICCPR, it has, therefore, been suggested that, alike the ECHR, “it is possible 
that that text does not guarantee an appeal in every case either”. This is because “[t]he right is 
to ‘a review by a higher tribunal according to law’ and this was understood by one delegate in 
the Third Committee of the General Assembly to mean that the right related to national 
standards so that […] all that is guaranteed is the availability of whatever right of appeal, if 
any, exists in each State ‘according to law’”. 953  However, the HRC and ECtHR have 
explicitly dismissed such an interpretation. 954  Accordingly, the complete inexistence of 
appellate structures for persons convicted at first instance has been declared at odds with the 
essential function of the rights to appeal contained in the ICCPR and Protocol 7 ECHR.955 
Although the IACtHR has not been confronted with the complete absence of appellate review, 
its rejection of the exceptions to the right to appeal in cases in which a person was convicted 
by the highest domestic court sitting in first instance and following an appeal from an 
acquittal establishes the same conclusion regarding Article 8(2)(h) ACHR.956 
 
                                                 
952 Part II, Chapter 2.3.2; Part II, Chapter 3.3.2; Part II, Chapter 4.3.5. Also: Part II, Chapter 1.1. 
953 D. Harris, ‘The Right to a Fair Trial in Criminal Proceedings as a Human Right’, 16(2) International & 
Comparative Law Quarterly 352 (1967), at 372. 
954 Part II, Chapter 2.3.3; Part II, Chapter 3.3.3.1; Part II, Chapter 5.1.3. 
955 Part II, Chapter 2.3.2; Part II, Chapter 3.3.2. 
956 Part II, Chapter 4.3.5. 
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5.1.1.2. Alternatives to Appellate Review 
The HRC, ECtHR, and IACtHR have dealt with alternative mechanisms to appellate review 
in a similar manner, insofar as this matter has arisen in their views and jurisprudence. 
Appellate review contingent upon the exercise of discretionary powers by judicial officers, as 
opposed to an automatic right to appeal at the disposal of the person concerned, falls short of 
the essence of Article 14(5) ICCPR and Article 2 Protocol 7 ECHR.957 Similarly, both the 
HRC and the IACtHR have found that the possibility of applying for a review of a conviction 
based on newly discovered evidence is an inadequate substitute for appellate review.958 
 
5.1.1.3. Exceptions to the Right to Appeal 
Although the human rights monitoring bodies and courts have dealt with the exceptions to the 
right to appeal to differing degrees, three such exceptions may be distinguished. These are: (i) 
trial by the highest domestic court sitting in first instance; (ii) an appellate conviction 
pronounced in lieu of an acquittal without further appellate review; and (iii) and an 
aggravated sentence imposed on appeal in the absence of further appellate remedies. 
 
5.1.1.3.1. First Instance Trial by Highest Court 
A clear discrepancy exists, between, on the one hand, the HRC and the IACtHR, and, on the 
other hand, the ECtHR in respect of the necessity of a right to appeal in cases in which a 
person has been tried and convicted by the highest domestic court sitting in first instance. The 
application of Article 2 Protocol 7 ECHR has been explicitly limited in such situations.959 
Even though this exception has not been applied in practice, the ECtHR may be expected to 
do so straightforwardly, considering the provision’s plain wording and the analogous 
precedent developed in respect of Article 6(1) ECHR. 960  Conversely, in light of the 
unrestricted nature of Article 14(5) ICCPR and Article 8(2)(h) ACHR, the HRC and the 
IACtHR have specifically disallowed trials by the highest domestic courts sitting in first 
instance without the possibility of further appellate review, barring a reservation.961 
 
                                                 
957 Part II, Chapter 2.3.2; Part II, Chapter 3.3.2. 
958 Part II, Chapter 2.3.2; Part II, Chapter 4.3.1. 
959 Article 2(2) Protocol 7 ECHR. 
960 Part II, Chapter 3.3.4. 
961 Part II, Chapter 2.3.5; Part II, Chapter 4.3.5. 
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5.1.1.3.2. Appellate Conviction Revoking Acquittal 
The various conceptions of the right to appeal also diverge in respect of convictions imposed 
on appeal in lieu of an acquittal without the possibility of further appellate review. Such a 
state of affairs has been declared contrary to both Article 14(5) ICCPR and Article 8(2)(h) 
ACHR.962 In this regard, it has been emphasised that the right to appeal has been afforded to 
convicted persons. Thus, where a person has been acquitted, the right to appeal remains 
dormant. Its protection is only activated once the person concerned has been actually declared 
guilty, regardless of the judicial instance first imposing a conviction.  
 
On the contrary, Protocol 7 ECHR further restricts the protection of the right to appeal in 
these circumstances and the ECtHR has explicitly invoked this exemption.963 Although its 
rationale has not been set forth,964 it appears to be premised on the notion that review by two 
judicial levels provides sufficient safeguards against arbitrary convictions, irrespective of the 
judicial instance first pronouncing the person concerned guilty or the unavailability of further 
appellate review. Nevertheless, even though Article 2 Protocol 7 ECHR espouses a decreased 
degree of protection regarding this facet of appellate proceedings in comparison with Article 
14(5) ICCPR and Article 8(2)(h) ACHR, the ECtHR has demanded two safeguards in this 
context. First, where the same evidence that underlay an acquittal at first instance produces an 
unreviewable conviction on appeal, the person concerned and/or witnesses testifying at first 
instance must be reheard pursuant to the right to a public hearing under Article 6(1) ECHR.965 
A very similar conclusion has been reached in respect of the right to examine, or have 
examined, witnesses on appeal under Article 6(3)(d) ECHR.966 Second, where an appellate 
court requalifies the legal or factual basis of an acquittal and proceeds to impose a conviction 
without offering the person concerned sufficient opportunity to defend himself or herself or to 
have further appellate recourse, a violation of the right to be informed of the charges ensues 
on the basis of Article 6(3)(a) ECHR.967 
 
                                                 
962 Part II, Chapter 2.3.5; Part II, Chapter 4.3.5. 
963 Part II, Chapter 3.3.5. 
964 Council of Europe, Explanatory Report Protocol No. 7 to the Convention for the Protection of Human Rights 
and Fundamental Freedoms, E.T.S. No. 17, 22 November 1984, at 20. 
965 Part II, Chapter 3.1.1. 
966 Part II, Chapter 3.2.4. 
967 Part II, Chapter 3.2.1. 
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5.1.1.3.3. Aggravated Appellate Sentence 
Despite the preceding divergence, Article 14(5) ICCPR and Article 2(2) Protocol 7 ECHR 
approximate each other in respect of a variation of this aspect of the right to appeal.968 The 
ECtHR has, along the lines of the aforementioned exception to the right to appeal, determined 
that Article 2(2) Protocol 7 ECHR also covers the appellate aggravation of a lower conviction, 
including an increased sentence.969 However, contrary to its views on the substitution of 
acquittals for final convictions, the HRC has excluded the application of Article 14(5) ICCPR 
in relation to appellate confirmations of inferior convictions accompanied with aggravated 
sentences, unless “the essential characterization of the offence” has been modified.970  
 
Its reasoning was not particularly convincing, however. First, the HRC advanced that many 
domestic systems allow for appellate aggravation of sentences. 971  Yet, as indicated by a 
dissenting member of the HRC,972 many jurisdictions also allow for an appellate conviction to 
replace an inferior acquittal but, in that context, the existence of domestic practice did not 
preclude the HRC from finding Article 14(5) ICCPR violated due to the absence of further 
appellate review.973 Second, besides the unproblematic finding that an appellate increase of a 
sentence arising out of the correction of a miscalculation of the applicable term of 
imprisonment does not amount to a modification of the essential characterisation of an 
offence,974 the conclusion that the appellate recharacterisation of a person as a principal and 
not an accessory does not do so either, as it would reflect a diverging appreciation of the 
seriousness of the circumstances of the offence, is highly unpersuasive.975 A modification of 
the applicable mode of liability arguably transcends a mere assessment of the circumstances 
of the offence, since an appraisal of dissimilar legal elements and facts may be involved. In 
the absence of additional guidance, it thus remains unclear what degree of recharacterisation 
would be required to generate the protection of Article 14(5) ICCPR in these circumstances.  
 
                                                 
968 The IACtHR has not been confronted with this issue in its jurisprudence and its position remains to be 
elucidated. 
969 Part II, Chapter 3.3.5. 
970 Part II, Chapter 2.3.4. 
971 Views, Pérez Escolar v. Spain, Communication No. 1156/2003, HRC, 28 March 2006, at 9.2. 
972 Views, Gomaríz Valera v. Spain, Communication No. 1095/2002, HRC, 22 July 2005, Individual Opinion of 
Committee Member Ms. Ruth Wedgwood. 
973 Part II, Chapter 2.3.4. 
974 Views, J.A.B.G. v. Spain, Communication No. 1891/2009, HRC, 29 October 2012, at 8.5. 
975 Views, Pérez Escolar v. Spain, Communication No. 1156/2003, HRC, 28 March 2006, at 9.2. 
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Be that as it may, additional appellate review is, arguably, not required in such a context, 
considering that Article 14(5) ICCPR “merely establishes the principle of two-level 
proceedings”.976 Indeed, where a conviction is subject to appellate review, whether as part of 
an appeal by the accused or as part of a complaint seeking an increased sentence by the 
prosecutor, the sentence is necessarily part of such a process. The requirements of Article 
14(5) ICCPR will, thus, have been fulfilled. 
 
5.1.1.4. Remit of the Right to Appeal 
The HRC has determined that the remit of Article 14(5) ICCPR is confined to single level 
appellate review.977 Although the ECtHR has not stated so explicitly, Article 2 Protocol 7 
ECHR has been applied in an identical matter, since it has held that this provision has not 
been violated where a conviction has been reviewed by an appellate jurisdiction.978 
 
At the same time, however, the HRC has found that, where domestic systems of criminal 
procedure provide for several instances of appellate review, effective access must be granted 
to such jurisdictions.979 Article 8(2)(h) ACHR displays similar characteristics, as it has been 
interpreted as regulating access to appellate jurisdictions980 and its application has not been 
limited to proceedings at first instance. 981  In this regard, it has been remarked that, in 
comparison with the ECHR, the HRC “has taken a much more liberal approach in interpreting 
Article 14 § 5 of the ICCPR”,982 which would extend to the IACtHR as well. Such a view, 
however, overlooks the fact that the Strasbourg organs have, in comparable situations, 
employed disparate legal bases with an identical outcome. The impossibility of lodging an 
additional appellate complaint has been addressed under the right of access to a court in 
particular circumstances.983 More specifically, exemplifying the close link between the two 
rights, the ECtHR has held that declaring an appeal on points of law before a court of third 
                                                 
976 M. Nowak, U.N. Covenant on Civil and Political Rights: CCPR Commentary (Kehl: N.P. Engel Verlag, 
2005), at 351. 
977 Part II, Chapter 2.3.2. 
978 E.g., Judgment, Saussier v. France, Application No. 35884/97, ECmHR, 20 May 1998, at 2; Judgment, 
Lantto v. Finland, Application No. 27665/95, ECtHR, 12 July 1999, at 2; Judgment, De Lorenzo v. Italy, 
Application No. 69264/01, ECtHR, 12 February 2004, at 4. 
979 Part II, Chapter 2.3.2; Part II, Chapter 2.3.7. 
980 Part II, Chapter 4.3.2. 
981 Judgment, Mohamed v. Argentina, Series C. No. 255, IACtHR, 23 November 2012, at 89-96. 
982 S. Trechsel, Human Rights in Criminal Proceedings (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2005), at 371. 
983 E.g., Judgment, Omar v. France, Application No. 43/1997/827/1033, ECtHR, 29 July 1998, at 40-44; 
Judgment, Khalfaoui v. France, Application No. 34791/97, ECtHR, 14 December 1999, at 40-54; Judgment, 
Korgul v. Poland, Application No. 35916/08, ECtHR, 17 April 2012, at 27-31. 
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instance inadmissible because of the failure of the person concerned to surrender himself to 
custody “impairs the very essence of the right of appeal […] on the one hand, and the right of 
access to the […] [court of third instance] and exercise of the rights of the defence on the 
other”.984 Furthermore, the aforementioned comparison between the ICCPR and the ECHR 
refers specifically to the view of the HRC in which the failure by an appellate court to 
produce reasons was considered to hamper access to additional appellate review.985 Yet, the 
ECtHR has specifically reviewed such impediments to additional appellate review too, albeit 
under Article 6(3)(b) ECHR.986 Similarly, the impossibility of further appellate recourse due 
to a lack of legal aid has been assessed under Article 6(3)(c) ECHR.987 
 
5.1.2. Bearer of the Right to Appeal 
Article 14(5) ICCPR and Article 2 Protocol 7 ECHR explicitly refer to a right to appeal 
available to “convicted” persons. Accordingly, the HRC and the ECtHR have determined that 
the right to appeal is not available to those acquitted at first instance.988 Some doubt may arise 
as to the formulation of Article 8(2) ACHR, which applies to “every person”. However, it 
may reasonably be read as imposing a similar limitation. Although the IACtHR has not 
explicitly denied appellate rights to acquitted persons, it has indicatively found that the right 
to appeal must be “available to anyone who has been convicted”.989  Indeed, whereas an 
appeal by an acquitted person may serve legitimate purposes, such as disagreement with the 
reasoning underlying the acquittal, the conferral of a general right of appeal to acquitted 
persons would demand too much from an instrument setting forth “minimum guarantees”. 
Even so, as indicated by the HRC and ECtHR, the exercise of the right to appeal is not a 
mandatory affair, considering the possibility of waiving this entitlement.990 
 
5.1.3. Regulation of the Appellate Process 
Like other stages of a criminal trial, the appellate phase demands regulation. In this respect, 
the expressions “according to law” in Article 14(5) ICCPR and “shall be governed by law” in 
Article 2 Protocol 7 ECHR provide States Parties with the discretion to do so. Whereas the 
                                                 
984 Judgment, Guérin v. France, Application No. 25201/94, ECtHR, 29 July 1998, at 43. 
985 S. Trechsel, Human Rights in Criminal Proceedings (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2005), at 371. 
986 E.g., Judgment, Hadjianastassiou v. Greece, Application No. 12945/87, ECtHR, 16 December 1992, at 33-
37. 
987 E.g., Judgment, Twalib v. Greece, Application No. 24294/94, ECtHR, 9 June 1998, at 51-57. 
988 Part II, Chapter 2.3.2; Part II, Chapter 3.3.2. 
989 Judgment, Catrimán et al. v. Chile, Series C. No. 279, IACtHR, 29 May 2014, at 270. 
990 Part II, Chapter 2.3.1; Part II, Chapter 3.1.1; Part II, Chapter 3.3.1. This conclusion extends, by the same 
logic, to Article 8(2)(h) ACHR. 
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IACtHR has acknowledged that Article 8(2)(h) ACHR omits the words “according to law”,991 
its description of the requirement of “accessible” closely approximates this component of the 
right to appeal.992  As noted by the HRC, such regulation, in general, encompasses “the 
determination of the modalities by which the review by a higher tribunal is to be carried out, 
as well as which court is responsible for carrying out a review”.993 Before addressing the latter 
component,994 the limits attaching to this discretion will be set out. 
 
5.1.3.1. Limits of the Discretion 
The views of the HRC and the Strasbourg jurisprudence similarly interpret the discretion 
afforded to States Parties as excluding the facility to remove the right to appeal across the 
board.995 Therefore, the claim that “[a]nother difference between the ECHR and the ICCPR is 
that those responsible for drafting the […] ECHR thought it necessary to add a sentence 
stressing that the exercise of the right to appeal ‘shall be governed by law’” does not 
withstand scrutiny.996  The IACtHR similarly held that, “[w]hile States have a margin of 
discretion in regulating the exercise of that remedy, they may not establish restrictions or 
requirements inimical to the very essence of the right to appeal”.997 
 
The HRC and the ECtHR have similarly determined that the references to “law” in the 
context of other rights in the ICCPR and the ECHR must be, on the one hand, 
precise/foreseeable to a reasonable degree and, on the other hand, accessible.998 Accordingly, 
considering that Article 14(5) ICCPR and Article 2 Protocol 7 ECHR explicitly refer to “law”, 
whilst Article 8(2)(h) ACHR is amenable to regulation as well,999 these requirements equally 
apply to the regulation of the modalities of the appellate process. 
 
                                                 
991 Judgment, Alibux v. Suriname, Series C. No. 276, IACtHR, 30 January 2014, at 93. 
992 Part II, Chapter 4.3.2. 
993 HRC, General Comment 32, Article 14: Right to Equality before Courts and Tribunals and to a Fair Trial, 
CCPR/C/GC/32, 23 August 2007, at 45. 
994 The human rights monitoring bodies and courts have not specifically defined “the modalities by which the 
review by a higher tribunal is to be carried out”. Accordingly, the remaining matters pertaining to appellate 
proceedings that have arisen in their views and jurisprudence will be addressed in Part II, Chapter 5.1.4. 
995 Part II, Chapter 2.3.3; Part II, Chapter 3.3.3.1. 
996 S. Trechsel, Human Rights in Criminal Proceedings (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2005), at 365. 
997 Judgment, Herrera-Ulloa v. Costa Rica, Series C. No. 107, IACtHR, 2 July 2004, at 161. 
998 Part II, Chapter 2.3.3; Part II, Chapter 3.3.3.1. 
999 Judgment, Herrera-Ulloa v. Costa Rica, Series C. No. 107, IACtHR, 2 July 2004, at 161. 
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5.1.3.2. Higher Court 
All three provisions concerning the right to appeal require appellate review by a “higher” 
court,1000 which appears to introduce a requirement of hierarchical superiority. 
 
However, as has been remarked, “[l]ittle substance is to be found” in this requirement.1001 
Indeed, the HRC, the ECtHR, and the IACtHR have not explicitly addressed this requirement. 
In addition, there are indications that alternative constructions may satisfy this aspect of the 
right to appeal. For instance, the ECtHR has found that review provided by a body combining 
legal advisory functions to the executive branch and judicial functions satisfied Article 2 
Protocol 7 ECHR, as it was “competent to deal with all aspects of the case”.1002 The IACtHR 
has also considered, in relation to trial at first instance before the highest domestic court, that 
such a situation may be remedied by conducting “the proceedings at first instance […] by the 
president or of a courtroom of a superior tribunal and [hearing] the appeal […] by the full 
tribunal, to the exclusion of those who already issued an opinion on the case”.1003 It appears, 
therefore, that the decisive criterion in this regard is whether the body charged with appellate 
review has been equipped to ensure review of a sufficient scope,1004 rather than its formal 
hierarchical relationship with the court pronouncing the judgment. 
 
5.1.4. Conduct of Appellate Proceedings 
The conduct of appellate proceedings has been held to certain minimum standards by all three 
human rights monitoring bodies, as is implied in the (varying degrees of) application of fair 
trial guarantees other than the right to appeal to appellate proceedings. 
 
5.1.4.1. Access to Appellate Review 
As discussed in the preceding sections, the right to appeal in international human rights law 
enjoins States who have undertaken such treaty obligations, in essence, to organise their 
criminal procedure systems in a manner so as to allow those convicted of a criminal offence 
to have recourse to a higher tribunal for the purpose of a review.1005 A similar, yet distinct, 
                                                 
1000 The issue of the highest domestic courts sitting in first instance is also linked to the division of judicial 
responsibilities under national law and the substance of the right to appeal in international human rights law. 
See: Part II, Chapter 5.1.1.3.1. 
1001 S. Trechsel, Human Rights in Criminal Proceedings (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2005), at 368. 
1002 Judgment, Didier v. France, Communication No. 58188/00, ECtHR, 27 August 2002, at 3. 
1003 Judgment, Barreto Leiva v. Venezuela, Series C. No. 206, IACtHR, 17 November 2009, at 90. 
1004 Also: Part II, Chapter 5.1.4.7. 
1005 Part II, Chapter 5.1.1.1. 
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matter arises in relation to situations in which appellate structures complying with the 
essential elements of the right to appeal have been put in place, but appellate review of a first 
instance conviction has been excluded or hampered for various reasons.  
 
Whilst the monitoring bodies and courts have invoked a multiplicity of legal bases to regulate 
sufficient access to appellate courts, the views of the HRC and the jurisprudence of the 
ECtHR and IACtHR reveal substantive overlap, although to varying degrees.1006 First, the 
availability of basic documents enabling the effective exercise of appellate rights, in particular 
a reasoned opinion by a court of first instance, has been linked to the issue of access to an 
appellate court by the HRC and the ECtHR. The HRC has considered that the provision of 
such documents is an explicit component of the effective exercise of the right to appeal under 
Article 14(5) ICCPR.1007 On the other hand, although the ECtHR has ruled that no separate 
matter arises under Article 2 Protocol 7 ECHR in relation to this question,1008 it has assessed 
it in a nearly indistinguishable manner under Article 6(3)(b) ECHR.1009 In more specific terms, 
the ECtHR has considered that the purpose underlying the need for reasoned judgments is, 
inter alia, to allow for the useful exercise of rights of appeal.1010 A further similarity is that 
neither Article 14(5) ICCPR nor Article 6(3)(b) ECHR imposes an absolute obligation in this 
context. Thus, the lack of a written judgment may, under both bases, be compensated for by 
less elaborate reasoning.1011 Second, both the ECtHR and the HRC have assessed issues as to 
time limits applicable to the filing of appellate review. The ECtHR has found that incorrect 
information as to the time limits for filing an appeal or the effective shortening of such limits 
                                                 
1006 In the jurisprudence of the ECtHR, additional issues have been addressed under the right of access to a court 
under Article 6(1) ECHR and the right to appeal under Article 2 Protocol 7 ECHR. Pursuant to the former legal 
basis, it has found violations of the right of access to a court concerning the refusal to entertain appeals instituted 
by absconders, a misunderstanding as to the appellate jurisdiction competent to examine an appeal, and the lack 
of a voluntary and unequivocal waiver of the right to legal assistance, which served as a precondition for filing 
an appeal, whereas no transgressions of this right have been found in respect of fines for vexatious appeals and 
the requirement to be represented by a lawyer on appeal (see: Part II, Chapter 3.1.1). Under the latter legal basis, 
besides a simultaneous violation concerning the exclusion of appeals by absconders, the ECtHR has separately 
found a violation of the right to appeal concerning the extension of detention because of the filing of an appeal 
and because of appellate review of a decision conducted after a sentence had been served (see: Part II, Chapter 
3.3.3.1). However, since these matters have not directly arisen in the HRC’s views and/or the IACtHR’s 
jurisprudence, they will not be discussed further in this context. 
1007 Part II, Chapter 2.3.7. 
1008 Judgment, Baucher v. France, Application No. 53640/00, ECtHR, 24 July 2007, at 43-52. 
1009 Part II, Chapter 3.2.2. The ECtHR has also addressed this issue under the right of access to a court under 
Article 6(1) ECHR. See: Part II, Chapter 3.1.1. 
1010 Judgment, Hadjianastassiou v. Greece, Application No. 12945/87, ECtHR, 16 December 1992, at 33. 
1011 Views, Bailey v. Jamaica, Communication No. 709/1996, HRC, 21 July 1999, at 7.4; Judgment, Zoon v. the 
Netherlands, Application No. 29202/95, ECtHR, 7 December 2000, at 46-51. 
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may contravene the right of access to a court under Article 6(1) ECHR.1012 Similarly, the 
HRC has assessed the ineffective provision of information concerning time limits for 
instituting an appeal, although with reference to the right to “have adequate time and facilities 
for the preparation of his defence”.1013 Finally, leave to appeal proceedings have not been 
declared inherently incompatible with the right to appeal by the HRC and the ECtHR.1014 
 
5.1.4.2. Orality 
Both the HRC and the ECtHR have determined that appellate hearings do not necessarily 
require public hearings to be conducted on appeal and that, accordingly, a written procedure 
may suffice.1015 However, this is not the case for all types of appellate procedures. In this 
regard, the HRC has, after some indeterminate views, subscribed to the position of the ECtHR 
that appellate procedures extending to matters of both fact and law and concluding with a 
determinative assessment as to the question of guilt or innocence do require oral hearings, 
pursuant to the publicity requirement in Article 14(1) ICCPR and Article 6(1) ECHR.1016 
 
5.1.4.3. Impartiality 
All three monitoring bodies operate highly similar definitions concerning the general 
impartiality guarantees contained in Articles 14(1) ICCPR, 6(1) ECHR and 8(1) ACHR,1017 
which invariably disallow the existence of actual bias on the part of judges and the reasonable 
appearance thereof. Whereas the general impartiality guarantee has not been specifically 
invoked in respect of appellate judges, there is no reason to discontinue its application in the 
appellate phase of a case, considering that it applies to judges in general. 
 
In addition, two specific consequences of the general impartiality guarantee have been carved 
out in respect of appellate proceedings in the views of the HRC and the jurisprudence of the 
                                                 
1012 Part II, Chapter 3.1.1. 
1013 Part II, Chapter 2.2.2. 
1014 Part II, Chapter 2.3.6; Part II, Chapter 3.3.3.2. According to both bodies, the remaining aspects of appellate 
fairness remain applicable to leave to appeal proceedings, albeit in adjusted form. In this respect, the ECtHR has 
found that the need for a public hearing under Article 6(1) ECHR and the presence of the accused under Article 
6(3)(c) ECHR is reduced (see: Part II, Chapter 3.1.2; Part II, Chapter 3.2.3), whereas both the HRC and the 
ECtHR have found that the extent of reasoning may be more limited under Article 14(5) ICCPR and Article 6(1) 
ECHR, respectively (see: Part II, Chapter 2.3.6; Part II, Chapter 3.1.1), but that the scope of appellate review 
required is similar to regular appellate proceedings, pursuant to Article 14(5) ICCPR and Article 6(3)(c) ECHR, 
respectively (see: Part II, Chapter 2.3.6; Part II, Chapter 3.2.3). 
1015 Part II, Chapter 2.1.2; Part II, Chapter 3.1.2. 
1016 Part II, Chapter 2.1.2; Part II, Chapter 3.1.2. 
1017 Part II, Chapter 2.1.3; Part II, Chapter 3.1.3; Part II, Chapter 4.1. 
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ECtHR and IACtHR. First, with regard to the accumulation of judicial functions in the 
appellate and preceding phases in the same case, the thrusts of the pronouncements of the 
HRC, the ECtHR, and the IACtHR coincide in that, although the recurring involvement of a 
judge in the same case need not impair the requirement of impartiality, a breach has been 
found where judges have formed an opinion on the charges, or the evaluation thereof, against 
appellants.1018 Second, the ECtHR has added that a violation of the impartiality requirement 
may also arise in relation to the involvement of the same appellate judge in interrelated cases 
concerning the same persons, if the judge in question directly assesses the criminal 
responsibility of these persons in both judgments. 1019  The latter form is, arguably, 
incompatible with the ICCPR and ACHR as well. It is a variation of the impermissible 
accumulation of judicial functions in different phases of the same trial, considering that the 
underlying principle, which denounces the repeated evaluation of the same charges levelled 
against the same person(s) by the same judge in a manner to allow the judge to form an 
opinion on the culpability of the person concerned, is identical. 
 
5.1.4.4. Presence 
The presence of the accused at appellate hearings has been assessed from two separate angles 
in the views of the HRC and the jurisprudence of the ECtHR. First, the absence of the accused 
and the presence of the prosecutorial authorities in appellate proceedings has been found to be 
in contravention of the right to equality under Article 14(1) ICCPR 1020  and the right to 
adversarial proceedings under Article 6(1) ECHR1021. Second, in close connection with the 
requirement to hold public hearings, 1022  the HRC and the ECtHR have deduced a more 
general right of the accused to attend appellate hearings from the analogous guarantees in 
Article 14(3)(d) ICCPR and Article 6(3)(c) ECHR, where such proceedings concern both 
matters of law and fact and culminate in a determination as to guilt or innocence.1023 
 
5.1.4.5. Information regarding the Accusation 
As discussed, the ECHR has found that the right to “be informed promptly […] and in detail 
[…] of the nature and cause of the accusation” may be breached on appeal if, inter alia, a 
                                                 
1018 Part II, Chapter 2.1.3; Part II, Chapter 3.1.3; Part II, Chapter 4.1. 
1019 Part II, Chapter 3.1.3. 
1020 Part II, Chapter 2.1.1. 
1021 Part II, Chapter 3.1.1. 
1022 Part II, Chapter 5.1.4.2. 
1023 Part II, Chapter 2.2.3: Part II, Chapter 3.2.3. 
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requalification of the legal or factual basis extrinsic to the original charge by an appellate 
court engenders an unreviewable conviction in favour of an acquittal.1024 However, the remit 
of this strand of jurisprudence of the ECtHR is wider. This right may also be violated where 
such a requalification leads to any type of alteration on appeal, including a diminished degree 
of culpability or a less serious offence.1025 Even though it has only considered the appellate 
aggravation of a first instance conviction, the HRC has espoused a similar understanding. It 
has considered whether the person concerned had been sufficiently appraised of the appellate 
modification of the basis upon which first instance proceedings had been conducted.1026 
 
5.1.4.6. Appellate Representation 
 
5.1.4.6.1. Legal Assistance 
The right to be defended through legal assistance has been applied by both the HRC and the 
ECtHR in relation to appeal proceedings. In more specific terms, the HRC has denounced the 
occurrence of appellate proceedings without the accused’s counsel present as incompatible 
with Article 14(3)(d) and/or 14(5) ICCPR,1027 whereas the ECtHR has found violations of 
Article 6(3)(c) ECHR in this context1028. Furthermore, according to the HRC, the defendant 
must be informed of his right to request the presence of his lawyer.1029 
 
This right also encompasses legal aid for the indigent. All three human rights monitoring 
bodies and courts have applied this right to appellate proceedings. Despite occasional 
references to either Article 14(3)(d) ICCPR or Article 14(5) ICCPR in isolation, the HRC has 
mostly found violations of both provisions taken together where requests for legal aid in 
respect of the appellate process have been unwarrantedly rejected. 1030  The IACmHR has 
adopted a nearly identical approach, invoking the corresponding provisions of the ACHR.1031 
Conversely, the Strasbourg bodies have referred to Article 6(3)(c) ECHR.1032 
 
                                                 
1024 Part II, Chapter 3.2.1. 
1025 Ibid. 
1026 Part II, Chapter 2.2.1. 
1027 Part II, Chapter 2.2.3; Part II, Chapter 2.3.8. 
1028 Part II, Chapter 3.2.3. The ECtHR has added that this right extends to absconders too. However, as it has not 
been addressed by the HRC, it will not be discussed further. 
1029 Part II, Chapter 2.2.3. 
1030 Part II, Chapter 2.2.3; Part II, Chapter 2.3.8. 
1031 Part II, Chapter 4.2.2. 
1032 Part II, Chapter 3.2.3. 
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What is more, pursuant to this right, it must be ensured that adequate legal assistance has been 
provided. The HRC has referred to various legal bases in this respect, namely Article 14(3)(b), 
14(3)(d) and 14(5) ICCPR.1033 On the other hand, the ECtHR has exclusively considered 
Article 6(3)(c) ECHR in this context1034 and it has even excluded the application of Article 2 
Protocol 7 ECHR.1035 However, a high threshold has been set by both the HRC and the 
ECtHR. Violations have only been found if counsel has, either fully or effectively, annulled 
the convicted person’s ability to file an appeal, as evidenced by the findings by the HRC 
and/or the ECtHR concerning the failure to provide appellate arguments, a concession that an 
appeal lacks merit, the lack of compliance with formal requirements and the consequent 
dismissal of an appeal, and the non-appearance at an appellate hearing.1036 Moreover, the 
scope of protection offered by this guarantee extends to appointed counsel only, despite some 
ambiguity. The general reference of the HRC to “the conduct of a defence lawyer” suggests 
that it considers that a court must verify whether the behaviour of both appointed and 
privately retained counsel is manifestly “incompatible with the interests of justice”,1037 but it 
has specifically restricted States’ responsibility to the conduct of appointed counsel.1038 The 
more general position of the ECtHR leans towards the possibility of responsibility for the 
conduct of privately retained counsel as well,1039 but it has, hitherto, only found violations of 
Article 6(3)(c) ECHR for inadequate assistance by appointed counsel on appeal.1040 
 
Finally, based on Article 14(3)(d) ICCPR, the HRC has determined that, absent sufficient 
justification, a violation may ensue if requests to substitute privately retained trial counsel 
remain unheeded and this counsel continues to represent the accused on appeal.1041  This 
matter has not been addressed by the ECtHR and the IACtHR in relation to appellate 
proceedings, however. Conversely, the right to counsel of one’s choice does not apply to 
counsel appointed under a legal aid scheme. It has been written that, in respect of the ICCPR, 
                                                 
1033 Part II, Chapter 2.2.2; Part II, Chapter 2.2.3; Part II, Chapter 2.3.8. 
1034 Part II, Chapter 3.2.3. 
1035 Judgment, Sannino v. Italy, Application No. 30961/03, ECtHR, 27 April 2006, at 50-59. 
1036 Part II, Chapter 2.2.2; Part II, Chapter 3.2.3. 
1037 HRC, General Comment 32, Article 14: Right to Equality before Courts and Tribunals and to a Fair Trial, 
CCPR/C/GC/32, 23 August 2007, at 32 (emphasis supplied). 
1038 Ibid., at 38. Also: M. Nowak, U.N. Covenant on Civil and Political Rights: CCPR Commentary (Kehl: N.P. 
Engel Verlag, 2005), at 341. 
1039 S. Trechsel, Human Rights in Criminal Proceedings (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2005), at 287. 
1040 Part II, Chapter 3.2.3. 
1041 Part II, Chapter 2.2.3. 
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“in principle accused persons have no influence on the selection of” such counsel,1042 which 
extends to appellate proceedings too. Neither the ECtHR nor the IACtHR have addressed this 
issue in respect of appellate proceedings, but the former is, in general, negatively inclined 
towards the existence of such a choice.1043  Nevertheless, it has also found that, “[w]hen 
appointing defence counsel the national courts must certainly have regard to the defendant’s 
wishes”, which may be overridden “when there are relevant and sufficient grounds for 
holding that this is necessary in the interests of justice”.1044 
 
5.1.4.6.2. Self-Representation 
The right to defend oneself in person in appellate proceedings has not featured in the views of 
the HRC. However, it has found that, in general, “[t]he interests of justice may […] require 
the assignment of a lawyer against the wishes of the accused”, but any restriction must have 
an objective and sufficiently serious purpose and not go beyond what is necessary to uphold 
the interests of justice”.1045 The ECtHR, on the other hand, has addressed this matter in a 
more direct manner in the context of appellate proceedings. It has indicated that the obligatory 
requirement of (specialised) legal representation by counsel on appeal need not infringe the 
right to defend oneself in person or the right of access to a court.1046 
 
5.1.4.7. Scope of Appellate Review 
 
5.1.4.7.1. Conviction and Sentence 
Whereas Article 14(5) ICCPR requires appellate review of “conviction and sentence”1047 and 
Article 8(2)(h) ACHR may be interpreted to encompass both aspects as well,1048 Article 2 
Protocol 7 ECHR stipulates that the “conviction or sentence” may be reviewed on appeal.1049 
The wording of the latter standard, thus, suggests a possible limiting effect. However, the 
practical differences are marginal, at best. As noted, the ECtHR has determined that this 
aspect does not foresee additional discretion on the part of the States Parties in respect of the 
                                                 
1042 M. Nowak, U.N. Covenant on Civil and Political Rights: CCPR Commentary (Kehl: N.P. Engel Verlag, 
2005), at 339. 
1043 Judgment, Franquesa Freixas v. Spain, Application No. 53590/99, ECtHR, 21 November 2000. 
1044 Judgment, Croissant v. Germany, Application No. 13611/88, ECtHR, 25 September 1992, at 29. 
1045 HRC, General Comment 32, Article 14: Right to Equality before Courts and Tribunals and to a Fair Trial, 
CCPR/C/GC/32, 23 August 2007, at 37. 
1046 Part II, Chapter 3.1.1; Part II, Chapter 3.2.3. 
1047 Part II, Chapter 2.3.6. 
1048 Part II, Chapter 4.3.4.1. 
1049 Part II, Chapter 3.3.3.1. 
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right to appeal, but pertains, in the main, to plea-bargaining procedures.1050 Such a limitation 
of the scope of appellate review is, thus, primarily inspired by the choice of the person 
concerned as to a particular procedural construct. However, the HRC has been inspired by 
similar considerations. It has, indeed, found that review of both components is not obligatory 
where the person concerned opts to appeal the sentence exclusively.1051 
 
5.1.4.7.2. Facts and Law 
The international and regional human rights instruments differ in respect of the scope of 
appellate review required. On the one hand, Articles 14(5) ICCPR and Article 8(2)(h) ACHR 
have been explicitly interpreted to extend, in one way or another, to appellate review 
encompassing matters of fact and law.1052 On the other hand, Article 2 Protocol 7 ECHR 
merely calls for appellate control of the application of the law.1053 Even so, the ECtHR has 
applied another safeguard, i.e. the right to a public hearing under Article 6(1) ECHR.1054 On 
this basis, the ECtHR has demanded an assessment of determinative factual matters in 
appellate proceedings dealing with issues of fact and law and resulting in a determination as 
to the guilt or innocence of the person concerned.1055 
 
5.1.4.8. Reasoned Opinion 
In addition to its function as a vehicle securing access to (further) appellate review,1056 the 
right to a reasoned opinion has an independent function in appellate proceedings. The 
accused’s right to take cognisance of the reasons advanced in support of the assessment of his 
guilt or innocence is no less relevant on appeal than at first instance. 
 
Indeed, all three monitoring bodies envisage such an application of the right to a reasoned 
opinion on appeal. In connection with the obligation to provide appellate review regarding 
facts and law under Article 14(5) ICCPR, the HRC has referred to the need to provide 
                                                 
1050 Ibid. 
1051 Part II, Chapter 2.3.6. 
1052 Part II, Chapter 2.3.6; Part II, Chapter 4.3.4. 
1053 Part II, Chapter 3.3.3.1. 
1054 Part II, Chapter 3.1.2. As noted, the ECtHR has also indicated that the right to examine, or have examined, 
witnesses may require the rehearing of witnesses on appeal, which could further increase the scope of appellate 
review. However, as noted, this provision has, in practice, mainly been applied to situations in which a 
conviction has been imposed on appeal following an appeal from an acquittal. See: Part II, Chapter 3.2.4. It will, 
therefore, not be assessed further in this context. 
1055 Part II, Chapter 3.1.2. 
1056 Part II, Chapter 5.1.4.1. 
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sufficient, but not exhaustive, consideration to an appeal.1057 Although it has only referred to 
the right to a reasoned opinion in respect of leave to appeal proceedings and not in relation to 
full-fledged appellate proceedings,1058 this aspect may be considered to attach to the latter as 
well. Similar standards apply to both types of proceedings.1059 The ECtHR has similarly 
found, on the basis of the reference to the general right to a fair trial in Article 6(1) ECHR, 
that this right entails the need to provide “meaningful consideration” to determinative matters, 
whereas more limited reasoning may be compensated by safeguards.1060 On the other hand, 
the IACtHR has required “clear, complete and logical grounds” to be set out by an appellate 
court,1061 which appears to constitute a more demanding threshold. 
 
5.1.4.9. Public Pronouncement of the Judgment 
The ECtHR has determined that appellate judgments need not necessarily be pronounced 
publicly, as long as other means of publication are available.1062 However, neither the HRC 
nor the IACtHR has clarified the extent of this aspect of the ICCPR and ACHR, respectively, 
regarding appellate proceedings. Even so, the ECtHR has adopted its interpretation of Article 
6(1) ECHR despite an observation that the wording of this provision, which sets forth that 
“[j]udgment shall be pronounced publicly”, would “appear to be stricter in this respect than 
Article 14 para. 1 of the […] [ICCPR], which provides that the judgment ‘shall be made 
public’”.1063 Indeed, the expression “shall be made public” in Article 14(1) ICCPR appears, 
on a plain reading, to allow for alternative forms of publication. Accordingly, the 
interpretation of Article 6(1) ECtHR falls in line with the wording of Article 14(1) ICCPR. 
 
5.2. The Similarities Explained 
At first sight, the explicit and implicit divergences between international and regional 
approaches to the right to appeal and associated fair trial guarantees applicable to appellate 
proceedings appear insurmountable. Nevertheless, the preceding discussion has revealed, in 
general, that the commonalities outweigh the dissimilarities in respect of the approaches to 
appellate fairness espoused by the human rights monitoring bodies and courts. Aside from 
particular aspects, distinct components of appellate proceedings have either been addressed in 
                                                 
1057 Part II, Chapter 2.3.6. 
1058 Ibid. 
1059 E.g., Part II, Chapter 2.3.9; Part II, Chapter 3.3.3.2. 
1060 Part II, Chapter 3.1.1. 
1061 Part II, Chapter 4.3.3. 
1062 Part II, Chapter 3.1.4. 
1063 Judgment, Sutter v. Switzerland, Application No. 8209/78, ECtHR, 22 February 1984, at 32. 
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a similar manner or the various approaches diverge less than may appear when the different 
taxonomies and legal bases employed by the monitoring bodies and courts are set aside. 
 
This development may be explained on the basis of two observations. First, the human rights 
monitoring bodies and courts have applied dissimilar methodologies to the assessment of the 
fairness of appellate proceedings. Whereas the HRC and the IACtHR have interpreted the 
right to appeal as the primary norm controlling appellate fairness, the ECtHR has stressed the 
continued application of the remaining fair trial norms in appellate proceedings and has 
employed the right to appeal as a supplementary norm. These methodologies have 
emphasised diverging legal bases, but have, even so, yielded similar results on the merits. 
Second, an ongoing process of convergence concerning standards of appellate fairness has 
been set in motion in the views of the HRC and the jurisprudence of the ECtHR and IACtHR. 
 
5.2.1. Diverging Methodologies 
With regard to the methodologies concerning the assessment of appellate fairness, it has been 
proposed that “[t]he protection afforded by ICCPR, Article 14(5) and Article 2, Protocol No. 
7 [ECHR], focuses on the fairness of the appeal itself” and that “[t]his ‘fair trial’ is not the 
same as the ‘fair trial’ of ICCPR, Article 14(1) and ECHR, Article 6(1), which were originally 
intended to apply to the merits of the case in the (original) trial: it is a separate notion, ‘which 
does […] depend on the special features of the proceedings involved’”.1064 
 
Article 14(5) ICCPR, and by extension Article 8(2)(h) ACHR, are indeed concerned with the 
“fairness of the appeal itself”. The views of the HRC establish, in the aggregate, that the 
former provision extends beyond the principal role of the right to appeal to guarantee review 
of a conviction by a higher court.1065 Instead, it also regulates many associated facets of 
appellate proceedings, such as the required scope of appellate review, the conditions for the 
effective exercise of the right to appeal, the legal assistance afforded to appellants, and their 
                                                 
1064 R. Roth and M. Henzelin, ‘The Appeal Procedure of the ICC’, in A. Cassese, P. Gaeta, and J. Jones (eds.), 
The Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court: a Commentary 1535 (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 
2002), at 1540-1541. In the original text, the final part of this sentence reads: “[…] which does not depend on the 
special features of the proceedings involved”. However, this appears to be an error, since the jurisprudence 
referred to by the authors states that “[t]he manner of application of Article 6 […] [ECHR] to proceedings before 
courts of appeal does […] depend on the special features of the proceedings involved”. See: Judgment, Ekbatani 
v. Sweden, Application No. 10563/83, ECtHR, 26 May 1988, at 27. 
1065 Part II, Chapter 2.3.5. 
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presence at appellate hearings.1066 The extensive remit of Article 14(5) ICCPR simultaneously 
entails that the remaining fair trial guarantees of Article 14 ICCPR have been assigned 
reduced significance in appellate proceedings. In addition to the fact that these guarantees 
have been invoked less frequently in relation to such proceedings, most of them lack a 
sufficient degree of independent application. In this regard, they have either been applied in 
conjunction with Article 14(5) ICCPR1067 or have displayed an overlap with aspects of the 
latter provision1068. The right to appeal may be characterised in similar terms in the Inter-
American human rights system. Article 8(2)(h) ACHR encompasses numerous aspects of 
appellate proceedings,1069 whereas the remaining fair trial guarantees have been invoked to a 
more limited degree.1070 In sum, these conceptions of the right to appeal amount, in their own 
right, to miniature fair trial provisions in the context of appellate proceedings. 
 
However, the aforementioned portrayal of Article 2 Protocol 7 ECHR as focusing on the 
fairness of the appeal itself overstretches this provision. Based on the jurisprudence of the 
Strasbourg organs, it has been afforded a more reduced scope of application. Considering that 
Article 6 ECHR has been invoked in respect of the majority of issues of fairness in appellate 
proceedings,1071  Article 2 Protocol 7 ECHR has been necessarily reduced to its primary 
function, namely the provision of an appellate remedy, as such.1072 The relationship between 
these rights is exemplified by two characteristics of the Strasbourg jurisprudence. First, in the 
application of the guarantees contained in Article 6 ECHR to appellate proceedings, the 
Strasbourg organs have explicitly determined that the right to appeal was at stake. For 
example, discussing the right of access to a court under Article 6(1) ECHR, the ECtHR has 
held that declaring an appeal inadmissible because the appellant had not surrendered to 
custody “impairs the very essence of the right of appeal”1073 and that “the right to have one’s 
conviction reviewed cannot be considered effective unless the arguments of the appellant […] 
are duly examined”. 1074  Second, it is even more telling that the Strasbourg organs have 
prioritised assessments under Article 6 ECHR over Article 2 Protocol 7 ECHR in relation to 
various issues. For instance, a finding of a violation of Article 6(1) ECHR for the 
                                                 
1066 Part II, Chapter 2.3.6; Part II, Chapter 2.3.8; Part II, Chapter 2.3.10. 
1067 E.g., Part II, Chapter 2.2.2; Part II, Chapter 2.2.3; Part II, Chapter 2.2.4. 
1068 E.g., Part II, Chapter 2.1.1; Part II, Chapter 2.1.2. 
1069 Part II, Chapter 4.3. 
1070 Part II, Chapter 4.1; Part II, Chapter 4.2. 
1071 Part II, Chapter 3.1; Part II, Chapter 3.2. 
1072 Part II, Chapter 3.3. 
1073 Judgment, Guérin v. France, Application No. 25201/94, ECtHR, 29 July 1998, at 43. 
1074 Judgment, Nedzela v. France, Application No. 73695/01, ECtHR, 27 July 2006, at 55. 
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impossibility of accessing an appellate court has been accompanied with a refusal to consider 
alleged associated violations of Article 2 Protocol 7 ECHR.1075 An equivalent approach is 
evident in the finding that the delivery of an oral first instance judgment confined solely to its 
operative paragraphs, in conjunction with the fact that the written version was only made 
available subsequent to the expiration of the deadline for the filing of an appeal, violated 
Article 6(3)(b) ECHR and that no separate question arose under Article 2 Protocol 7 
ECHR.1076 Similarly, the absence of an accused person from an appellate hearing was only 
considered under paragraphs (c) and (d) of Article 6(3) ECHR and not under Article 2 
Protocol 7 ECHR.1077 Accordingly, Article 2 Protocol 7 ECHR primarily supplements the 
continued application of Article 6 ECHR by ensuring an appellate remedy, as such. 
 
The diverging methodologies of, on the one hand, the HRC and the ACHR and, on the other 
hand, the ECtHR result mainly from the dissimilar processes of inception of the rights to 
appeal. This right was conceived of as part of the right to a fair trial in the ICCPR and ACHR 
from the outset.1078 In such a construction, the right to appeal is naturally brought into play to 
exclusively or conjointly regulate the majority of issues of fairness arising on appeal. 
Consequently, the realm of application of the remainder of the fair trial guarantees contained 
in Article 14 ICCPR and Article 8 ACHR has been relegated to secondary importance in 
respect of appellate proceedings. On the other hand, Article 2 Protocol 7 ECHR was inserted 
into a pre-existing, although not fully developed, edifice of fair trial norms applicable to 
appellate proceedings.1079 In these circumstances, Protocol 7 ECHR was, thus, pre-ordained to 
elicit a limited scope of operation, in view of the dominant role of Article 6 ECHR. 
 
5.2.2. Tendencies of Convergence 
Notwithstanding their divergent methodologies, the human rights monitoring bodies and 
courts have invariably applied fair trial guarantees other than the right to appeal to appellate 
proceedings, albeit to varying degrees. On this basis, the views and jurisprudence of the 
monitoring bodies reveal tendencies of convergence in respect of their assessments of 
                                                 
1075 Judgment, Papon v. France, Application No. 54210/00, ECtHR, 25 July 2002, at 95-106. 
1076 Judgment, Baucher v. France, Application No. 53640/00, ECtHR, 24 July 2007, at 51-52. 
1077 Judgment, Umnikov v. Ukraine, Application No. 42684/06, ECtHR, 19 May 2016, at 56. 




appellate proceedings. This process is, arguably, an outgrowth of increased “transjudicial 
communication”, which entails “communication among courts […] across borders”.1080 
 
It has been noted that “[s]upranational courts […] engage in horizontal communication, as 
evidenced […] by direct citation”.1081 For instance, it has been remarked that the ECHR “is 
the most highly developed scheme of international human rights protection” and that “the 
influence of Strasbourg can […] be seen in the work of the Human Rights Committee”, 
including on “the concept of ‘equality of arms’ and the obligation to provide the accused with 
guarantees of his rights which are effective”.1082 Such communication has also occurred in 
respect of standards of appellate fairness. Most significantly, relying on an ECtHR precedent, 
the HRC has found that, as an appellate court “had to examine the case as to the facts and the 
law, and in particular had to make a full assessment of the question of the author’s guilt or 
innocence, it should have used its power to conduct hearings” when imposing convictions on 
additional counts on appeal.1083 This is even though it had previously considered that “the 
absence of oral hearings in the appellate proceedings … [raises] no issue under article 14” 
ICCPR.1084 The ECtHR has referred to the approach of the HRC in relation to a particular 
component of appellate fairness in even more explicit terms. It has held that, because a 
Member State had not ratified Protocol 7 ECHR, it was prevented from “subjecting the law 
governing the […] system to scrutiny similar in nature and scope to that of the” HRC.1085 
Nevertheless, the ECtHR continued by holding that “[i]t remains to be decided whether the 
requirements of Article 6” ECHR had been met. 1086  In this regard, it has, ultimately, 
concluded that the decision was not “based on a full and thorough evaluation of the relevant 
factors” under Articles 6(1) and 6(3)(c) ECHR.1087 Even though it had claimed that it was 
prevented from reviewing the matter in a manner similar to the HRC, its conclusion was 
highly comparable, since the latter had found, in relation to the same domestic system, that 
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the motivation provided by a judge was “inadequate and insufficient”, as it, inter alia, did not 
reveal that it took into consideration “the evidence presented before the first instance 
judge”. 1088  Finally, whereas the IACmHR has also invoked aspects of the ECtHR’s 
jurisprudence on appellate fairness,1089 the IACtHR has more directly aligned itself with the 
HRC. It has, in this regard, stated that Article 14(5) ICCPR “is very similar to Article 8(2)(h)” 
ACHR on a number of occasions.1090 
 
Transjudicial communication between supranational courts also occurs by means of “tacit 
emulation”,1091 which may be taken to signify the implicit adoption of standards set by other 
bodies. Indeed, traces of ECtHR jurisprudence are clearly distinguishable in the views of the 
HRC and the jurisprudence of the IACtHR. The former has, for instance, concluded that 
Article 14(3)(d) ICCPR applies to appellate proceedings, as the appellate court had 
“examined the case as to the facts and the law and made a new assessment of the issue of guilt 
or innocence”,1092 and that, in light of a finding that Article 14(3)(d) ICCPR had been violated, 
it would not “separately examine the author’s claims under article 14(5)” ICCPR. 1093  A 
renewed assessment of guilt or innocence has identically been invoked by the ECtHR as a 
basis for the application of certain Article 6 ECHR guarantees,1094 which has repeatedly led to 
the conclusion that no separate issues under the right to appeal had arisen.1095 The HRC has 
also considered the absence of the accused from appellate proceedings under the principle of 
equality of arms,1096 which is analogous to the approach of the ECtHR,1097 even though it has 
subsequently recognised that this issue may raise issues concerning the right to appeal, as 
                                                 
1088 Views, Mennen v. the Netherlands, Communication No. 1797/2008, HRC, 27 July 2010, at 8.3. 
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such, too1098. Furthermore, in the aforementioned case in which the HRC directly referred to 
the jurisprudence of the ECtHR concerning public hearings on appeal, it has applied a very 
similar approach to the requirement of impartiality on appeal without invoking ECtHR 
precedents directly. In this regard, on the basis of the Article 14(1) ICCPR exclusively, it has 
deemed that the participation of two appellate judges in preliminary proceedings, which “was 
such as to allow them to form an opinion on the case prior to the […] appeal proceedings” and 
which was “necessarily related to the charges against the author and the evaluation of those 
charges”, incompatible with the impartiality requirement.1099 Aside from the unmistakable 
similarity with the ECtHR approach to such matters,1100 the HRC omitted to invoke Article 
14(5) ICCPR in this context. As to the IACtHR, in addition to its direct association with the 
HRC in respect of Article 14(5) ICCPR, its jurisprudence also bears some hallmarks of the 
ECtHR. For instance, in respect of an appellate conviction in final instance on the basis of 
testimony introduced during these proceedings, after two instances had dismissed the charges 
for lack of jurisdiction, the IACtHR has found a violation of the rights to “prior notification 
[…] of the charges” and “adequate time and means for the preparation of his defense”.1101 
This is nearly identical to the conclusions adopted by the ECtHR in similar circumstances.1102 
In addition, more generally, the IACtHR has found that “appeal regimes must respect the 
minimum procedural guarantees that, pursuant to Article 8 […] [ACHR], are pertinent and 
necessary”,1103 which is emblematic for the ECtHR’s jurisprudence.1104 
 
As with the diverging methodologies, the process of convergence between the approaches of 
the human rights monitoring bodies and courts is also connected with the atypical origins of 
the rights to appeal in international human rights law. This process is rooted in the unequal 
temporal development of the fair trial standards relevant to appellate proceedings. Whereas 
Article 2 Protocol 7 ECHR became part of an evolving scheme of fair trial norms applicable 
to appellate proceedings, the development of Article 14(5) ICCPR and Article 8(2)(h) ACHR 
by the HRC and the IACtHR has been delayed and incomplete.1105  Therefore, the more 
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elaborate body of principles concerning fair trial standards applicable to appellate proceedings 
of the Strasbourg organs has become a significant source of reference for corresponding 
matters of appellate fairness encountered by the HRC and IACtHR. At the same time, this 
chronology has produced inverse effects too. The preparatory work concerning Protocol 7 
ECHR clearly anticipated a more limited conception of the right to appeal,1106 but, at the 
relevant time, the HRC had not yet issued its views on Article 14(5) ICCPR.1107 The extent of 
the schism between Article 2 Protocol 7 ECHR and Article 14(5) ICCPR has, thus, only 
become apparent at a later stage. Accordingly, as the HRC’s views evolved, the ECtHR has 
arguably further pushed its interpretation of other fair trial standards applicable to appellate 
proceedings to diminish the gap between these approaches.1108 
 
6. Interim Conclusion: Norms of International Human Rights Law 
The belated introduction of the right to appeal in the corpus of fair trial norms, the 
divergences between the various conceptions of the right to appeal, and the differing legal 
bases relied upon by human rights monitoring bodies and courts may, at first sight, suggest 
that norms of international human rights law concerning appellate proceedings have 
insufficiently matured to be employed as touchstones for the appellate processes of the Ad 
Hoc Tribunals and the ICC. However, upon closer scrutiny, the preceding analysis dispels this 
impression. It reveals that, when the interaction between the rights to appeal and the 
correlating application of other fair trial guarantees is taken into account, international human 
rights law constitutes an appropriate yardstick in relation to such proceedings. In more 
specific terms, two such categories of norms and/or approaches may be identified. 
 
6.1. Identical and Unopposed ICCPR Norms or Approaches 
The first category consists of, on the one hand, identical norms or approaches espoused by the 
human rights instruments or human rights monitoring bodies and courts and, on the other 
hand, norms or approaches promulgated by the ICCPR or the HRC, which are not 
contradicted by their regional counterparts. Norms and/or approaches to appellate fairness that 
are common to both international and regional human rights instruments and/or human rights 
monitoring bodies and courts are comprehensively grounded in international human rights 
law. On this basis, the appellate proceedings of the Ad Hoc Tribunals and the ICC must 
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comply with such norms. Furthermore, the appellate proceedings of the Ad Hoc Tribunals and 
the ICC must also abide by ICCPR norms and/or approaches of the HRC concerning appellate 
fairness that are not in conflict with norms of the regional human rights instruments (Protocol 
7 ECHR, ECHR, and ACHR) and/or approaches of the regional human rights courts (ECtHR 
and IACtHR). This is because, on account of its global scope and widespread ratification, the 
ICCPR is the primary source of human rights obligations of the Ad Hoc Tribunals and the 
ICC, whilst the ECHR and the ACHR, as human rights instruments of regional reach, do not 
have binding authority vis-à-vis these institutions as such.1109 
 
In more specific terms, the following norms fall into these categories. First, as concerns the 
essence of the right to appeal: (i) recourse to an appellate court at second instance must be 
available; (ii) appellate review contingent upon the exercise of discretionary powers by 
judicial officers or based on newly-discovered evidence constitute inadequate substitutes for 
appellate review; (iii) additional appellate review is not required in respect of a confirmed 
conviction accompanied by an aggravated sentence; and (iv) the right to appeal does not 
extend beyond appellate review at second instance, but, in case of a multi-tiered appellate 
edifice, effective access to each level of appeal must be granted. Second, the right to appeal 
has been exclusively granted to convicted persons, but, at the same time, such persons may 
relinquish this right. Third, regarding the regulation of the appellate process: (i) such 
regulation is permissible, provided that it is sufficiently precise/foreseeable and accessible; 
and (ii) appellate review by a “higher” court entails that the court carrying out appellate 
review must ensure review of a sufficient scope. Fourth, appellate proceedings must be 
conducted in accordance with the following requirements: (i) appellate review must be 
accessible, which entails, more specifically, a reasoned opinion provided by a court of first 
instance and correct and effective information as to applicable time-limits; (ii) oral hearings 
are required in respect of appellate hearings dealing with matters of fact and law and 
determining guilt or innocence; (iii) appellate judges must, in general, be impartial and, in 
specific, may not partake in pre-appeal and appeal proceedings in the same case or in 
interrelated appellate proceedings involving the same persons where their participation is such 
to allow them to form an opinion as to the charges; (iv) the accused has a right to be present at 
appellate hearings dealing with matters of fact and law and determining guilt or innocence; 
(v) the accused must be informed of the appellate modification of the basis of first instance 
                                                 
1109 Introduction, Chapter 2.1.2. 
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proceedings; (vi) the accused is entitled to counsel and must be informed of such a right; (vii) 
indigent accused must be afforded counsel without remuneration; (viii) counsel appointed 
under a legal aid scheme must provide adequate legal assistance; (ix) the accused must be 
allowed to select privately retained counsel, although this right may be departed from with 
sufficient justification as to the necessity for the restriction or the impossibility of appointing 
legal aid counsel; (x) the right to a pro se defence persists on appeal, but may be curtailed in 
the interests of justice; (xi) the scope of appellate review must encompass both conviction and 
sentence (although such review may be confined to sentencing in particular circumstances) 
and questions of law; and (xii) appellate judgments need not necessarily be pronounced 
publicly, provided that alternative means of publication are available. 
 
6.2. Dissimilar Norms or Approaches 
International human rights instruments and/or their monitoring bodies and courts are at 
variance in respect of: (i) the possibility of the highest court sitting in first instance; (ii) the 
obligation to provide further appellate review regarding a final appellate conviction imposed 
in favour of an acquittal; (iii) the scope of appellate review; and (iv) the right to a reasoned 
opinion on appeal. Accordingly, whereas the norms and/or approaches to appellate fairness 
falling in the preceding category enjoy a sufficient foundation in international human rights 
law to bind the Ad Hoc Tribunals and the ICC in respect of their appellate proceedings, these 
norms and/or approaches lack, in principle, such a basis. It must accordingly be determined 
which norm or approach should guide the appellate proceedings of the Ad Hoc Tribunals and 
the ICC in respect of these matters. Scholarship and international appellate practice have not 
provided a well-defined solution in this regard. For instance, even though the jurisprudence of 
the Ad Hoc Tribunals has, in the final analysis, eschewed the human rights dimension of the 
question whether an appellate conviction replacing a first instance acquittal engenders a 
further right to appellate review, commentators and individual judges have endorsed either the 
approach by the HRC to Article 14(5) ICCPR (as supported by Article 8(2)(h) ACHR) or the 
norm contained in Article 2(2) Protocol 7 ECHR.1110 Stated more generally, a choice for a 
particular norm or approach to appellate fairness has been suggested thus far.  
 
However, this study will pursue a different method. It will assess whether aspects of the 
general right to a fair trial supplement the application of the various rights to appeal in 
                                                 
1110 Part III, Chapter 10.1.4. 
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international human rights law and whether a common core of protection is inherent in the 
different legal bases. Accordingly, it integrates conflicting norms and/or approaches 
concerning appellate fairness in international human rights law in order to define applicable 
touchstones for the appellate proceedings of the Ad Hoc Tribunals and ICC. This method is 
better attuned to appellate proceedings in the context of international criminal law than a 
selective endorsement of a particular construct of appellate fairness. 
 
First, this method garners broader support in international human rights law for appellate 
proceedings conducted by the Ad Hoc Tribunals and the ICC. This comports better with the 
nature of the human rights obligations of the Ad Hoc Tribunals and the ICC in relation to 
their appellate proceedings. In this regard, the U.N. Secretary-General expressed an intention 
to integrate the various conceptions of the right to appeal in the design of an appellate 
procedure for the Ad Hoc Tribunals. It has been indicated that the right to appeal “is a 
fundamental element of civil and political rights and has, inter alia, been incorporated in the” 
ICCPR.1111 The use of “inter alia” signals that the appellate phase of the proceedings before 
the Ad Hoc Tribunals was not modelled exclusively after the ICCPR. This intention has been 
confirmed by the ICTY Appeals Chamber, which has found that the appellate provision of the 
ICTY Statute “reflects the position in the general corpus of international human rights law”, 
namely “Article 14(5) [ICCPR], […] Article 2 [Protocol 7 ECHR], and […] Article 8(2)(h) 
[ACHR]”. 1112  Furthermore, the rationale of “internationally recognized human rights” 
contained in Article 21(3) ICC Statute entails a similar need to ground the appellate 
proceedings of the ICC in the various sources of international human rights law. In this 
regard, it has been suggested that, with regard to treaty norms, “[t]he number and 
geographical distribution of States having ratified the respective treaty will have to be taken 
into consideration” 1113  as well as “the relevant reservations” 1114  to determine whether a 
particular norm is “internationally recognized”. It follows that regional human rights 
instruments must, in addition, be assessed to determine whether particular aspects pertaining 
to appellate fairness enjoy a sufficient degree of international recognition, in view of the 
aforementioned divergences relating to this subject matter. Thus, the proposed method 
                                                 
1111 U.N. Security Council, Report of the Secretary-General Pursuant to Paragraph 2 of Security Council 
Resolution 808 (1993), S/25704, 3 May 1993, at 116 (emphasis in original). 
1112 Tadić Sentencing Appeal, at 29 (emphasis supplied). Similar: Aleksovski, at 104 (footnote 247). 
1113 G. Hafner and C. Binder, ‘The Interpretation of Article 21 (3) ICC Statute. Opinion Reviewed’, 9 Austrian 
Review of International and European Law 163 (2004), at 187.  
1114 Ibid., at 189. 
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guarantees an inclusive assessment of the various conceptions of the right to appeal in 
international human rights law, which ensures that a particular norm or approach to appellate 
fairness reflects “the general corpus of international human rights law” regarding the Ad Hoc 
Tribunals’ appellate proceedings and surpasses the threshold of “internationally recognized” 
for the purposes of the ICC’s appellate process. 
 
Second, this method fully embraces the applicability of other fair trial guarantees to appellate 
proceedings. The Ad Hoc Tribunals (and arguably the ICC) have largely ignored fair trial 
guarantees other than the right to appeal in relation to their appellate proceedings. 1115 
However, this study builds on the evolving indications in international human rights law as to 
the complementary regulatory effect inherent in other fair trial guarantees vis-à-vis appellate 
proceedings. In this manner, it concretises the interrelationship between these legal bases with 
regard to the appellate processes of the Ad Hoc Tribunals and the ICC.  
 
Nevertheless, if it would prove impossible to define a common core of protection in different 
legal bases relating to appellate proceedings, it must be determined which norm or approach 
concerning appellate fairness in international human rights law carries more weight in legal 
terms. This will be assessed on the basis of the degree to which a particular norm and/or 
approach to appellate fairness has been accepted by States and/or the extent to which 
international human rights law digresses in relation to such a norm and/or approach. 
 
6.2.1. First Instance Trial by Highest Court 
The human rights instruments and their monitoring bodies and courts explicitly diverge on the 
question of trial in first instance by the highest courts in a judicial system. Whereas the HRC 
and IACtHR have found that such trials do not detract from the right to appeal and require an 
opportunity to have recourse to a higher instance,1116 Protocol 7 ECHR provides an explicit 
exception in this regard.1117 The ECtHR has not mitigated this exception on the basis of other 
fair trial guarantees contained in the ECHR, but has, on the contrary, found that no right of 
appeal may be deduced from Article 6 ECHR in these circumstances.1118  
                                                 
1115 E.g., A. Cassese, ‘The Influence of the European Court of Human Rights on International Criminal Tribunals 
- Some Methodological Remarks’, in M. Bergsmo (ed.), Human Rights for the Downtrodden. Essays in Honour 
of Asbjørn Eide 19 (Leiden: Brill Academic Publishers, 2003), at 47. 
1116 Part II, Chapter 2.3.5; Part II, Chapter 4.3.5. 





Accordingly, international human rights law lacks a sufficient basis to demarcate a common 
core of protection in relation to this matter and it must, therefore, be determined which of the 
existing approaches carries superior legal weight. In this regard, it is recalled that several 
States have made reservations to Article 14(5) ICCPR to permit their highest courts to sit in 
first instance in particular circumstances and that, in such situations, the HRC has condoned 
such appellate constructions.1119 In addition, as mentioned, an explicit exception has been 
enshrined in a legally binding manner in Protocol 7 ECHR. The approaches of the HRC and 
IACtHR to Articles 14(5) ICCPR and 8(2)(h) ACHR in relation to first instance trials before 
the highest courts, thus, enjoy insufficient support in international human rights law to bind 
the Ad Hoc Tribunals and the ICC. It follows that the Appeals Chambers of the Ad Hoc 
Tribunals and the ICC are, in principle, not prevented from sitting as courts of first instance. 
 
6.2.2. Appellate Conviction Revoking Acquittal 
Although the ICCPR and the ACHR require additional appellate review if an acquitted person 
is irrevocably convicted on appeal, Protocol 7 ECHR carves out an explicit exception to the 
right to appeal in such circumstances. This dichotomy, nevertheless, comprises a commonly 
applicable core, which is based on two foundations.  
 
First, there is insufficient support for the interpretation provided to Article 14(5) ICCPR and 
Article 8(2)(h) ACHR in international human rights law. Several States have made 
reservations to this aspect of Article 14(5) ICCPR.1120 Moreover, the relevant understanding 
of Article 14(5) ICCPR has not been laid down in the ICCPR, but emanates from a non-
binding view of the HRC, whereas the exception foreseen in Article 2(2) Protocol 7 ECHR 
has been set forth in a legally binding instrument of a regional nature.1121  
 
Second, the output of the human rights monitoring bodies and courts yields, in the aggregate, 
two commonly shared safeguards in respect of such convictions.  
 
                                                 
1119 Part II, Chapter 2.3.5. 
1120 Part II, Chapter 2.3.4. 
1121 Similar: D. Sheppard, ‘The International Criminal Court and ‘Internationally Recognized Human Rights’: 
Understanding Article 21(3) of the Rome Statute’, 10(1) International Criminal Law Review 43 (2010), at 70. 
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The first safeguard demands a sufficient degree of appellate scrutiny in respect of the basis 
underlying the reversal of an acquittal into a non-reviewable conviction on appeal. 
Commencing with the ECtHR, it has required, as mentioned, oral hearings on appeal.1122 This 
safeguard has been particularly emphasised in respect of appellate convictions in favour of 
acquittals by lower instances. 1123  Commentators have critically noted that the ECtHR 
“confuses the right to a public hearing […] with the right to be heard in person” as the crucial 
question in such cases does “not concern the publicity requirement but […] whether the court 
of appeal […] [can] properly […] [decide] to examine the case without the applicants having 
to present their arguments at a hearing”. 1124  This critique overlooks the fact that a 
reorientation in Strasbourg jurisprudence provides a more appropriate basis. In this regard, the 
ECtHR has advanced that the denial of an opportunity to contest appellate conclusions by 
means of adversarial examination (also referred to as the right to a defence in the context of 
adversarial debate) infringes this right.1125 It, thus, specified that a public hearing is a vehicle 
to ensure that contentious matters of fact have been sufficiently litigated on appeal. Be that as 
it may, the ECtHR has not only required intensified appellate scrutiny on the basis of oral 
hearings, but also pursuant to the right to examine, or have examined, witnesses on appeal.1126 
The possibility of examining witnesses on appeal necessarily requires a broadened assessment 
of the underlying aspects of a first instance acquittal. As to the HRC, it has similarly invoked 
the requirement of appellate hearings. Although it initially found that Article 14(5) ICCPR 
does not necessitate an appellate hearing,1127  it subsequently held that such hearings are 
required on the basis of Article 14(1) ICCPR when first instance acquittals are revoked in 
favour of final convictions,1128 pursuant to, inter alia, the jurisprudence of the ECtHR.1129 
Despite these diverging legal bases, both institutions have unequivocally stressed the need to 
ensure enhanced evidentiary evaluation in such circumstances. Thus, the ECtHR has held 
that, despite the submission of written arguments, 1130  appellate hearings require the 
                                                 
1122 Part II, Chapter 3.1.2. 
1123 Ibid. 
1124 P. van Dijk, F. van Hoof, A. van Rijn, and L. Zwaak, (eds.), Theory and Practice of the European 
Convention of Human Rights (Antwerpen: Intersentia, 2006), at 599 (emphasis in original). Similar: S. Trechsel, 
Human Rights in Criminal Proceedings (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2005), at 131. 
1125 Part II, Chapter 3.1.2. 
1126 Part II, Chapter 3.2.4. 
1127 Part II, Chapter 2.1.2. 
1128 Ibid. 
1129 Ibid. 
1130 Judgment, Constantinescu v. Romania, Application No. 28871/95, ECtHR, 27 June 2000, at 18, 58-59; 
Judgment, Ekbatani v. Sweden, Application No. 10563/83, ECtHR, 26 May 1988, at 15; Judgment, Lacadena 
Calero v. Spain, Application No. 23002/07, ECtHR, 22 November 2011, at 40. 
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production of evidence 1131  or the direct appreciation of witness testimony. 1132  The latter 
aspect is, of course, also a direct result of the right to “examine or have examined witnesses” 
on appeal.1133  Highlighting that an appellate court had reviewed the trial record without 
“hearing the testimony of any witnesses”, 1134  the HRC similarly operated under the 
understanding that appellate hearings must, at least, facilitate witness examination.1135  
 
The second safeguard rules out irrevocable appellate reversals of acquittals based on a 
requalification of the original judgment that either: (i) provides insufficient notice to the 
person concerned; or (ii) results from legal or factual elements extrinsic to the original 
charges. The HRC and ECtHR have resorted to disparate legal bases in this regard as well, 
namely Article 14(5) ICCPR and a combined application of Article 6(3)(a)-(b) ECHR, but 
they have both concluded that a violation of these provisions may originate in an act of 
appellate requalification.1136 Therefore, these provisions are capable of addressing a highly 
similar challenge to appellate fairness — a requalification of an inferior decision by an 
appellate court may deny the person concerned a further opportunity to appeal a conviction 
imposed for the first time on appeal and, at the same time, it may entail rejection of a 
sufficiently detailed notification of the accusation and adequate time and facilities for the 
preparation of a defence. However, whilst the ECtHR has clarified that Article 6(3)(a)-
(b) ECHR is only violated in relation to appellate re-qualifications of which insufficient 
notice is provided1137 or that are extrinsic to the original accusation,1138 the HRC has not 
                                                 
1131 Judgment, Popovici v. Moldova, Applications Nos. 289/04 & 41194/04, ECtHR, 27 November 2007, at 70-
72. 
1132 Judgment, Lacadena Calero v. Spain, Application No. 23002/07, ECtHR, 22 November 2011, at 40; 
Judgment, Vilanova Goterris & Llop Garcia v. Spain, Applications Nos. 5606/09 & 17516/09, ECtHR, 27 
November 2012, at 35. 
1133 E.g., Judgment, Destrehem v. France, Application No. 56651/00, ECtHR, 18 May 2004, at 46-47; Judgment, 
Dănilă v. Romania, Application No. 53897/00, ECtHR, 8 March 2007, at 60-63. 
1134 Views, Larrañaga v. the Philippines, Communication No. 1421/2005, HRC, 24 July 2006, at 2.10. 
1135 As discussed, the HRC has also referred to the right “[t]o examine, or have examined, the witnesses against 
him”, but its views in relation to the application of this right to the appellate phase of a criminal case are not 
sufficiently clear. See: Part II, Chapter 2.2.4. 
1136 Views, Conde Conde v. Spain, Communication No. 1325/2004, HRC, 31 October 2006, at 2.3, 2.5, 7.2 (an 
offence was characterised as continuing as opposed to time-barred); Judgment, Pélissier & Sassi v. France, 
Application No. 25444/94, ECtHR, 25 March 1999, at 58-63 (the mode of liability was requalified from 
perpetration to aiding and abetting). Some further support has been provided by an identical application by the 
IACtHR of the corresponding protection contained in Article 8(2)(b) ACHR. See: Part II, Chapter 4.2.1. 
1137 The sufficiency of the notification hinges on the specific circumstances. It can even be provided on appeal. 
E.g., Judgment, Bäckström & Andersson v. Sweden, Application No. 67930/01, ECtHR, 5 September 2006, at 8-
10. 
1138 In general, the ECtHR considers whether the requalification is based on legal or factual elements additional 
to the original charge(s). See: e.g., Judgment, Pélissier & Sassi v. France, Application No. 25444/94, ECtHR, 25 
March 1999, at 58; Judgment, Salvador Torres v. Spain, Application No. 21525/93, ECtHR, 24 October 1996, 
30-33; Judgment, Juha Nuutinen v. Finland, Application No. 45830/99, ECtHR, 24 April 2007, at 32-33. 
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established any such limitations.1139 Even so, if a substitution of an acquittal for a conviction 
inevitably prompts the protection of Article 14(5) ICCPR, this provision must apply a fortiori 
regarding re-qualifications suffering from the aforementioned defects. What is more, the HRC 
and ECtHR have demanded nearly identical fair trial protection in such circumstances. In this 
regard, it has been determined that Article 6(3)(a)-(b) ECHR explicitly absorbs, in part, the 
fundamental protection provided by Article 14(5) ICCPR. That is, the ECtHR has considered 
whether further appellate recourse is available to the person concerned following an act of 
appellate re-qualification.1140 Needless to say, the availability of appellate remedies lies at the 
very heart of the application of Article 14(5) ICCPR.1141 It may be held, in contrast, that the 
appellate recourse required in respect of Article 6(3)(a)-(b) ECHR is merely of a remedial 
character, whereas it is the quintessential purpose of Article 14(5) ICCPR. However, this 
distinction is offset by the fact that both legal bases require appellate review of sufficient 
scope. As discussed, according to the HRC, Article 14(5) ICCPR imposes “a duty to review 
substantively, both on the basis of sufficiency of the evidence and of the law, the conviction 
and sentence, such that the procedure allows for due consideration of the nature of the 
case”.1142 Similarly, under Article 6(3)(a)-(b) ECHR, the ECtHR requires that “all relevant 
legal and factual aspects of the conviction [be contested] before the appeal court”.1143 The 
latter approach is especially relevant when considering that it requires a heightened threshold 
in comparison with Protocol 7 ECtHR, which confines appellate review to legal matters.1144 
 
In summary, in the current state of international human rights law, the better approach is to 
proceed on a shared basis between, on the one hand, Article 14(5) ICCPR, as endorsed by 
Article 8(2)(h) ACHR, and, on the other hand, Article 6 ECHR and Article 2 Protocol 7 
ECHR. This construction recognises that final appellate convictions as a replacement of first 
instance acquittals are, as such, permissible, but carves out two commonly shared safeguards 
to allay a potential fairness deficit, i.e. the provision of a sufficient degree of appellate 
                                                 
1139 HRC, General Comment 32, Article 14: Right to Equality before Courts and Tribunals and to a Fair Trial, 
CCPR/C/GC/32, 23 August 2007, at 47. 
1140 Judgment, Juha Nuutinen v. Finland, Application No. 45830/99, ECtHR, 24 April 2007, at 8-14, 32; 
Judgment, Dallos v. Hungary, Application No. 29082/95, ECtHR, 1 March 2001, at 48-53; Judgment, Sipavičius 
v. Lithuania, Application No. 49093/99, ECtHR, 21 February 2002, at 29-34. 
1141 HRC, General Comment 32, Article 14: Right to Equality before Courts and Tribunals and to a Fair Trial, 
CCPR/C/GC/32, 23 August 2007, at 47. 
1142 Part II, Chapter 2.3.6. 
1143 Judgment, Juha Nuutinen v. Finland, Application No. 45830/99, ECtHR, 24 April 2007, at 33. 
1144 Part II, Chapter 3.3.3.2. 
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scrutiny and the exclusion of appellate convictions without sufficient notice to the convicted 
person or grounded in legal or factual elements extrinsic to the original charges. 
 
6.2.3. Scope of Appellate Review 
In relation to the scope of appellate review, the same division persists, seeing that, on the one 
hand, the HRC and IACtHR demand appellate review of both questions of law and fact and, 
on the other hand, Protocol 7 ECHR is limited to appellate review extending to questions of 
law. However, a commonly applicable core exists in respect of this matter as well. 
 
In the literature, the reach of appellate review under, especially, Article 14(5) ICCPR has been 
overstated. It has been indicated, for instance, that this provision imposes a need to conduct 
“an evaluation of the evidence presented at the trial” 1145 or “a complete review”.1146 On the 
basis of the views of the HRC, the better view is that it requires appellate courts only to deal 
with those issues of fact that are most pertinent to the adjudication of the matter at hand. It is 
indicative, in this regard, that the HRC’s descriptions of the required scope of appellate 
review denote a narrowing trend. Whereas early descriptions demanded “full review”,1147 “a 
duty to review substantively […], such that the procedure allows for due consideration of the 
nature of the case” applies currently. 1148  Similarly, whereas “the evidence” 1149  used to 
constitute the object of appellate review, the current standard only stipulates that “the 
sufficiency of evidence” must be reviewed.1150 This tendency has clearly left its traces in the 
views of the HRC. The need to conduct a full retrial or a rehearing on appeal has been 
explicitly rejected.1151 In addition, the application of this benchmark does not disclose a need 
to review all factual aspects of a case on appeal either. In departing from a previous line of 
                                                 
1145 S. Shah, ‘The Administration of Justice’, in D. Moeckli, S. Shah, and S. Sivakumaran (eds.), International 
Human Rights Law 304 (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2010), at 327 (emphasis supplied). Similar: A. Conte 
and R. Burchill, Defining Civil and Political Rights, the Jurisprudence of the United Nations Human Rights 
Committee (Farnham: Ashgate, 2009), at 194. 
1146 L. Burgorgue-Larsen and M. Úbeda de Torres, The Inter-American Court of Human Rights - Case Law and 
Commentary (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2011), at 661 (emphasis supplied). 
1147 Views, Domukovsky et al. v. Georgia, Communications Nos. 623/1995, 624/1995, 626/1995 & 627/1995, 
HRC, 6 April 1998, at 18.11. 
1148 HRC, General Comment 32, Article 14: Right to Equality before Courts and Tribunals and to a Fair Trial, 
CCPR/C/GC/32, 23 August 2007, at 48 (emphasis supplied). 
1149 Views, Lumley v. Jamaica, Communication No. 662/1995, HRC, 31 March 1999, at 7.3. Similar: Views, 
Rogerson v. Australia, Communication No. 802/1998, HRC, 3 April 2002, at 7.5; Views, Romanov v. Ukraine, 
Communication No. 842/1998, HRC, 30 October 2003, at 6.5. 
1150 HRC, General Comment 32, Article 14: Right to Equality before Courts and Tribunals and to a Fair Trial, 
CCPR/C/GC/32, 23 August 2007, at 48 (emphasis supplied). 
1151 Views, Perera v. Australia, Communication No. 536/1993, HRC, 28 March 1995, at 5.5, 6.4; Views, Juma v. 
Australia, Communication No. 984/2001, HRC, 28 July 2003, at 7.5; Views, Gbondo Sama v. Germany, 
Communication No. 1771/2008, HRC, 28 July 2009, at 6.8. 
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views concerning the scope of appellate review in the Spanish legal system, the HRC has held 
that two appellate instances had “thoroughly addressed the author’s allegation that 
circumstantial evidence was insufficient to convict him, and disagreed with his account, 
developing extensive arguments to conclude that the evidence, though circumstantial, was 
sufficient to warrant the author’s conviction”.1152 Subsequent views have largely proceeded 
along these lines, probing whether the inferior conviction is sufficiently based in fact as 
opposed to a review of all factual elements.1153 Article 8(2)(h) ACHR has been applied in a 
similar manner in practice. Despite indications of a scope of appellate review exceeding 
Article 14(5) ICCPR, such as the need for “a thorough analysis or examination of all the 
issues debated and analyzed in the lower court”,1154 the IACtHR has clarified that an appellate 
remedy requires an analysis of “questions of fact, evidence, and law upon which the contested 
judgment is based”, but that a new trial is not necessarily required.1155 
 
At the same time, despite the limitation reflected in Protocol 7 ECHR, the view has been put 
forward that the application of Article 6 ECHR to appellate proceedings curtails States’ 
margin of appreciation in respect of, inter alia, the scope of review on appeal.1156 While this 
line of thought has not been specified in full, the jurisprudence of the ECtHR indeed reveals 
such indications. According to the ECtHR, the right to a public hearing under Article 6(1) 
ECHR,1157  which remains unaffected by the more limited scope of Article 2 Protocol 7 
ECHR, operates to ensure a sufficiently wide scope of review in situations in which appellate 
courts have been mandated to revisit factual issues and conclusively determine guilt or 
innocence.1158 As noted, the ECtHR has extrapolated the applicant’s right to be heard in 
                                                 
1152 Views, Parra Corral v. Spain, Communication No. 1356/2005, HRC, 29 March 2005, at 4.3 (emphasis 
supplied). 
1153 Part II, Chapter 2.3.6. 
1154 Judgment, Herrera-Ulloa v. Costa Rica, Series C. No. 107, IACtHR, 2 July 2004, at 150, 152, 165, 167 
(emphasis supplied). 
1155 Judgment, Mohamed v. Argentina, Series C. No. 255, IACtHR, 23 November 2012, at 101-102. 
1156 S. Trechsel, ‘Das Verflixte Siebente? Bemerkungen zum 7. Zusatzprotokoll zur EMRK’, in M. Nowak, D. 
Steuer, and H. Tretter (eds.), Fortschritt im Bewußtsein der Grund- und Menschenrechte, Festschrift für Felix 
Ermacora 195 (Kehl: N.P. Engel Verlag, 1988), at 203. 
1157 As noted, the ECtHR has also indicated that the right to examine, or have examined, witnesses may require 
the rehearing of witnesses on appeal, which could further increase the scope of appellate review. However, as 
noted, this provision has, in practice, mainly been applied to situations in which a conviction has been imposed 
on appeal following an appeal from an acquittal. See: Part II, Chapter 3.2.4; Part II, Chapter 6.2.2. 
1158 Besides the fact that the division between matters of fact and matters of law is not easily discerned (e.g., 
Judgment, Hermi v. Italy, Application No. 18114/02, ECtHR, 18 October 2006, at 95, Dissenting Opinion of 
Judge Zupančič), it must be noted that this determination is autonomous in character. The Strasbourg organs 
have, thus, established this matter independently from the label assigned to the appellate procedure under 
domestic law. Indeed, rulings in which appellate issues have been deemed factual, in contradiction to their 
characterisation as legal under domestic law, have been provided on several occasions. E.g., Judgment, Botten v. 
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person from this right. 1159  In the context of appellate proceedings, this right primarily 
concerns, as mentioned, the right to adduce evidence, which widens the requisite scope to 
determinative questions of fact, without, however, requiring a trial de novo.1160 
 
Accordingly, international human rights law as a whole demands that matters of fact are 
assessed by appellate courts that are mandated to examine such matters and decisively 
determine guilt or innocence. However, a trial de novo is not required, as this aspect of 
appellate fairness extends only to the consideration of determinative matters of fact. 
 
6.2.4. Reasoned Opinion 
Even though all three human rights courts and monitoring bodies require an appellate court to 
provide a reasoned opinion,1161 the scope of the corresponding right varies. In this regard, the 
IACtHR appears to have imposed a higher threshold than the HRC and the ECtHR.1162 In 
more specific terms, the former demands “clear, complete and logical grounds” by an 
appellate body1163 and the latter have accepted appellate opinions confined to determinative 
issues1164. Even so, the ICCPR, including the views of the HRC, is, as discussed, leading in 
respect of the international human rights law obligations of the Ad Hoc Tribunals and the 
ICC.1165 What is more, this interpretation is strengthened by a similar interpretation provided 
by the ECtHR to the right to a reasoned opinion in appellate proceedings. This joint 
interpretation entails that the right to a reasoned opinion does not extend to each and every 
issue raised on appeal, but that it requires sufficient or meaningful consideration of the core 
issues before an appellate body. The more narrow interpretation of the right to a reasoned 
opinion on appeal enjoys, therefore, a stronger basis in international human rights law. 
                                                                                                                                                        
Norway, Application No. 16206/90, ECtHR, 19 February 1996, at 49; Judgment, Igual Coll v. Spain, 
Application No. 37496/04, ECtHR, 10 March 2009, at 38-39; Judgment, Marcos Barrios v. Spain, Application 
No. 17122/07, ECtHR, 21 September 2010, at 40; Judgment, Lacadena Calero v. Spain, Application No. 
23002/07, ECtHR, 22 November 2011, at 6-22, 48; Judgment, Serrano Contreras v. Spain, Application No. 
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Nos. 5606/09 & 17516/09, ECtHR, 27 November 2012, at 33-37. 
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Part three will, in chapter one, describe the general inception of the right to appeal in the 
context of the establishment of the Ad Hoc Tribunals and the ICC and the manner in which 
the Appeals Chambers have explained the rationale of this right. Thereafter, part three will 
expound on the specific configurations of the appellate systems of the Ad Hoc Tribunals and 
the ICC and contrast the disparate elements against the yardsticks developed in part two. 
Proceeding in a rough chronological order of the appellate process, chapters two through 
eleven will address and assess the essence of appellate review, the manner in which the 
appellate process has been regulated, the bearers of the right to appeal, legal representation of 
the accused on appeal, the composition of the Appeals Chambers, access to the Appeals 
Chambers, the oral and written nature of the appellate proceedings, the scope of appellate 
review, the powers of the Appeals Chambers, and the pronouncement of an appellate 
judgment. Finally, in the conclusion, an explanation concerning the compatibility (or lack 
thereof) of the specific components of the appellate processes of the Ad Hoc Tribunals and 
the ICC with the relevant norms of international human rights law will be provided. 
 
1. Inception of the Right to Appeal 
 
1.1. Ad Hoc Tribunals 
The negotiation process preceding the establishment of the ICTY was marked by a lack of 
enthusiasm in relation to appellate proceedings. Canada, for example, noted that 
“[p]rocedures for appeal […] must be established […] despite any practical difficulties that 
these proceedings may present”.1166 Similarly, France put forward that “the practical difficulty 
of establishing appeals proceedings [dedicated to questions of fact] indicates that it is in fact 
not desirable that such proceedings be instituted” and that appeals on question of law require 
an “extremely cumbersome judicial machinery”.1167 Even so, it was generally agreed that 
appellate proceedings should be conducted in one manner or another.1168  
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However, two matters surfaced prominently. First, the majority of the contributing States 
preferred an appellate system limited to questions of law,1169 whereas some explicitly foresaw 
a factual component in addition to appellate review of questions of law 1170  or remained 
neutral in this regard.1171 France, for instance, explained its position in some detail. It referred 
to the lack of appellate review of questions of fact demanded by Article 14(5) ICCPR and the 
compensatory safeguards of the “great formality of the trial”, “the publicity attracted by it”, 
and “the existence of revision proceedings […] review proceedings and the possibility of a 
pardon”.1172 Second, prosecutorial rights of appeal proved divisive. The U.S., for example, 
exclusively reserved the right to appeal to the defence,1173 but the majority explicitly favoured 
an extension of the right to appeal to the prosecutor. 1174  The Netherlands, for instance, 
referred to the principle of the “equality of arms” as a justification for such a right.1175 
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The negotiation process led to the adoption of the Secretary-General Report on the 
establishment of the ICTY. This document did not treat the matter extensively, in view of the 
fact that the description of the principles underlying the establishment of an Appeals Chamber 
was limited to three paragraphs. It noted that, since the right to appeal “is a fundamental 
element of civil and political rights and has, inter alia, been incorporated in the […] [ICCPR], 
[…] there should be an Appeals Chamber”.1176 The right to appeal, which extends to the 
prosecutor as well, “should be exercisable on two grounds: an error on a question of law 
invalidating the decision or, an error of fact which has occasioned a miscarriage of 
justice”. 1177  Finally, it was considered that “[t]he judgement of the Appeals Chamber 
affirming, reversing or revising the judgement of the Trial Chamber would be final”.1178 
 
As a result of this negotiation process, the role of the Ad Hoc Tribunals’ Appeals Chambers 
has been described as unique. A former judge of the ICTY has noted that the characterisation 
of the role of the Appeals Chambers is not uncomplicated, since, structurally, they must play 
the role of a Supreme Court, but must treat a large variety of other appeals too.1179 Indeed, the 
Ad Hoc Appeals Chambers have revealed their distinct roles in their pronouncements. First, 
the Ad Hoc Appeals Chambers have assumed a “developmental” role. In this regard, they 
have considered, for instance, that they may “raise questions proprio motu or agree to 
examine alleged errors which […] raise an issue of general importance for the case-law or 
functioning of the Tribunal[s] […] to ensure the development of the […] case-law and the 
standardisation of the applicable law” 1180  and that, “in the interests of certainty and 
predictability”, the Ad Hoc Appeals and Trial Chambers should follow previous decisions of 
the Ad Hoc Appeals Chambers, although the latter may depart from previous decisions “for 
cogent reasons in the interests of justice”.1181 Second, the Ad Hoc Appeals Chambers give 
effect to the “individualised” effects of appellate review. For instance, the ICTY Appeals 
Chamber has noted that “[a]n individual’s right to appeal a judgement of a Trial Chamber 
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resulting in conviction is established under Article 25 of the Statute”. 1182  It has further 
considered that “[t]he right to a fair trial requires and ensures the correction of errors made at 
trial” and “the principle of fairness is the ultimate corrective of errors of law and fact”.1183 
Appellate review has also been described as a mechanism for “[t]he prevention of injustice 
arising from error”1184 and a “safeguard” concerning erroneous sentencing decisions.1185 
 
1.2. ICC 
Even though the number of provisions dedicated to the appellate process in the ICC Statute is 
limited vis-à-vis the pre-trial and trial stage, the negotiation process “proved difficult and 
time-consuming”, because of “the need to achieve a blending of the approaches taken in the 
major legal” systems of the world”.1186 This difficulty mainly manifested itself in relation “to 
the question whether the prosecutor should be able to appeal against the decision of a Trial 
Chamber to acquit an accused person”.1187 However, at the diplomatic conference at which 
the ICC Statute was adopted, delegations “were cognizant that Article 81 [ICC Statute] 
reflected a compromise between civil and common law jurisdictions” and the debate, thus, 
concentrated on the details of this Article, namely “the grounds upon which the Prosecutor 
and the convicted person may base an appeal” and “the grounds upon which a sentence may 
be appealed”.1188 Two main issues were raised in respect of Article 83 ICC Statute, which 
regulates the proceedings on appeal. First, a previous draft “to the effect that the accused 
would only be able to raise defences at the appeal stage which had already been raised in the 
Trial Chamber” was rejected, as “[m]any delegations argued such a provision would preclude 
fresh evidence which arises after the trial, and would penalize an accused whose defense 
counsel had not raised certain defenses and/or evidence at trial”. 1189  Second, “[m]any 
delegations wanted all of the judges in the Appeals Chamber to agree upon the final decision”, 
while “other delegations […] thought majority decisions should be allowed”.1190 Eventually, 
an agreement was reached “that the Appeals Chamber shall deliver one judgement which shall 
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contain the views of the majority and minority, but a judge may deliver a separate or 
dissenting opinion on a question of law”.1191 
 
The role of the ICC Appeals Chamber may be characterised in a manner similar to the role of 
the Appeals Chambers of the Ad Hoc Tribunals, even though the ICC Appeals Chamber has 
not explicitly defined this matter. It is, however, uncontroversial that, analogous to the Ad 
Hoc Tribunals, the ICC Appeals Chamber has, in principle, a “developmental” role and brings 
the “individualised” effects of appellate review to fruition.1192 The latter is mainly established 
by the explicit assignment of a right to appeal to a convicted person on several grounds.1193 
As to the former, it has been noted that “[t]he particular significance of the [ICC] Appeals 
Chamber […] is its ability to ensure coherence and consistency of the law”,1194 which is 
mainly reflected in its mandate to address errors of law.1195 Nevertheless, the ICC Appeals 
Chamber appears to have adopted, on balance, a more guarded approach to this aspect of its 
role, especially when contrasted against the early practice of the Ad Hoc Appeals 
Chambers. 1196  For instance, it has noted that a particular “determination has not been 
challenged on appeal by any of the parties” 1197  and decided, “not to consider” this 
question.1198 In this respect, a dissenting judge found, without further elaboration, that “it is 
necessary for the [ICC] Appeals Chamber to address this issue proprio motu”.1199 In a similar 
vein, it has considered it inappropriate “to give further guidance on the parameters of” a legal 
notion1200 and that “it is not necessary […] to determine which of the possible approaches” to 
an issue of interpretation was correct.1201 This may be due to the fact that “the density of legal 
regulation” is higher at the ICC than at the Ad Hoc Tribunals and that the ICC Appeals 
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Chamber “is not a higher court vis-à-vis the other [ICC Trial] Chambers”,1202 since the ICC 
Statute does not recognise binding precedent.1203 
 
2. Essence of Appellate Review 
 
2.1. Ad Hoc Tribunals and ICC 
 
2.1.1. Availability of Appellate Recourse 
The Ad Hoc Tribunals’ legal system comprises “three Trial Chambers and an Appeals 
Chamber”.1204 According to the Report of the U.N. Secretary-General, the inclusion of an 
Appeals Chamber into the institutional structures of the Ad Hoc Tribunals was motivated by 
the right to appeal as a norm of international human rights law. As mentioned, it indicates that 
the right to appeal “is a fundamental element of civil and political rights and has, inter alia, 
been incorporated in the […] [ICCPR] […], which is why “there should be an Appeals 
Chamber”.1205 Furthermore, the ICTY Appeals Chamber has invoked the various standards 
concerning the right to appeal in international human rights law. Specifically, it has 
considered that the appellate provision of the ICTY Statute “reflects the position in the 
general corpus of international human rights law”, in respect of which it has invoked, “in 
particular, […] Article 14(5) [ICCPR], […] Article 2 [Protocol 7 ECHR], and […] Article 
8(2)(h) [ACHR]”.1206 In addition, it has found that “[t]he right of appeal is a component of the 
fair trial requirement”, which “is […] a requirement of customary international law”.1207 It has 
even stated, in the context of the right to appeal, that “Article 14 […] [ICCPR] reflects an 
imperative norm of international law to which the […] [ICTY] must adhere”.1208 
 
The judicial structure of the ICC consists of “[a]n Appeals Division, a Trial Division and a 
Pre-Trial Division”.1209 The rationale for the establishment of the ICC Appeals Chamber may 
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primarily be traced back to the right to appeal as a human rights norm as well. This is 
illustrated by the fact that the ILC Draft Statute for the ICC referred to Article 14(5) ICCPR 
as a basis for the need to provide appellate review, in combination with Article 25 ICTY 
Statute. 1210  However, the ICC Appeals Chamber has not specifically referred to these 
standards in its early jurisprudence. 
 
2.1.2. Remit of Appellate Recourse 
In contradistinction to most national systems, which operate a three-tier legal process, the Ad 
Hoc Tribunals feature a two-stage procedure. The ICTY Appeals Chamber has specifically 
noted these limitations. It has held that, whereas Civil Law systems provide “a de novo 
rehearing, followed by two or more levels of appeal on matters of law, or on matters of both 
facts and law” and Common Law systems ensure “either one or two levels of appeal on 
matters of law, or on matters of mixed fact and law”, the ICTY “has only one level of 
appeal”.1211 It has concluded, accordingly, that “[t]he prospect of an injustice resulting from a 
judgment of the [ICTY] Appeals Chamber is not met by any further levels of appeal”.1212  
 
Although the ICC operates a three-tier judicial structure, consisting of a pre-trial, trial, and 
appeal phase, it does not contemplate a two-staged appellate process either. Whereas the ICC 
Statute permits “the simultaneous constitution of more than one Trial Chamber or Pre-Trial 




2.2.1. Availability of Appellate Recourse 
The essential function of the right to appeal, i.e. the availability of appellate recourse, is 
firmly entrenched in international human rights law and binds, on this basis, the Ad Hoc 
Tribunals and the ICC.1214 The inclusion of an appellate stage into the legal systems of the Ad 
Hoc Tribunals and the ICC ensures that this obligation has been complied with.  
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It has, however, been maintained that “[t]he right of appeal guaranteed under international 
human rights provisions would not perforce have required the creation of an appeals section 
in the ad hoc Tribunals or in the ICC systems”.1215 This position suggests that “the exception 
of trials held before the highest available court, which is explicitly provided for by the rules of 
the […] [ECHR], but which may also be considered implicit in the other provisions, would 
naturally have covered international judicial organs”.1216 Thus, although no such exception 
has been provided for in the Statutes of the Ad Hoc Tribunals and the ICC, it would operate to 
remove the legal obligation for these institutions to provide appellate review altogether. 
Although this exception is not implicit in Article 14(5) ICCPR and Article 8(2)(h) ACHR, the 
state of international human rights law permits, in principle, trials in first instance by the 
Appeals Chambers of the Ad Hoc Tribunals and the ICC.1217 Even so, over and above the fact 
that the legal texts of the Ad Hoc Tribunals and the ICC do not allow for such a possibility 
and that, in practice, such proceedings have not been conducted in relation to those charged 
with crimes falling within the primary jurisdictions of the Ad Hoc Tribunals and the ICC,1218 
this exception is not transposable to international criminal procedure. 
 
The possibility of applying this exemption is premised on a false analogy between 
international and domestic jurisdictions. It has been noted that this exception “actually 
presupposes the continued existence of a judicial hierarchy made up of higher and lower 
                                                                                                                                                        
such a course of action. Furthermore, except for the possibility of trial by the highest court sitting in first 
instance, the exceptions to the right to appeal encountered in international human rights law are reserved for the 
discussion on the powers of the Appeals Chambers of the Ad Hoc Tribunals and the ICC. See: Part III, Chapter 
10. 
1215 S. Zappalà, Human Rights in International Criminal Proceedings (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2003), 
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conviction”. See: L. Gradoni, ‘International Criminal Courts and Tribunals: Bound by Human Rights Norms … 
or Tied Down?’, 19(3) Leiden Journal of International Law 847 (2006), at 865 (emphasis in original). As to the 
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1217 Part II, Chapter 6.2.1. 
1218 However, ruling in the first instance, the Appeals Chamber of the ICTY has convicted a person of contempt 
of court. Accordingly, the question arose whether this person was entitled to have his conviction reviewed. 
Referring to Article 14(5) ICCPR, the ICTY Appeals Chamber answered in the affirmative. See: Appeal 
Judgement on Allegations of Contempt against Prior Counsel, Milan Vujin, Prosecutor v. Tadić, Case No. IT-
94-1-A-AR77, ICTY, Appeals Chamber, 27 February 2001, at p. 3. 
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courts” and, “[s]ince single-instance international jurisdictions are not by definition integrated 
into a judicial hierarchy, they are ‘supreme’ in a meaning that substantially differs from that 
of the exception”.1219 Indeed, the highest domestic courts are located in the upper echelons of 
a State’s judicial system on account of, e.g., the qualifications of their judicial benches and 
their particular subject matter expertise. 1220  International criminal procedure consists, in 
contrast, of a limited two-tiered legal edifice and, therefore, it is not possible to draw the same 
distinctions between the Trial Chambers and Appeals Chambers of the Ad Hoc Tribunals and 
the ICC. Thus, the exception drawn from international human rights law is not apt in the 
context of international criminal procedure. 
 
Even if this differentiation could be overcome, the limited scope of this exception in 
international human rights law does not allow for the extinguishment of the right to appeal. 
According to the Explanatory Report to Protocol 7 ECHR, this exemption could be applied 
“by virtue of […] [one’s] status as a minister, judge or other holder of high office, or because 
of the nature of the offence”.1221 The former basis is arguably prompted by the status of 
officials under domestic law,1222 which does not exert binding effect in international criminal 
procedure. Moreover, the status-based exception concerns exceptional situations in domestic 
contexts to ensure an appropriate criminal procedure for high-ranking officials, which is too 
narrow to establish an across-the-board exception to the right to appeal in the proceedings of 
the Ad Hoc Tribunals and the ICC. In addition, the latter basis has not been invoked before 
the ECtHR and its boundaries remain, therefore, unclear.1223 In any event, an exclusion of the 
right to appeal on the basis of the gravity of the crimes within the jurisdiction of the Ad Hoc 
Tribunals and the ICC arguably exceeds the discretion permitted under international human 
rights law when applied in the context of international criminal law. Both the ICCPR and 
Protocol 7 mandate that any regulation of the appellate process may not infringe the very 
essence of the right to appeal.1224 As will be discussed infra, such discretion applies, mutatis 
mutandis, in the context of international criminal procedure.1225 However, considering that the 
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jurisdictions of the Ad Hoc Tribunals and the ICC exclusively cover international crimes, this 
would effectively entail a comprehensive absence of appellate review. The fact that such 
crimes may attract severe consequences for the accused militates, in fact, in favour of the non-
applicability of this exception in international criminal law. 
 
2.2.2. Remit of Appellate Recourse 
The remit of Article 14(5) ICCPR, Article 2 Protocol 7 ECHR, and, arguably, Article 8(2)(h) 
ACHR have been explicitly confined to single-level appellate review.1226 Accordingly, even 
though the two-tier legal systems of the Ad Hoc Tribunals and the ICC fall out of line with 
the vast majority of domestic systems of criminal procedure, the lack of a third instance does 
not trigger any conflict with international human rights law.1227 
 
3. Regulation of the Appellate Process 
 
3.1. Ad Hoc Tribunals and ICC 
The Statutes of the Ad Hoc Tribunals dedicate a single provision to appellate proceedings, 
which addresses the bearers of the right to appeal, the grounds of appeal, and the powers of 
the Appeals Chambers.1228 The RPE are more specific, setting forth a general rule, which 
stipulates that “[t]he rules of procedure and evidence that govern proceedings in the Trial 
Chambers shall apply mutatis mutandis to proceedings in the Appeals Chamber[s]”,1229 and 
regulate specific aspects of the appellate procedure, namely the written submissions,1230 the 
pre-appeal judge, 1231  the record on appeal, 1232  the date of the appellate hearing, 1233  the 
admission of additional evidence,1234 the possibility of an expedited appeals procedure,1235 the 
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the ICTY Appeals Chamber appointed a pre-appeal judge, based on a combined reading of Rule 65ter ICTY 
RPE, which regulates the duties of a pre-trial judge, and Rule 107 ICTY RPE. See: Order Appointing a Pre-
Appeal Judge, Prosecutor v. Mučić et al., Case No. IT-96-21-A, ICTY, Appeals Chamber, 12 October 1999. 
1232 Rules 109, 110 ICTY RPE and ICTR RPE. 
1233 Rule 114 ICTY RPE and ICTR RPE. 
1234 Rule 115 ICTY RPE and ICTR RPE. 
1235 Rule 116bis ICTY RPE; Rule 117 ICTR RPE. 
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judgment on appeal,1236 and the status of the accused following the appellate procedure.1237 
Besides the Statutes and the RPE, “detailed aspects of the conduct of proceedings before the 
Appeals Chamber[s]” are addressed in “Practice Directions”, which may be issued by “[t]he 
Presiding Judge of the Appeals Chamber […], in consultation with the President of the 
Tribunal”.1238 In view of the relative paucity of the legal texts, the appellate process has been 
subject to additional regulation in the jurisprudence of the Ad Hoc Appeals Chambers. 
 
The appellate process of the ICC has been regulated in a similar manner. The ICC Statute is 
more elaborate in comparison with the Statutes of the Ad Hoc Tribunals, since it addresses the 
bearers of the right to appeal,1239  the grounds of appeal,1240  custodial issues pending the 
appellate process, 1241  the execution of the first instance decision and/or sentence, 1242  the 
powers of the ICC Appeals Chamber,1243 and the delivery of the judgment.1244 However, as 
with the Ad Hoc Tribunals, more specific issues have been reserved for the ICC RPE. Similar 
to the Ad Hoc RPE, the ICC RPE relating to the appellate process commence with a general 
provision, which extend the provisions in “Parts 5 and 6 [of the ICC Statute] and rules [of 
procedure and evidence] governing proceedings and the submission of evidence in the Pre-
Trial and Trial Chambers […] mutatis mutandis to proceedings in the Appeals Chamber”,1245 
and continue to regulate specific aspects of the appellate procedure, namely the time 
limits,1246 the procedure for filing an appeal,1247 and the discontinuance of an appeal.1248 This 
document is supplemented by the ICC Regulations, which contain, in addition to “provisions 
relating to all stages of the proceedings”,1249 more detailed regulation concerning the various 
written submissions,1250 the variation of the grounds of appeal,1251 additional evidence,1252 and 
                                                 
1236 Rule 117 ICTY RPE; Rule 118 ICTR RPE. 
1237 Rule 118 ICTY RPE; Rule 119 ICTR RPE. 
1238 Rule 107bis ICTR RPE. 
1239 Art. 81(1)-(2) ICC Statute. 
1240 Art. 81(1)-(2)(a) ICC Statute. 
1241 Art. 81(3) ICC Statute. 
1242 Art. 81(4) ICC Statute. 
1243 Arts. 81(2)(b)-(c), 83(1)-(3) ICC Statute. 
1244 Art. 83(4)-(5) ICC Statute. 
1245 Rule 149 ICC RPE. 
1246 Rule 150(1)-(2) ICC RPE. 
1247 Rules 150(3), 151 ICC RPE.  
1248 Rule 152 ICC RPE. 
1249 Regulations 19bis-44 ICC Regulations. 
1250 Regulations 57-60 ICC Regulations. 
1251 Regulation 61 ICC Regulations. 
1252 Regulation 62 ICC Regulations. 
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the procedure for consolidated appeals1253. Despite this seemingly more elaborate edifice vis-
à-vis the Ad Hoc Tribunals, it has been noted that “more weight [will be placed] on the case 
law and practice of the” ICC in respect of the regulation of its appellate proceedings.1254 
 
3.2. Evaluation 
International human rights law permits the regulation of the appellate process on the domestic 
level.1255 However, it has been remarked that the reference to “law” in Article 14(5) ICCPR 
and Article 2 Protocol 7 ECHR, on the basis of which the HRC and ECtHR have determined 
that the appellate process may be regulated, “is so unclear that one wonders if it can really be 
transposed into an international instrument”. 1256  These references clearly express the 
orientation of these instruments towards domestic systems of criminal procedure. The ICTY 
Appeals Chamber has held that “[i]t is clearly impossible to classify the organs of the United 
Nations into the […] divisions which exist in the national law of States”.1257 Such divisions 
are also non-existent in the context of the ICC. Accordingly, the lack of a legislative process 
on the international level militates against the extension of an entitlement to regulate the 
appellate process to the Ad Hoc Tribunals and the ICC.  
 
Even so, on the basis of a contextualised approach to the exigencies of the Ad Hoc Tribunals 
and the ICC arising out of international human rights law, the Appeals Chambers of the Ad 
Hoc Tribunals and the ICC must be considered to retain the freedom to regulate their 
appellate proceedings. The reason is that the Ad Hoc Tribunals and the ICC must, as a matter 
of practice, regulate their appellate processes. For instance, the Statutes of the Ad Hoc 
Tribunals and the ICC require, inter alia, expeditious proceedings, both as a general feature of 
the judicial process 1258  and as an aspect of the accused’s right to a fair trial,1259  which 
necessarily calls for regulatory measures. Therefore, the reference to “law” in international 
                                                 
1253 Regulation 63 ICC Regulations. 
1254 R. Roth and M. Henzelin, ‘The Appeal Procedure of the ICC’, in A. Cassese, P. Gaeta, and J. Jones (eds.), 
The Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court: a Commentary 1535 (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 
2002), at 1540. 
1255 Part II, Chapter 5.1.3.1; Part II, Chapter 6.1. The requirement of a “higher” court will be assessed infra. See: 
Part III, Chapter 9.3.2. 
1256 R. Roth and M. Henzelin, ‘The Appeal Procedure of the ICC’, in A. Cassese, P. Gaeta, and J. Jones (eds.), 
The Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court: a Commentary 1535 (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 
2002), at 1539. 
1257 Decision on the Defence Motion for Interlocutory Appeal on Jurisdiction, Prosecutor v. Tadić, ICTY, 
Appeals Chamber, Case No. IT-94-1, 2 October 1995, at 43. 
1258 Art. 20(1) ICTY Statute (together with Rule 107 ICTY RPE); Art. 19(1) ICTR Statute (together with Rule 
107 ICTR RPE); Art. 64(2), (3)(a) ICC Statute (together with Rule 149 ICC RPE). 
1259 Art. 21(4)(c) ICTY Statute; Article 20(4)(c) ICTR Statute; Art. 67(c) ICC Statute. 
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human rights law, as adjusted to the circumstances of international criminal law, must be 
considered to encompass regulation through the legal texts of the Ad Hoc Tribunals and the 
ICC, as well as their jurisprudence. The ECtHR has, in fact, proposed a similar approach in 
relation to the ECHR. As discussed, Common Law systems rely on unwritten rules to a larger 
extent than written rules.1260 In this regard, the ECtHR has determined that references to “law” 
in the ECHR cover “not only statute but also unwritten law”, since “[i]t would clearly be 
contrary to the intention of the drafters of the […] [ECHR] to hold that a restriction imposed 
by virtue of the common law is not ‘prescribed by law’ on the sole ground that it is not 
enunciated in legislation”.1261 Such an adjustment evidently encompasses the limits attaching 
to the freedom to regulate the appellate process developed in international human rights law. 
Accordingly, the appellate processes of the Ad Hoc Tribunals and the ICC may be regulated, 
provided that such measures neither annul the right to appeal, nor suffer from a lack of 
clarity/foreseeability to an unreasonable degree or accessibility.1262 
 
4. Bearers of the Right to Appeal 
 
4.1. Ad Hoc Tribunals and ICC 
The Statutes of the Ad Hoc Tribunals identify “persons convicted by the Trial Chambers” and 
“the Prosecutor” as those endowed with a right to appeal from a trial judgment.1263 This 
enumeration constitutes an exhaustive list. According to the ICTY Appeals Chamber, the 
Statute leaves “no room for other persons interested in the outcome of the appeal”.1264 
 
As to the former category, the wording and the jurisprudence of the Ad Hoc Appeals 
Chambers have given rise to certain limitations. First, the reference to “convicted” persons 
necessarily excludes acquitted persons from the primary appellate process. In this regard, the 
ICTY Appeals Chamber has specifically determined that “under Article 25 of the [ICTY] 
                                                 
1260 Part I, Chapter 1.1. 
1261 E.g., Judgment, Sunday Times v. The United Kingdom, Application No. 6538/74, ECtHR, 26 April 1979, at 
47; Judgment, Tolstoy Miloslavsky v. The United Kingdom, Application No. 18139/91, ECtHR, 13 July 1995, at 
37; Judgment, S.W. v. The United Kingdom, Application No. 20166/92, ECtHR, 22 November 1995, at 35. 
1262 Part II, Chapter 5.1.3.1. 
1263 Art. 25(1) ICTY Statute; Art. 24(1) ICTR Statute. 
1264 Decision on the Outcome of Proceedings, Prosecutor v. Delić, Case No. IT-04-83-A, ICTY, Appeals 
Chamber, 29 June 2010, at 6. However, other actors may play a role in appeal proceedings by means of, for 
instance, amicus curiae contributions. See: e.g., Brđanin, at 359; Krajišnik, at 8; Nahimana et al., Procedural 
History, at 14. 
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Statute […] an acquitted person has no right of appeal from acquittals”. 1265  The second 
limitation is not as obvious. The Ad Hoc Appeals Chambers are also barred from reviewing 
first instance convictions of those who have deceased before completion of the appellate 
process. In this regard, the ICTY Appeals Chamber has considered that its “jurisdiction 
ratione personae is limited to living accused or convicted persons”,1266 advancing that: (i) 
“the personal jurisdiction of the Tribunal is limited to ‘natural persons’”; (ii) “Article 25 of 
the [ICTY] Statute clearly states that ‘[t]he Appeals Chamber shall hear appeals from persons 
convicted by the Trial Chambers or from the Prosecutor’”; and (iii) “neither the [ICTY] 
Statute nor the […] [ICTY RPE] allow for [sic] Tribunal’s jurisdiction in relation to any 
procedures initiated by the convicted person’s heirs or victims”.1267 Accordingly, in such 
circumstances, “nothing can undermine the finality of the Trial Judgement”.1268 
 
With regard to the latter category, according to the ICTY Appeals Chamber, prosecutorial 
appeals are on an equal footing with defence appeals.1269 It has found that there is no basis for 
the claims that “the Prosecution’s right to appeal against acquittals should be exercised only 
exceptionally”, that “such an appeal would have to reach a higher threshold of ‘diligence’”, or 
that it “would have, as a pre-condition, to serve the ‘purposes for which th[e] [International] 
Tribunal has been created’, in a manner different from all other appeals against 
judgements”.1270 As is well known, the mandates of the prosecutors of the Ad Hoc Tribunals 
are to investigate and prosecute persons responsible for serious crimes in the former 
Yugoslavia and Rwanda.1271 It is, therefore, unsurprising that, in the normal course of events, 
appeals instituted by the prosecutors seek an aggravation of the position of the accused in 
comparison with the outcome of the first instance proceedings. However, the appellate role of 
the prosecutorial authorities of the Ad Hoc Tribunals is not entirely limited to the traditional 
                                                 
1265 Order, Prosecutor v. Goran Jelisić, Case No. IT-95-10-A, ICTY, Appeals Chamber, 21 March 2000. Also: 
Delalić et al., Procedural History, at 9. Further: R. Nieto-Navia and B. Roche, ‘The Ambit of the Powers under 
Article 25 of the ICTY Statute: Three Issues of Recent Interest’, in R. May, C. Greenwood, and T. McCormack, 
Essays on ICTY Procedure and Evidence in Honour of Gabrielle Kirk McDonald 473 (The Hague: Kluwer Law 
International, 2001), at 487-489. 
1266 Decision on the Outcome of Proceedings, Prosecutor v. Delić, Case No. IT-04-83-A, ICTY, Appeals 
Chamber, 29 June 2010, at 6. 
1267 Ibid., at 6. Also: Decision Terminating Appellate Proceedings in Relation to Milan Gvero, Prosecutor v. 
Popović et al., Case No. IT-05-88-A, ICTY, Appeals Chamber, 7 March 2013, at 5-6. 
1268 Decision on the Outcome of Proceedings, Prosecutor v. Delić, Case No. IT-04-83-A, ICTY, Appeals 
Chamber, 29 June 2010, at 15. 
1269 Certain adjustments have, however, been made to the prosecutors’ appellate rights. See: Part III, Chapter 
9.1.1.2.1. 
1270 Halilović, at 16 (additions in original).  
1271 Art. 16(1) ICTY Statute; Art. 15(1) ICTR Statute. 
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understanding of an entity pitted against the accused. The Ad Hoc prosecutors have acted in 
accordance with, or even in favour of, the accused as well. In this regard, the jurisprudence 
reveals that they have, on certain occasions, supported1272 or supplemented1273 allegations of 
error advanced by the accused. Although it cannot be excluded that the Ad Hoc prosecutors 
were (in part) motivated by self-interest, 1274  these examples cautiously exhibit a wider 
commitment to accuracy and fairness inherent in the prosecutorial function on appeal. 
 
However, irrespective of the fact that the Statutes of the Ad Hoc Tribunals explicitly assign 
the right to appeal to convicted persons and the prosecutors, this right need not be brought 
into play.1275 A party may, on its own motion, relinquish its right to appeal.1276 A variety of 
reasons may be the basis for such a choice, including acceptance of the outcome of the first 
instance proceedings, an anticipated lack of success on appeal, and the protracted nature of 
international criminal proceedings, in relation to which an appeal would further stretch 
proceedings against a person sentenced to a relatively limited term of imprisonment and 
eligible for early release. In addition, the right to appeal may also be forfeited pursuant to an 
agreement between the parties. For instance, a convicted person has agreed not to appeal a 
sentence within the range proposed by the parties as part of a plea-bargaining deal1277 and 
both the convicted person and the ICTY prosecutor have withdrawn their appeals in light of 
the advanced age and deteriorated health situation of the convicted person.1278 
 
Like the Statutes of the Ad Hoc Tribunals, the ICC Statute bestows the right to appeal a 
decision of conviction or acquittal and/or the sentence onto “the convicted person” and “[t]he 
Prosecutor”.1279 The explicit references to these parties suggests that this enumeration also 
constitutes an exhaustive list and, thus, leaves no room for the right to appeal to be exercised 
                                                 
1272 E.g., Babić Sentencing Appeal, at 34, 47, 54; Martić, at 164; Zigiranyirazo, at 47. 
1273 E.g., Babić Sentencing Appeal, at 34, 54. 
1274 For instance, in Babić, the Trial Chamber imposed a harsher sentence than the recommendations provided by 
the prosecution and the defence in their plea-agreement. See: Babić Sentencing Appeal, at 3-4. Thus, the 
prosecutor’s partial support of the defence appeal could arguably also be seen as an attempt to ensure predictable 
plea-bargaining procedures, so as to ensure the continuing attractiveness of this mechanism for defendants. 
1275 In respect of the right to appeal held by the convicted person, the ICTY Appeals Chamber has determined 
that the right to appeal must be relinquished in an informed manner. Decision on Strugar’s Request to Reopen 
Appeal Proceedings, Prosecutor v. Strugar, Case No. IT-01-42-Misc.1, ICTY, Appeals Chamber, 7 June 2007, 
at 42. 
1276 E.g., Kvočka et al., at 1; Simić, at 4 (footnote 18); Šainović et al., Annex A – Procedural History, at 12; 
Popović et al., Annex I: Procedural History, at 5. 
1277 M. Nikolić Sentencing Appeal, at 4. This condition fell through, because the Trial Chamber imposed a 
harsher sentence than the one agreed upon by the parties. 
1278 Strugar, Annex A – Procedural History, at 13. 
1279 Art. 81(1) ICC Statute. 
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by other actors in the ICC’s judicial process. Thus, notwithstanding the extensive rights of 
participation to victims in the proceedings at the ICC, these actors do not hold a right to 
appeal, as such. As held by the ICC Appeals Chamber, “only the Prosecutor and the convicted 
person, or the prosecutor “on that person’s behalf” may appeal a decision” of conviction or 
acquittal and “victims are not entitled to bring an appeal against such a decision”. 1280 
However, their right to participate persists on appeal.1281 
 
The restrictions pertaining to acquitted and deceased persons set forth by the Ad Hoc 
Tribunals seem to apply to the ICC Statute as well. Considering that the ICC Statute 
designates “the convicted person” as the primary addressee of the right to appeal, it would, on 
a plain reading, deprive acquitted persons of such a right. In addition, the ICC Statute does 
not foresee the possibility of an appeal filed by other persons on behalf of a deceased person. 
This must be construed as a deliberate choice, considering that, with regard to revision, the 
ICC Statute explicitly stipulates that, “after death, spouses, children, parents or one person 
alive at the time of the accused’s death who has been given express written instructions from 
the accused to bring such a claim […] may apply to the [ICC] Appeals Chamber to revise the 
final judgement of conviction or sentence”.1282 Similar language would have been employed 
in respect of appellate proceedings, had the drafters intended such a result. 
 
                                                 
1280 Ngudjolo, at 41. Victims’ right to appeal an order for reparations through their legal representative on the 
basis of Article 82(4) ICC Statute is beyond the scope of this research. 
1281 The ICC Appeals Chamber has allowed victim participation on appeal, noting that their personal interests are 
affected by the appeal “in the same way as during trial”, since the relevant appeals were either directed against 
the entirety of a conviction decision (see: Decision on the Participation of Victims in the Appeals against Trial 
Chamber I’s Conviction and Sentencing Decisions, Prosecutor v. Lubanga, Case No. ICC-01/04-01/06, ICC, 
Appeals Chamber, 13 December 2012, at 3) or because a person had been acquitted of all charges at trial (see: 
Decision on the Participation of Victims in the Appeal against Trial Chamber II’s “Jugement Rendu en 
Application de l’Article 74 du Statut”, Prosecutor v. Ngudjolo, Case No. ICC-01/04-02/12, ICC, Appeals 
Chamber, 6 March 2013, at 3). The participation of victims on appeal consists, in principle, of filing 
observations on the documents in support of the appeal and/or the responses to these documents, to which the 
prosecutor and accused may file a response (see: Decision on the Participation of Victims in the Appeals against 
Trial Chamber I’s Conviction and Sentencing Decisions, Prosecutor v. Lubanga, Case No. ICC-01/04-01/06, 
ICC, Appeals Chamber, 13 December 2012, at 5). However, according to the ICC Appeals Chamber, “the 
participating victims may make observations as to alleged errors […], even if these alleged errors were not 
specifically raised by the Prosecutor, as long as they affect the victims’ personal interests and remain within the 
ambit of the Prosecutor’s grounds of appeal” (Ngudjolo, at 41). In addition, further modalities of participation 
may be regulated, such as the questioning of witnesses (Scheduling Order and Decision in Relation to the 
Conduct of the Hearing before the Appeals Chamber, Prosecutor v. Lubanga, Case No. ICC-01/04-01/06, ICC, 
Appeals Chamber, 30 April 2014, at 25-26), the filing of observations on applications for additional evidence 
(Directions under Regulation 62 of the Regulations of the Court, Prosecutor v. Lubanga, Case No. ICC-01/04-
01/06, ICC, Appeals Chamber, 21 December 2012, at 10), and presenting observations at the appeal hearing 
(Further Order regarding the Conduct of the Hearing of the Appeals Chamber, Prosecutor v. Lubanga, Case No. 
ICC-01/04-01/06, ICC, Appeals Chamber, 25 March 2014, at 2(e)). 
1282 Art. 84(1) ICC Statute. 
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Furthermore, excluding the grounds of appeal,1283 the ICC prosecutor’s right to appeal is on 
par with the right to appeal held by the convicted person. In the first appeal against acquittal 
instituted by the ICC prosecutor, the ICC Appeals Chamber held that the standard of review 
pertaining to an appeal from a decision of conviction “has equal application for an appeal 
against an acquittal decision”.1284 However, whereas the Ad Hoc prosecutors have, de facto, 
acted in favour or on behalf of the accused, the ICC Statute mandates that the ICC prosecutor 
is entitled to do so de jure. In this regard, it stipulates that the prosecutor, “on […] [the 
convicted] person’s behalf, may make an appeal”, including on the ground of appeal 
exclusively reserved for the convicted person.1285 Such an extended mandate is congruent 
with the more neutral role of the ICC prosecutor foreseen by the ICC Statute, which is largely 
encapsulated by the imperative that “[t]he Prosecutor shall in order to establish the truth, 
extend the investigation to cover all facts and evidence relevant to an assessment of whether 
there is criminal responsibility […], and, in doing so, investigate incriminating and 
exonerating circumstances equally”.1286 Nevertheless, it has been noted that “[i]t is hard to see 
why the Prosecutor would want to do this, unless the convicted person has no counsel of his 
own, or […] his counsel has failed to represent him adequately”.1287 It may, therefore, be 
expected that the ICC prosecutor will prioritise the habitual prosecutorial function on appeal, 
in line with his or her responsibility “for conducting investigations and prosecutions before 
the Court”,1288 as confirmed by the initial appellate practice of the ICC.1289 
 
Finally, the ability to refrain from exercising the right to appeal has equal application at the 
ICC, but it has been more explicitly set forth by the Ad Hoc Tribunals’ Statutes and RPE. In 
this regard, the ICC Statute uses permissive language, setting forth that a “decision of 
acquittal or conviction or against sentence […] may be appealed”.1290 Furthermore, the ICC 
RPE explicitly provide that, if an appeal is not filed, “the decision [or] the sentence […] of the 
Trial Chamber shall become final”1291 and permits “[a]ny party who has filed an appeal […] 
                                                 
1283 Part III, Chapter 9.2.1. 
1284 Ngudjolo, at 19. 
1285 Art. 81(1)(b) ICC Statute. 
1286 Art. 54(1)(a) ICC Statute. 
1287 R. Roth and M. Henzelin, ‘The Appeal Procedure of the ICC’, in A. Cassese, P. Gaeta, and J. Jones (eds.), 
The Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court: a Commentary 1535 (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 
2002), at 1543. 
1288 Art. 42(1) ICC Statute. 
1289 Lubanga Sentencing Appeal, at 29; Ngudjolo, at 5. 
1290 Art. 81(1) ICC Statute (emphasis supplied). Similar: Rule 150(1) RPE. 
1291 Rule 150(4) ICC RPE. 
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[to] discontinue the appeal at any time before judgement has been delivered”.1292 The decision 
not to institute an appeal or to withdraw an appeal at the ICC may be grounded in 
considerations similar to those applicable to the Ad Hoc Tribunals. For instance, an accused 
and the ICC prosecutor have concluded an agreement as to the guilty plea of the former, 
which, inter alia, stipulates that he forfeits his right to appeal and that he will not appeal a 
sentence within a certain range.1293 In another example, a convicted person discontinued his 
appeal against his first instance decision of conviction, since he accepted the conclusions 
adopted therein and expressed his regret to the victims of his acts,1294 which led the ICC 
prosecutor to discontinue her appeal against this decision as well.1295 
 
4.2. Evaluation 
Persons convicted at first instance have been designated as the primary beneficiaries of the 
right to appeal in Article 14(5) ICCPR and Article 2 Protocol 7 ECHR, whereas Article 8(2)(h) 
ACHR may be interpreted identically.1296 The legal texts of the Ad Hoc Tribunals and the 
ICC explicitly incorporate such a right for convicted persons, directly or indirectly, and, 
therefore, comply with international human rights law. What is more, the limitations applied 
by the Ad Hoc Tribunals and the ICC with regard to this right enjoy, or may be considered to 
enjoy, sufficient support in international human rights law as well. This is uncontroversial as 
regards the exclusion of acquitted persons from the appellate processes of the Ad Hoc 
                                                 
1292 Rule 152(1) ICC RPE. However, according to Rule 152(2) ICC RPE, “[i]f the Prosecutor has filed an appeal 
on behalf of a convicted person […], before filing any notice of discontinuance, the Prosecutor shall inform the 
convicted person that he or she intends to discontinue the appeal in order to give him or her the opportunity to 
continue the appeal proceedings”. 
1293 Version Publique Expurgée du «Dépôt de l’Accord sur l’Aveu de Culpabilité de M. Ahmad Al Faqi Al 
Mahdi», Annex 1, Prosecutor v. Al Mahdi, Case No. ICC-01/12-01/15, ICC, Defence and OTP, 19 August 2016, 
at 13, 21(e). 
1294 Defence Notice of Discontinuance of Appeal against the ‘Jugement Rendu en Application de l’Article 74 du 
Statut’ rendered by Trial Chamber II on 7 April 2014, Annex A, Prosecutor v. Katanga, Case No. ICC-01/04-
01/07, ICC, Defence, 25 June 2014, at p. 2. 
1295 Notice of Discontinuance of the Prosecution’s Appeal against the Article 74 Judgment of Conviction of Trial 
Chamber II dated 7 March 2014 in relation to Germain Katanga, Prosecutor v. Katanga, Case No. ICC-01/04-
01/07, ICC, Prosecutor, 25 June 2014, at 3. However, the prosecutor’s withdrawal has elicited disagreement and 
disappointment from the two groups of victims. See: Observations des Victimes sur le Désistement d’Appel du 
Procureur contre le Jugement Concernant G. Katanga, Prosecutor v. Katanga, Case No. ICC-01/04-01/07, ICC, 
Le Représentant Légal Commun du Groupe Principal des Victimes, 26 June 2014; Prosecution’s Response to the 
Observations of the Legal Representative of the Main Group of Victims filed on 26 June 2014, Prosecutor v. 
Katanga, Case No. ICC-01/04-01/07, ICC, Prosecutor, 27 June 2014, at 8; Communication du Représentant 
Légal des Victimes Enfants Soldats Relative au Double Désistement d’Appel dans le Dossier Le Procureur c. 
Germain Katanga et Annexe Publique, Prosecutor v. Katanga, Case No. ICC-01/04-01/07, ICC, Le Représentant 
Légal des Victimes Enfants Soldats, 30 June 2014; Prosecution’s Response to the Communication of the Legal 
Representative of the Child Soldier Group of Victims, Prosecutor v. Katanga, Case No. ICC-01/04-01/07, ICC, 
Prosecutor, 2 July 2014, at 3.  
1296 Part II, Chapter 5.1.2; Part II, Chapter 6.1. 
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Tribunals and, arguably, the ICC, considering that such an exception has been explicitly 
contemplated in the views of the HRC and the judgments of the ECtHR.1297 The Ad Hoc 
Tribunals and the ICC have also withheld appellate rights from deceased accused, but the 
human rights monitoring bodies and courts have not had the opportunity to consider this 
situation. Even so, the fact that the right to appeal has been specifically assigned to the 
“convicted” person in international human rights law, taken together with the absence of 
relevant precedents by the human rights monitoring bodies and courts concerning the 
possibility for other persons to perpetuate this right on behalf of the deceased person, 
precludes such an interpretation. 
 
Under international human rights law, the convicted person’s right to appeal is not absolute, 
considering that it may be waived under both the ICCPR and the ECHR, including Protocol 7 
thereto.1298 Accordingly, the forfeiture of appellate rights by convicted persons before the Ad 
Hoc Tribunals and the ICC, either through a plea agreement or in another manner, enjoys a 
clear basis in international human rights law. What is more, whereas the position of the ICC 
Appeals Chamber remains to be determined, the Ad Hoc Tribunals have adopted a cautious 
approach in respect of the loss of appellate rights, especially in respect of plea agreements. In 
this regard, recourse to the Ad Hoc Appeals Chambers has not been cut off for those who 
have been sentenced to a term of imprisonment in accordance with the (upper limit of the) 
sentencing recommendation contained in the plea agreements.1299 However, provided that all 
relevant safeguards concerning the plea agreement have been fulfilled, the right to appeal 
appears to have been validly relinquished in such circumstances. In fact, the ICTY Appeals 
Chamber has, in similar circumstances, refused to entertain a sentencing appeal by the ICTY 
prosecutor, considering that the Trial Chamber had sentenced several persons in accordance 
with the sentencing range proposed by the ICTY prosecutor.1300 
 
The designation of the convicted person as the exclusive holder of a right to appeal entails, at 
the same time, that international human rights law does not foresee a right to appeal held by 
prosecutorial authorities. However, there is no doubt that such rights of appeal are, in 
principle, permissible as a matter of international human rights law. The HRC and the 
                                                 
1297 Part II, Chapter 5.1.2. 
1298 Ibid.; Part II, Chapter 6.1. 
1299 E.g., Jokić Sentencing Appeal; Bralo Sentencing Appeal. 
1300 Šainović et al., at 8, 9, 11. 
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IACtHR have denounced the conversion of first instance acquittals into appellate convictions 
without the possibility of further appellate review, but they have, nonetheless, stopped short 
of declaring prosecutorial rights to appeal, as such, incompatible with the right to appeal.1301 
Furthermore, this interpretation is supported by a related aspect of the right to a fair trial in 
international human rights law. Notwithstanding the impossibility of prosecutorial appeals, at 
least in respect of factual findings, on the basis of the double jeopardy principle in various 
Common Law systems,1302 the corresponding norms in international human rights law do not 
contain an analogous restriction. The ICCPR and Protocol 7 ECHR only disallow a renewed 
trial or punishment “for an offence for which he has already been finally convicted or 
acquitted in accordance with the law and penal procedure”1303 of a State, whereas the identical 
protection enshrined in the ACHR only extends to “an accused person acquitted by a 
nonappealable judgment”. 1304  Therefore, these instruments postpone the effects of this 
guarantee until a final judgment has been pronounced in criminal proceedings, as defined 
under domestic law. This entails that, prior to that stage, the renewed assessment of the same 
charges in the appellate phase is permissible. As part of this interpretation, a prosecutorial 
right to appeal constitutes a necessary precondition to institute such appellate proceedings.1305 
 
5. Appellate Representation 
 
5.1. Ad Hoc Tribunals and ICC 
 
5.1.1. Legal Assistance 
An accused before the ICTY or ICTR is entitled “to defend himself […] through legal 
assistance of his own choosing”.1306 This right persists throughout the appellate phase of the 
proceedings before the Ad Hoc Tribunals. In this regard, the Ad Hoc RPE stipulate that the 
aforementioned rights “apply to any person detained under the authority of the” Ad Hoc 
                                                 
1301 Part II, Chapter 5.1.1.3.2. However, whether such convictions are permissible in light of the right to appeal 
held by the convicted person will be discussed infra. See: Part III, Chapter 10.3.1. 
1302 Part I, Chapter 5.1.2. 
1303 Art. 14(7) ICCPR; Art. 4(1) Protocol 7 ECHR (emphasis supplied). 
1304 Art. 8(4) ACHR (emphasis supplied). 
1305 Similar: R. Roth and M. Henzelin, ‘The Appeal Procedure of the ICC’, in A. Cassese, P. Gaeta, and J. Jones 
(eds.), The Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court: a Commentary 1535 (Oxford: Oxford University 
Press, 2002), at 1542-1543. 
1306 Art. 21(4)(d) ICTY Statute; Art. 20(4)(d) ICTR Statute. 
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Tribunals.1307 Seeing that the RPE allow for the continued detention of a person convicted at 
first instance and the renewed detention of a person acquitted at first instance,1308 this right 
logically extends beyond proceedings before Trial Chambers. As a general rule, “the same 
lead and co-counsel who represented the accused at trial will continue to represent him on 
appeal”,1309 in light of their detailed understanding of the case and the limited amount of time 
for new counsel to familiarise themselves with the voluminous materials in the record. Even 
so, the jurisprudence of the Ad Hoc Appeals Chambers contains numerous requests for 
substitution of (co-)counsel on appeal,1310 but such requests have been frequently rejected.1311 
 
The aforementioned right to legal assistance includes the right to have such “assistance 
assigned to […] [the accused], in any case where the interests of justice so require, and 
without payment by him in any such case if he does not have sufficient means to pay for 
it”.1312 In this regard, the ICTY has developed an “Appeals Legal Aid Policy”, which sets 
forth “the provisions governing the remuneration of Defence counsel assigned by the Registry 
during the appeal stage of the proceedings”.1313 Although the ICTR lacks such a document, its 
“Directive on the Assignment of Defence Counsel” contains a right to legal assistance 
assigned free of charge, who “shall deal with all stages of procedure and all matters arising 
out of the representation of the suspect or accused or of the conduct of his Defence”.1314 On 
account of its general language, this provision encompasses the appellate stage too. 
 
With regard to the ICC, this right has been formulated in a similar manner in the ICC Statute, 
which stipulates that “the accused shall be entitled […] to conduct the defence […] through 
legal assistance of the accused’s choosing, to be informed, if the accused does not have legal 
assistance, of this right and to have legal assistance assigned by the Court in any case where 
                                                 
1307 Rule 45bis ICTY and ICTR RPE. Also: Arts. 5(iii), 6 ICTY, Directive on the Assignment of Defence 
Counsel, No. 1/94, 11 July 2006; Arts. 1, 2(c), ICTR, Directive on the Assignment of Defence Counsel, No. 1/96, 
14 March 2008. 
1308 Rules 99(B), 102(A) ICTY and ICTR RPE. 
1309 UNICRI, ADC ICTY, and OSCE ODIHR, Manual on International Criminal Defence - ADC-ICTY 
Developed Practices (Turin: UNICRI Publisher, 2011), at 175. 
1310 E.g., Decision, Prosecutor v. M. Stanišić, Case No.IT-08-91-A, ICTY, Registrar, 2 May 2013; Decision, 
Prosecutor v. Ojdanić, Case No. IT-05-87-A, ICTY, Registrar, 20 March 2009; Decision, Prosecutor v. 
Šljivančanin, Case No.IT-95-13/1-A, ICTY, Registrar, 22 January 2008. 
1311 E.g., Delalić et al., Annex A, at 26-28; Kupreškić et al., Annex A: Procedural Background, at 515; Blaškić, 
Annex A: Procedural Background, at 42; Kordić & Čerkez, Annex A: Procedural Background, at 1104; Kvočka 
et al., Annex A: Procedural Background, at 749; Rutaganda, Annex A: Appeal Proceedings, at 16-17; Nahimana 
et al., Annex A: Procedural Background, at 16-20. 
1312 Art. 21(4)(d) ICTY Statute; Art. 20(4)(d) ICTR Statute. 
1313 ICTY, Appeals Legal Aid Policy. 
1314 Arts. 3, 15(a) ICTR, Directive on the Assignment of Defence Counsel, No. 1/96, 14 March 2008. 
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the interests of justice so require, and without payment if the accused lacks sufficient means 
to pay for it.”1315 These provisions pertain to the sections of the ICC Statute that “shall apply 
mutatis mutandis to proceedings in the Appeals Chamber”,1316 which entails that these rights 
do not cease at the conclusion of the first instance proceedings before the ICC. Indeed, in 
practice, accused have been represented through legal assistance on appeal and legal aid has 
been administered to indigent appellants at the ICC.1317 
 
5.1.2. Self-Representation 
Besides the right to be defended “through legal assistance”, the Ad Hoc Tribunals’ Statutes 
and RPE also enshrine the accused’s right to “defend himself in person”.1318 Accordingly, 
notwithstanding the idiosyncrasies of international appellate proceedings, accused persons 
have been allowed to argue their cases on appeal themselves. The ICTY Appeals Chamber 
has considered that the right to counsel contained in the ICTY statute “draws no distinction 
between the trial stage and the appeal stage of a case” and that “a review of the case law of 
domestic jurisdictions does not support a distinction between the trial and appeal stages for 
purposes of self-representation”.1319 This right may, however, be accompanied by safeguards, 
as concerns relating to fairness may be heightened. Accused persons acting pro se have been, 
for instance, assisted by an amicus curiae, who have been invited “to assist the Appeals 
Chamber by arguing in favour” of the accused’s interests,1320 defence counsel in respect of a 
particular ground of appeal,1321 or a legal advisor with limited rights of audience.1322 
 
                                                 
1315 Art. 67(1)(d) ICC Statute.  
1316 Rule 149 ICC RPE (emphasis in original). 
1317 E.g., Assembly of States Parties (ICC), Registry’s Single Policy Document on the Court’s Legal Aid System, 
ICC-ASP/12/3, 4 June 2013, at 31, 42; Decision on Mr Ngudjolo’s Request for Review of the Registrar’s 
Decision regarding the Level of Remuneration during the Appeal Phase and Reimbursement of Fees, Prosecutor 
v. Ngudjolo, Case No. ICC-01/04-02/12, ICC, Appeals Chamber, 11 February 2014. 
1318 Art. 21(4)(d) ICTY Statute; Art. 20(4)(d) ICTR Statute; Rule 45(F) ICTY RPE and ICTR RPE. 
1319 Decision on Momčilo Krajišnik’s Request to Self-Represent, on Counsel’s Motions in Relation to 
Appointment of Amicus Curiae, and on the Prosecution Motion of 16 February 2007, Prosecutor v. Krajišnik, 
Case No. IT-00-39-A, ICTY, Appeals Chamber, 11 May 2007, at 11-12. Also: Tolimir, Annex A: Procedural 
History, at 5. 
1320 Decision on Momčilo Krajišnik’s Request to Self-Represent, on Counsel’s Motions in Relation to 
Appointment of Amicus Curiae, and on the Prosecution Motion of 16 February 2007, Prosecutor v. Krajišnik, 
Case No. IT-00-39-A, ICTY, Appeals Chamber, 11 May 2007, at 19. 
1321 Krajišnik, Annex A: Procedural Background, at 8-9. 
1322 Tolimir, Annex A: Procedural History, at 6. 
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Whereas the ICC Statute also entitles the accused to “conduct the defence in person” in the 
context of appellate proceedings,1323 the ICC Appeals Chamber has not determined the scope 




5.2.1. Legal Assistance 
The right to be defended through legal assistance on appeal, as such, has been entrenched in 
the views of the HRC and the analogous jurisprudence of the ECtHR.1324 Furthermore, the 
right of indigent accused persons to be assigned legal assistance free of charge has been laid 
down by all three human rights monitoring bodies and courts.1325 The appellate proceedings 
of the Ad Hoc Tribunals and the ICC have been conducted in accordance with these 
obligations, since their legal texts enshrine corresponding rights, which have been 
operationalised in practice. 
 
In addition, both the HRC and the ECtHR have found that courts’ failure to intervene in cases 
of inadequate legal assistance provided in appellate proceedings may engender the violation 
of disparate fair trial norms, which does not extend to privately retained counsel.1326 In light 
of the high threshold for intervention established by the HRC and the ECtHR, it appears that, 
in general, the practice of the Ad Hoc Tribunals accords with this obligation. Even though 
conflicts have arisen in the relationship between convicted persons and appointed counsel in 
light of the requests to substitute trial counsel for the purpose of appellate proceedings at the 
Ad Hoc Tribunals, no cases of inadequate assistance of a nature to directly or indirectly annul 
the convicted person’s right to appeal have been recorded. In this respect, the most concerning 
situation relates to the excessively rigid application of standards of summary dismissal by the 
Ad Hoc Appeals Chambers in certain situations.1327 Whereas the ICC Appeals Chamber has 
not resorted to this measure on such a scale, the Ad Hoc Appeals Chambers have, on occasion, 
summarily dismissed large parts or even the majority of the grounds of appeal submitted by a 
                                                 
1323 Art. 67(1)(d) ICC Statute, read together with Rule 149 ICC RPE.  
1324 Part II, Chapter 5.1.4.6.1; Part II, Chapter 6.1. 
1325 Ibid. 
1326 Ibid. 
1327 Part III, Chapter 7.1.5. 
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party.1328 This could constitute an indication of inadequate legal assistance, considering that 
counsel must be deemed to be capable of formulating grounds of appeal in compliance with 
the relevant standards.1329 However, even in such cases, the threshold set by the HRC and 
ECtHR has not been surpassed.1330 Such conduct has not annulled the facility to appeal the 
conviction imposed at first instance to such a degree as to require the intervention by the Ad 
Hoc Appeals Chambers. Indeed, in these circumstances, the Ad Hoc Appeals Chambers have 
considered the remainder of the grounds of appeal set forth and have, in certain situations, 
even partially annulled the first instance conviction.1331 
 
Finally, as established by the HRC, the right to legal assistance also encompasses the faculty 
to appoint legal assistance of one’s “own choosing” on appeal in relation to privately retained 
counsel.1332 In general, the Statutes of the Ad Hoc Tribunals and the ICC feature similarly 
worded guarantees and the appointment of (co-)counsel on appeal has, in general, proceeded 
with the agreement of the accused. However, although this matter has not arisen before the 
ICC, the rejection of requests for the substitution of trial counsel for the purposes of appellate 
proceedings before the Ad Hoc Appeals Chambers may signal non-compliance. Even so, the 
majority of these requests have been made in relation to counsel appointed under the legal aid 
scheme of the Ad Hoc Tribunals, which does not give rise to a right to choose counsel. In any 
event, even if such requests were made in respect of privately retained counsel, a restrictive 
position of the Ad Hoc Tribunals appears justified. The relevant view of the HRC concerns an 
extreme situation, namely the refusal of the replacement of a lawyer retained by the relatives 
of the co-defendants of the persons concerned and suspected of acting contrary to his 
interests. 1333  The situations considered by the Ad Hoc Tribunals have not been of a 
comparable nature. Moreover, it is especially relevant to limit this right to extreme situations 
in the context of international criminal law, as it may adversely affect the position of the 
convicted person. The specific, complex, and voluminous cases before the Appeals Chambers 
of the Ad Hoc Tribunals (and the ICC) require familiarity with the case at hand to ensure a 
                                                 
1328 E.g., Vasiljević, at 23; Krajišnik, at 427-647; Brđanin, at 18-31 (combined with the application of these 
principles in the judgment); Mrkšić & Šljivančanin, at 214; Milošević, at 48; Krnojelac, at 18-27, 55; Martić, at 
16-21 (combined with the application of these principles in the judgment). 
1329 E.g., HRC, General Comment 32, Article 14: Right to Equality before Courts and Tribunals and to a Fair 
Trial, CCPR/C/GC/32, 23 August 2007, at 51; Judgment, Czekalla v. Portugal, Application No. 38830/97, 
ECtHR, 10 October 2002, at 65-66. 
1330 Part II, Chapter 5.1.4.6.1; Part II, Chapter 6.1. 
1331 E.g., Vasiljević, at p. 60-61; Krajišnik, at p. 279; Brđanin, at p. 162-163; Milošević, at p. 144-145. 
1332 Part II, Chapter 5.1.4.6.1. 
1333 Views, Y.M. v. Russia, Communication No. 2059/2011, HRC, 31 March 2016, at 2.3. 
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fully argued and expeditious appellate process. This militates strongly in favour of retention 
of trial counsel as a general rule, to which limited exceptions should be made. 
 
5.2.2. Self-Representation 
International human rights law permits self-representation on appeal and acknowledges 
restrictions imposed in this respect.1334 The legal framework of the Ad Hoc Tribunals is in 
accordance with a maximalist interpretation of this right. The general limitation to the right to 
self-representation identified by the HRC, which relates to, inter alia, “cases of persons […] 
facing a grave charge but being unable to act in their own interests”,1335 as well as the specific 
limitation developed by the ECtHR, which allows for obligatory representation by counsel at 
the expense of the right to self-representation concerning appellate proceedings requiring 
particular legal knowledge,1336 appear especially relevant in respect of international criminal 
law.1337 In light of the gravity of the offences within the jurisdictions of the Ad Hoc Tribunals, 
the repercussions for the accused may be very grave and the appellate procedures of the Ad 
Hoc Tribunals and the ICC have been circumscribed in a specific manner and require 
particular legal skills.1338 Accordingly, depending on the specific circumstances, the limitation 
of such rights would not inherently contravene the right to self-representation. Even so, as 
discussed, the Ad Hoc Appeals Chambers have expressly permitted self-representation on 
appeal, in conjunction with compensatory safeguards to secure an effective appeal. 
 
6. Composition of Ad Hoc and ICC Appeals Chambers 
 
6.1. Ad Hoc Tribunals and ICC 
Seven of the permanent judges of the Ad Hoc Tribunals are members of the Appeals 
Chambers, which are, for each appeal, composed of five of its members.1339 The judges of the 
Appeals Chambers are appointed to specific benches by the president of the ICTY, in 
                                                 
1334 Part II, Chapter 5.1.4.6.2; Part II, Chapter 6.1. 
1335 HRC, General Comment 32, Article 14: Right to Equality before Courts and Tribunals and to a Fair Trial, 
CCPR/C/GC/32, 23 August 2007, at 37. 
1336 Part II, Chapter 5.1.4.6.2. 
1337 Decision on Momčilo Krajišnik’s Request to Self-Represent, on Counsel’s Motions in Relation to 
Appointment of Amicus Curiae, and on the Prosecution Motion of 16 February 2007, Prosecutor v. Krajišnik, 
Case No. IT-00-39-A, ICTY, Appeals Chamber, 11 May 2007, Fundamentally Dissenting Opinion of Judge 
Schomburg on the Right to Self-Representation. 
1338 Part III, Chapter 9. 
1339 Art. 12(3) ICTY Statute; Art. 11(3) ICTR Statute. Pursuant to Article 13(4) ICTR Statute, “[t]he members of 
the Appeals Chamber of the International Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia shall also serve as the members of 
the Appeals Chamber of the International Tribunal for Rwanda”.  
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accordance with his or her responsibility for the coordination of the work of the Chambers.1340 
In this regard, no distinctions have been drawn between judges of the Trial Chambers and 
Appeals Chambers in respect of their qualifications and election. 1341  Accordingly, the 
“rotation principle” applies, which entails that “[p]ermanent Judges shall rotate on a regular 
basis between the Trial Chambers and the Appeals Chamber”.1342 
 
Alike judges of the Trial Chambers, judges of the Ad Hoc Appeals Chambers may be subject 
to disqualification. The following principles guide the Ad Hoc Appeals Chambers “in 
interpreting and applying the impartiality requirement of the Statute: A. [a] Judge is not 
impartial if it is shown that actual bias exists. B. There is an unacceptable appearance of bias 
if: (i) a Judge is a party to the case, or has a financial or proprietary interest in the outcome of 
a case, or if the Judge’s decision will lead to the promotion of a cause in which he or she is 
involved, together with one of the parties […] or (ii) the circumstances would lead a 
reasonable observer, properly informed, to reasonably apprehend bias”.1343 Applications for 
the disqualification of judges of the Ad Hoc Appeals Chambers have, for instance, been based 
on a judge’s prior involvement in the assessment of a trial judge’s independence and 
impartiality1344 and a judge’s nationality in combination with a prior political position1345.  
 
The aforementioned rotation principle also entails certain consequences in respect of the 
impartiality requirement. In general, the Ad Hoc Appeals Chambers have held that the judges 
“sometimes involved in several trials which, by their very nature, cover issues that overlap” 
and that “[i]t is assumed, in the absence of evidence to the contrary, that, by virtue of their 
training and experience, the Judges will rule fairly on the issues before them, relying solely 
and exclusively on the evidence adduced in the particular case”.1346 In addition, according to 
the Ad Hoc RPE, the involvement of a judge of the Trial Chamber in the review of an 
indictment against an accused does not disqualify that judge from “sitting as a member of the 
                                                 
1340 Rule 19(1) ICTY RPE. The jurisprudence reveals that the benches of the Ad Hoc Appeals Chambers undergo 
frequent changes before the issuance of a judgment. E.g., Blaškić, Annex A: Procedural Background; at 34-38; 
Nzabonimana, Annex A: Procedural History, at 10; Nyiramasuhuko et al., Annex A: Procedural History, at 23, 
25; Popović et al., Annex I: Procedural History, at 4; Stanišić & Simatović, Annex I: Procedural History, at 1. 
1341 Arts. 13, 13bis ICTY Statute; Arts. 12, 12bis ICTR Statute. 
1342 Rule 27 ICTY RPE, which applies, mutatis mutandis, to the ICTR by virtue of Article 13(4) ICTR Statute. 
1343 Nahimana et al., at 49. Also: Rule 15 ICTY and ICTR RPE. 
1344 Delalić et al., Annex A, at 22-25. 
1345 Order on Defence Motion to Disqualify Judge Wolfgang Schomburg from Sitting on Appeal, Prosecutor v. 
Martić, Case No. IT-95-11-A, ICTY, Vice-President, 23 October 2007.  
1346 Nahimana et al., at 78. 
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Appeals Chamber to hear any appeal in that case”.1347 Accordingly, after confirming the 
indictment against an accused, certain judges have been assigned to the appellate bench of the 
same case.1348 However, the Ad Hoc Statutes also set forth that “[n]o Judge shall sit on any 
appeal in a case in which that Judge sat as a member of the Trial Chamber”.1349 
 
Turning to the ICC, a difference and a similarity arise in the composition of the ICC Appeals 
Chamber in comparison with the Ad Hoc Tribunals. Commencing with the former, the ICC 
Statute only provides for appellate adjudication by an undivided Appeals Chamber, as 
opposed to the formation of appellate benches by the Ad Hoc Appeals Chambers. In this 
regard, it stipulates that “[t]he Appeals Division shall be composed of the President and four 
other judges”,1350 that “[t]he Appeals Chamber shall be composed of all the judges of the 
Appeals Division”,1351 and that the “Judges assigned to the Appeals Division shall serve in 
that division for their entire term of office”.1352 On the other hand, like the Ad Hoc Appeals 
Chambers, “[t]here is no hierarchy between the judges of the [ICC] Appeals Chamber […] 
and the judges of the other [ICC] Chambers”.1353 In this regard, “all judges of the ICC are 
elected in the same way, irrespective of whether they will serve in the Pre-Trial, Trial, or 
Appeals Chambers of the” ICC.1354 The ICC Statute indicates that “the assignment of judges 
to divisions shall be based on the nature of the functions to be performed by each division and 
the qualifications and experience of the judges elected to the Court” and that “[t]he Trial and 
Pre-Trial Divisions shall be composed predominantly of judges with criminal trial 
experience”.1355 These criteria “are based on the specific functions of the [ICC Appeals] 
                                                 
1347 Rule 15(C) ICTY RPE. 
1348 E.g., Judge Robinson in Boškoski & Tarčulovski (see: Decision on Review of the Indictment, Prosecutor v. 
Boškoski & Tarčulovski, Case No. IT-04-82-I, ICTY, Reviewing Judge, 9 March 2005 and Boškoski & 
Tarčulovski) and Judge Agius in Stanišić & Simatović (see: Judgment, Prosecutor v. Stanišić & Simatović, Case 
No. IT-03-69-T, ICTY, Trial Chamber I, 30 May 2013, Appendix A: Procedural History, at 2419 and Stanišić & 
Simatović). Whereas Judge Agius dissented from the judgment of the Appeals Chamber in part, he agreed with 
the majority that the Trial Chamber had erred in respect of the acquittal of the accused. See: Stanišić & 
Simatović, Separate and Partially Dissenting Opinion of Judge Carmel Agius, at 2. However, a judge has 
withdrawn on his own motion from an appellate bench because of his involvement in pre-trial matters in the 
same case. See: Order of the Vice-President for the Assignment of Judges to the Appeals Chamber, Prosecutor 
v. Mučić et al., Case No. IT-96-21-A, ICTY, Appeals Chamber, 20 January 1999. 
1349 Rule 15(D)(i) ICTY RPE. 
1350 Art. 39(1) ICC Statute. 
1351 Art. 39(2)(b)(i) ICC Statute. 
1352 Art. 39(3)(b) ICC Statute. 
1353 V. Nehrlich, ‘The Role of the Appeals Chamber’, in C. Stahn (ed.), The Law and Practice of the 
International Criminal Court 963 (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2015), at 965. 
1354 Ibid., at 964. 
1355 Art. 39(1) ICC Statute. 
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Chamber, but not in the sense that the [ICC] Appeals Chamber is hierarchically superior”.1356 
Further underlying the judges’ equality, the ICC Regulations stipulate that, “[i]n the event that 
a member of the Appeals Chamber is disqualified, or unavailable for a substantial reason, the 
Presidency shall, in the interests of the administration of justice, attach to the Appeals 
Chamber on a temporary basis a judge from either the Trial or Pre-Trial Division”.1357 
 
Furthermore, the ICC’s conditions as to disqualification and combination of judicial roles are 
largely similar to those existing at the Ad Hoc Tribunals. The ICC’s legal texts allow for the 
disqualification of a judge of the ICC Appeals Chamber upon request of “[t]he Prosecutor or 
the person being investigated or prosecuted” 1358  where “his or her impartiality might 
reasonably be doubted on any ground”. 1359  For instance, a request for recusal has been 
deposed, because “certain public statements made by the Judge [allegedly] adversely affected 
the appearance of his impartiality, or possibly evinced actual bias on his part” and “the 
involvement of the Judge in a particular organisation […] [allegedly] gave rise to a personal 
interest in the outcome of the appeals […] [or] was ‘manifestly likely’ to create a conflict of 
interest in which the Judge’s impartiality might reasonably be called into question”. 1360 
Furthermore, as in the Ad Hoc Tribunals, participation by the same judge in the trial and 
appellate phase of the same case has been explicitly excluded.1361 However, the ICC Statute 
imposes stricter conditions in respect of the compatibility of judges’ prior engagements and 
subsequent membership of the Appeals Chamber in respect of the same case. It stipulates that 
“[u]nder no circumstances shall a judge who has participated in the pre-trial […] phase of a 
case be eligible to sit on the Appeals Chamber hearing that case […]”.1362 Indeed, appellate 
                                                 
1356 V. Nehrlich, ‘The Role of the Appeals Chamber’, in C. Stahn (ed.), The Law and Practice of the 
International Criminal Court 963 (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2015), at 965. 
1357 Regulation 12 ICC Regulations. 
1358 Art. 41(2)(b) ICC Statute. However, Rule 35 ICC RPE stipulates that “[w]here a judge […] has reason to 
believe that a ground for disqualification exists in relation to him or her, he or she shall make a request to be 
excused and shall not wait for a request for disqualification to be made […]”. 
1359 Art. 41(2)(a) ICC Statute. This Article provides that “[a] judge shall be disqualified from a case in 
accordance with this paragraph if, inter alia, that judge has previously been involved in any capacity in that case 
before the Court or in a related criminal case at the national level involving the person being investigated or 
prosecuted”. Rule 34(1) ICC RPE contains further grounds for disqualification. 
1360 Decision of the Plenary of Judges on the Defence Application of 20 February 2013 for the Disqualification 
of Judge Sang-Hyun Song from the Case of the Prosecutor v. Thomas Lubanga Dyilo, Prosecutor v. Lubanga, 
Case No. ICC-01/04-01/06, ICC, Plenary of Judges, 11 June 2013, at 4. 




judges have recused themselves because they have issued arrest warrants and confirmed 





It may appear that particular compositions of the Ad Hoc and ICC Appeals Chambers negate 
or mitigate their hierarchical superiority vis-à-vis the relevant Trial Chambers. The rotation 
principle operated by the Ad Hoc Tribunals and the possibility to temporarily attach judges 
from the Pre-Trial and Trial Divisions of the ICC to the ICC Appeals Chamber allows first 
instance judges to become part of the mechanism that should exercise control over them. 
 
However, the consequences of the requirement of appellate review by “higher” tribunals or 
courts, which is contained all three human rights instruments, have not been specifically 
elucidated in the views and jurisprudences of the human rights monitoring bodies and 
courts. 1364  Instead, the ability to provide appellate review of sufficient scope has been 
emphasised.1365 As will be set out below,1366 the scope of the appellate review provided by the 
Ad Hoc and ICC Appeals Chamber complies with this overriding criterion. Accordingly, it 
cannot be concluded that the mixed compositions of certain appellate benches of the Ad Hoc 
and ICC Appeals Chambers, as such, violate international human rights law. 
 
6.2.2. Impartiality 
The appellate proceedings of the Ad Hoc and ICC Appeals Chambers have proceeded in 
accordance with the general norms concerning impartiality established in international human 
rights law.1367 The recusal mechanisms set forth in their legal texts, which define criteria 
resembling those set forth by the human rights monitoring bodies and courts, have been 
applied to the judges of the Ad Hoc and ICC Appeals Chambers. 
 
                                                 
1363 E.g., Decision Replacing Judges in the Appeals Chamber, Prosecutor v. Katanga, Case No. ICC-01/04-
01/07, ICC, Presidency, 19 March 2014; Decision Replacing Judges in the Appeals Chamber, Prosecutor v. 
Ngudjolo, ICC, Presidency, Case No. ICC-01/04-02/12, 20 December 2012; Decision Replacing a Judge in the 
Appeals Chamber, Prosecutor v. Lubanga, Case No. ICC-01/04-01/06, ICC, Presidency, 7 September 2012. 
1364 Part II, Chapter 5.1.3.2; Part II, Chapter 6.1. 
1365 Ibid. 
1366 Part III, Chapter 9; Part III, Chapter 10. 
1367 Part II, Chapter 5.1.4.3; Part II, Chapter 6.1. 
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However, with respect to the specific consequences of the impartiality requirement for 
appellate proceedings,1368 the legal frameworks and/or the practical application of the relevant 
norms of the Ad Hoc Tribunals fall short of the applicable standards developed in 
international human rights law in general or in particular situations. Whereas the ICC’s 
appellate process is, in part, aligned with these norms, certain aspects may also give rise to 
violations of the impartiality requirement in future proceedings. 
 
First, in contrast to the ICC, the Ad Hoc Tribunals’ legal texts do not structure their appellate 
processes in a manner to preclude the impermissible accumulation of judicial functions in the 
same case. Whereas the ICC Statute specifically excludes the involvement of a judge in, on 
the one hand, the appellate phase and, on the other hand, either the pre-trial or trial 
proceedings in the same case, the Ad Hoc Tribunals’ RPE only disallow the participation of 
the same judge in the trial and appeal phase of the same case and permit combined pre-trial 
and appeal adjudication. The confirmation of an indictment before the Ad Hoc Tribunals 
requires the establishment of a “prima facie case”,1369 which has been defined as “a credible 
case which would (if not contradicted by the Defence) be a sufficient basis to convict the 
accused on the charge”. 1370  Thus, if the indictment is confirmed, the judge in question 
believes that it has been prima facie established that the person concerned has “committed the 
crimes with which […] [he or she is] charged”.1371 Such an evaluation entails that, if the case 
progresses to appeal after trial at first instance, the person concerned will be confronted with a 
judge who has formed an opinion on (aspects of) his or her criminal responsibility to a prima 
facie standard. Both the HRC and the ECtHR have specifically rejected similar combinations 
of judicial functions in pre-trial proceedings concerning preliminary charges and appellate 
proceedings regarding the merits of a judgment.1372 It has been maintained that this standard 
“is not totally equivalent to proof of guilt beyond reasonable doubt” and “only documentary 
sources” are considered, which does not entail examination of the “evidence stricto 
sensu”.1373 These arguments are thoroughly unconvincing. The test is whether the judges’ 
involvement is such as to allow them to form an opinion regarding the culpability of the 
                                                 
1368 Ibid. 
1369 Art. 19(1) ICTY Statute; Art. 18(1) ICTR Statute. Also: Rule 45 ICTY and ICTR RPE. 
1370 E.g., Decision on Review of the Indictment, Prosecutor v. Boškoski & Tarčulovski, Case No. IT-04-82-I, 
ICTY, Reviewing Judge, 9 March 2005, at 2. 
1371 Ibid., at 2. 
1372 Part II, Chapter 5.1.4.3; Part II, Chapter 6.1. 
1373 S. Zappalà, ‘The Rights of the Accused’, in A. Cassese, P. Gaeta, J. Jones (eds.), The Rome Statute of the 
ICC: a Commentary 1319 (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2002), at 1335. 
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accused. 1374  This test does not require uniformity between the standards of assessment 
relevant to pre-trial proceedings and appellate proceedings or the type of evidence considered 
in such proceedings. Indeed, it is conceivable that, even though pre-trial proceedings involve 
a lower standard of assessment or evidence of less exacting standards, a judge forms an 
opinion regarding the culpability of the accused. 
 
Second, the Ad Hoc Tribunals have not completely averted intolerable assessments of the 
criminal liability of the same person by the same judge in distinct judgments in particular 
situations. The proceedings before the Ad Hoc and ICC Appeals Chambers may involve 
separate trials of persons alleged to have been involved in similar or identical events of a 
massive scale. Despite the formal disconnect between these cases, the theories of perpetration 
employed by the Ad Hoc Tribunals and the ICC often establish a close association between 
the persons concerned, most notably through the application of joint criminal enterprise and 
direct or indirect co-perpetration. This has led certain judges of the Ad Hoc Appeals 
Chambers to express opinions on (aspects of) the individual criminal responsibility of persons 
who have been closely involved in the events under consideration, even though these persons 
were not parties to the appellate proceedings in question. Subsequently, these judges have sat 
on appellate benches regarding the appeals from first instance judgments of the persons in 
respect of whom determinations as to culpability had already been made in a previous 
judgment. For instance, in Seromba, the ICTR Appeals Chamber concluded that “Seromba 
approved and embraced as his own the decision of Kayishema, Ndahimana, Kanyarukiga, 
Habarugira, and other persons to destroy the church in order to kill the Tutsi refugees”. 1375 
However, the latter four persons were not on trial in the Seromba case, but two of them, i.e. 
Ndahimana and Kanyarukiga, would be tried before the ICTR on partially overlapping 
charges after the conclusion of the Seromba trial. And yet, two judges who had been part of 
the Seromba Appeals Chamber have also sat on either the Ndahimana or Kanyarukiga 
Appeals Chambers,1376 which have confirmed similar findings of the Trial Chambers on the 
responsibility of Ndahimana and Kanyarukiga concerning the same events. 1377  Similar 
                                                 
1374 Views, Larrañaga v. the Philippines, Communication No. 1421/2005, HRC, 24 July 2006, at 7.9; Judgment, 
Ionuţ-Laurenţiu Tudor v. Romania, Application No. 34013/05, ECtHR, 24 June 2014, at 77-87. 
1375 Seromba, at 171. Similar: ibid., at 177. 
1376 Judge Robinson was part of the Kanyarukiga Appeals Chamber and Judge Meron sat on the Ndahimana 
Appeals Chamber. 
1377 E.g., Kanyarukiga, at 172-229; Ndahimana, at 59-74. 
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situations have arisen in the jurisprudence of the ICTY Appeals Chamber.1378 This is not, as 
considered by the Ad Hoc Appeals Chambers, merely a situation of judicial involvement in 
“several trials which […] cover issues that overlap”. 1379  On the contrary, the judges in 
question had already pre-judged aspects of the third persons’ culpability, even before their 
first instance trials on these charges had been completed. Even if the assessment provided in a 
preceding case is not determinative or binding, the person in question will have to appear 
before judges, who are vested with the power to make the final determination of guilt in his or 
her case, but who have already provided an indication as to their opinion in regards of the 
most crucial aspect of the appellate process. This scenario has been explicitly declared, or 
may be considered, incompatible with international human rights law.1380 
 
7. Access to the Appeals Chambers 
 
7.1. Ad Hoc Tribunals and ICC 
As discussed, convicted persons and the prosecutors have an automatic right of appeal before 
the Ad Hoc Tribunals and the ICC, which may be exercised at their discretion.1381 Such a 
right does not, however, entail guaranteed access to the Appeals Chambers. Impediments 
have been set up, which concern, as the case may be, the “raise or wave” rule, a reasoned 
opinion provided by a Trial Chamber, and formal requirements for access to the appellate 
process in the form of time-limits, word-limits, and the form of written submissions.1382 
 
7.1.1. Raise or Waive Rule 
A specific outgrowth of the possibility to waive the right to appeal is the obligation imposed 
on parties to preserve issues for appellate review during first instance proceedings before the 
Ad Hoc Tribunals. In this respect, the ICTY Appeals Chamber has ruled that a “party cannot 
remain silent on […] [a] matter [at trial] only to return on appeal to seek a trial de novo.”1383 
                                                 
1378 E.g., Judge Pocar in Krstić, at 102-106 and Popović et al., at 483; Judge Güney in Vasiljević, at 32-86 and 
Lukić & Lukić, at 121-145. 
1379 Nahimana et al., at 78. 
1380 Part II, Chapter 5.1.4.3; Part II, Chapter 6.1. 
1381 Part III, Chapter 4. 
1382 Accordingly, the remaining issues that have been addressed in connection with the right of access to an 
appellate court in international human rights law are not of relevance to the Ad Hoc Tribunals and the ICC. See: 
Part II, Chapter 5.1.4.1. 
1383 Tadić, at 55. 
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Accordingly, where a party fails to raise an issue at trial, it waives its right to argue it on 
appeal,1384 although limited exceptions have been carved out in this regard.1385 
 
It remains unclear whether this doctrine applies at the ICC. It has been noted that, “[i]n the 
text prepared by the Preparatory Committee, Article 82 [ICC Statute] provided that the 
accused would only be able to raise defences in the appeal proceedings which had already 
been raised in the Trial Chamber or if resulting from the proceedings in that Chamber”, but 
that “[t]his provision was deleted because many delegations asserted that such a provision 
would preclude fresh evidence which arises after the trial and would penalize an accused 
whose defence counsel had not raised certain pleadings and evidence at the trial”. 1386 
Accordingly, the exclusion of such a qualifier militates against an application of the “raise or 
waive” rule. However, the delegates appeared to be mainly concerned with the possible 
preclusion of fresh evidence and, as will be discussed, the legal texts of the ICC permit the 
presentation of such evidence in appellate proceedings under certain circumstances.1387 What 
is more, the ICC Appeals Chamber has come close to applying the “raise of waive” rule in 
practice. In summarily dismissing a ground of appeal, it has referred to the failure of an 
appellant to raise certain issues before a Trial Chamber, even though it ultimately rejected it 
on a different basis, namely a failure to substantiate the allegation of error.1388 
 
7.1.2. Reasoned Opinion at First Instance 
The Ad Hoc Trial Chambers are required to render a judgment “accompanied by a reasoned 
opinion in writing”.1389 In addition to the fact that this requirement constitutes “an aspect of 
the fair trial requirement” contained in the Ad Hoc Statutes,1390 it serves a procedural goal too. 
In the words of the ICTY Appeals Chamber, it “enables a useful exercise of the right of 
appeal […]” and “allows the [ICTY] Appeals Chamber to understand and review the findings 
of the Trial Chamber as well as its evaluation of the evidence”.1391  
 
                                                 
1384 E.g., Furundžija, at 174; Akayesu, at 361; Kambanda Sentencing Appeal, at 25; Blaškić, at 222; Naletilić & 
Martinović, at 21; Simić, at 212.  
1385 E.g., Ndindabahizi, at 66 (alibi defence); Niyitegeka, at 200 (notice of the charges). 
1386 P. De Cesari, ‘Observations on the Appeal before the International Criminal Court’, in M. Politi and G. Nesi 
(eds.), The Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court: a Challenge to Impunity 225 (Aldershot: Ashgate, 
2001), at 229. 
1387 Part III, Chapter 9.2. 
1388 Lubanga, at 135-136. 
1389 Art. 23(2) ICTY Statute; Art. 22(2) ICTR Statute. 
1390 Furundžija, at 69. Also: e.g., Hadžihasanović & Kubura, at 13; Musema, at 18. 
1391 Kunarac et al., at 41. Also: e.g., Babić Sentencing Appeal, at 17. 
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On the basis of this rationale, the obligation imposed on ICC Trial Chambers to provide a 
reasoned opinion must also be considered to exert accessorial effects in relation to ICC 
appellate proceedings.1392 Indeed, although the ICC Appeals Chamber has not dealt with this 
issue as a specific ground of appeal, it has invoked similar considerations. It has stressed “that, 
for reasons of clarity, the [ICC] Appeals Chamber’s ability to review impugned decisions, and 
an effective and meaningful right to appeal, [ICC] Trial Chambers should set out with clarity 
which factual findings are the basis for each of the elements of a crime”.1393 
 
7.1.3. Time Limits 
The Ad Hoc Tribunals have defined specific time limits for each written document in the 
appellate process. A party signals its intent to invoke its right to appeal by filing a notice of 
appeal within thirty days from the date on which it is pronounced.1394 Within seventy-five 
days of filing the notice of appeal, an appellant’s brief shall be filed.1395 A “Respondent’s 
brief of argument and authorities shall be filed within forty days of filing of the Appellant’s 
brief”.1396 Finally, “[a]n Appellant may file a brief in reply within fifteen days of filing of the 
Respondent’s brief”.1397 The latter three documents are subject to shortened deadlines when 
limited to sentencing, namely thirty, thirty, and ten days, respectively.1398 These limits may be 
varied or “any act done after the expiration of a time-limit” may be recognised.1399 
 
The situation is similar at the ICC. Within thirty days of notification of a decision of 
conviction or acquittal or a sentence, a notice of appeal must be filed.1400 Thereafter, within 
ninety days of notification of the relevant decision, the appellant must file a document in 
                                                 
1392 Art. 74(5) ICC Statute. Although the ICC Statute does not impose an explicit obligation on the Trial 
Chamber to provide reasons for the sentence, such an obligation may be deduced from the obligations of the 
Trial Chamber to take into account “the evidence presented and submissions made during the trial that are 
relevant to the sentence” (Art. 76(1) ICC Statute); “such factors as the gravity of the crime and the individual 
circumstances of the convicted person” (Art. 78(1) ICC Statute); and additional factors set forth in Rule 145 ICC 
RPE. Indeed, Trial Chambers have provided reasons in respect of the first sentencing decisions of the ICC in 
connection with the first conviction decisions. See: Decision on Sentence pursuant to Article 76 of the Statute, 
Prosecutor v. Lubanga, Case No. ICC-01/04-01/06, ICC, Trial Chamber I, 10 July 2012; Decision on Sentence 
pursuant to Article 76 of the Statute, Prosecutor v. Katanga, Case No. ICC-01/04-01/07, ICC, Trial Chamber II, 
23 May 2014. 
1393 Lubanga, at 313. Similar: Lubanga, at 222. 
1394 Rule 108 ICTY and ICTR RPE. 
1395 Rule 111 ICTY and ICTR RPE. 
1396 Rule 112 ICTY and ICTR RPE.  
1397 Rule 113 ICTY and ICTR RPE.  
1398 Rules 111-113 ICTY and ICTR RPE. 
1399 ICTY, Practice Direction on Formal Requirements for Appeals from Judgement, No. IT/201, 7 March 2002, 
at 17. 
1400 Rule 150 ICC RPE; Regulation 57 ICC Regulations. 
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support of the appeal. 1401  The opposing side may file a response within sixty days of 
notification of the document in support of the appeal.1402 An extension of these limits is 
possible “for good cause, upon the application of the party seeking to file the appeal”.1403 
 
7.1.4. Word Limits 
Appellate briefing has been subject to word limits at the Ad Hoc Tribunals and the ICC. The 
former have limited the appeal brief, respondent’s brief, and reply brief to 30,000, 30,000, and 
9,000 words, respectively.1404 The latter allows 100, 100, and 50 pages to be devoted to the 
document in support of the appeal, the response and, if applicable, a reply, respectively.1405 
Variations of these limits may be allowed upon request by a party, provided that “exceptional 
circumstances” necessitating the oversized filing have been demonstrated at the Ad Hoc 
Tribunals1406 and “good cause” has been established at the ICC1407. 
 
7.1.5. Form of Written Submissions 
The Ad Hoc Appeals Chambers have, in general, attached considerable importance to parties’ 
written submissions. As stated by the ICTY Appeals Chamber, “[i]n a primarily adversarial 
system, like that of the […] [ICTY], the deciding body considers its case on the basis of the 
arguments advanced by the parties” and “[i]t thus falls to the parties appearing before the 
[ICTY] Appeals Chamber to present their case clearly, logically and exhaustively so that the 
Appeals Chamber may fulfil its mandate in an efficient and expeditious manner”.1408  
 
It has, subsequently, developed stringent formal criteria attaching to the form the Parties’ 
written submissions must take. Appellants and respondents must “clearly set out […] grounds 
of appeal as well as the arguments in support of each ground”, “set out the arguments 
supporting the contention that the alleged error has invalidated the decision or occasioned a 
                                                 
1401 Regulation 58 (1)-(2) ICC Regulations. The grounds of appeal may be varied in accordance with Regulation 
61 ICC Regulations. Furthermore, the procedure concerning a prosecutorial appeal in cases involving multiple 
appeals is set forth in Regulation 63 ICC Regulations.  
1402 Regulation 59(1) ICC Regulations. Furthermore, the procedure concerning a prosecutorial response in cases 
involving multiple appeals is set forth in Regulation 63 ICC Regulations. 
1403 Rule 150(2) ICC RPE. 
1404 ICTY, Practice Direction on the Length of Briefs and Motions, No. IT/184 Rev. 2, 16 September 2005, at 1. 
If an appeal is limited to sentencing, the appeal brief and respondent’s brief must be limited to 12,000 words and 
the reply brief to 3,000 words. 
1405 Regulations 58(5), 59(2), 60(2) ICC Regulations. 
1406 ICTY, Practice Direction on the Length of Briefs and Motions, No. IT/184 Rev. 2, 16 September 2005, at 7. 
1407 Rule 150(2) ICC RPE. 
1408 Kunarac et al., at 43. 
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miscarriage of justice”, “provide the Appeals Chamber with exact references to the parts of 
the records on appeal invoked in its support”, and give “references to paragraphs in 
judgements, transcript pages, exhibits or other authorities, indicating precisely the date and 
exhibit page number or paragraph number of the text to which reference is made”.1409  
 
Consonant with this position, the ICTY Appeals Chamber has concluded that it may exercise 
“its inherent discretion in selecting which submissions of the parties merit a ‘reasoned opinion’ 
in writing”. 1410  Accordingly, it has declared, in general, that it “will dismiss, without 
providing detailed reasons, those Appellants’ submissions in the briefs or the replies or 
presented orally during the Appeal Hearing which are evidently unfounded”. 1411  This 
approach has subsequently been referred to “summary dismissal”.1412 In more specific terms, 
the Ad Hoc Appeals Chambers have initially specified three categories of arguments liable for 
summary dismissal, namely: “1. the argument of the appellant is clearly irrelevant; 2. it is 
evident that a reasonable trier of fact could have come to the conclusion challenged by the 
appellant; or 3. the appellant’s argument unacceptably seeks to substitute his own evaluation 
of the evidence for that of the Trial Chamber”.1413  
 
As their jurisprudence matured, the Appeals Chambers expanded or further specified these 
categories. A general list comprising ten grounds for summary dismissal has been developed: 
“(i) arguments that fail to identify the challenged factual findings, that misrepresent the 
factual findings or the evidence, or that ignore other relevant factual findings; (ii) mere 
assertions that the Trial Chamber must have failed to consider relevant evidence, without 
showing that no reasonable trier of fact, based on the evidence could have reached the same 
conclusion as the Trial Chamber did; (iii) challenges to factual findings on which a conviction 
does not rely, and arguments that are clearly irrelevant, that lend support to, or that are not 
inconsistent with the challenged finding; (iv) arguments that challenge a Trial Chamber’s 
reliance or failure to rely on one piece of evidence, without explaining why the conviction 
should not stand on the basis of the remaining evidence; (v) arguments contrary to common 
sense; (vi) challenges to factual findings where the relevance of the factual finding is unclear 
and has not been explained by the appealing party; (vii) mere repetition of arguments that 
                                                 
1409 Ibid., at 44 (also: 45). Also: Part III, Chapter 10. 
1410 Kunarac et al., at 47. 
1411 Ibid., at 48. 
1412 E.g., Brđanin, at 17-31; Strugar, at 18-24; Martić, at 16-21. 
1413 Kunarac et al., at 48. 
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were unsuccessful at trial without any demonstration that their rejection by the Trial Chamber 
constituted an error warranting the intervention of the Appeals Chamber; (viii) allegations 
based on material not on record; (ix) mere assertions unsupported by any evidence, 
undeveloped assertions, failure to articulate error; and (x) mere assertions that the Trial 
Chamber failed to give sufficient weight to evidence or failed to interpret evidence in a 
particular manner”. 1414  Furthermore, additional grounds have been set forth in the 
jurisprudence. Although these matters have not been categorised as grounds for summary 
dismissal, they function as such, considering that the Appeals Chambers have refused to 
entertain such arguments on the merits. Examples concern arguments that exceed the notice of 
appeal1415 and failures to distinguish between the legal or factual nature of an alleged error1416. 
 
However, the Ad Hoc Tribunals’ approach to summary dismissal displays considerable 
variance. In this regard, an accommodating and a strict stance may be identified. The 
accommodating approach may be exemplified as follows. First, summary dismissal has been 
applied as a measure of last resort. For instance, the ICTY Appeals Chamber has proceeded to 
summarily dismiss grounds of appeal only after reminding an appellant “of the criteria for 
appeal at the appeal hearing” and requesting him “to clarify some of the issues raised in the 
Defence Appeal Brief and in the Additional Defence Brief”.1417 This approach falls in line 
with the Practice Direction on Formal Requirements for Appeals from Judgement. In respect 
of non-compliance, it stipulates that “a designated Pre-Appeal Judge or the Appeals Chamber 
may, within its discretion, decide upon an appropriate sanction, which can include an order 
for clarification or re-filing”, although “[t]he Appeals Chamber may also reject a filing or 
dismiss submissions therein”.1418 Accordingly, it does not foresee dismissal as an automatic 
sanction. Second, arguments have been admitted that fall short of the aforementioned formal 
requirements. A typical example concerns the dismissal of a ground of appeal for failure to 
comply with the standards for summary dismissal, accompanied by a conclusion that it cannot 
succeed on the merits either. For instance, the ICTR Appeals Chamber has noted that, “[i]n 
addition to […] [the] failure to properly raise this ground of appeal in the Notice of Appeal, 
                                                 
1414 Milošević, at 17. Also: Brđanin, at 17-31; Strugar, at 18-24; Martić, at 16-21. 
1415 E.g., Kupreškić, at 469-470; Vasiljević, at 15. 
1416 Haradinaj et al., at 289. However, the Appeals Chambers have frequently omitted to attach any consequences 
to erroneous classifications of errors, failures to specify the type of error committed, or arguments advancing 
combined errors of fact and law. E.g., Akayesu, at 241; Ntakirutimana & Ntakirutimana, at 298; Renzaho, at 
318; Krnojelac, at 183; Kvočka et al., at 77; Boškoski & Tarčulovski, at 61, 69; Nizeyimana, at 352-354. 
1417 Vasiljević, at 14. Also: Aleksovski, at 8; Halilović, at 48-52. 




[…] the present submission lacks merit”.1419 Another example relates to an assessment that a 
ground of appeal falling short of the standards of summary does not lead to dismissal on 
procedural grounds but, instead, on substantive grounds. In this regard, the ICTY Appeals 
Chamber has noted that an appellant had “merely suggested an interpretation of the facts at 
odds with that of the Trial Chamber”,1420 but, as opposed to a summary dismissal on this basis, 
it has concluded that the appellant had “failed to show that the Trial Chamber erred”.1421 In 
justification of the admission of formally defective arguments, the Ad Hoc Appeals Chambers 
have invoked: a lack of prejudice for the opposing party;1422 the need to ensure heightened 
fairness where an appellant is exercising his right to self-representation;1423 the fact that the 
Appeals Chambers are judicial instances of last resort;1424 the importance of the issues at 
stake;1425 or their discretion1426. The strict approach is primarily reflected in the outright 
dismissal of grounds of appeal for lack of compliance with formal standards and without a 
remedial avenue or an assessment of the merits, either with regard to specific arguments1427 or 
as part of an in limine collective dismissal of deficient arguments.1428 
 
                                                 
1419 Ntakuritimana & Ntakuritimana, at 370-371. Also: Kunarac et al., at 331-334; Bizimungu, at 296; 
Nzabonimana, at 21; Strugar, at 80; Đorđević, at 97. 
1420 Martić, at 90. 
1421 Ibid., at 90. Also: Kvočka et al., at 250-255; Galić, at 198; Ntakuritimana & Ntakuritimana, at 315-325; 
Kalimanzira, at 50; Strugar, at 129; Karera, at 239. 
1422 E.g., Deronjić Sentencing Appeal, at 102-103, 129; Martić, at 229; Šainović et al., at 84; Popović et al., at 
489; Naletilić & Martinović, at 410; Gacumbitsi, at 11, 47; Simba, at 12; Karera, at 375. 
1423 E.g., Krajišnik, at 651, 748; Tolimir, at 184, 418. 
1424 E.g., Kambanda Sentencing Appeal, at 55. 
1425 E.g., Niyitegeka, at 200; Kamuhanda, at 21; Babić Sentencing Appeal, at 83; Deronjić Sentencing Appeal, at 
103; Galić, at 99; Limaj et al., at 74; Nahimana et al., at 174. 
1426 E.g., Kayishema & Ruzindana, at 177; Niyitegeka, at 263; Kamuhanda, at 133 (footnote 281); Nchamihigo, 
at 56; Nyiramasuhuko et al., at 568 (footnote 1288), 3309 (footnote 7568); 3348 (footnote 7671). For a critique 
of this approach, see: Nyiramasuhuko et al., Dissenting and Separate Opinion of Judge Agius, at 46-47, who has 
claimed that it has led to unequal treatment. 
1427 In respect of arguments exceeding the notice of appeal, see: e.g., Naletilić & Martinović, at 155, 172 
(footnote 370), 412; Blagojević & Jokić, at 54 (footnote 147); Mrkšić & Šljivančanin, at 369; Haradinaj et al., at 
19; Akayesu, at 275-276; Ntagerura et al., at 338, 349; Karera, at 374. In respect of repetition of trial arguments, 
see: e.g., Lukić & Lukić, at 523, 646; Hadžihasanović & Kubura, at 45; Mrkšić & Šljivančanin, at 214; 
Milošević, at 48; Kvočka et al., at 425; Naletilić & Martinović, at 254; Brđanin, at 35; Ndindiliyimana et al., at 
97; Nzabonimana, at 16. In respect of failures to raise errors of law or fact, see: e.g., Kupreškić et al., at 24; 
Kvočka et al., at 314, 447-448; Limaj et al., at 45. In respect of failures to substantiate alleged errors of fact or 
law, see: e.g., Babić Sentencing Appeal, at 91; Kordić & Čerkez, at 127; Deronjić Sentencing Appeal, at 62; 
Kvočka et al., at 687; Stakić, at 206; Martić, at 42; Simba, at 99; Nzabonimana, at 16; Kayishema & Ruzindana, 
at 177; Rutaganda, at 48. In respect of failures to refer to specific findings of the Trial Chamber, see: e.g., Galić, 
at 189; Rutaganda, at 48. In respect of challenges to findings on which a trial judgment did not depend, see: e.g., 
Simba, at 99; Nchamihigo, at 102; Munyakazi, at 12 (footnote 27), 129; Kupreškić et al., at 23. 
1428 E.g., Vasiljević, at 13, 16-22, 23; Krnojelac, at 18-27. Also: Halilović, at 25-27, 43-56, 106, 135, 152, 169-
170; Bagosora & Nsengiyumva, at 435; Renzaho, at 258; Niyitegeka, at 249-262. For a critique of the ICTY 
Appeals Chamber’s failure to apply this approach, see: Popović et al., Separate and Dissenting Opinion of Judge 
Mandiaye Niang, at 7-8. 
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Turning to the ICC, the Appeals Chamber has also stressed the importance of the parties’ 
written submissions, although in less forceful terms than the Ad Hoc Appeals Chambers. It 
has held that “the appellant is required to set out the alleged error and how the alleged error 
materially affected the impugned decision”.1429 Whether sufficient substantiation has been 
provided depends “on the specific argument raised, including the type of error alleged”.1430  
 
In addition, its approach to summary dismissal is highly comparable to the Ad Hoc Tribunals’ 
practice. It has held that, if an appellant fails to comply with the requirement of substantiation, 
“the [ICC] Appeals Chamber may dismiss the argument without analysing it in 
substance”.1431 What is more, its practice has been affected by predicaments analogous to 
those encountered at the Ad Hoc Tribunals. In this regard, it has oscillated between a strict 
approach, according to which defective arguments have been dismissed pursuant to a failure 
to comply with the standards concerning the form of written submissions,1432 and a flexible 




7.2.1. Raise or Waive Rule 
The “raise or waive” rule has not been specifically considered in the views or jurisprudence of 
the HRC, ECtHR, or the IACtHR. Although the HRC has noted that the impossibility of 
raising issues on appeal that have not been argued at trial may preclude a finding of 
ineffective legal representation,1434 it has not determined that a “raise or waive” rule is, as 
such, compatible or incompatible with fair trial standards. Accordingly, such an impediment 
falls to be considered under the general discretion to regulate the appellate process.1435 
 
                                                 
1429 Lubanga, at 30. 
1430 Ibid., at 31. 
1431 Ibid., at 30. E.g., Lubanga, at 135-136, 153, 170, 183, 201, 262, 383; Ngudjolo, at 251-252. 
1432 In respect of the failure to challenge a finding, see: e.g., Lubanga, at 155, 169; Lubanga Sentencing Appeal, 
at 117-118. In respect of the misrepresentation of a Trial Chamber’s findings and/or the ignoring of other 
relevant findings, see: e.g., Lubanga, at 165, 174, 212, 411-412, 478-479. In respect of mere disagreement with a 
finding of a Trial Chamber, see: e.g., Lubanga, at 175, 507; Ngudjolo, at 198, 218. In respect of the speculative 
character of an argument, see: e.g., Lubanga, at 226. In respect of the repetition of arguments raised at trial, see: 
e.g., Lubanga, at 248, 440, 448. In respect of the fact that a Trial Chamber ultimately did not rely on an 
impugned finding, see: e.g., Lubanga, at 343. 
1433 E.g., Lubanga, at 148, 160, 238, 265, 455, 480, 518; Ngudjolo, at 207, 287. 
1434 Part III, Chapter 2.2.3. 
1435 Part III, Chapter 3. 
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Whereas the status of the “raise of waive” rule in ICC appellate proceedings remains 
ambiguous and cannot, therefore, be assessed,1436 the resort to such a rule by the Ad Hoc 
Tribunals may be considered permissible under international human rights law, provided that 
its application complies with the outer limits of this discretion. This is, arguably, the case. The 
“raise or waive” rule does not, as such, annul the right to appeal. In light of the enormous 
scope of the cases dealt with by these institutions, this rule seeks to keep appellate procedures 
within reasonable bounds, by disallowing an unbridled expansion of the case vis-à-vis 
proceedings at first instance. If the convicted person presents his or her case in full at the first 
opportunity, unrestricted recourse to the Ad Hoc Appeals Chambers may be had. Moreover, 
the legal texts of the Ad Hoc Tribunals contain an important safeguard. The “raise or waive” 
rule is counterbalanced by the possibility of admitting additional evidence on appeal, which 
allows for issues to be raised in appellate proceedings that could not have been reasonably 
anticipated at first instance.1437 The “raise or waive” rule also does not suffer from a lack of 
accessibility or clarity/foreseeability to an unreasonable degree. The rule has been made 
available through the jurisprudence of the Ad Hoc Tribunals and, despite the existence of 
certain exceptions, which mainly operate to the benefit of the convicted person, it has been 
applied relatively consistently. 
 
7.2.2. Reasoned Opinion at First Instance 
Under international human rights law, a reasoned opinion by a court of first instance serves to 
ensure access to the appellate process.1438 
 
This principle has, in general, been heeded in the jurisprudence of the Ad Hoc Tribunals. The 
accused are, in the normal course of events, provided either immediately with the written first 
instance judgment or soon after the public reading of the summary thereof. In addition, 
remedial measures have been taken when Trial Chambers have failed to discharge their 
responsibilities in this respect. In this regard, in light of a Trial Chamber’s “manifest failure to 
provide a reasoned opinion”, the ICTR Appeals Chamber has, in order to safeguard the 
accused’s “right to an effective appeal”, ordered that the appellate proceedings concerning the 
accused in question be severed from his co-accused and additional submissions on the 
                                                 
1436 Part III, Chapter 7.1.1. 
1437 Part III, Chapter 10. 
1438 Part II, Chapter 5.1.4.1; Part II, Chapter 6.1. 
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evidentiary basis for the accused’s conviction be filed.1439 It went on to consider that, in light 
of the additional submissions, the accused “has had a full and focused opportunity to appeal 
his […] conviction and to respond to the Prosecution’s case in this regard”.1440 
 
Although the approach of the ICC Appeals Chamber is more ambiguous, it does not appear to 
exceed the limits established in the views of the HRC and the jurisprudence of the ECtHR. It 
has considered, on one occasion, that “the reasoning of the Trial Chamber […] could have 
been more extensive”. 1441  On another occasion, it has noted that the lack of separate 
consideration of an element of an offence had “led to some ambiguity and […] confusion on 
the part of” the accused,1442 but concluded that “the Trial Chamber’s findings relevant to that 
element were nonetheless discernable [sic] and reviewable”.1443 Considering that both the 
HRC and the ECtHR permit a more limited degree of reasoning in this context,1444 the ICC 
Appeals Chamber’s determinations appear to fall within the outer limits of the 
aforementioned norms. Even so, it would have been preferable for the ICC Appeals Chamber 
to specifically set forth why the accused’s access to appellate review had not been affected, in 
light of the difficulty it itself admitted to have in reviewing the impugned findings.1445 
 
7.2.3. Time Limits 
Pursuant to international human rights law, appellate processes may, in principle, be subject 
to time limits.1446 Thus, the application of time limits by the Ad Hoc Tribunals and the ICC is, 
in principle, acceptable. In this regard, there is no indication in the jurisprudence of the 
Appeals Chambers that time limits have been applied in a manner specifically rejected by the 
HRC and the ECtHR. In fact, more generally, the Ad Hoc Tribunals and the ICC allow for 
flexibility to avoid unwarrantedly adverse effects regarding the essence of the right to appeal. 
They permit time limits to be extended in certain circumstances1447 and, in respect of the Ad 
Hoc Tribunals, transgressions of time limits by convicted persons have been condoned.1448 
                                                 
1439 Bizimungu, at 19-20 (also: 29-30). Similar: Nyiramasuhuko et al., at 733, 737. 
1440 Bizimungu, at 19-20 (also: 32). Similar: Nyiramasuhuko et al., at 734, 737. 
1441 Lubanga, at 222. 
1442 Ibid., at 312. 
1443 Ibid., at 312. 
1444 Part II, Chapter 5.1.4.1. 
1445 Lubanga, at 222, 312. 
1446 Part II, Chapter 5.1.4.1; Part II, Chapter 6.1. 
1447 Part III, Chapter 7.1.3. 
1448 E.g., Milošević, at 10. Conversely, belated filings submitted by the ad hoc prosecutors have, on occasion, 
been discarded in full. See: e.g., Kayishema & Ruzindana, at 16-49 (refusal to consider entire appeal of ICTR 




7.2.4. Word Limits 
Considering that the human rights monitoring bodies and courts have not specifically assessed 
the compatibility of word limits attaching to written appellate arguments with the various 
conceptions of the right to appeal, resort must be had to the general discretion to regulate the 
appellate process under international human rights law.1449 
 
In this regard, the application of word limits by the Ad Hoc Tribunals and the ICC is, 
arguably, in compliance with the outer limits of the discretion to regulate the appellate 
process. The application of this requirement has not led to the complete annulment of the right 
to appeal in the jurisprudence of the Ad Hoc Tribunals and the ICC, seeing that they permit 
relatively extensive appellate briefing, as balanced against the need to restrain the scope of 
appellate proceedings,1450 and all Appeals Chambers have granted variations of the word 
limits on a frequent basis.1451  Furthermore, the application of the word limits to written 
appellate arguments is neither unreasonably unclear/unforeseeable nor inaccessible, as such 
limits have been defined in the legal texts of the Ad Hoc Tribunals and the ICC, whereas 
applications for extensions must be approved by the Appeals Chambers.1452 
 
7.2.5. Form of Written Submissions 
The forms of written submissions on appeal have not been assessed against the relevant 
standards of appellate fairness by either the HRC or the regional human rights courts. 
However, these requirements bear some resemblance to leave to appeal proceedings. They 
could, in theory, entail a complete lack of access to the Appeals Chambers of the Ad Hoc 
Tribunals and the ICC, if written submissions would, in their entirety, fall short of the relevant 
standards for admission to the appellate process. Even so, unlike typical leave to appeal 
proceedings, the Appeals Chambers of the Ad Hoc Tribunals and the ICC do not directly 
engage in a preliminary review of to the chances of success on appeal, although some 
standards of summary dismissal seem to approximate such an assessment. Accordingly, the 
approaches of the Appeals Chambers of the Ad Hoc Tribunals and the ICC to the form of 
                                                 
1449 Part III, Chapter 3. 
1450 Part III, Chapter 7.1.4. 
1451 E.g., Nyiramasuhuko et al., Annex A: Procedural History, at 3, 13; Stanišić & Simatović, Annex A: 
Procedural History, at 4; Popović et al., Annex I: Procedural History, at 5-7; Šainović et al., Annex A – 
Procedural History, at 2, 5, 6; Mugenzi & Mugiraneza, Annex A – Procedural History, at 3-4; Lubanga, Annex 
3, at 3 (footnote 9), 16; Ngudjolo, Annex 2, at 75, 78, 79. 
1452 Part III, Chapter 7.1.4. 
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written submissions on appeal are not to be contrasted against standards of appellate fairness 
applicable to leave to appeal proceedings, as developed in international human rights law. 
Instead, such requirements fall within the general discretion of the Ad Hoc Tribunals and the 
ICC to regulate their appellate procedures.1453 
 
No firm conclusion may be reached in respect of the developing jurisprudence of the ICC 
Appeals Chamber.1454 However, the practical application of these requirements by the Ad Hoc 
Tribunals is, irrespective of the question whether they extinguish the right to appeal or are 
accessible, not reconcilable with the need to ensure a reasonable degree of 
clarity/foreseeability in the regulation of appellate proceedings. As discussed, the practical 
application of these requirements has fluctuated immensely. Defective arguments have either 
been subject to remedial avenues or have been admitted for consideration on the merits in a 
large number of cases.1455 Conversely, appellate arguments suffering from comparable defects 
have been rejected without remedial recourse or additional assessment on the merits in many 
other cases.1456 The Ad Hoc Appeals Chambers have not provided clear guidelines in respect 
of the procedural consequences attaching to non-compliance with the formal requirements 
pertaining to written arguments. Nor have they explained the particular discrepancies in the 
outcomes of comparable cases in an appropriate manner. 
 
8. Written or Oral Argument 
 
8.1. Ad Hoc Tribunals and ICC 
 
8.1.1. Written Submissions 
Written submissions concerning the merits of an appeal are provided over four stages at the 
Ad Hoc Tribunals. In its notice of appeal, a party is required to “identify the order, decision or 
ruling challenged with specific reference to the date of its filing, and/or the transcript page, 
and indicate the substance of the alleged errors and the relief sought”.1457 An appellant’s brief 
                                                 
1453 Part III, Chapter 3. 
1454 Part III, Chapter 7.1.5. 
1455 Part III, Chapter 7.1.5. 
1456 Ibid. 
1457 Rule 108 ICTY and ICTR RPE. Also: ICTY, Practice Direction on Formal Requirements for Appeals from 
Judgement, No. IT/201, 7 March 2002, at 1. 
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must set out all the arguments and authorities. 1458  The opposing side may file “[a] 
Respondent’s brief of argument and authorities”,1459 which must contain “for each ground of 
appeal, in the following order: (a) a statement on whether or not the relief sought by the 
Appellant is opposed; (b) a statement on whether or not the ground of appeal is opposed; (c) 
arguments in support of these statements”.1460  Finally, the appellant may file “a brief in 
reply”,1461 which must be “limited to arguments in reply to the Respondent’s Brief”.1462 
 
The appellate proceedings of the ICC are conducted in a similar manner. The notice of appeal 
is mainly of a formal nature and must indicate “(a) [t]he name and number of the case; (b) 
[t]he date of the decision of conviction or acquittal, sentence or reparation order appealed 
against; (c) [w]hether the appeal is directed against the whole decision or part thereof; [and] 
(d) [t]he relief sought”.1463 The document in support of the appeal “shall contain the grounds 
of appeal”, consisting of “[t]he ground of appeal” and “[t]he legal and/or factual reasons in 
support of the ground of appeal”.1464 It must further comply with certain formal criteria by 
referring to “the relevant part of the record or any other document or source of information as 
regards any factual issue”, setting out references “to any relevant article, rule, regulation or 
other applicable law, and any authority cited in support thereof” for legal arguments, and 
“[w]here applicable, the finding or ruling challenged in the decision shall be identified, with 
specific reference to the page and paragraph number”. 1465  The opposing side may file a 
response to this document, which, in addition to the aforementioned references concerning 
legal and factual issues,1466 must answer “[e]ach ground of appeal […] separately, stating 
whether it is opposed, in whole or in part, together with the grounds put forward in support 
thereof” and state “whether the relief sought is opposed, in whole or in part, together with the 
                                                 
1458 Rule 111 ICTY and ICTR RPE. According to this Rule, “[w]here limited to sentencing, an Appellant’s brief 
shall be filed within thirty days of filing of the notice of appeal […]”. Also: ICTY, Practice Direction on Formal 
Requirements for Appeals from Judgement, No. IT/201, 7 March 2002, at 4. 
1459 Rule 112 ICTY and ICTR RPE. According to this Rule, “[w]here limited to sentencing, a Respondent’s brief 
shall be filed within thirty days of filing of the Appellant’s brief”.  
1460 ICTY, Practice Direction on Formal Requirements for Appeals from Judgement, No. IT/201, 7 March 2002, 
at 5. 
1461 Rule 113 ICTY and ICTR RPE. According to this Rule, “[w]here limited to sentencing, a brief in reply shall 
be filed within ten days of filing of the Respondent’s brief”.  
1462 ICTY, Practice Direction on Formal Requirements for Appeals from Judgement, No. IT/201, 7 March 2002, 
at 6. 
1463 Rule 150 ICC RPE; Regulation 57 ICC Regulations. 
1464 Regulation 58 (1)-(2) ICC Regulations. The grounds of appeal may be varied in accordance with Regulation 
61 ICC Regulations. Furthermore, the procedure concerning a prosecutorial appeal in cases involving multiple 
appeals is set forth in Regulation 63 ICC Regulations.  
1465 Regulation 58(3) ICC Regulations. 
1466 Regulation 59(1)(b)-(c) ICC Regulations. 
204 
 
grounds of opposition in support thereto”.1467 However, contrary to the Ad Hoc Tribunals, the 
ICC appellate procedure does not allow for a reply as of right. Such a document may only be 
filed where the ICC Appeals Chamber orders an appellant to do so whenever it “considers it 
necessary in the interests of justice”.1468 It has determined, in this regard, that, “[a]lthough not 
specifically mentioned in […] the [ICC] Regulations […], an appellant may request, and 
accordingly, trigger the powers of the [ICC] Appeals Chamber to order the filing of a reply 
under said regulation”.1469 A reply “must not repeat submissions made previously”.1470 
 
8.1.2. Appellate Hearings 
Following the filing of the written submissions, the Ad Hoc Appeals Chambers “shall set the 
date for the [appeal] hearing”.1471 This hearing allows, primarily, for the presentation of the 
parties’ arguments. However, it is not an opportunity for the parties to restate their written 
submissions. Instead, as held by the ICTY Appeals Chamber, the parties “should confine their 
oral arguments to elaborating on points […] that they wish to bring to the Appeals Chamber’s 
attention”.1472 Furthermore, “the parties are to focus their oral arguments on the grounds of 
appeal raised in their briefs […]”, considering that “[…] the appeals hearing is not the 
occasion for presenting new arguments on the merits of the case”.1473 Such arguments will, in 
principle, not be considered in the judgments of the Ad Hoc Appeals Chambers.1474 The Ad 
Hoc Appeals Chambers have, however, displayed some flexibility in this regard, by allowing 
parties to supplement written submissions at appeal hearings.1475 Furthermore, the Ad Hoc 
Appeals Chambers have sought additional clarifications from the parties at appellate hearings. 
In this regard, they have, for instance, requested the parties to respond to specific questions 
                                                 
1467 Regulation 59(1)(a) ICC Regulations. Furthermore, the procedure concerning a prosecutorial response in 
cases involving multiple appeals is set forth in Regulation 63 ICC Regulations. 
1468 Regulation 60(1) ICC Regulations. Furthermore, the procedure concerning a prosecutorial reply in cases 
involving multiple appeals is set forth in Regulation 63 ICC Regulations. 
1469 Order on the Filing of a Reply under Regulation 60 of the Regulations of the Court, Prosecutor v. Lubanga, 
Case No. ICC-01/04-01/06, ICC, Appeals Chamber, 21 February 2013, at 6. 
1470 Ibid., at 8. 
1471 Rule 114 ICTY and ICTR RPE. 
1472 Order Re-Scheduling Appeal Hearing, Prosecutor v. B. Simić, Case No. IT-95-9-A, ICTY, Appeals 
Chamber, 5 May 2006, at 4. Also: Decision on Appellant Jean-Bosco Barayagwiza’s Motion Concerning the 
Scheduling Order for the Appeals Hearing, Nahimana et al. v. the Prosecutor, Case No. ICTR-99-52-A, ICTR, 
Appeals Chamber, 5 December 2006, at 4. 
1473 Decision on Appellant Jean-Bosco Barayagwiza’s Motion Concerning the Scheduling Order for the Appeals 
Hearing, Nahimana et al. v. the Prosecutor, Case No. ICTR-99-52-A, ICTR, Appeals Chamber, 5 December 
2006, at 4. 
1474 E.g., Haradinaj et al., at 19. 
1475 E.g., Naletilić & Martinović, at 128; Mrkšić & Šljivančanin, at 350-361 (footnote 1188). 
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arising out of their written submissions1476 or to provide their views on issues raised by the Ad 
Hoc Appeals Chambers proprio motu.1477 In addition, appellate hearings have served to allow 
the Ad Hoc Appeals Chambers to proprio motu summon witnesses.1478 
 
Conversely, an oral hearing is not a mandatory affair at the ICC. The provision on the 
procedure on appeal does not provide for such a hearing 1479  and, according to the ICC 
Appeals Chamber, there is no support for the contention that it was “‘the drafters’ intention 
[…] that an oral hearing would be the norm for final appeal’”, since “they would have 
specifically stated so”.1480 It has further held that “the case law of other international criminal 
tribunals and, to a certain extent, the jurisprudence on internationally recognised human rights 
lend support to the notion that an oral hearing may be held”.1481 However, considering that 
most other international tribunals, including the Ad Hoc Tribunals, “have mandatory hearings 
because their rules expressly require such hearings”, it has concluded that, “absent an explicit 
provision in the Court’s statutory framework mandating an oral hearing, any such hearing can 
only be discretionary”.1482 It seems, nevertheless, that the ICC Appeals Chamber has adopted 
a broad approach in this regard. Appellate hearings have been conducted, either without 
specifying the need to do so1483 or by merely noting that it “would be useful in assisting the 
[ICC] Appeals Chamber in its decision-making process”.1484 As with the Ad Hoc Tribunals, 
such hearings serve to allow the parties to present arguments. Although the ICC Appeals 
Chamber has not provided extensive guidance, it has stipulated that any relevant issue arising 
in the appeal may be addressed within the confines of the written submissions.1485 
 
  
                                                 
1476 E.g., Simić, at 75; Brđanin, at 270; Mrkšić & Šljivančanin, at 37; Zigiranyirazo, Annex A – Procedural 
History, at 9; Nyiramasuhuko et al., at 725. 
1477 E.g., Karera, at 360; Boškoski & Tarčulovski, at 19. 
1478 E.g., Stakić, Annex A: Procedural Background, at 23. 
1479 Rule 151 ICC RPE. 
1480 Scheduling Order for a Hearing before the Appeals Chamber, Prosecutor v. Ngudjolo, Case No. ICC-01/04-
02/12, ICC, Appeals Chamber, 18 September 2014, at 12. 
1481 Ibid., at 12. 
1482 Ibid., at 12. 
1483 Scheduling Order for a Hearing before the Appeals Chamber, Prosecutor v. Lubanga, Case No. ICC-01/04-
01/06, ICC, Appeals Chamber, 21 March 2014, at 1(b). 
1484 Scheduling Order for a Hearing before the Appeals Chamber, Prosecutor v. Ngudjolo, Case No. ICC-01/04-
02/12, ICC, Appeals Chamber, 18 September 2014, at 13. 
1485 Further Order regarding the Conduct of the Hearing of the Appeals Chamber, Prosecutor v. Lubanga, Case 
No. ICC-01/04-01/06, ICC, Appeals Chamber, 25 March 2014, at 2(d)(iv); Order in Relation to the Conduct of 
the Hearing before the Appeals Chamber, Prosecutor v. Ngudjolo, Case No. ICC-01/04-02/12, ICC, Appeals 






Pursuant to Article 14(1) ICCPR and Article 6(1) ECHR, both the HRC and the ECtHR have 
required oral hearings for appellate instances empowered to consider both facts and law and 
to revisit the question of guilt or innocence.1486 Considering that the Appeals Chambers of the 
Ad Hoc Tribunals and the ICC boast corresponding prerogatives,1487 they are, as a matter of 
international human rights law, obliged to conduct such hearings.  
 
Accordingly, the combination of written submissions and an obligatory oral hearing at the Ad 
Hoc Tribunals is in, in principle, in compliance with the general requirement to include an 
oral component in the appellate process. 1488  However, the ICC Appeals Chamber has 
determined that the ICC Statute does not mandate such hearings, but that they may be 
permitted as a discretionary measure following written arguments. Whereas this ruling falls 
short of standards of international human rights law in general, no specific violation has 
occurred in the early jurisprudence of the ICC Appeals Chamber, in light of its broad 
approach, on the basis of which oral hearings have been conducted as a matter of course. 
 
8.2.2. Presence 
The HRC and the ECtHR have both established that the accused has a right to appear in 
person where: (i) an appellate court is entitled to determine matters of law and fact and to 
address guilt or innocence; and (ii) prosecutorial authorities have been authorised to 
appear.1489 Accordingly, in view of their far-reaching powers, the Ad Hoc and ICC Appeals 
Chambers are under an obligation to allow an accused person to appear in person.1490  
 
Although the Ad Hoc Tribunals do not specifically set forth a right of the accused to be 
present on appeal, but only stipulate that “the Registrar shall notify the parties” of the date of 
the appellate hearing,1491 and the ICC conducts oral hearings as a matter of discretion,1492 this 
right has been effectively applied pursuant to the obligatory hearings conducted before the Ad 
                                                 
1486 Part II, Chapter 5.1.4.2; Part II, Chapter 6.1. 
1487 Part III, Chapter 9; Part III, Chapter 10. 
1488 However, see: Part III, Chapter 10.3.4. 
1489 Part II, Chapter 5.1.4.4; Part II, Chapter 6.1. 
1490 Part III, Chapter 9; Part III, Chapter 10. 
1491 Rule 114 ICTY and ICTR RPE. See: Part III, Chapter 8.1.2. 
1492 Part III, Chapter 8.1.2. 
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Hoc Appeals Chambers and the broad approach adopted by the ICC Appeals Chamber.1493 
Furthermore, in practice, such proceedings have not been conducted in the presence of the Ad 
Hoc and ICC prosecutors and to the exclusion of accused persons before either institution. 
 
9. Scope of Appellate Review 
 
9.1. Ad Hoc Tribunals 
 
9.1.1. Appeal from the Merits 
The jurisdiction of the Appeals Chambers of the Ad Hoc Tribunals has been specifically 
circumscribed to two grounds: “an error on a question of law invalidating the decision” and 
“an error of fact which has occasioned a miscarriage of justice”.1494 The use of the connector 
“or”, coupled with the lack of an open-ended category, points towards an exhaustive list of 
errors. Therefore, this structure implies a perfect dichotomy, according to which a ground of 
appeal is defined as either an error of law or an error of fact. In light of the wording of the Ad 
Hoc Statutes, these grounds of appeal will be discussed separately,1495 notwithstanding certain 
contradictory signals as to the mutual exclusivity of these categories.1496 
 
Before turning to these grounds of appeal, the general character of the appellate review of the 
Ad Hoc Tribunals’ Appeals Chambers needs to be set out. The circumscription of their 
                                                 
1493 Ibid. 
1494 Art. 25(1)(a)-(b) ICTY Statute; Art. 24(1)(a)-(b) ICTR Statute. 
1495 A more detailed discussion is beyond the scope of this study. 
1496 Certain aspects of the jurisprudence of the Ad Hoc Tribunals support the dichotomy implicit in the wording 
of the Ad Hoc Statutes. For instance, it has been decided that, where a ground of appeal ultimately seeks to 
impugn a factual finding, the standard of review relative to errors of fact has been applied to the exclusion of the 
standard of review concerning errors of law (e.g., Aleksovski, at 73; Ntakirutimana & Ntakirutimana, at 174; 
Blagojević & Jokić, at 145; Milošević, at 18). In addition, the Appeals Chambers have requalified alleged errors 
of fact into errors of law (e.g., Muhimana, at 166 (footnote 386); Simba, at 291, 294). However, the Ad Hoc 
Tribunals’ jurisprudence also contains pervasive indications as to a lack of distinction between these errors. In 
this regard, the Appeals Chambers have, explicitly and implicitly, broadened the grounds of appeal foreseen by 
the ICTY and ICTR Statutes, by defining a category of “a mixed error of law and fact” (e.g., Strugar, at 252 
(also: at 269)) and by considering closely intertwined allegations of errors of law and errors of fact together (e.g., 
Limaj et al., at 159, 222, 278, 318; Kajelijeli, at 29, 158-160, 182. Similar: Zigiranyirazo, at 51, 73; Blagojević 
& Jokić, at 300-303; Kalimanzira, at 186; Renzaho, at 319-320). The Ad Hoc Appeals Chambers have also 
proceeded in a general manner without clearly specifying the type of error committed by a Trial Chamber. For 
instance, the ICTY Appeals Chamber has found that a Trial Chamber had committed “an error” (e.g., Gotovina 
& Markač, at 61) and, according to a dissenting judge, it had not characterised it “either as an error of fact or as 
an error of law” (Gotovina & Markač, Dissenting Opinion of Judge Carmel Agius, at 6. Adding further to the 
uncertainty, another dissenting judge has indicated that this error “ultimately constitutes an error of law”, as it 
was used as a “legal tool” for witness credibility (Gotovina & Markač, Dissenting Opinion of Judge Fausto 
Pocar, at 10)). Similar examples may be identified in the jurisprudence of the Ad Hoc Appeals Chambers (e.g., 
Tadić, at 183; Kordić & Čerkez, at 355-360; Orić, at 47; Šainović et al., at 550; Mrkšić & Šljivančanin, at 61-62; 
Aleksovski, at 64). 
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jurisdiction to errors of law and fact entails, inter alia, that a trial judgment is not subject to de 
novo review on appeal, as has been confirmed repeatedly in the jurisprudence. 1497  Such 
review has been interpreted to encompass the autonomous reassessment of the matters at issue, 
in whole or in part. This is established by the ICTY Appeals Chamber’s rejection of the 
argument that it should “conduct an independent assessment of the evidence, both as to its 
sufficiency and its quality” and “inquire whether a reasonable trier of fact could have found 
that an inference or hypothesis consistent with innocence of the offence charged was open on 
the evidence”.1498 It has concluded, in this respect, that it “does not operate as a second Trial 
Chamber” and that its role “is limited, pursuant to […] the Statute, to correcting errors of law 
invalidating a decision, and errors of fact which have occasioned a miscarriage of justice”.1499 
It has further considered that, “[u]nlike the procedures in force in some national systems, the 
appeals procedure provided for under […] the ICTY Statute is, by nature, corrective”.1500 
 
Certain approaches to appellate litigation have been dismissed by the Appeals Chambers as a 
result of this principle. It has mainly been considered that it is “totally inadmissible” “to 
question the entire proceedings and to challenge most of the findings of the Trial Chamber 
that appeared to be unfavourable to” the party. 1501  This characterisation of the appellate 
process also affects the type of evidentiary material considered by the Appeals Chambers. The 
ICTY Appeals Chamber has found that it will only consider “evidence referred to by the Trial 
Chamber in the body of the judgement or in a related footnote; evidence contained in the trial 
record and referred to by the parties; and additional evidence admitted on appeal”.1502 In its 
justification, it has held that “[t]o hold otherwise would mean to hold a trial de novo […] 
merely based on documentary evidence including transcripts” and it has noted “that it is not 
obliged by […] the […] [RPE] to review proprio motu the entire trial record”.1503 
 
9.1.1.1. Error of Law 
According to the Ad Hoc Appeals Chambers, an error of law could arise “from the application 
of a wrong legal standard by a Trial Chamber”.1504 On this basis, a wide array of substantive 
                                                 
1497 Furundžija, at 38; Krnojelac, at 3; Rutaganda, at 15. 
1498 Furundžija, at 38. 
1499 Ibid., at 40. 
1500 Krnojelac, at 5. 
1501 Rutaganda, at 15. Also: Musema, at 17. Similar: Kajelijeli, at 89. 
1502 Kordić & Čerkez, at 21. 
1503 Ibid., at 21 (footnote 12). 
1504 Blaškić, at 15. 
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and procedural matters of a legal nature have been reviewed on appeal. Recurring examples 
include the definitions of crimes1505 and modes of liability1506 within the Ad Hoc Tribunals’ 
jurisdiction, the specificity of the charges levelled against the accused,1507  and the Trial 
Chambers’ obligation to provide a reasoned opinion in writing.1508 
 
The ICTY Appeals Chamber has considered that “[e]rrors of law do not raise a question as to 
the standard of review as directly as errors of fact”, since, “as the final arbiter of the law of the 
Tribunal, [it] must determine whether there was such a mistake”.1509 It has, thus, intimated 
that it would accord no deference to Trial Chambers’ findings of law on account of its status 
as a Chamber of last resort within the ICTY’s legal edifice. Subsequently, the lack of 
deference has been concretely laid down by the ICTR Appeals Chamber. It has held that it 
“does not cross-check the findings of the Trial Chamber on matters of law merely to 
determine whether they are reasonable, but indeed to determine whether they are correct”.1510 
 
In addition to establishing an error of law, the appealing party must “demonstrate that the 
error renders the decision invalid”.1511 There has been a lack of general guidance by the Ad 
Hoc Appeals Chambers as to this matter, however. For instance, the Ad Hoc Appeals 
Chambers have often stated in a conclusory manner that an appellant has not demonstrated 
that an alleged error of law has invalidated the impugned judgment.1512 Even so, the Ad Hoc 
appellate jurisprudence indicates that the words “invalidating the judgement” primarily entail 
an assessment as to whether an error of law fatally undermines the basis for the impugned 
finding. In this regard, the Appeals Chambers have frequently found that errors of law 
concerning particular elements of a Trial Chamber’s analysis were inconsequential, since the 
remainder of its analysis sufficiently supported the impugned finding,1513 the error of law had 
been committed in relation to issues insignificant to appellants’ liability,1514 or that such errors 
                                                 
1505 E.g., Kunarac et al., at 116-124, 127-133, 142-156, 161-166; Blaškić, at 94-128; Stakić, at 14-28; 
Kalimanzira, at 155-160. 
1506 E.g., Blaškić, at 33-51; Brđanin, at 389-425; Perišić, at 25-40. 
1507 E.g., Ðorđević, at 579-696; Ntagerura et al., at 115-165; Muvunyi I, at 13-32, 33-47, 89-101, 102-113, 149-
158; Nchamihigo, at 339-344. 
1508 E.g., Perišić, at 96; Nzabonimana, at 383; Nyiramasuhuko et al., at 733. 
1509 Furundžija, at 35. Also: Rutaganda, at 20. 
1510 Rutaganda, at 20. Also: Krnojelac, at 10. Further: Part III, Chapter 10.1.1.2.1. 
1511 Furundžija, at 36. It may be noted that the Appeals Chambers have caused some confusion in this respect by 
considering whether the conviction was “not safe” or “unsafe”, as opposed to “invalidating the judgement”. See: 
e.g., Muvunyi I, at 148; Nchamihigo, at 354; Kalimanzira, at 100. 
1512 E.g., Stakić, at 136, 173; Hadžihasanović & Kubura, at 131; Krnojelac, at 74. 
1513 E.g., Niyitegeka, at 247-248; Muhimana, at 228; Mugenzi & Mugiraneza, at 55, 62. 
1514 E.g., Rutaganda, at 156; Ntakuritimana & Ntakuritimana, at 121; Nahimana et al., at 215. 
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were of minor import. 1515  Moreover, the Appeals Chambers have considered whether 
appellate proceedings have had a remedial effect,1516 which further suggests that this criterion 
is exclusively concerned with fatal errors.  
 
However, the Ad Hoc Appeals Chambers have dispensed with this requirement in certain 
circumstances. In one of its first judgments, the ICTY Appeals Chamber found that “[n]either 
Party asserts that the Trial Chamber’s finding […] had a bearing on the verdict”, but, since it 
concerned “a matter of general significance for the Tribunal’s jurisprudence”, it considered it 
appropriate “to set forth its views on this matter”. 1517  Subsequently, the ICTR Appeals 
Chamber provided some indications as to the basis for such a power. It considered such a 
determination justified “in light of the Appeals Chamber’s role in unifying the law”. 1518 
Further, it referred to the fact that the jurisdiction of the ICTR is “time bound” and that the 
crimes within its jurisdiction are “particularly serious and their definition given [by] the 
courts contributes to the overall development of international humanitarian law and 
international criminal law”.1519 At the same time, it noted that this power “does not seek to 
create a new power or a possible advisory power” and that, accordingly, the Appeals Chamber 
has the discretion to consider such issues or to decline to do so.1520 
 
9.1.1.2. Error of Fact 
In the jurisprudence of the Appeals Chambers of the Ad Hoc Tribunals, allegations of an error 
of fact based on the trial record and allegations of an error of fact based on additional 
evidence presented on appeal have raised distinct issues. 
 
9.1.1.2.1. Error of Fact based on the Trial Record 
Considering that the record on appeal “shall consist of the trial record”,1521 alleged errors of 
fact are usually litigated on the basis of the trial record. 
 
  
                                                 
1515 E.g., Nchamihigo, at 32; Kalimanzira, at 21-22. 
1516 E.g., Krstić, at 187; Blaškić, at 282, 298; Simba, at 195; Bagosora & Nsengiyumva, at 543-546. 
1517 Tadić, at 247, 281, 315. Also: e.g., Gacumbitsi, at 147-157; Krnojelac, at 125-145. 
1518 Akayesu, at 21. Also: Krnojelac, at 6. 
1519 Akayesu, at 22. Also: Krnojelac, at 6. 
1520 Akayesu, at 23. Also: Krnojelac, at 6. For examples of the Appeals Chambers’ refusal to deal with such 
matters, see: e.g., Blagojević & Jokić, at 316-318; Kanyarukiga, at 264-268. 




The Ad Hoc Appeals Chambers have exhibited several approaches to such errors of fact, the 
most important of which concern “plain” errors of fact, a “sufficiency” assessment, and the 
“only reasonable inference” assessment. The first category constitutes the most 
straightforward approach to an error of fact and examines whether a factual issue has been 
correctly or incorrectly appraised. Obvious examples include misrepresentations by a Trial 
Chamber of documentary evidence1522 and witness testimony.1523 As to the second category, 
in the early stages of its jurisprudence, the ICTY Appeals Chamber has referred to “the issue 
as to whether the evidence is factually sufficient to sustain a conviction” 1524  and it has 
considered that it “will not call the [Trial Chamber’s] findings of fact into question where 
there is reliable evidence on which the Trial Chamber might reasonably have based its 
findings”.1525 These statements imply that an error of fact is constituted by a factual finding 
that does not enjoy sufficient support in the evidence referred to by the Trial Chamber. A 
typical illustration is reflected in the finding of the ICTY Appeals Chamber that, “[t]here was 
insufficient evidence to prove beyond a reasonable doubt that” the appellant’s conduct 
constituted either encouragement or moral support for the commission of crimes.1526 The 
appellate jurisprudence of the Ad Hoc Tribunals is replete with similarly worded 
evaluations.1527 Finally, as concerns the third category, the Appeals Chambers have examined 
whether no reasonable trier of fact could have concluded that the impugned finding was the 
only reasonable inference on the evidence before it.1528 
 
9.1.1.2.1.2. Standard of Review 
In one of its first judgments, the ICTY Appeals Chamber held that “the standard to be used 
when determining whether the Trial Chamber’s factual finding should stand is that of 
unreasonableness, that is, a conclusion which no reasonable person could have reached”.1529 
This approach entails that “[t]he standard of review to be applied does not require the Appeals 
Chamber to decide for itself whether or not this evidence is reliable or corroborated”.1530 
                                                 
1522 E.g., Bizimungu, at 135. 
1523 E.g., Lukić & Lukić, at 328; Nyiramasuhuko et al., at 3028-3030. 
1524 Delalić et al., at 434 (emphasis in original). 
1525 Krnojelac, at 12. Also: Rutaganda, at 22. 
1526 Brđanin, at 276.  
1527 E.g., Kvočka et al., at 599; Milošević, at 270; Kamahunda, at 65; Nahimana et al., at 513; Muvunyi I, at 81-
87; Ndindiliyimana et al., at 346-347; Šainović et al., at 1679. 
1528 E.g., Milošević, at 277; Šainović et al., at 452, 504; Popović et al., at 774. 
1529 Tadić, at 64. 
1530 Kordić & Čerkez, at 291. 
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Accordingly, the assessment must be made from a detached perspective: “it requires the 
Appeals Chamber to consider whether no reasonable trier of fact could have come to the” 
impugned conclusions.1531 In its early jurisprudence, the ICTY Appeals Chamber appeared to 
have expanded the standard of appellate review concerning an error of fact. After reiterating 
the “reasonableness” standard, it considered that it may also overturn a factual finding “where 
the evaluation of the evidence is wholly erroneous”. 1532  However, thereafter, the ICTY 
Appeals Chamber maintained that the standards, in fact, do not differ: “it is clear […] that 
there is in reality no difference in substance between that test and the unreasonableness one 
usually stated”.1533 Therefore, although these standards have been used in conjunction on 
occasion,1534 the ensuing discussion will be limited to the “reasonableness test”. 
 
The ICTY Appeals Chamber has distinguished the “reasonableness test” from two related 
legal standards. First, it has clarified that the “reasonableness test” exceeds a mere assessment 
as to whether there was a legal basis for a conviction.1535 The latter issue is adjudicated at the 
end of the prosecution case at trial and seeks to determine “whether there is evidence (if 
accepted) upon which a reasonable tribunal of fact could be satisfied beyond reasonable doubt 
of the guilt of the accused”.1536 The reasonableness test has been described as involving “a far 
wider inquiry than would an inquiry into the legal sufficiency of the evidence”, considering 
that the latter “requires an acceptance of the truthfulness of the witness, whereas the [former] 
inquiry […] requires a consideration as to whether no reasonable tribunal of fact could have 
accepted the witness’s evidence as either truthful or reliable or both”. 1537  Second, it has 
explained that the “reasonableness test” is distinct from the “only reasonable inference” test 
applicable to a first instance case based on circumstantial evidence. The latter test entails that, 
in a case of circumstantial evidence, a finding of guilt “must be the only reasonable 
conclusion available” and, “[i]f there is another conclusion which is also reasonably open 
from that evidence, and which is consistent with the innocence of the accused, he must be 
acquitted”.1538 In a subsequent case, the ICTY Appeals Chamber has considered that this 
formulation may appear inconsistent with the “reasonableness” test because the latter 
                                                 
1531 Ibid., at 291. 
1532 Aleksovski, at 63 (emphasis supplied); Also: Kupreškić et al., at 30, 41; Rutaganda, at. 22.  
1533 Mučić et al. Sentencing Appeal, at 55.  
1534 Blaškić, at 332, 335; Muvunyi II, at 26. 
1535 Delalić et al., at 433-436. 
1536 Ibid., at 434 (emphasis in original). Also: Rule 98bis ICTY and ICTR RPE. 
1537 Mučić et al. Sentencing Appeal, at 58. 
1538 Delalić et al., at 458. 
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“permits a conclusion to be upheld on appeal even where other inferences sustaining guilt 
could reasonably have been drawn at trial”.1539 However, it has also considered that such a 
determination is not precluded by the “only reasonable inference” test. It found that this test is 
“a practical application of the presumption of innocence, but applied only to circumstances 
where a conclusion of the accused’s innocence is what a reasonable trier of fact could have 
reached”. 1540  Beyond these clarifications, the jurisprudence has provided little additional 
guidance. Indeed, the ICTR Appeals Chamber has acknowledged that this test “is extremely 
relative” and that, “reasonableness must be assessed on a case-by-case basis in the light of the 
specific circumstances of the case”.1541  
 
The Ad Hoc Appeals Chambers have, nevertheless, shed light on auxiliary aspects of the 
“reasonableness” test. First, the ICTY Appeals Chamber has determined that it is 
accompanied by the deference principle. Accordingly, “[t]he task of hearing, assessing and 
weighing the evidence presented at trial is left to the Judges sitting in a Trial Chamber” and, 
“[t]herefore, the Appeals Chamber must give a margin of deference to a finding of fact 
reached by a Trial Chamber”.1542 It subsequently considered that the principle of deference 
arises out of its disadvantageous position vis-à-vis Trial Chambers: “the Trial Chamber has 
the advantage of observing witness testimony first-hand, and is, therefore, better positioned 
than […] [the Appeals] Chamber to assess the reliability and credibility of the evidence”.1543 
Second, the Appeals Chambers have found that the reasonableness standard also entails that 
“two judges, both acting reasonably, can come to different conclusions on the basis of the 
same evidence”.1544 Therefore, “[a] party suggesting only a variation of the findings which the 
Trial Chamber might have reached […] has little chance of a successful appeal”. 1545  In 
application of these principles, the Appeals Chambers have, for instance, rejected grounds of 
appeal advancing that different Trial Chambers arrived at diverging outcomes1546 or asserting 
that a dissenting trial judge drew opposite conclusions.1547 
 
  
                                                 
1539 Kordić & Čerkez, at 288-289. 
1540 Ibid., at 290. Also: Ntagerura et al., at 305. 
1541 Musema, at 204. 
1542 Tadić, at 64. 
1543 Furundžija, at 37. 
1544 Tadić, at 57. 
1545 Krnojelac, at 12. 
1546 E.g., Lukić & Lukić, at 396; Ðorđević, at 180. 
1547 E.g., Ntawukulilyayo, at 15. 
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9.1.1.2.1.3. Practical Application 
The appellate review of factual findings has produced diverging results in practice. In this 
regard, it is indicative that individual judges have found fault with an overly restrictive 
approach by the Ad Hoc Appeals Chambers, 1548  whilst some of their colleagues have 
dismissed the Ad Hoc Appeals Chambers’ application of the relevant norms as excessively 
expansive.1549 A dissenting judge of the ICTY Appeals Chamber has succinctly described this 
dichotomy within the same judgment. He found that “the selective activism of the [ICTY] 
Appeals Chamber makes it difficult to grasp the overall rationale of the approach to the facts, 
deferring sometimes to the Trial Chamber’s discretion […] and directly sorting out sometimes 
the alleged inconsistencies […]”.1550 Even though it is not possible to draw strict boundaries 
between the types of appellate review engaged in by the Appeals Chambers, these opinions 
provide clear indications of “narrow” and “broad” appellate review. On this basis, “narrow” 
appellate review is understood as an augmented degree of deference afforded to Trial 
Chambers to the detriment of the Appeals Chambers’ scope of review concerning matters of 
facts, whereas “broad” appellate review denotes the opposite tendency. 
 
The exercise of a “narrow” form of appellate review by the Ad Hoc Appeals Chambers 
primarily arises out of two approaches. 
 
First, the Ad Hoc Appeals Chambers have frequently limited their assessments of matters of 
fact as to whether or not the Trial Chambers have considered relevant matters. For instance, 
ruling on a claim that a Trial Chamber had failed to credit certain evidence, the ICTR Appeals 
Chamber recalled “that, when faced with competing versions of the same event, it is the 
prerogative of the trier of fact to decide which version it considers more credible”.1551 It then 
dismissed the allegation, considering that “the Trial Chamber expressly considered the 
testimonies […] and explained its reasons for rejecting them”. 1552  Such an assessment 
resembles the aforementioned determination as to the “the legal sufficiency of the evidence” 
more than the description of the “reasonableness test”. 1553  By reducing its review to a 
verification as to which sources the Trial Chamber considered, it has exhibited “an acceptance 
                                                 
1548 E.g., Muvunyi I, Dissenting Opinion of Judges Liu and Meron, at 7-8. 
1549 E.g., Nchamihigo, Partly Dissenting Opinion of Judge Pocar, at 8; Ntabakuze, Joint Dissenting Opinion of 
Judges Pocar and Liu, at 2. 
1550 Popović et al., Separate and Dissenting Opinions of Judge Mandiaye Niang, at 11 (footnote 3). 
1551 Ndahimana, at 46.  
1552 Ibid., at 47. 
1553 Part III, Chapter 9.1.1.2.1.2. 
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of the truthfulness of the witness[es]”, which is the distinguishing hallmark of the former test, 
and omitted to engage in the type of review that sets the “reasonableness test” apart from this 
test, namely “a consideration as to whether no reasonable tribunal of fact could have accepted 
the witness’s evidence as either truthful or reliable or both”.1554 Similar assessments have 
appeared throughout the jurisprudence of the Ad Hoc Appeals Chambers.1555 
 
Second, the Ad Hoc Appeals Chambers have restricted appellate review to a reiteration of the 
principle of deference in various situations. This approach has particularly prevailed in respect 
of assessments concerning witness testimony. For instance, among similar examples,1556 the 
ICTR Appeals Chamber has, in respect of an argument that the Trial Chamber unreasonably 
assessed prosecution witnesses’ testimony, restricted its assessment to a conclusion that “[t]he 
assessment of the demeanour of witnesses in considering their credibility is one of the 
fundamental functions of a Trial Chamber to which the Appeals Chamber must accord 
considerable deference”.1557 The Ad Hoc Appeals Chambers have even proceeded in this 
manner in respect of findings that display indications of error. For instance, the ICTR Appeals 
Chamber has found that “a reasonable trial chamber could not have reconciled the differences 
in the testimony of” a witness on the basis of the argumentation put forward by the Trial 
Chamber. 1558  Even so, this error did not warrant intervention. The Appeals Chamber 
considered that the Trial Chamber had expressed doubts about the evidence of the witnesses 
who provided evidence to the contrary, which must be accorded substantial deference as it is 
“in a unique position to evaluate the demeanour of the testifying witness, to question the 
witnesses directly about the gaps or inconsistencies in their testimonies, and to evaluate their 
credibility on the basis of the witnesses’ reaction to the difficult questions put to them by the 
parties or by the judges”.1559 Examples of a comparable nature recur in the jurisprudence.1560 
 
In contrast to the “narrow” approach, the “broad” variety of the appellate review exercised by 
the Ad Hoc Appeals Chambers arises mainly in three manners. 
                                                 
1554 Part III, Chapter 9.1.1.2.1.2. 
1555 E.g., Aleksovski, at 74; Delalić et al., at 506; Kajelijeli, at 96; Karemera & Ngirumpatse, at 468; Lukić & 
Lukić, at 283; Popović et al., at 1142. 
1556 E.g., Kajelijeli, at 124; Bagosora & Nsengiyumva, at 262; Kalimanzira, at 176. 
1557 Muvunyi II, at 26. 
1558 Ntakuritimana & Ntakuritimana, at 203. 
1559 Ibid., at 203-204. However, the Appeals Chamber also held that the allegation of an error of fact could not 
succeed on additional grounds either. 
1560 E.g., ibid., at 244; Ndindiliyimana et al., at 334-346; Ndindabahizi, at 34; Munyakazi, at 154; Niyitegeka, at 




First, the Ad Hoc Appeals Chambers have limited the effects of the Trial Chambers’ 
opportunity to observe witnesses in several situations, which has been the cornerstone of the 
principle of deference. In respect of the specific matter of identifications made under difficult 
circumstances, the ICTY Appeals Chamber found that the ability of the Trial Chamber to 
observe the witness was not decisive. Following an extensive transcript-based review of the 
witness’ testimony,1561 it concluded that there were “several strong indications on the trial 
record that her absolute conviction in her identification evidence was very much a reflection 
of her personality and not necessarily an indicator of her reliability”.1562 Moreover, even 
though the ICTY Appeals Chamber had dismissed a similar argument as a request for review 
de novo in the early stages of its jurisprudence,1563 the Ad Hoc Appeals Chambers have 
evaluated the quality of particular types of witness evidence relied upon by Trial Chambers. 
The most important examples concern findings that Trial Chambers have not applied 
sufficient caution concerning suspicious evidence provided by accomplices1564 and those that 
are exclusively underpinned by uncorroborated hearsay evidence.1565 
 
Second, the Ad Hoc Appeals Chambers have interfered in the factual assessments of the Trial 
Chambers on the basis of mere disagreement with the impugned findings on numerous 
occasions.1566 As opposed to identifying an error of fact by demonstrating that the finding at 
issue was one that no reasonable Trial Chamber could have made, the Ad Hoc Appeals 
Chambers have often recited the relevant findings or evidence and have proceeded to draw the 
opposite conclusion. For instance, after finding that a Trial Chamber had erred in fact in 
finding that the transcripts of the testimonies of two witnesses revealed that they were 
mutually corroborative,1567 and after acknowledging that it “did not have the opportunity to 
hear […] and/or to examine” the witnesses, 1568  the ICTR Appeals Chamber concluded, 
without further elaboration, that “no tribunal of fact could have reached the conclusion […] 
that the testimonies […] considered together established the Appellant’s guilt beyond any 
                                                 
1561 Kupreškić et al., at 136, 140-153.  
1562 Ibid., at 154. The reversal was not limited to this error, however. See: ibid., at 155-221, 224. 
1563 Furundžija, at 38, 40.  
1564 E.g., Muvunyi I, at 129-131; Nchamihigo, at 312. 
1565 E.g., Muvunyi I, at 70; Karera, at 204; Kalimanzira, at 79, Ndindabahizi, at 114-115. 
1566 Similar: G. Boas, J. Bischoff, N. Reid, and B. Don Taylor III, International Criminal Law Practitioner 
Library: International Criminal Procedure (Volume 3) (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2011), at 445-
446; M. Drumbl and K. Gallant, ‘Appeals in the Ad Hoc International Criminal Tribunals: Structure, Procedure, 
and Recent Cases’, 3(2) The Journal of Appellate Practice and Process 589 (2001), at 625-627. 
1567 Rutaganda, at 496, 500. 
1568 Ibid., at 505 (emphasis supplied). 
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reasonable doubt”. 1569  Similar assessments are commonplace in the jurisprudence. 1570 
Moreover, the Ad Hoc Appeals Chambers have also overruled Trial Chambers on the basis of 
the “only reasonable inference” approach to errors of fact. Such assessments strongly evoke a 
subjective appraisal of the evidence by the Appeals Chambers themselves, as opposed to a 
mere assessment as to the existence of an error of fact. For instance, the ICTR Appeals 
Chamber has found that, although “[t]here is no doubt […] that the […] factual findings [of 
the Trial Chamber] are compatible with the existence of ‘a joint agenda’ aiming at committing 
genocide”, “it is not the only reasonable inference”.1571 The breadth of such assessments is 
made clear by the proponents of a narrow approach in respect of such issues. For instance, a 
dissenting judge of the ICTY Appeals Chamber claimed that “[a]ppellate jurisdiction is not to 
be exercised to determine whether the appellate court agrees with a finding of fact made by 
the trial court, except in the sense of determining whether there was evidence on which a 
reasonable trier of fact could make that finding” and, “[i]f there was such evidence before the 
Trial Chamber, in the absence of a clear error of reasoning, it is immaterial that the Appeals 
Chamber, if it were the Trial Chamber, would have made a different finding of fact”.1572 This 
approach has been applied frequently in the jurisprudence.1573 
 
Finally, the Ad Hoc Appeals Chambers have directly resolved contentious issues of fact on 
appeal. Thus, despite their professed limitations as to factual issues, they have made findings 
of fact in respect of matters not fully explored at first instance. For instance, the ICTR 
Appeals Chamber concluded that, although a Trial Chamber had not found that certain crimes 
had been committed at locations supervised by an appellant, “such a finding was implicit and 
it could reasonably be based on the testimony of” a witness.1574 A dissenting judge noted that 
this finding exemplified that the Appeals Chamber “acted as a fact-finder in the first instance 
and substituted its own findings in order to cure the errors”.1575 In another example, the ICTY 
                                                 
1569 Ibid., at 506 (emphases in original). 
1570 E.g., Krnojelac, at 166-171, 176-180, 184-188, 189-207; Hadžihasanović & Kubura, at 198-232; Muvunyi I, 
at 81-87; Karera, at 203-204; Bagosora & Nsengiyumva, at 279-283, 312-315, 321-323, 356-362, 375-376; 
Ndindiliyimana et al., at 346-351; Karemera & Ngirumpatse, at 649-651; Nzabonimana, at 451-453; 
Nyiramasuhuko et al., at 3028-3030; Lukić & Lukić, at 320-321, 324, 328, 329, 331; Šainović et al., at 451-452, 
504; Popović et al., at 773-774; Nahimana et al., at 510, 519, 593-600.  
1571 Nahimana et al., at 910. 
1572 Ibid., Partly Dissenting Opinion of Judge Shahabuddeen, at 63. 
1573 E.g., Milošević, at 277; Mrkšić & Šljivančanin, at 61-62, 103; Šainović et al., at 452, 453, 504, 520; Popović 
et al., at 774-775; Bagosora & Nsengiyumva, at 283, 303; Nizeyimana, at 151-159, 274-276; Mugenzi & 
Mugiraneza, at 88-91, 94, 136-142; Bizimungu, at 138-139, 174, 251-253. 
1574 Nahimana et al., at 663. 
1575 Ibid., Partly Dissenting Opinion of Judge Meron, at 1. 
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Appeals Chamber drew a critical inference establishing an accused’s mens rea in respect of 
certain criminal events.1576 However, this particular fact had not been subject to litigation at 
trial and, accordingly, the Trial Chamber had dismissed it as “conjecture”.1577 
 
9.1.1.2.2. Error of Fact based on Additional Evidence 
The reference to an error of fact in the appellate provisions of the Ad Hoc Tribunals does not, 
on an ordinary reading, encompass an error of fact based on additional evidence. In the words 
of the ICTY Appeals Chamber, “it is difficult to see how the Trial Chamber may be said to 
have committed an error of fact where the basis of the error lies in additional evidence which, 
through no fault of the Trial Chamber, was not presented to it”.1578 It has, nevertheless, found 
that “by construing the reference to ‘an error of fact’ as meaning objectively an incorrectness 
of fact disclosed by relevant material, whether or not erroneously excluded by the Trial 
Chamber, that additional material may be admitted”.1579  In a subsequent case, the ICTY 
Appeals Chamber highlighted the “danger of a miscarriage of justice when a Trial Chamber is 
deprived of crucial evidence relating to the guilt or innocence of an accused that does not 
surface until the trial is completed”.1580 Accordingly, it held that where “a party is successful 
in locating additional evidence demonstrating that a Trial Chamber’s finding of guilt is 
erroneous, it will fall within the Appeals Chamber’s jurisdiction to hear an appeal on the 
ground of ‘an error of fact that has occasioned a miscarriage of justice’”.1581 
 
9.1.1.2.2.1. Admission of Additional Evidence 
The record on appeal may be supplemented through the admission of additional evidence. In 
general, a restrictive stance towards additional evidence has been adopted. As held by the 
ICTY Appeals Chamber, “[…] additional evidence should not be admitted lightly at the 
appellate stage”, 1582  since “[t]he appeal process […] is not designed for the purpose of 
                                                 
1576 Mrkšić & Šljivančanin, at 62. 
1577 Ibid., at 61. 
1578 Decision on Appellant’s Motion for the Extension of the Time-Limit and Admission of Additional Evidence, 
Prosecutor v. Tadić, Case No. IT-94-1-A, ICTY, Appeals Chamber, 15 October 1998, at 37. 
1579 Ibid., at 38. 
1580 Kupreškić et al., at 44. 
1581 Ibid., at 44. 
1582 Tadić, at 16, referring to: Decision on Appellant’s Motion for the Extension of the Time-Limit and 




allowing parties to remedy their own failings or oversights during trial or sentencing”.1583 
Two principal avenues exist for the admission of such evidence. 
 
Rule 115(A) of the Ad Hoc RPE specifically lays down that “[a] party may apply by motion 
to present additional evidence before the Appeals Chamber” and that “[r]ebuttal material may 
be presented by any party affected by the motion”.1584 The Rule’s neutral wording implies 
that both the person convicted or acquitted at first instance and the prosecutor may seek the 
admission of additional evidence on appeal. The latter may even do so on behalf of a 
convicted person.1585 Three criteria apply to such applications. First, “the applicant must […] 
demonstrate that the additional evidence tendered on appeal was not available to him at trial 
in any form, or discoverable through the exercise of due diligence”.1586 Second, the evidence 
must be “both relevant to a material issue and credible”.1587 Third, “the evidence must be such 
that […] it could show that the verdict was unsafe”, which is satisfied if “there is a realistic 
possibility that the Trial Chamber’s verdict might have been different if the new evidence had 
been admitted”.1588 The first criterion may, however, be departed from, if “the exclusion of 
the additional evidence would lead to a miscarriage of justice, in that if it had been admitted at 
trial, it would have affected the verdict”,1589 which is a heightened threshold in comparison 
with the aforementioned “could” standard. 
 
In addition, an alternative legal basis has been employed for the admission of additional 
evidence, pursuant to the stipulation in Rule 107 of the Ad Hoc RPE that “[t]he rules of 
procedure and evidence that govern proceedings in the Trial Chambers shall apply mutatis 
mutandis to proceedings in the Appeals Chamber[s]”.1590 On this basis, the Ad Hoc Appeals 
Chambers have invoked analogous prerogatives of the Trial Chambers to: (i) “to admit any 
                                                 
1583 Erdemović, at 15. 
1584 This Rule further stipulates the following formal requirements: “[…] [s]uch motion shall clearly identify 
with precision the specific finding of fact made by the Trial Chamber to which the additional evidence is 
directed, and must be served on the other party and filed with the Registrar not later than thirty days from the 
date for filing of the brief in reply, unless good cause or, after the appeal hearing, cogent reasons are shown for a 
delay. […] Parties are permitted to file supplemental briefs on the impact of the additional evidence within 
fifteen days of the expiry of the time limit set for the filing of rebuttal material, if no such material is filed, or if 
rebuttal material is filed, within fifteen days of the decision on the admissibility of that material”. Also: ICTY, 
Practice Direction on Formal Requirements for Appeals from Judgement, No. IT/201, 7 March 2002, at 11. 
1585 Naletilić & Martinović, Annex 1: Procedural Background, at 26. 
1586 Decision on Vujadin Popović’s Motion for Admission of Additional Evidence on Appeal Pursuant to Rule 
115, Prosecutor v. Popović et al., Case No. IT-05-88-A, ICTY, Appeals Chamber, 20 October 2011, at 7. 
1587 Ibid., at 8. 
1588 Ibid., at 9. 
1589 Ibid., at 10 (emphasis in original). 
1590 Rule 107 ICTY RPE and ICTR RPE. 
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relevant evidence which it deems to have probative value”;1591 (ii) “to proprio motu order 
either party to produce additional evidence” and “to summon witnesses and order their 
attendance”;1592  or (iii) “to proprio motu […] issue such orders, summonses, subpoenas, 
warrants and transfer orders as may be necessary for the purposes of […] the trial”.1593 This 
approach may circumvent the strict conditions of Rule 115. For instance, the ICTR Appeals 
Chamber has denied an accused’s request to call a witness “pursuant to Rule 115 […], but 
decided to summon […] [him] pursuant to Rules 98 and 107” ICTR RPE itself.1594 
 
As held by the ICTY Appeals Chamber, additional evidence “may not have been subjected to 
any form of adversarial scrutiny, save for the Appeals Chamber’s initial assessment as to 
whether it was, on its face, credible”.1595 In this regard, the Ad Hoc RPE stipulate that an 
additional evidence motion may be decided “with or without an oral hearing”. 1596  The 
decision to conduct an evidentiary hearing concerning additional evidence on appeal is often 
contingent on challenges raised by the opposing party.1597 However, as the aforementioned 
wording indicates, this remains a discretionary decision and the Ad Hoc Appeals Chambers 
have, accordingly, also dispensed with such hearings. 1598  Using the aforementioned 
prerogatives of the Trial Chambers pursuant to Rule 107 RPE, the Ad Hoc Appeals Chambers 
have, on occasion, expanded the reach of such hearings. For instance, acting proprio motu, 
they have summoned witnesses to assess their statements,1599 admitted rebuttal material,1600 
and ordered further testing of additional evidence by means of an expert report 1601  and 
additional investigations by the prosecutor. 1602  Besides testing additional evidence 
autonomously, the Ad Hoc Appeals Chambers have also considered that they may “order the 
                                                 
1591 Rule 89(C) ICTY and ICTR RPE. E.g., Kupreškić et al., at 55-57, referring to decisions of the ICTY Appeals 
Chamber in the Furundžija and Delalić et al. cases in the accompanying footnotes. 
1592 Rule 98 ICTY and ICTR RPE. E.g., Krstić, at 92; Bagosora & Nsengiyumva, at 531. 
1593 Rule 54 ICTY and ICTR RPE. E.g., Nahimana et al., at 454. 
1594 E.g., Bagosora & Nsengiyumva, at 531. Also: M. Drumbl and K. Gallant, ‘Appeals in the Ad Hoc 
International Criminal Tribunals: Structure, Procedure, and Recent Cases’, 3(2) The Journal of Appellate 
Practice and Process 589 (2001), at 630. 
1595 Kupreškić et al., at 70. This statement was provided in the context of Rule 115 of the RPE, but it equally 
applies to the admission of evidence on appeal pursuant to various prerogatives of the Trial Chambers in 
conjunction with Rule 107 of the RPE. 
1596 Rule 115(C) ICTY and ICTR RPE. Additional evidence may be tested during the appellate hearing provided 
for in Rule 114 of the ICTY and ICTR RPE or during a separate hearing (e.g., Kupreškić et al., Annex A: 
Procedural Background, at 505; Krajišnik, Annex A: Procedural Background, at 48). 
1597 E.g., Kupreškić et al., Annex A: Procedural Background, at 505. 
1598 E.g., ibid., at 70. 
1599 E.g., Blaškić, Annex A: Procedural Background, at 41; Musema, Annex A - Proceedings on Appeal, at 4; 
Kvočka et al., Annex A: Procedural Background, at 746; Nahimana et al., at 447. 
1600 Nahimana et al., at 448. 
1601 Ibid., at 454. 
1602 Kamuhanda, Annex A - Procedural Background, at 442. 
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case to be remitted to a Trial Chamber”.1603 Limited guidance has, however, been provided as 
to this possibility. For instance, after ordering the parties to submit arguments as to whether 
the admission of voluminous additional evidence justified a retrial, the ICTY Appeals 
Chamber has simply concluded that “a re-trial was not warranted”.1604 
 
9.1.1.2.2.2. Definition 
The Ad Hoc Appeals Chambers have, much like the approach to errors of fact based on the 
trial record, primarily assessed whether the additional evidence discloses “plain” errors of fact 
or whether it affects a “sufficiency” assessment. With regard to the first category, the Appeals 
Chambers have mainly sought to determine whether additional evidence materially 
invalidates facts accepted by Trial Chambers. 1605  In respect of the second category, the 
Appeals Chambers have examined whether the additional evidence has altered the balance of 
the evidence supporting a factual finding reached at first instance. On this basis, “sufficient” 
evidence could be rendered “insufficient” or vice versa.1606 
 
9.1.1.2.2.3. Standard of Review 
The availability of additional evidence on appeal must necessarily alter the Appeals Chambers’ 
standard of review. As explained by a judge of the ICTR Appeals Chamber, whereas “the 
reasonable conclusion criterion applies where all the evidence has in fact been assessed by the 
trial court and where the conclusion reached by the trial court on that evidence is known”, 
“[i]n the case of additional evidence, the evidence in question was never before the trial court 
and the latter never came to a conclusion on it […]”.1607 Accordingly, the salient issue is 
whether the Appeals Chambers should continue to apply a deferential standard of review - i.e. 
whether the conclusion was one that no reasonable trier of fact could have adopted when 
taking account of the additional evidence – or whether they should resort to an autonomous 
review standard - i.e. whether they should themselves be convinced of the existence of an 
error of fact in light of the additional evidence presented on appeal. 
                                                 
1603 Kupreškić et al., at 70. Also: Rutaganda, at 473 (footnote 837). 
1604 Blaškić, at 6. Similar: Rutaganda, at 473 (footnote 837). 
1605 For instance, it has been found that, contrary to the impugned findings of fact established at first instance, 
individual appellants did not: (i) hold a certain position (Kupreškić et al., at 274); (ii) exercise exclusive control 
over explosives (Blaškić, at 454); or (iii) commit a specific criminal act (Musema, at 193). 
1606 For instance, it has been found that additional evidence: (i) did not “have any impact on the Trial Chamber’s 
findings” that an appellant participated in a beating (Kvočka et al., at 496, 554); (ii) was not “sufficient to 
undermine the extensive evidence supporting the Trial Chamber’s findings” as to an appellant’s hierarchical 
position (Krajišnik, at 351); and (iii) did “not undermine the credibility” of witnesses establishing an appellant’s 
criminal responsibility (Nyiramasuhuko et al., at 1368, 3117. Similar: Nahimana et al., at 466). 




Initially, the ICTY Appeals Chamber “decided against importing tests from domestic 
jurisdictions” 1608  and determined that, in relation to appellate proceedings dealing with 
additional evidence, the “reasonableness” test must be upheld with appropriate modifications. 
Accordingly, it defined the applicable test as: “has the appellant established that no reasonable 
tribunal of fact could have reached a conclusion of guilt based upon the evidence before the 
Trial Chamber together with the additional evidence admitted […]”.1609 In this respect, the 
Appeals Chamber noted that it “has been guided by Rule 117(A) which provides that ‘[t]he 
Appeals Chamber shall pronounce judgement on the basis of the record on appeal together 
with such additional evidence as has been presented to it’”.1610 
 
A remarkable shift occurred thereafter. In a subsequent case, the ICTY Appeals Chamber 
considered that its previous judgment “did not determine whether it was satisfied itself, 
beyond reasonable doubt, as to the conclusion reached, and indeed, it did not need to do so, 
because the outcome in that situation was that no reasonable trier of fact could have reached a 
finding of guilt”.1611 On this basis, it developed a new standard of appellate review: “[…] 
when the Appeals Chamber is itself seized of the task of evaluating trial evidence and 
additional evidence together, and in some instances in light of a newly articulated legal 
standard, it should, in the interests of justice, be convinced itself, beyond reasonable doubt, as 
to the guilt of the accused […]”.1612 It reasoned that, “if it were to apply a lower standard, 
then the outcome would be that neither in the first instance, nor on appeal, would a conclusion 
of guilt based on the totality of evidence relied upon in the case, assessed in light of the 
correct legal standard, be reached by either Chamber beyond reasonable doubt”.1613 A two-
stage analysis has resulted from these considerations. The Ad Hoc Appeals Chambers “will 
first determine, on the basis of the trial record alone, whether no reasonable trier of fact could 
                                                 
1608 Kupreškić et al., at 73-75. 
1609 Ibid., at 75. This standard was also accepted by the ICTR Appeals Chamber. See: Musema, at 185-186; 
Rutaganda, at. 473. 
1610 Kupreškić et al., at 75. 
1611 Blaškić, at 22. Also: Kvočka et al., at footnote 993. This is, however, an unconvincing argument. The 
Kupreškić Appeals Chamber had defined a deferential standard of review in general terms and, in this respect, it 
did not leave room for autonomous consideration. The outcome it had reached was fully in line with this 
formulation. Accordingly, there was no basis for the Kupreškić Appeals Chamber to consider, in addition, 
whether it was itself convinced of the relevant finding beyond reasonable doubt on the basis of the additional 
evidence.  
1612 Blaškić, at 23 (emphasis supplied). 
1613 Ibid., at 23. 
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have reached the conclusion of guilt beyond reasonable doubt”.1614 The second part of the test 
applies “[i]f […] the Appeals Chamber determines that a reasonable trier of fact could have 
reached a conclusion of guilt beyond reasonable doubt” and, if this is the case, it “will 
determine whether, in light of the trial evidence and additional evidence admitted on appeal, it 
is itself convinced beyond reasonable doubt as to the finding of guilt”.1615 
 
9.1.1.2.2.4. Practical Application 
The aforementioned shift regarding the standard of review concerning alleged errors of fact 
based on additional evidence has also met with opposition from dissenting judges, who have 
argued in favour of the retention of the initial standard.1616 It is, therefore, not surprising that 
the practical application of the standard of appellate review has oscillated.  
 
Both Ad Hoc Appeals Chambers have applied a deferential standard akin to the initial 
standard after the adoption of the autonomous standard. For instance, the ICTY Appeals 
Chamber determined that, “based on the evidence before the Trial Chamber together with the 
additional evidence admitted during the appellate proceedings, […] no reasonable trier of fact 
could have concluded that” an appellant’s subordinate held a certain position.1617 
 
9.1.1.2.3. Miscarriage of Justice 
Regardless of the preceding distinction, besides demonstrating an error of fact, as such, an 
appellant must establish that such an error gives rise to a “miscarriage of justice”.1618 The Ad 
Hoc Appeals Chambers have defined a “miscarriage of justice” as a “grossly unfair outcome 
in judicial proceedings”.1619 Such an outcome arises, in general, where a Trial Chamber fails 
to “discharge its obligation by not deducing all the legal implications from the evidence 
                                                 
1614 Ibid., at 24(c)(i). The ICTY Appeals Chamber made this finding in the context of an appeal against 
conviction based on additional evidence. There is no reason to conclude, however, that the same test would not 
be applicable, mutatis mutandis, in an appeal against acquittal based on additional evidence. 
1615 Ibid., at 24(c)(ii). Also: Ndindabahizi, at 68. 
1616 Blaškić, Partial Dissenting Opinion of Judge Weinberg De Roca (also: Kordić & Čerkez, Separate Opinion 
of Judge Weinberg de Roca; Kvočka et al., Separate Opinion of Judge Weinberg De Roca); Kvočka et al., 
Separate Opinion of Judge Shahabuddeen. 
1617 Naletilić & Martinović, at 167 (emphasis supplied). Similar: Nahimana et al., at 466. 
1618 Furundžija, at 37. This criterion entails a modification of the appellate process in respect of prosecutorial 
appeals alleging an error of fact vis-à-vis defence appeals based on such errors. Whereas “[a]n accused must 
show that the Trial Chamber’s factual errors create a reasonable doubt as to his guilt”, the prosecution “must 
show that, when account is taken of the errors of fact committed by the Trial Chamber, all reasonable doubt of 
the accused’s guilt has been eliminated”. See: Bagilishema, at 13. 
1619 Furundžija, at 37. 
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presented”. 1620  In more specific terms, a miscarriage of justice typically manifests itself 
“when a defendant is convicted despite a lack of evidence on an essential element of the 
crime”.1621 With respect to an erroneous acquittal, a miscarriage of justice results from the 
failure to identify “all of the requisite legal implications of the evidence”.1622 Conversely, the 
most obvious example of the absence of a miscarriage of justice is where, despite an error in 
the assessment of a piece of evidence, other evidence continues to support the impugned 
finding,1623 whether or not additional evidence has been presented.1624  
 
9.1.2. Appeal from Sentence 
Although the Statutes of the Ad Hoc Tribunals do not specifically contemplate appeals from 
the Trial Chambers’ sentencing decisions, the appellate provisions are sufficiently generally 
worded to accommodate such appeals. Indeed, the Ad Hoc Appeals Chambers have 
entertained appeals that do not concern the merits of a trial judgment, but seek an adjustment 
of the sentence imposed at first instance. Such appeals typically concern requests for appellate 
review of the sentencing procedure following a guilty plea1625 and specific grounds of appeal 
alleging that, irrespective of errors of law or fact allegedly committed on the merits, the Trial 
Chamber erroneously exercised its sentencing discretion.1626 
 
9.1.2.1. Standard of Review 
Similar to appeals from the merits of trial judgments, the Ad Hoc Appeals Chambers have 
determined that appeals from the sentence imposed by a Trial Chamber do not entail de novo 
review. 1627  They have, accordingly, adopted a deferential attitude to Trial Chambers’ 
assessments as to sentencing.1628 In its first sentencing appeal, the ICTY Appeals Chamber 
                                                 
1620 Rutaganda, at 580. 
1621 Furundžija, at 37. 
1622 Krnojelac, at 172. 
1623 E.g., Nyiramasuhuko et al., at 3097. 
1624 E.g., ibid., at 3110. 
1625 E.g., Serushago Sentencing Appeal, at 2-3; Kambanda Sentencing Appeal, at 2-3; D. Nikolić Sentencing 
Appeal, at 3-5; Babić Sentencing Appeal, at 3-4; Deronjić Sentencing Appeal, at 3-5; Jokić Sentencing Appeal, 
at 3-5; M. Nikolić Sentencing Appeal, at 3-5; Bralo Sentencing Appeal, at 3-5; Zelenović Sentencing Appeal, at 
4-6. 
1626 E.g., Galić, at 438; Gacumbitsi, at 109; Muvunyi II, at 64. 
1627 E.g., Babić Sentencing Appeal, at 6-7; Vasiljević, at 9; M. Nikolić Sentencing Appeal, at 7-8; Jokić 
Sentencing Appeal, at 7-8. Limited exceptions have been made in this regard. See: Kupreškić et al., at 463-464. 
1628 The deferential approach is further underscored by the refusal of the Appeals Chambers to lay down 
sentencing guidelines for Trial Chambers. See: Furundžija, at 238; Delalić et al., at 715-718. 
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noted that “there is no discernible error […] that would permit the Appeals Chamber to 
substitute its own decision for that of the Trial Chamber”.1629  
 
It provided more guidance as to its approach subsequently. Referring to four national 
jurisdictions, it considered that “[a]ppellate review of sentencing […] in the major legal 
systems […] is usually exercised sparingly” and that it “followed this general practice” on the 
basis of the “discernible error” standard.1630  The ICTR Appeals Chamber provided more 
detail as to the discernible error standard thereafter. It held that a discretionary sentencing 
decision may be disturbed on appeal only where “the Trial Chamber either took into account 
what it ought not to have, or failed to take into account what it ought to have […]”.1631 
Whereas this statement has been provided in relation to the appellate review regarding the 
weight attached to mitigating circumstances, the ICTY Appeals Chamber has applied this 
approach to sentencing assessments in general.1632 The latter thereafter reformulated these 
grounds and added two additional ones. It considered that it has to be demonstrated “that the 
Trial Chamber gave weight to extraneous or irrelevant considerations, failed to give weight or 
sufficient weight to relevant considerations, made a clear error as to the facts upon which it 
exercised its discretion, or that the Trial Chamber’s decision was so unreasonable or plainly 
unjust that the Appeals Chamber is able to infer that the Trial Chamber must have failed to 
exercise its discretion properly”. 1633  Moreover, the early emphasis placed by the ICTY 
Appeals Chamber on an erroneous “exercise of discretion” has been expanded by the ICTR 
Appeals Chamber. It considered that it may also disturb a Trial Chamber’s sentencing 
decision if it “has failed to follow applicable law”.1634 
 
However, sentencing errors need not necessarily give rise to an adjustment of the sentence. 
The Ad Hoc Appeals Chambers have most often found that such errors have not had any 
                                                 
1629 Tadić Sentencing Appeal, at 22 (emphasis supplied). 
1630 Aleksovski, at 186-187. 
1631 Serushago Sentencing Appeal, at 23. Also: Delalić et al., at 780. 
1632 D. Nikolić Sentencing Appeal, at 9. 
1633 Babić Sentencing Appeal, at 44. Also: M. Nikolić Sentencing Appeal, at 95; Galić, at 394. 
1634 Serushago Sentencing Appeal, at 23. Also: Akayesu, at 408. The ICTY Appeals Chamber has adopted this 
aspect too. See: Delalić et al., at 725. 
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material effect on the totality of the criminal conduct of the appellant.1635 A lack of effect on 
the sentence has also been found with regard to a range of specific considerations.1636 
 
9.1.2.2. Practical Application 
Comparable to appellate review of errors of fact, 1637  the appellate review of sentencing 
decisions may be separated into two variants in practice. In this regard, “narrow” appellate 
review, characterised by an augmented degree of deference to Trial Chambers’ sentencing 
decisions to the detriment of the Appeals Chambers’ powers to exercise appellate review, and 
“broad” appellate review, revealing an increased willingness to intervene in sentencing 
decisions pursuant to a decreased degree of deference, are distinguishable. 
 
Two main forms of “narrow” appellate review of sentencing decisions have been applied. 
First, such review has, on occasion, been reduced to a mere verification of the factors 
considered by the Trial Chamber. Among other examples,1638 the ICTR Appeals Chamber has 
found that, “[a]s the Trial Chamber clearly considered […] an aggravating factor in some 
detail”, it was not satisfied that it has been established that it “gave insufficient weight” to 
it.1639 Second, appellate review of sentencing decisions has also been effectively omitted on 
the basis of the principle of deference. In this regard, the Appeals Chambers have frequently 
confined their review to unadorned confirmations that Trial Chambers’ assessments of 
sentencing factors or the sentence itself fall within their discretionary frameworks.1640 
 
“Broad” appellate review is mainly reflected in the Appeals Chambers’ interference with Trial 
Chambers’ sentencing determinations on the basis of mere disagreement with the sentence 
imposed. For instance, the ICTY Appeals Chamber has increased a sentence of twenty years’ 
imprisonment to a sentence of life imprisonment, on the basis that, “[a]lthough the Trial 
                                                 
1635 E.g., Jelisić, at 94; Kunarac et al., at 362; Babić Sentencing Appeal, at 59-60; Rutaganda, at 592; Niyitegeka, 
at 269; Ntakirutimana & Ntakirutimana, at 570; Kamuhanda, at 363; Naletilić & Martinović, at 619, 632; 
Šainović et al., at 1844; Popović et al., at 2115-2116; Tolimir, at 648. 
1636 E.g., the fact that an appellant had already been incarcerated when he surrendered voluntarily (Kvočka et al., 
at 713), the probability that a mitigating factor would have been accorded limited weight on the basis of other 
findings of the Trial Chamber (Naletilić & Martinović, at 606), the lack of clarity as to how much weight a Trial 
Chamber had assigned to a particular issue (Kalimanzira, at 229), and the provision of insufficient evidence to 
the ICTY Appeals Chamber (Krnojelac, at 260). 
1637 Part III, Chapter 9.1.1.2. 
1638 E.g., Muvunyi II, at 67-68; Ndindiliyimana et al., at 440, 442; Karemera & Ngirumpatse, at 698. 
1639 Bikindi, at 190 (emphases supplied).  
1640 E.g., Tadić Sentencing Appeal, at 20; Kambanda Sentencing Appeal, at 126; Limaj et al., at 132; Kayishema 
& Ruzindana, at 370; Nahimana et al., at 1106. 
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Chamber did not err in its factual findings and correctly noted the principles governing 
sentencing, it committed an error in finding that the sentence imposed adequately reflects the 
level of gravity of the crimes committed […] and […] [the accused’s] degree of 
participation”.1641 Thus, on the basis of the findings of the Trial Chamber, it concluded that 
the sentence “was so unreasonable and plainly unjust, in that it underestimated the gravity of 
[…] [the accused’s] criminal conduct, that it is able to infer that the Trial Chamber failed to 
exercise its discretion properly”. 1642  A dissenting judge indicated that elements of 
disagreement lay at the basis of the aggravation of sentence. He noted that “the majority 
simply offers conclusory statements”. 1643  Indeed, other jurisprudential references have 
confirmed this interpretation. In a related case, the ICTY Appeals Chamber dismissed an 
identical argument, setting forth that “[m]erely reciting the Trial Chamber’s findings on the 
gravity of the offence does not suffice to show that the Trial Chamber erred in the exercise of 




9.2.1. Appeal from Conviction or Acquittal 
Compared to the Ad Hoc Tribunals’ Statutes, the ICC Statute has expanded the grounds of 
appeal pertaining to decisions of conviction or acquittal. Whereas the former provide for two 
grounds of appeal equally applicable to the convicted person and the prosecutors, the ICC 
Statute sets forth three common grounds of appeal (i.e. procedural error, error of fact, and 
error of law1646) and bestows an additional ground of appeal on the convicted person (i.e. 
“[a]ny other ground that affects the fairness or reliability of the proceedings or decision”1647). 
Even though, as with the Ad Hoc Tribunals’ Statutes,1648 questions have arisen as to the 
distinction between them, these grounds will be assessed individually.1649 
                                                 
1641 Galić, at 455. 
1642 Ibid., at 455. Similar, e.g., Gacumbitsi, at 204; Mrkšić & Šljivančanin, at 413; Nyiramasuhuko et al., at 3424. 
1643 Galić, Separate and Partially Dissenting Opinion of Judge Meron, at 13. 
1644 Milošević, at 323. 
1645 E.g., Kordić & Čerkez, at 1063-1065; Ndindiliyimana et al., at 442. 
1646 Art. 81(1)(a)(i)-(iii), 81(1)(b)(i)-(iii) ICC Statute. 
1647 Art. 81(1)(b)(iv) ICC Statute. 
1648 Part III, Chapter 9.1.1. 
1649 Whereas further issues may crystallise as the jurisprudence of the ICC Appeals Chamber matures, its early 
jurisprudence and/or the wording of the ICC Statute reveal the following two matters of concern. First, with 
regard to the distinction between errors of fact and law, the ICC Appeals Chamber has prioritised the former 
over the latter, in line with the approach of the Ad Hoc Tribunals’ Appeals Chambers. It has explicitly 
considered that, even though an appellant had alleged errors of law, the arguments in question had to “be 




As to the general character of the appellate process of the ICC, the ICC Appeals Chamber has, 
based on the Ad Hoc Tribunals’ jurisprudence, considered that “[…] ‘an appeal is not a trial 
de novo’ […]”.1650 Rather, the ICC’s appellate “proceedings are of a corrective nature, which 
finds expression in, inter alia, the standard of review on appeal”.1651 Accordingly, it has also 
imported certain attendant corollaries of this characterisation of its appellate proceedings, 
namely the exclusion of an unfettered right to adduce additional evidence on appeal1652 and 
the limited body of evidence to be considered1653.  
 
However, this is not an obvious conclusion. Prior to the ICC Appeals Chamber’s holding, 
commentators had noted, as to the question whether an appeal at the ICC is “intended to be a 
‘hearing de novo’ or […] a corrective procedure”, that “[t]he [Rome] Statute is not entirely 
clear on this point, although the specified grounds of appeal would suggest it is more in the 
nature of the latter”.1654 Various elements of the appellate structure of the ICC indeed leave 
room for a broader conception. The ICC Statute mandates the ICC Appeals Chamber to 
                                                                                                                                                        
review the Trial Chamber’s factual findings” (e.g., Ngudjolo, at 44, 129). It has also applied this approach in a 
more implicit manner, by, for instance, adjudicating both alleged errors of law (e.g., Lubanga, at 177-178) and 
arguments concerning the standard of proof (e.g., Lubanga, at 110-118) against the “reasonableness” standard. 
However, the ICC Appeals Chamber has also blurred the distinction between these categories by adjudicating 
grounds of appeal in a general manner and without clarifying the exact category or standard of review at stake 
(e.g., Lubanga, at 205-209). Second, in respect of “[a]ny other ground that affects the fairness or reliability of the 
proceedings or decision”, it has been noted that it “may add little to the other specified grounds of appeal”, as the 
“apparent intention was to include a ‘catch-all’ provision”, but “it is likely that any valid grounds of appeal 
would fall within one of the other categories” (see: C. Staker and F. Eckelmans, ‘Article 81’, in O. Triffterer and 
K. Ambos (eds.), Commentary on the Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court. Observers’ Notes, 
Article by Article 1915 (München: Verlag C.H. Beck, 2016), at 1941. Similar: P. De Cesari, ‘Observations on the 
Appeal before the International Criminal Court’, in M. Politi and G. Nesi (eds.), The Rome Statute of the 
International Criminal Court: a Challenge to Impunity 225 (Aldershot: Ashgate, 2001), at 228). The early 
jurisprudence of the ICC Appeals Chamber seems to confirm this position. In this regard, the ICC Appeals 
Chamber has not drawn a specific distinction between this ground and the other grounds of appeal. For instance, 
it has held that an appellant had failed to establish a fair trial violation (Lubanga, at 136, 171) or the 
erroneousness of a finding (Lubanga, at 153) and that it could not find an “error” on the part of the Trial 
Chamber, without further specification as to the type of error at issue (Lubanga, at 163, 175). It has also referred 
to the “reasonableness” standard on one occasion (Lubanga, at 178), which applies to an error of fact. However, 
a more detailed discussion of these matters is beyond the scope of this research. 
1650 Lubanga, at 26-27 (emphasis in original). 
1651 Ibid., at 56. 
1652 Ibid., at 75. 
1653 Ibid., at 26. 
1654 H. Brady and M. Jennings, ‘Appeal and Revision’, in R. Lee (ed.), The International Criminal Court. The 
Making of the Rome Statute. Issues, Negotiations, Results 294 (The Hague: Kluwer Law International, 1999), at 
585 (emphasis in original). Similar: R. Cryer, H. Friman, D. Robinson, and E. Wilmshurst, An Introduction to 
International Criminal Law and Procedure (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2010), at 473. Contra: C. 
Staker and F. Eckelmans, ‘Article 81’, in O. Triffterer and K. Ambos (eds.), Commentary on the Rome Statute of 
the International Criminal Court. Observers’ Notes, Article by Article 1915 (München: Verlag C.H. Beck, 
2016), at 1922-1923. 
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proprio motu broaden an appeal1655 and to call evidence itself to determine a factual issue.1656 
Moreover, the ICC Appeals Chamber’s entitlement to resort to the Trial Chambers powers 
provides a particularly broad basis to investigate and examine an impugned decision’s factual 
aspects.1657 In this context, it may, most pertinently, adopt “such procedures as are necessary 
to facilitate the fair and expeditious conduct of the proceedings”,1658 “[r]equire the attendance 
and testimony of witnesses and production of documents and other evidence by obtaining, if 
necessary, the assistance of States”,1659 “[o]rder the production of evidence in addition to that 
already collected prior to the trial or presented during the trial by the parties”,1660 request “the 
submission of all evidence that it considers necessary for the determination of the truth”,1661 
and “rule on the relevance or admissibility of any evidence”.1662 
 
9.2.1.1. Procedural Error 
According to the ICC Appeals Chamber, procedural errors occur, in general, “in the 
proceedings leading up to an impugned decision” and they “may be based on events which 
occurred during the trial proceedings and pre-trial proceedings”.1663 In more specific terms, 
under this category, the ICC Appeals Chamber has reviewed a Trial Chamber’s refusal to: 
permit access to certain reports;1664 to use particular documents in cross-examination,1665 and 
to allow a witness to be questioned in a certain manner.1666 
 
Decisions adopted by a Trial Chamber during trial and pre-trial proceedings will often have 
been subject to scrutiny by the ICC Appeals Chamber - or, at least, may have been proposed 
for such scrutiny 1667  - through the interlocutory appeal procedure foreseen by the ICC 
Statute.1668 The question, therefore, arises whether the appellant is barred from arguing the 
same issue in connection with an appeal from a decision of conviction or acquittal, pursuant 
to the res judicata doctrine. In this respect, the ICC Appeals Chamber has determined that no 
                                                 
1655 Art. 81(2)(b)-(c) ICC Statute. 
1656 Art. 83(2) ICC Statute. 
1657 Art. 81 ICC Statute; Rule 149 ICC RPE. 
1658 Art. 64(3)(a) ICC Statute. 
1659 Art. 64(6)(b) ICC Statute. 
1660 Art. 64(6)(d) ICC Statute. 
1661 Art. 69(3) ICC Statute. 
1662 Art. 69(4) ICC Statute. 
1663 Lubanga, at 20; Ngudjolo, at 21. 
1664 Ngudjolo, at 259-270. 
1665 Ibid., at 271-276. 
1666 Ibid., at 277-283. 
1667 Leave to appeal may be denied for such requests on the basis of Art. 82(1)(d) ICC Statute. 
1668 Art. 82 ICC Statute. 
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such impediment exists. After noting that “the impugned decision itself will only rarely 
contain procedural errors” and that “it is likely that any procedural errors are committed in the 
proceedings leading up to a decision” of conviction or acquittal, it has concluded that “it must 
be possible to raise procedural errors on appeal”, since “to decide otherwise would […] 
deprive the parties of the ability to raise procedural errors on appeal”.1669 
 
The ICC Appeals Chamber has determined that “procedural errors often relate to alleged 
errors in a Trial Chamber’s exercise of its discretion”.1670 It has, thus, introduced the standard 
of review it had developed in respect of discretionary decisions in its jurisprudence on appeal 
against other decisions adopted by Trial Chambers.1671 In this regard, it has held that “‘[t]he 
Appeals Chamber will not interfere with the […] Trial Chamber’s exercise of discretion […] 
merely because the Appeals Chamber, if it had the power, might have made a different 
ruling’”.1672 Accordingly, it “will not interfere with the […] Trial Chamber’s exercise of 
discretion […], save where it is shown that that determination was vitiated by an error of law, 
an error of fact, or a procedural error […]’”.1673 This entails that appellate interference is only 
justified: “‘(i) where the exercise of discretion is based on an erroneous interpretation of the 
law; (ii) where it is exercised on patently incorrect conclusion of fact; or (iii) where the 
decision is so unfair and unreasonable as to constitute an abuse of discretion’”.1674 
 
9.2.1.2. Error of Fact 
As with the Ad Hoc Tribunals, an allegation of an error of fact in the appellate procedure of 
the ICC may be based on either the trial record or additional evidence. 
 
9.2.1.2.1. Error of Fact based on the Trial Record 
In comparison with the Ad Hoc Tribunals, the ICC Appeals Chamber has more explicitly 
defined an error of fact. It has held that “it will not interfere with factual findings of the first 
instance Chamber unless it is shown that the Chamber committed a clear error, namely, 
misappreciated the facts, took into account irrelevant facts, or failed to take into account 
                                                 
1669 Ngudjolo, at 247. 
1670 Ibid., at 21. 
1671 Art. 82(1) ICC Statute. 
1672 Ngudjolo, at 21. 
1673 Ibid., at 21. 
1674 Ngudjolo, at 21, referring to: Lubanga Sentencing Appeal, at 41. 
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relevant facts”.1675 As this enumeration appears to be exhaustive, it may be seen as a more 
narrow construction of an error of fact vis-à-vis the Ad Hoc Tribunals.1676 On the other hand, 
the specific illustrations, and in particular the reference to the misappreciation of the facts, 
may be considered wide enough to accommodate the Ad Hoc Tribunals’ definitions too. 
 
The ICC Appeals Chamber has considered that, “[h]aving regard to the similarity between the 
[…] [ICC’s] legal framework and those under which the ad hoc tribunals operate, the Appeals 
Chamber considers it appropriate to apply the same standard” of “reasonableness” in 
reviewing a Trial Chamber’s factual findings.1677 It has further imported the corollaries of this 
standard, namely the primacy of the Trial Chamber in resolving inconsistencies in witness 
testimonies, the deference owed to the Trial Chamber in light of its advantages in assessing 
the credibility and reliability of evidence, and the need for a case-by-case assessment 
regarding the alleged erroneousness of a factual evaluation.1678 
 
As concerns the practical application of the standard of review relating to alleged errors of 
fact, the early jurisprudence of the ICC Appeals Chamber mainly reveals characteristics 
associated with “narrow” appellate review.1679 Most importantly, the ICC Appeals Chamber’s 
review of alleged errors of fact has been reduced to an assessment as to the factors considered 
by a Trial Chamber. For instance, in respect of an argument that a “purportedly erroneous 
finding stems from the Trial Chamber’s reliance on the ‘inaccurate statements of [a] Witness 
[…]’ and its dismissal of direct evidence presented by” other witnesses,1680  the Appeals 
Chamber has held that the appellant had failed “to identify an error” in respect of the first part 
of this argument1681 and that “the Trial Chamber took full account of the conflicting testimony 
of a number of witnesses”.1682 Its reasoning, thus, addresses which considerations the Trial 
Chamber set forth, but it does not reflect whether, in terms of substance, the statements of the 
witness relied on by the Trial Chamber were or were not inaccurate and whether this evidence 
was affected by the other evidence pointed out by the appellant. Similar examples appear in 
                                                 
1675 Ibid., at 21. 
1676 Part III, Chapter 9.1.1.2.1.2. 
1677 Lubanga, at 27. See: Part III, Chapter 9.1.1.2.1.2. 
1678 Lubanga, at 23-25. 
1679 Part III, Chapter 9.1.1.2.1.3. 
1680 Lubanga, at 476. 
1681 Ibid., at 480. 
1682 Ibid., at 481-482. 
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the early jurisprudence of the ICC Appeals Chamber. 1683  The prevalence of “narrow” 
appellate review is further confirmed by pleas for a broader scope of review by a dissenting 
judge of the ICC Appeals Chamber. De novo review of particular evidentiary material has 
been proposed, 1684  on the basis that, “in cases where the appellant has adequately 
substantiated his or her arguments, the Appeals Chamber must assess the evidence at hand 
compared to the factual findings of the Trial Chamber, in order to decide whether these 
findings were reasonable or not, and to give effect to the important safeguards that the right of 
appeal is intended to provide”.1685 
 
9.2.1.2.2. Error of Fact based on Additional Evidence 
The legal regime of the ICC does not specifically set forth the criteria applicable to the 
admissibility of additional evidence on appeal.1686 The ICC Statute provides that “the [ICC] 
Appeals Chamber shall have all the powers of the Trial Chamber”1687 and, in connection 
therewith, that it “may remand a factual issue to the original Trial Chamber for it to determine 
the issue and to report back accordingly, or may itself call evidence to determine the 
issue”.1688 On this basis, the ICC Appeals Chamber disposes of far-reaching prerogatives. 
Most pertinently, it may invoke the powers of the Trial Chamber to “[r]equire the attendance 
and testimony of witnesses and production of documents and other evidence by obtaining, if 
necessary, the assistance of States”;1689 “[o]rder the production of evidence in addition to that 
already collected prior to the trial or presented during the trial”; 1690  and request “the 
submission of all evidence that it considers necessary for the determination of the truth”.1691 
 
Despite the ostensible flexibility inherent in the legal framework, the ICC Appeals Chamber 
has adopted a rather conservative approach to additional evidence, inspired by the Ad Hoc 
Tribunals. In this regard, it has considered that, although the Ad Hoc Tribunals’ 
                                                 
1683 Ibid., at 235, 245-248, 350-352, 428-432; Ngudjolo, at 150-153, 191-192, 204, 219. 
1684 Lubanga, Dissenting Opinion of Judge Anita Ušacka, at 50. 
1685 Ibid., at 51. 
1686 E.g., L. Carter, ‘The Importance of Understanding Criminal Justice Principles in the Context of International 
Criminal Procedure: The Case of Admitting Evidence on Appeal’, in G. Venturini and S. Bariatti (eds.), Liber 
Fausto Pocar: Individual Rights and International Justice 125 (Milano: Giuffre Editore, 2009), at 129; H. Brady 
and M. Jennings, ‘Appeal and Revision’, in R. Lee (ed.), The International Criminal Court. The Making of the 
Rome Statute. Issues, Negotiations, Results 294 (The Hague: Kluwer Law International, 1999), at 585-586. 
1687 Art. 83(1) ICC Statute. Also: Rule 149 ICC RPE. 
1688 Art. 83(2) ICC Statute. 
1689 Art. 64(6)(b) ICC Statute. 
1690 Art. 64(6)(d) ICC Statute. 
1691 Art. 69(3) ICC Statute. 
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“jurisprudence may be of assistance, the Court’s legal texts provide for the criteria that are 
applicable with regard to the admissibility of evidence on appeal”.1692 But, after developing 
these criteria, it has concluded that they “are in many respects similar to those applied by […] 
the ad hoc tribunals”.1693 As to the specific criteria, it has found that “the [trial] criteria of 
relevance,1694  probative value and potential prejudicial effect [to a fair trial or to a fair 
evaluation of the testimony of a witness] also apply to the admission of evidence at the 
appellate stage of proceedings”, as “it would be of no use to admit evidence into the record 
that is irrelevant, devoid of probative value or potentially prejudicial”. 1695  It went on to 
consider that this is not an exhaustive list and that, therefore, other criteria “can be taken into 
account, especially given the distinct features of the appellate stage of proceedings”. 1696 
Noting that ICC appellate proceedings “are of a corrective nature”1697 and that the evaluation 
of the evidence “is the primary responsibility of the relevant Trial Chamber”1698, it has found 
that “allowing the admission of additional evidence on appeal, without further restriction, 
entails a real risk of litigation strategies that contemplate the presentation of evidence for the 
first time on appeal, even if such evidence was available at trial or, with due diligence, could 
have been produced”.1699  Accordingly, it has concluded that it “will generally not admit 
additional evidence on appeal unless there are convincing reasons why such evidence was not 
presented at trial, including whether there was a lack of due diligence”.1700 This criterion is, in 
fact, contained in the ICC Regulations of the Court, which provide that “[a] participant 
seeking to present additional evidence shall file an application setting out: (a) [t]he evidence 
to be presented; [and] (b) [t]he ground of appeal to which the evidence relates and the reasons, 
if relevant, why the evidence was not adduced before the Trial Chamber”.1701 Especially 
illustrative of its restrictive approach, the ICC Appeals Chamber has found that, although the 
ICC Regulations of the Court do not do so, “it is necessary to introduce the criterion that it 
must be demonstrated that the additional evidence could have led the Trial Chamber to enter a 
different verdict, in whole or in part”, as it “derives from the principle that evidence should, 
                                                 
1692 Lubanga, at 53. 
1693 Ibid., at 63. 
1694 Ibid., at 74, 93. 
1695 Ibid., at 54 (footnote supplied). 
1696 Ibid., at 55. 
1697 Ibid., at 56. 
1698 Ibid., at 57. 
1699 Ibid., at 57. 
1700 Ibid., at 58. See: e.g., ibid, at 75-79, 92. 
1701 Regulation 62(1) ICC Regulations. 
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as far as possible, be presented before the Trial Chamber”.1702 Despite these limitations, the 
ICC Appeals Chamber has also introduced a residual power. Thus, it has found that “it is 
within its discretion to admit additional evidence on appeal despite a negative finding on one 
or more of the above-mentioned criteria, if there are compelling reasons for doing so”.1703 
 
However, the early appellate jurisprudence of the ICC Appeals Chamber also discloses a 
divergence with the approach of the Ad Hoc Tribunals. Whereas the Ad Hoc Tribunals decide, 
in general, upon the admissibility of additional evidence prior to hearing such evidence,1704 
the ICC Appeals Chamber may proceed in the reverse order. According to the ICC 
Regulations of the Court, the ICC Appeals Chamber may “[d]ecide to first rule on the 
admissibility of the additional evidence, in which case it shall direct the participant affected 
by the application […] to address the issue of admissibility of the evidence in his or her 
response, and to adduce any evidence in response only after a decision on the admissibility of 
that evidence has been issued by the Appeals Chamber; or […] “[d]ecide to rule on the 
admissibility of the additional evidence jointly with the other issues raised in the appeal, in 
which case it shall direct the participant affected by the application […] to both file a response 
setting out arguments on that application and to adduce any evidence in response”. 1705 
However, the latter sequence may be cumbersome. As noted by the ICC prosecutor, it could 
entail that a response would have to be filed to arguments “that are based on evidence that is 
not part of the record, while arguing, at the same time, that the evidence is inadmissible”.1706 
The ICC Appeals Chamber found, however, that this approach does not “exclude […] the 
making of interlocutory decisions in relation to the proposed additional evidence”.1707 
 
Additional evidence may be heard at the appellate hearing.1708 In this regard, the ICC Appeals 
Chamber has adopted “procedures similar to those used during the trial proceedings”,1709 in 
respect of which it has determined the Parties’ rights to communicate with the witnesses prior 
                                                 
1702 Lubanga, at 59. See: e.g., ibid, at 104, 113. 
1703 Ibid., at 62. 
1704 Part III, Chapter 9.1.1.2.1. However, the ICTY Appeals Chamber has also considered such a course of 
action. See: Kupreškić et al., at 71. 
1705 Regulation 62(2) ICC Regulations. 
1706 Directions under Regulation 62 of the Regulations of the Court, Prosecutor v. Lubanga, Case No. ICC-
01/04-01/06, ICC, Appeals Chamber, 21 December 2012, at 3. 
1707 Ibid., at 8. Also: Lubanga, at 80. 
1708 Scheduling Order for a Hearing before the Appeals Chamber, Prosecutor v. Lubanga, Case No. ICC-01/04-
01/06, ICC, Appeals Chamber, 21 March 2014, at 1(a). 
1709 Scheduling Order and Decision in Relation to the Conduct of the Hearing before the Appeals Chamber, 
Prosecutor v. Lubanga, Case No. ICC-01/04-01/06, ICC, Appeals Chamber, 30 April 2014, at 17. 
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to their testimony,1710 the order and time-frame of the questioning of the witnesses,1711 the 
procedure for the notification of the materials used during the questioning of the witnesses,1712 
and the conduct and scope of the Parties’ questioning of the witnesses.1713 
 
However, having rejected requests for the admission of additional evidence on appeal in its 
early jurisprudence,1714 the ICC Appeals Chamber has not explicitly set forth the standard of 
review applicable to alleged errors of fact based on additional evidence. 
 
9.2.1.3. Error of Law 
In respect of appeals from decisions of acquittal or conviction, the ICC Appeals Chamber has 
not set out what an error of law entails in general. However, based on the standard of review, 
as set forth below, such errors must be taken to concern, first and foremost, Trial Chambers’ 
“‘interpretation of the law’”.1715 This understanding corresponds with the approach of the 
early jurisprudence of the ICC Appeals Chamber. It has, for instance, reviewed Trial 
Chambers’ interpretation of elements of crimes,1716 modes of liability,1717 the possibility of 
treating separate crimes together, 1718  the standard of proof, 1719  and the definition of 
evidence.1720 However, an error of law does not encapsulate two closely associated matters, 
namely procedural issues and fair trial rights,1721 as they may be appealed separately. 
 
In a manner similar to the Ad Hoc Tribunals’ Appeals Chambers, 1722  the ICC Appeals 
Chamber has determined that it reviews matters of law de novo. Thus, it “will not defer to the 
Trial Chamber’s interpretation of the law”, but “it will arrive at its own conclusions as to the 
appropriate law and determine whether or not the Trial Chamber misinterpreted the law”.1723 
  
                                                 
1710 Ibid., at 2(b), 19. 
1711 Ibid., at 2(c), 24. 
1712 Ibid., at 2(d), 20-23. 
1713 Ibid., at 2(e). 
1714 Lubanga, at 65-113. 
1715 Ibid., at 18. 
1716 Ibid., at 283-303, 322-340. 
1717 Ibid., at 441-473. 
1718 Ibid., at 307-313. 
1719 Ngudjolo, at 93, 123-125. 
1720 Ibid., at 217. 
1721 Part III, Chapter 9.2.1.1; Part III, Chapter 9.2.1.4. 
1722 Part III, Chapter 9.1.1.1. 




9.2.1.4. Any other Ground 
Commentators have suggested that this ground differs from “procedural errors, as it “should 
be substantive”, which would entail that it would cover various fair trial issues and the 
conduct of the trial on the basis of “grounds originally unconnected with it, e.g., an armed 
conflict or uprising in the city where the Court is located, or a threat to the safety of the 
audience or participants”.1724 The ICC Appeals Chamber has addressed this matter in a rather 
hesitant manner. With respect to allegations of violations of fair trial rights, it has held that, 
“[i]n keeping with articles 81 (1) (b) (iv) […] of the [Rome] Statute, these allegations are 
considered […] in relation to whether his rights have been violated […]”.1725 In addition, as is 
apparent from the dearth of analysis concerning this ground of appeal, the ICC Appeals 
Chamber has not defined a specific standard of review.  
 
9.2.1.5. Affected Reliability or Materially Affected 
In addition to establishing one of the aforementioned categories, an appellant must establish 
that, in respect of “[a]ny other ground that affects the fairness or reliability of the proceedings 
or decision”, “that the proceedings appealed from were unfair in a way that affected the 
reliability of the decision or sentence” and, in respect of procedural error, error of fact, or 
error of law, “that the decision or sentence appealed from was materially affected”.1726  
 
Whereas the ICC Appeals Chamber has not provided a specific definition of the former 
criterion,1727 it has addressed the latter in more detail. In this regard, it has found that it has to 
be demonstrated that, “in the absence of the […] error, the judgment would have substantially 
differed from the one rendered”.1728 It has further clarified that “this standard is high – it must 
be demonstrated that, had the Trial Chamber not erred […], the decision […] would (as 
opposed to “could” or “might”) have been substantially different”.1729 
 
As discussed, the Ad Hoc Appeals Chambers have found that they may dispense with the 
corresponding “invalidation” criterion regarding errors of law and discuss matters of general 
                                                 
1724 R. Roth and M. Henzelin, ‘The Appeal Procedure of the ICC’, in A. Cassese, P. Gaeta, and J. Jones (eds.), 
The Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court: a Commentary 1535 (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 
2002), at 1544-1545. 
1725 Lubanga, at 28. 
1726 Arts. 81(1), 83(2) ICC Statute. 
1727 Lubanga, at 28. 
1728 Ibid., at 20; Ngudjolo, at 21. 
1729 Ngudjolo, at 285 (emphasis in original). 
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significance for the jurisprudence.1730 It has been noted that the justification of the Ad Hoc 
Tribunals, i.e. their ad hoc and temporary nature, “doesn’t apply to the” ICC and, therefore, 
that the latter “is likely to confine itself to the terms of article 83” of its Statute.1731 The more 
detailed nature of the ICC Statute and the fact that the verdicts of the ICC Appeals Chamber 
do not bind other chambers1732 further render such an expansive approach as to errors of law 
improbable. Even though the ICC Appeals Chamber has not expressly set forth its views in 
respect of this issue, signals from its early jurisprudence confirm these assessments. It has, for 
instance, “decided not to consider a question of law”, since a “determination [by a Trial 
Chamber] has not been challenged on appeal by any of the parties”.1733 
 
9.2.2. Appeal from Sentence 
In contradistinction to the Ad Hoc Tribunals’ Statutes’ general language,1734 the ICC Statute 
explicitly sets forth that both decisions of conviction and acquittal, on the one hand, and the 
sentence, on the other hand, may be appealed.1735 A particular ground of appeal may be 
invoked in respect of an appeal from a sentence, i.e. “disproportion between the crime and the 
sentence”.1736 The ICC Appeals Chamber has confirmed that a decision on sentence is only 
appealable on this basis.1737 It has further stated that “[p]roportionality is generally measured 
by the degree of harm caused by the crime and the culpability of the perpetrator and, in this 
regard, relates to the determination of the length of sentence”.1738 
 
The designation of a single ground of appeal could be seen to narrow the jurisdiction of the 
ICC Appeals Chamber in relation to such appeals. Interpreted narrowly, the review of the 
proportionality of the sentence vis-à-vis the crime need not encompass the facets of appellate 
review associated with decisions of conviction or acquittal, such as the interpretation of the 
law or the assessment of factual elements. However, such effects seem to have been largely 
                                                 
1730 Part III, Chapter 9.1.1.1. 
1731 W. Schabas, The International Criminal Court: A Commentary on the Rome Statute (Oxford: Oxford 
University Press, 2010), at 954-955. A dissenting judge has found that “it is necessary for the Appeals Chamber 
to address this issue proprio motu”. Lubanga, Partly Dissenting Opinion of Judge Sang-Hyun Song, at 1 
(emphasis in original). 
1732 According to Art. 21(2) ICC Statute, “[t]he Court may apply principles and rules of law as interpreted in its 
previous decisions” (emphasis supplied). 
1733 Lubanga, at 37-38. 
1734 Part III, Chapter 9.1.2. 
1735 Art. 81 ICC Statute. 
1736 Art. 81(2)(a) ICC Statute. 
1737 Lubanga Sentencing Appeal, at 40. 
1738 Ibid., at 40. 
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avoided in the early jurisprudence of the ICC Appeals Chamber. In this regard, it has held that 
“[t]he drafting history reveals that delegates considered including the qualifiers of 
‘significantly’ or ‘manifestly disproportionate’, but ultimately rejected them”.1739 Furthermore, 
it has considered that “arguments which challenge findings in the Conviction Decision that 
are raised for the first time” on appeal will be considered on a case-by-case basis and will not, 
therefore, be dismissed in limine.1740 
 
Aligning itself with the Ad Hoc Tribunals,1741  the ICC Appeals Chamber has adopted a 
deferential approach to appeals against a sentence imposed by a Trial Chamber. In this regard, 
it has held that its “primary task is to review whether the Trial Chamber made any errors in 
sentencing the convicted person” and “not to determine, on its own, which sentence is 
appropriate”.1742 This language amounts to a rejection of an appeal de novo in respect of 
sentencing too. It has further clarified that, in the context of sentencing, “the weight given to 
an individual [sentencing] factor and the balancing of all relevant [sentencing] factors is at the 
core of a Trial Chamber’s exercise of discretion”. 1743  Accordingly, it has imported the 
corresponding standard for appellate review employed by the Ad Hoc Tribunals.1744  
 
The early jurisprudence of the ICC mainly reveals a “narrow” approach to sentencing appeals 
in practice.1745 The primary illustration of such an approach is the provision of reasoning that 




9.3.1. Conviction and Sentence 
Despite the variations in the relevant provisions, the output of the human rights monitoring 
bodies and courts contains a common core in respect of the scope of appellate review 
pertaining to the conviction and the sentence. It entails that both the conviction and sentence 
                                                 
1739 Ibid., at 40. 
1740 Ibid., at 50. 
1741 Ibid., at 46. 
1742 Ibid., at 39. 
1743 Ibid., at 43. 
1744 Ibid., at 44. See: Part III, Chapter 9.1.2.1. 
1745 Part III, Chapter 9.1.2.1. 
1746 E.g., Lubanga Sentencing Appeal, at 73, 93, 111. 
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must be reviewed on appeal, but that appellate review may be limited to sentencing on 
account of the nature of the procedure or the behaviour of the person concerned.1747 
 
The appellate procedures of the Ad Hoc Tribunals and the ICC clearly comply with this norm. 
The jurisprudence of the former has established that the language of the Statutes of the Ad 
Hoc Tribunals encompasses appeals from sentences, whereas the ICC Statute expressly 
contemplates appellate review as to both components of first instance proceedings. Moreover, 
the Ad Hoc Appeals Chambers have only confined their appellate review to matters of 
sentencing on admissible grounds, namely as a result of plea agreements1748 and the ICC 
Appeals Chamber may be expected to follow an identical approach.1749 
 
9.3.2. Facts and Law 
Since the Appeals Chambers of the Ad Hoc Tribunals and ICC have been empowered to 
determine matters of guilt or innocence,1750 they must, as a matter of international human 
rights law,1751 assess factual issues of a determinative nature. The scope of appellate review 
provided by the Ad Hoc and ICC Appeals Chambers is in accordance with this norm.1752 
Whereas the “wide” type of appellate review provided by the Ad Hoc Appeals Chambers 
clearly envisages the assessment of factual matters, arguments based on factual considerations 
have not been excluded under the “narrow” type of appellate review exercised by both the Ad 
Hoc and ICC Appeals Chambers either, without entering into a trial de novo.1753 
 
Even though the human rights monitoring bodies and courts have not specifically determined 
the scope of appellate review required in respect of appellate proceedings based on additional 
evidence, the approach of the Appeals Chambers of the Ad Hoc Tribunals and the ICC does 
not, as such, conflict with human rights norms. These types of appellate proceedings 
explicitly broaden the factual scope of appellate proceedings and, thus, fall in line with the 
aforementioned need to provide for appellate review of matters of law and fact. Moreover, as 
                                                 
1747 Part II, Chapter 5.1.4.7.1; Part II, Chapter 6.1. 
1748 Part III, Chapter 4.1; Part III, Chapter 9.1.2. 
1749 Part III, Chapter 4.1; Part III, Chapter 9.2.2. 
1750 Part III, Chapter 10. 
1751 Part II, Chapter 5.1.4.7.2; Part II, Chapter 6.2.3. 
1752 In light of the conclusion that the practical application of the requirements concerning the form of written 
submissions by the Ad Hoc Tribunals is not reconcilable with the need to ensure a reasonable degree of 
clarity/foreseeability in the regulation of appellate proceedings, it is not possible to consider whether the scope of 
review afforded to arguments dismissed summarily is in accordance with standards of international human rights 
law. This inconsistency precludes such an assessment. See: Part III, Chapter 7.2.5. 
1753 Part III, Chapter 9.1.1.2.1.3; Part III, Chapter 9.2.1.2.1. 
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discussed, the scope of appellate review must encompass both conviction and sentence, but 
may be confined to sentencing on account of the nature of the procedure or the behaviour of 
the person concerned.1754 This would entail, a contrario¸ that the scope of appellate review 
may also be broadened on appeal on account of a request by the convicted person, such as in 
the case of a motion to present additional evidence on appeal.  
 
9.3.3. Regulation of Scope of Appellate Review 
In addition to the aforementioned components, the scope of appellate review also engages the 
general discretion to regulate the appellate process. The combination of various legal 
traditions in the procedural systems of the Ad Hoc Tribunals and the ICC implies a particular 
choice for the type of appellate review.1755 Thus, the scope of appellate review of the Appeals 
Chambers of the Ad Hoc Tribunals and the ICC must comply with the outer limits of the 
discretion to regulate the appellate process recognised in international human rights law, 
namely the preservation of the core of the right to appeal and the conservation of a reasonable 
degree of clarity/foreseeability and accessibility.1756 
 
Commencing with the latter aspect, whereas the ICC Appeals Chamber has more consistently 
applied a “narrow” form of appellate review regarding alleged errors of fact based on the trial 
record and sentencing appeals,1757 the scope of appellate review provided by the Ad Hoc 
Tribunals has swung back and forth between a “narrow” and “broad” variety of appellate 
review in relation to these matters.1758 The Ad Hoc Appeals Chambers have not been able to 
formulate a clear and consistent approach in this regard. Indeed, individual judges have 
exhibited their divisions in separate and dissenting opinions.1759 Accordingly, the type of 
appellate review applied in such situations has been unclear or unforeseeable to an 
unreasonable degree. Therefore, in this respect, the Ad Hoc Appeals Chambers have exceeded 
the discretion afforded by international human rights law to regulate the appellate process. 
Whereas the Ad Hoc Tribunals have inconsistently applied the standard for appellate review 
concerning errors of fact based on additional evidence too,1760 the uncertainty affecting the 
practical application of this variation of the appellate review of the Ad Hoc Tribunals has 
                                                 
1754 Part II, Chapter 5.1.4.7.1. 
1755 Part I, Chapter 5.1.6; Part III, Chapter 1. 
1756 Part II, Chapter 5.1.3.1; Part II, Chapter 6.1; Part III, Chapter 3. 
1757 Part III, Chapter 9.2.1.2.1; Part III, Chapter 9.2.2. 
1758 Part III, Chapter 9.1.1.2.1.3; Part III, Chapter 9.1.2.2. 
1759 Ibid. 
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been confined to a relatively limited number of cases.1761 In addition, the ICTY Appeals 
Chamber has provided reasoning as to its initial reorientation towards an autonomous scope 
of appellate review regarding such errors. 1762  Therefore, although regrettable, these 
inconsistencies are not of such a nature to warrant the conclusion that this facet of the scope 
of appellate review is unclear or unforeseeable to an unreasonable degree. 
 
Turning to the former issue, although the ICC Appeals Chamber has not been in a position to 
address this matter in its early jurisprudence, the Ad Hoc Appeals Chamber have decided, in 
principle, to apply an autonomous standard of review in respect of alleged errors of facts 
based on additional evidence, so as to ensure that “a conclusion of guilt based on the totality 
of evidence relied upon in the case” is, at least, achieved on appeal.1763 This standard appears 
to confer a first instance role onto the Ad Hoc Appeals Chambers, which would render an 
appeal from such a conviction impossible in the context of a two-tier legal process. The 
exercise of the discretion to regulate the appellate process by the Ad Hoc Appeals Chambers 
could, therefore, be seen to annul the right to appeal in such situations.1764 Even so, such a 
final appellate assessment does not adjust the appellate process to such an extent to warrant 
the conclusion that the right to appeal has been fully cancelled out. As discussed, appellate 
review of sufficient scope remains encapsulated by this type of appellate scrutiny. 1765 
Furthermore, it is critical that, when additional evidence is adduced by the prosecutor, the 
accused is entitled to address the admissibility of such evidence and its impact on the 
impugned findings.1766 It, therefore, allows the defendant to exercise his rights on appeal. 
Accordingly, the approach of the Ad Hoc Appeals Chambers remains within the confines set 
by international human rights law. 
 
10. Powers of Ad Hoc and ICC Appeals Chambers 
 
10.1. Ad Hoc Tribunals 
The Ad Hoc Tribunals’ legal texts contain two sets of provisions relevant to the Appeals 
Chambers’ powers. First, the Ad Hoc Statutes set forth that the Appeals Chambers “may 
                                                 
1761 Ibid. 
1762 Ibid. 
1763 Blaškić, at 23. 
1764 Part II, Chapter 5.1.3.1. 
1765 Part III, Chapter 9.3.2. 
1766 Part III, Chapter 9.1.1.2.2.1. 
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affirm, reverse or revise the decisions taken by the Trial Chamber”.1767 These powers will be 
discussed in respect of both appeals from the trial judgment’s merits or the sentence imposed, 
as the case may be. Second, the Ad Hoc RPE stipulate that “[i]n appropriate circumstances 
the Appeals Chamber[s] may order that the accused be retried according to law”. 1768 
Furthermore, the Appeals Chambers have expressly invoked their inherent powers as 
supplementary to the powers conferred on them by their Statutes and RPE. Finally, the 
application of the powers of the Ad Hoc Appeals Chambers in respect of prosecutorial 
appeals will be described separately, considering the particular nature of such appeals. 
 
10.1.1. Affirm, Reverse, or Revise 
 
10.1.1.1. Affirm 
The power to “affirm” logically entails a lack of appellate intervention in respect of first 
instance proceedings. Affirmations mainly result from the fact that, in practice, the Ad Hoc 
Appeals Chambers dismiss the vast majority of grounds of appeal on substantive grounds. 
Trial judgments or first instance sentences may also be affirmed where a Trial Chamber has 
erred. If the threshold for appellate intervention has not been met (i.e. if an error of law has 
not invalidated the impugned judgment, an error of fact has not occasioned a miscarriage of 
justice, or a sentencing error has not had material effect on the sentence imposed at first 
instance), the Ad Hoc Appeals Chambers need not correct an error.  
 
10.1.1.2. Reverse 
The plain meaning of the verb “to reverse” is “to make (something) the opposite of what it 
was”.1769 It, therefore, mainly pertains to the conversion of a first instance conviction into an 
acquittal on appeal or vice versa in the context of judicial proceedings.  
 
Such an interpretation also entails that this power is inherently incompatible with the nature of 
an appeal from a sentence imposed by a Trial Chamber. Considering that sentencing appeals 
in the context of a conviction do not pertain to the innocence of the person concerned,1770 a 
conviction pronounced at first instance may not be reversed into an acquittal on this basis. 
                                                 
1767 Art. 25(2) ICTY Statute; Art. 24(2) ICTR Statute. 
1768 E.g., Jelisić, at 73, 77; Krajišnik, at 799. 
1769 C. Soanes and A. Stevenson (eds.), Oxford Dictionary of English (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2006). 
1770 Furundžija, at 253; Kayishema & Ruzindana, at 369. 
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This is further confirmed by the Appeals Chambers’ discussion of their power to “revise” in 
various appeals from sentencing decisions and the concomitant absence of references to the 
power to “reverse”.1771 In addition, this issue does not arise in the context of an acquittal, as 
no sentence will have been imposed and, therefore, such an appeal necessarily concerns the 
merits of the trial judgment. Therefore, the ensuing discussion is restricted to the power to 
“reverse” in the context of appeals from the merits of a trial judgment. 
 
10.1.1.2.1. Errors of Law 
In respect of errors of law, the Appeals Chambers have explicitly found that they may 
determine the ramifications of such errors themselves. After proceeding first as a matter of 
course,1772 the ICTY Appeals Chamber overtly established its powers in this respect. It has 
considered that, where an error of law arises, “it is open to the Appeals Chamber to articulate 
the correct legal standard and to review the relevant findings of the Trial Chamber 
accordingly”.1773 In addition, it has held that, “[i]n doing so, the Appeals Chamber not only 
corrects a legal error, but applies the correct legal standard to the evidence contained in the 
trial record […] and must determine whether it is itself convinced beyond reasonable doubt as 
to the factual finding”. 1774  Further, the ICTY Appeals Chamber has clarified that a 
supplementary step is involved where additional evidence has been presented on appeal. If it 
is itself convinced beyond reasonable doubt as to the finding of guilt 1775  following the 
application of the aforementioned test, it will “determine whether, in light of the trial evidence 
and additional evidence admitted on appeal, it is itself still convinced beyond reasonable 
doubt as to the finding of guilt” as a second step.1776 
 
These powers have been employed in a wide-ranging manner by the Ad Hoc Appeals 
Chambers. For instance, errors of law concerning Trial Chambers’ definitions of crimes and 
                                                 
1771 E.g., D. Nikolić Sentencing Appeal, at 9; Babić Sentencing Appeal, at 7; Deronjić Sentencing Appeal, at 8. 
1772 For instance, after famously finding that a test of “overall control” should be applied in the determination of 
the international or non-international armed character of an armed conflict, rather than the “effective control” 
test developed by the ICJ, it continued to hold that it “must now apply its foregoing analysis to the facts and 
draw the necessary legal conclusions therefrom”. See: Tadić, at 80-145, 149. Similar: Tadić, at 185-228, 230-
232; Krnojelac, at 97, 105-113. 
1773 Blaškić, at 15. Also: Nahimana et al., at 13. 
1774 Blaškić, at 15, 24(b), 24(d)(i). Also: Nahimana et al., at 13. 
1775 The ICTY Appeals Chamber has made this finding in the context of an appeal against conviction based on 
additional evidence. There is no reason to conclude, however, that the same test would not be applicable, mutatis 
mutandis, in an appeal against acquittal based on additional evidence, in light of the equal rights of appeal 
afforded to the prosecutor and defendant. 
1776 Blaškić, at 24(d)(ii). 
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modes of liability have resulted in conclusive determinations on the guilt or innocence of the 
person concerned on multiple occasions.1777 Errors of law arising out of Trial Chambers’ 
failure to provide a reasoned opinion have proven to be a particularly effective vehicle in this 
regard. For example, the jurisprudence of the ICTY indicates that such an error could lead to a 
broader role for the Appeals Chamber than foreseen in the Statute. After finding that a Trial 
Chamber had failed “to discuss all constituent elements of all crimes charged […]”, it has 
noted that it had been forced “to reassess a plethora of evidence in order to find out whether 
or not all constituent elements of the crimes were established during trial, instead of being in 
a position […] of focussing on the mere legal and factual issues of the case”.1778 The Appeals 
Chambers’ de novo review of witnesses’ credibility or reliability pursuant to such an error, in 
spite of the deference traditionally owed to Trial Chambers in this respect, constitutes a 
further manifestation of the wide-ranging effects of the power to reverse.1779  
 
However, the practical application of the powers of the Ad Hoc Appeals Chambers in 
connection with errors of law has revealed considerable ambiguity in various respects. 
 
First, it has remained unclear whether the Ad Hoc Appeals Chambers apply an autonomous or 
deferential standard of review upon concluding that an error of law has been committed by a 
Trial Chamber. The aforementioned reference to “itself” in the general description of the 
standard of review pertaining to errors of law clearly points to an autonomous review standard, 
according to which the Appeals Chambers would have to determine the matter from their own 
perspective. This test has, indeed, been applied on a number of occasions.1780 The ICTY 
Appeals Chamber has even explicitly referred to the need to assess relevant evidence de novo 
in certain cases.1781 However, several judges of the Appeals Chambers have dissented from 
cases in which de novo review has been applied after finding an error of law.1782 Considering 
                                                 
1777 Martić, at 313-320; Kalimanzira, at 160-165; Perišić, at 43-74. 
1778 Kordić & Čerkez, at 387 (emphasis supplied). Similar: Nahimana et al., at 477; Nzabonimana, at 383-384; 
Stanišić & Simatović, at 80; Ndindiliyimana et al., at 56, 293, 316. However, the ICTR Appeals Chamber has 
also considered that “[t]he absence of discussion reconciling the apparently contradictory evidence of” witnesses 
warranted, as such, the quashing of a conviction. A review of the evidentiary record was, thus, not carried out by 
the ICTR Appeals Chamber in this situation. See: Nchamihigo, at 345-355. 
1779 E.g., Bizimungu, at 64; Kalimanzira, at 99-100; Lukić & Lukić, at 62; Haradinaj et al., at 134, 147, 154, 226, 
254. 
1780 E.g., Hadžihasanović & Kubura, at 266; Nahimana et al., at 736, 754; Kalimanzira, at 160, 200-201; 
Seromba, at 161, 185; Strugar, at 297-308; Ðorđević, at 863-869, 876-901, 919-927. 
1781 E.g., Perišić, at 45, 70-71, 96; Gotovina & Markač, at 110. 
1782 E.g., Stakić, Partly Dissenting Opinion of Judge Shahabuddeen, at 2-7; Seromba, Dissenting Opinion of 
Judge Liu, at 11-12; Kalimanzira, Partially Dissenting and Separate Opinions of Judge Pocar, at 4-5. 
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this chasm, it is not surprising that the Appeals Chambers have also frequently applied a 
detached perspective, i.e., after concluding that an error of law had been committed, they have 
asked whether the impugned finding was one that no reasonable trier of fact could have 
reached.1783 In addition, the ICTY Appeals Chamber has explicitly rejected de novo review in 
a particular case. It has found that, “given the factually complex circumstances of this case, an 
appellate assessment […] would require the Appeals Chamber to re-evaluate the entire trial 
record”, but that it “cannot be expected to act as a primary trier of fact”.1784 
 
Second, the scope of the evidence to be considered by the Appeals Chambers in such 
situations has been subject to divergent interpretations. In this regard, the reference to 
“evidence contained in the trial record” has given rise to opposing tendencies. Conflicting 
interpretations of the “trial record” lie at the heart of this matter. As mentioned, the Appeals 
Chambers have found that, in light of the absence of de novo review, only evidence relied on 
by Trial Chambers or referred to by the Parties will be taken into account.1785 However, a 
literal interpretation of the relevant Rules, which stipulate that “the record on appeal shall 
consist of the trial record”,1786 does not impose such limitations and would, therefore, allow 
the Appeals Chambers to peruse the entire trial record on their own motion.1787 In light of 
these matters, the approaches of the Appeals Chambers have varied. In certain instances, the 
Appeals Chambers have limited their review to an assessment of certain findings adopted by 
Trial Chambers, without considering the underlying evidence. For instance, as found by a 
dissenting member of the ICTY Appeals Chamber, the majority had not considered “the 
evidence in the trial record to determine whether the conclusion of the Trial Chamber is still 
valid, but limits its assessment to the Trial Chamber’s analysis and findings”.1788 This was 
illustrated by the fact that the Appeals Chamber had relied on the Trial Chamber’s dismissal 
of a relevant body of evidence as “not wholly conclusive when considered alone”,1789 without 
considering whether the underlying evidence supported this finding. On the other hand, the 
Appeals Chambers have adopted a significantly broader approach, by considering evidence 
                                                 
1783 E.g., Nchamihigo, at 283-286; Ntabakuze, at 171, 174; Blaškić, at 543, 557; Popović et al., at 1417, 1428; 
Ndindiliyimana et al., at 56-61, 71-75; Krnojelac, at 97-113. 
1784 Orić, at 185-186. 
1785 Part III, Chapter 9.1.1. 
1786 Rule 109 ICTY and ICTR RPE. 
1787 Blaškić, Partial Dissenting Opinion of Judge Weinberg De Roca, at 11; Kordić & Čerkez, Separate Opinion 
of Judge Weinberg De Roca, at 5. 
1788 Gotovina & Markač, Dissenting Opinion of Judge Fausto Pocar, at 12 (emphases in original). Also: Gotovina 
& Markač, Dissenting Opinion of Judge Carmel Agius, at 3, 12-14. 
1789 Gotovina & Markač, at 66. 
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that had not been invoked by Trial Chambers. For instance, the ICTR Appeals Chamber has 
reviewed “the Trial Chamber’s factual conclusions and the evidence contained in the trial 
record” with the understanding that “the law should be applied to the factual findings of the 
Trial Chamber, taken as a whole”. 1790  In this regard, a dissenting judge noted that “the 
Majority’s factual conclusions are not all based on findings of fact that have been made by the 
Trial Chamber”, but that it “consistently supplements the Trial Chamber’s findings with the 
testimony of witnesses simply because the ‘Trial Chamber found them to be credible’”.1791  
 
10.1.1.2.2. Errors of Fact 
In contradistinction to errors of law, the Appeals Chambers have been more reticent in the 
formulation of their powers to reverse trial judgments based on errors of fact in the absence of 
additional evidence presented on appeal. Whereas the ICTY Appeals Chamber has stated that 
it may “substitute its own finding for that of the Trial Chamber”,1792 it has not explicitly 
determined that it may apply its findings to the trial record. However, the jurisprudence leaves 
no doubt that, in effect, the Appeals Chambers have conclusively settled issues upon finding 
an error of fact. For instance, as a result of determinations that no reasonable trier of fact 
could have concluded that the impugned finding was the only reasonable inference on the 
evidence before the Trial Chamber, the Ad Hoc Appeals Chambers have often quashed 
findings and pronounced convictions or acquittals.1793 
 
The description of the Appeals Chambers’ powers in respect of errors of fact based on 
additional evidence on appeal was initially marked by a similar reticence. With regard to the 
need for adversarial scrutiny of the additional evidence, the ICTY Appeals Chamber held that 
it can “either […] test the evidence itself to determine veracity, or order the case to be 
remitted to a Trial Chamber […] to hear the new evidence”.1794 The latter option would imply 
that the primary fact-finding role of the Trial Chambers would be sustained and that the 
Appeals Chambers would retain their limited role in respect of factual issues. However, the 
aforementioned statement of the ICTY Appeals Chamber that it “should […] be convinced 
                                                 
1790 Seromba, at 161-162. 
1791 Seromba, Dissenting Opinion of Judge Liu, at 11. Also: Lukić & Lukić, Dissenting Opinion of Judge 
Morrison, at 29. 
1792 Kupreškić et al., at 30. 
1793 E.g., Milošević, at 277; Mrkšić & Šljivančanin, at 61-62, 103; Šainović et al., at 452, 453, 504, 520; Popović 
et al., at 774-775; Bagosora & Nsengiyumva, at 283, 303; Nizeyimana, at 151-159, 274-276; Mugenzi & 
Mugiraneza, at 88-91, 94, 136-142; Bizimungu, at 138-139, 174, 251- 253. 
1794 Kupreškić et al., at 70. Also: Part III, Chapter 9.1.1.2.2.1. 
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itself, beyond reasonable doubt, as to the guilt of the accused […]”, so as to prevent that 
“neither in the first instance, nor on appeal, would a conclusion of guilt based on the totality 
of evidence relied upon in the case, assessed in light of the correct legal standard, be reached 
by either Chamber beyond reasonable doubt”, clearly establishes a power to conclusively 
determine issues of fact based on additional evidence on appeal.1795 Accordingly, on the basis 
of additional evidence, considered either in isolation or in combination with other factors, the 
Appeals Chambers have frequently proceeded to substitute convictions for acquittals.1796 
 
10.1.1.3. Revise 
In general terms, as noted by the ICTY Appeals Chamber, “[o]ne meaning of the term revise 
is ‘to alter (an opinion, judgement, etc.) after reconsideration, or in the light of further 
evidence’”. 1797  As such, an overlap with the term “reverse” arises. The conversion of 
convictions into acquittals and vice versa, encapsulated by the term “reverse”, is, at the same 
time, an extreme form of alteration, which falls under the term “revise”. However, a 
contextual reading reveals that the terms necessarily differ in scope. As the conversion of 
convictions into acquittals and vice versa is specifically expressed by the term “reverse”, the 
term “revise” must relate to alterations of a trial judgment that fall short thereof. 
 
This power has mainly been employed by the Ad Hoc Appeals Chambers to maintain (part of) 
a trial judgment on a different legal basis. In this regard, the Appeals Chambers have 
considered, for instance, whether the reversal of a conviction for a particular crime may be 
replaced with a conviction for a different crime.1798 More frequently, however, the Appeals 
Chambers have considered whether a conviction may be sustained on the basis of an alternate 
mode of liability, despite an error in respect of the form of liability underlying the initial 
conviction.1799 Initially, the Appeals Chambers proceeded in this manner without specifically 
detailing their powers to do so. Subsequently, in a relatively advanced stage of its appellate 
jurisprudence, the ICTY Appeals Chamber explicitly addressed this matter.1800 In this regard, 
it held that, in light of the aforementioned literal meaning of its power to “revise” a trial 
judgment, “[t]he practice of sustaining a conviction pursuant to an alternate mode of liability 
                                                 
1795 Blaškić, at 23. 
1796 E.g., Kupreškić et al., at 304; Blaškić, at 455, 494, 511; Musema, at 194. 
1797 Gotovina & Markač, at 106. 
1798 E.g., Đorđević, at 538. 
1799 Blaškić, at 52; Stakić, at 58-98; Krstić, at 135-144; Milošević, at 263-282; Rukundo, at 37-39. 
1800 Considering the general nature of the Appeals Chamber’s reasoning, this explanation may be extended to 
revision of a trial judgment pursuant to alternate crimes or any other legal basis as well. 
248 
 
is effectively one such alteration to a trial chamber’s legal reasoning”.1801 Further, it observed 
that “appellate bodies of various national jurisdictions are also empowered to enter 
convictions on an alternate basis of liability”, referring to England & Wales, Western 
Australia, Germany, Canada, and Italy.1802 Furthermore, the ICTY Appeals Chamber clarified 
that this power “is not dependent on whether the Prosecution appeals”.1803 
 
Even so, the Appeals Chambers have also referred to a significant limitation attaching to the 
power to “revise” a trial judgment. The ICTY Appeals Chamber has considered, in general, 
that it “will not enter convictions under alternate modes of liability where this would 
substantially compromise the fair trial rights of appellants or exceed its jurisdiction” to review 
“the findings of trial chambers for errors of law which invalidate a decision and errors of fact 
which occasion a miscarriage of justice”.1804 The specific assessments have, however, differed. 
On the one hand, the Appeals Chambers have referred to their jurisdictional inability to act as 
a primary trier of fact,1805 combined with the impossibility of appealing new findings entered 
on appeal in certain situations.1806 On the other hand, they have referred to the need to ensure, 
either separately or cumulatively, that the alternate legal basis has been pleaded adequately 
and/or that it has been sufficiently litigated on appeal.1807  
 
In addition, in respect of appeals from sentencing decisions, the Appeals Chambers have 
made use of their power to “revise” by adjusting a sentence either upwards or downwards.1808 
However, their specific powers to do so have not been determined explicitly. In the first case 
                                                 
1801 Gotovina & Markač, at 106 (emphasis in original). According to a dissenting judge, the Appeals Chamber 
failed to distinguish between revising an appellant’s conviction for a certain crime from one mode of liability to 
another and entering a new conviction on appeal. See: Gotovina & Markač, Dissenting Opinion of Judge Fausto 
Pocar, at 31-36. 
1802 Gotovina & Markač, at 106 (footnote 312).  
1803 Ibid., at 107. 
1804 Ibid., at 107. 
1805 Krajišnik, at 798. 
1806 E.g., Orić, at 186 (in conjunction with the Appeals Chamber’s jurisdictional inability to act as a primary trier 
of fact); Gotovina & Markač, at 153 (in this regard, two judges held that this course of action is open to the 
Appeals Chamber, provided that it remains within the boundaries of the findings of fact established by the Trial 
Chamber. See: Gotovina & Markač, Dissenting Opinion of Judge Carmel Agius, at 87; Gotovina & Markač, 
Separate Opinion of Judge Patrick Robinson, at 3); Stanišić & Simatović, at 124. Furthermore, in Gotovina & 
Markač, the Appeals Chamber referred to similar jurisdictional limitations, i.e. a lack of relevant findings made 
by the Trial Chamber and erroneous findings of fact made by the Trial Chamber (Gotovina & Markač, at 115, 
130-134, 148-149. Similar: Muvunyi I, at 148). 
1807 E.g., Stakić, at 58; Milošević, at 278; Krstić, at 137; Blaškić, at 52; Simić, at 84; Brđanin, at 361. The ICTY 
Appeals Chamber has also assessed whether constituent elements of an alternate crime had been pleaded 
sufficiently clearly. See: Đorđević, at 539. 
1808 E.g., Aleksovski, at 182-190; D. Nikolić Sentencing Appeal, at 87-97; M. Nikolić Sentencing Appeal, at 57-
63, 94-113; Galić, at 444-456; Mrkšić & Šljivančanin, at 407-413. 
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in which this issue arose, the ICTY Appeals Chamber considered that “[a]ppellate review of 
sentencing […] in the major legal systems […] is usually exercised sparingly” and that it “has 
followed this general practice”. 1809  Although this reasoning did not directly address its 
authority to adjust the sentence itself, it was subsequently invoked as the main basis.1810 
 
10.1.1.4. Sentence Adjustment 
Where the Appeals Chambers exercise their powers to “reverse” or “revise” in an appeal from 
the merits of a first instance judgment, it may be questioned whether, if applicable,1811 they 
may adjust the sentence directly or whether the case should be remitted to a Trial Chamber for 
this purpose.1812 These powers differ from the Ad Hoc Appeals Chambers’ powers concerning 
sentencing appeals, as such. The latter are, as discussed, a specific component of their primary 
powers,1813 but the former constitute a corollary of the Ad Hoc Appeals Chambers’ powers to 
adjudicate errors of fact or law. In this regard, the ICTY Appeals Chamber has found that it 
may revise “the sentence meted out by the Trial Chamber, although the latter did not 
necessarily commit a discernible error in the exercise of its sentencing discretion”.1814 
 
In an early phase of its jurisprudence, the ICTY Appeals Chamber remitted cases to a Trial 
Chamber for sentencing after establishing an error of fact or law in respect of the merits of a 
trial judgment. For instance, without further clarification, it has noted that, “for the purposes 
of this case, it is sufficient for the [ICTY] Appeals Chamber to decide […] that it is competent 
to remit sentencing to a Trial Chamber and that in the circumstances of the case it is 
preferable to do so”.1815 In a subsequent case, it provided more indications as to the need to 
remit. In this regard, the ICTY Appeals Chamber noted that sentencing “lies within the 
discretion of the Trial Chamber”, it “has had no submissions from the parties”, “there may be 
matters of important principle involved”, and “a new matter of such significance should be 
determined by a Chamber from which an appeal is possible”.1816 Nevertheless, the ICTY 
                                                 
1809 Aleksovski, at 186-187. 
1810 E.g., Delalić et al., at 851; Vasiljević, at 181 (footnote 290). 
1811 Where a conviction is reversed into an acquittal on appeal, the question of adjustment of the sentence does 
not arise. Moreover, as discussed, the power to “reverse” is inapplicable in respect of appeals from a sentence 
imposed by a Trial Chamber. 
1812 Orders regarding a retrial constitute a separate matter. See: Part III, Chapter 10.1.2. 
1813 Part III, Chapter 9.1.2. 
1814 Blaškić, at 680 (emphasis supplied). 
1815 Order Remitting Sentencing to a Trial Chamber, Prosecutor v. Tadić, Case No. IT-94-1-A, ICTY, Appeals 
Chamber 10 September 1999. 
1816 Delalić et al., at 431, 711. Subsequently, an appeal was indeed instituted against the Trial Chamber’s revision 
of the sentences. See: Mučić et al. Sentencing Appeal, at 5. 
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Appeals Chamber decided the grounds of appeal concerning sentencing itself on the merits, 
“[a]s it will be an issue as to whether any adjustment should be made to the sentences […], 
and not a complete rehearing on the issue of sentence” on remittal.1817 
 
Nevertheless, where a trial judgment has been reversed or revised, the Ad Hoc Appeals 
Chambers have proceeded to adjust the sentence themselves in the vast majority of cases.1818 
Even so, their powers to do so have not been explicitly elucidated. For instance, after noting 
that the appellant had not raised a challenge, the ICTY Appeals Chamber simply held that it 
“accepts” the prosecution’s submission “that it is possible for the Appeals Chamber to revise 
the sentence itself rather than remit the matter to the Trial Chamber”. 1819  The Appeals 
Chamber’s reasoning in a case involving additional evidence was marked by a similar paucity 
of reasoning. It noted that it “is being called upon […] to impose a sentence de novo […] on 
the basis of its own findings”, which is “a function […] that it may perform in this case 
without remitting the case to the Trial Chamber”.1820 
 
10.1.2. Retrial 
As mentioned, according to the RPE “[i]n appropriate circumstances the Appeals Chamber[s] 
may order that the accused be retried according to law”.1821 Since this power has not been 
exercised in respect of sentencing appeals, it will only be considered in connection with 
appeals taken from the merits of a trial judgment. 
 
As is apparent from the references to “in appropriate circumstances” and “may” in the 
relevant rules, 1822  the Ad Hoc Appeals Chambers have stressed that this power is of a 
discretionary nature.1823 In this regard, the ICTY Appeals Chamber held that “factors such as 
fairness to the accused, the interests of justice, the nature of the offences, the circumstances of 
the case in hand and considerations of public interest” must be balanced “on a case by case 
                                                 
1817 Delalić et al., at 712 (emphasis in original). In this regard, the Appeals Chamber found errors on the part of 
the Trial Chamber and instructed the latter to take them into account when imposing a revised sentence. See: 
ibid., at 726-851. 
1818 E.g., Simić, at 233, 235; Rutaganda, at 588-592; Kamuhanda, at 363-364; Krajišnik, at 801; Mrkšić & 
Šljivančanin, at 418-419; Nchamihigo, at 402-404; Setako, at 299; Đorđević, at 980; Šainović et al., at 1842-
1846; Popović et al., at 2110-2116. 
1819 Krnojelac, at 263. 
1820 Blaškić, at 726. 
1821 E.g., Jelisić, at 73, 77; Krajišnik, at 799. 
1822 Rule 117(C) ICTY RPE; Rule 118(C) ICTR RPE. 
1823 E.g., Jelisić, at 73; Krajišnik, at 799. 
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basis”. 1824  Further, the Appeals Chambers have added that “[a]n order for retrial is an 
exceptional measure to which resort must necessarily be limited”.1825 These factors have, in 
the aggregate, contributed to a sparse and inconsistent practice. 
 
First, the Ad Hoc Appeals Chambers have provided limited reasoning as to the need to order a 
retrial. In certain situations, they have referred to specific factors. For instance, the ICTY 
Appeals Chamber has refused a retrial, considering that: the appellant had entered a guilty 
plea; the scope of the potential retrial would be limited; the appellant bore no responsibility 
for the Trial Chamber’s error; the lapse of time between the events and the potential retrial; 
the limited resources of the ICTY; and the need for “psychological and psychiatric follow-up 
treatment” for the appellant.1826 In addition, the ICTR Appeals Chamber has ordered a retrial, 
because “the alleged offence is of the utmost gravity and interests of justice would not be well 
served if retrial were not ordered to allow the trier of fact the opportunity to fully assess the 
entirety of the relevant evidence and provide a reasoned opinion”.1827 On the other hand, the 
Ad Hoc Appeals Chambers have also ordered, or declined to order, a retrial without any 
reasoning and simply noted that it “orders that […] [the accused] be retried”1828 or that it “is 
not appropriate”1829 or “not in the interests of justice”1830 to order a retrial. 
 
Second, the reasoning of the Appeals Chambers appears to clash in different respects. In this 
regard, the interrelationship between the mandate of the ICTY Appeals Chamber and the need 
to order a retrial has been explained in conflicting manners. The ICTY Appeals Chamber has 
considered itself unable to reverse or revise a trial judgment, because it would have had to 
review the entire trial record de novo, which would fall outside its mandate, and, in addition, 
it concluded that a retrial was not warranted.1831 In direct contradiction with this ruling, it has 
ordered a retrial in another case, since it was not in a position to review the entire trial record 
de novo.1832 Furthermore, the Appeals Chambers diverge in their assessments of the purpose 
of a retrial. As mentioned, the ICTR Appeals Chamber has ordered a retrial to allow the Trial 
                                                 
1824 Jelisić, at 73. 
1825 Muvunyi I, at 148. Also: Krajišnik, at 799; Stanišić & Simatović, at 127. 
1826 Jelisić, at 74-76. 
1827 Muvunyi I, at 148. 
1828 Haradinaj et al., at 50. 
1829 Kupreškić et al., at 246. 
1830 Krajišnik, at 799. 
1831 Ibid., at 799. 
1832 Stanišić & Simatović, at 124-125, 127. The Appeals Chamber, in addition, referred to the gravity of the 
crimes at stake. See: ibid., at 127. 
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Chamber “to fully assess the entirety of the relevant evidence”.1833 It has, thus, assessed the 
need for a retrial in light of the Trial Chamber’s primary responsibility concerning factual 
matters. However, the ICTY Appeals Chamber has required a preliminary evidentiary 
assessment to be made by itself before remanding a case for retrial. In this regard, it has found 
that a retrial “would serve no purpose” because the prosecution had failed to point to evidence 
in support of its allegations on appeal.1834 This interpretation reveals, at least in part, an 
increased role for the Appeals Chamber in the determination of factual issues. 
 
10.1.3. Inherent Powers 
The ICTY Appeals Chamber, after mentioning its “inherent powers as an appellate body” in 
passing,1835 has considered that its powers “in relation to an appeal are not limited to those 
expressly stated in Article 25 of the […] Statute or in Rule 117(C)” RPE, but that it “also has 
an inherent power, deriving from its judicial function, to control its proceedings in such a way 
as to ensure that justice is done”.1836 The ICTR Appeals Chamber has similarly noted its 
“inherent jurisdiction […] to do justice”.1837 
 
The Appeals Chambers’ inherent powers are primarily reflected in the use of proprio motu 
powers.1838 In its very first judgment, the ICTY Appeals Chamber held that it had “raised 
preliminary issues proprio motu pursuant to its inherent powers as an appellate body once 
seised of an appeal lodged by either party”.1839 The basis for this power arose out of the lack 
of a specific proscription to do so, as “nothing in the Statute or the Rules, nor in practices of 
international institutions or national judicial systems, […] would confine its consideration of 
the appeal to the issues raised formally by the parties”. 1840  Whereas the ICTY Appeals 
Chamber initially indicated that its proprio motu powers are, in principle, related to errors of 
law,1841 these powers have also been applied in respect of findings made pursuant to the 
                                                 
1833 Muvunyi I, at 148. 
1834 Orić, at 186-187. 
1835 Erdemović, at 16. 
1836 Mučić et al. Sentencing Appeal, at 16. Also: Stanišić & Simatović, at 125. 
1837 Niyitegeka, at 200. 
1838 An important component of the Appeals Chambers’ inherent powers concerns summary dismissals. These 
powers have been discussed supra. See: Part III, Chapter 7.1.5; Part III, Chapter 7.2.5. 
1839 Erdemović, at 16 (emphasis in original). Also: Akayesu, at 17. 
1840 Erdemović, at 16. 
1841 Jokić Sentencing Appeal, at 26. Most instances of proprio motu assessments indeed concern errors of law. 
See: e.g., Kunarac et al., at 145-148; Stakić, at 59; Kamuhanda, at 21-28; Renzaho, at 564-568; Bagosora & 
Nsengiyumva, at 736; Karera, at 360-370; Ndindabahizi, at 121-123. 
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“reasonableness standard”1842 and sentencing errors.1843 Subsequently, this power has been 
described in more narrow terms. Instead of raising grounds of appeal not brought forward by 
the parties, the Appeals Chambers have referred to their powers to grant grounds of appeal 
based on a varying argumentation. Thus, “if the arguments do not support the contention, that 
party has not failed to discharge a burden in the sense that a person who fails to discharge a 
burden automatically loses his point”, as “[t]he Appeals Chamber may step in and, for other 
reasons, find […] that there is an error of law”.1844 Moreover, pursuant to their proprio motu 
powers, the Appeals Chambers have also extended errors of law and fact arising as a result of 
grounds of appeal formulated by a party in a multi-accused appeal to other parties who had 
not formally raised the same ground of appeal. 1845  They have referred to “reasons of 
fairness” 1846  and “the interests of justice” 1847  as the bases for such a course of action. 
Similarly, in relation to a particular ground of appeal, the ICTY Appeals Chamber has 
“proprio motu reviewed the trial record in fairness to” the accused.1848 
 
However, an important restriction to the Appeals Chambers’ inherent powers has been carved 
out in the jurisprudence of the Ad Hoc Tribunals.1849 In this regard, the Appeals Chambers 
have found that they lack the ability to aggravate the position of the accused in the absence of 
a specific appeal instituted by the prosecution. Also described as “reformatio in peius”,1850 the 
Appeals Chambers have primarily applied this principle in respect of unchallenged 
indications of errors of fact or law pertaining to the merits of a trial judgment.1851 It further 
extends to challenges raised by the prosecution in respect of the merits of a trial judgment that 
are not accompanied by a specific request for an increased sentence.1852 In addition, this 
                                                 
1842 E.g., Boškoski & Tarčulovski, at 19-24. 
1843 E.g., Simić, at 269, 274; Naletilić & Martinović, at 610-613; Jokić Sentencing Appeal, at 26. 
1844 Furundžija, at 35 (emphasis supplied). However, the ICTY Appeals Chamber swiftly acted to prevent a 
dilution of the parties’ obligation to provide supporting arguments. In a subsequent case, it noted that a party 
“must at least identify the alleged error and advance some arguments in support of its contention”, since “[a]n 
appeal cannot be allowed to deteriorate into a guessing game for the Appeals Chamber”. Where appellants fail to 
do so, “the Appeals Chamber will only address legal errors where the Trial Chamber has made a glaring 
mistake”. See: Kupreškić et al., at 27. For an application of these powers, see: e.g., Brđanin, at 327; Kajelijeli, at 
208-255; Naletilić & Martinović, at 109-122. 
1845 E.g., Delalić et al., at 414; Kupreškić et al., at 243; Šainović et al., at 551; Popović et al., at 1070. 
1846 Delalić et al., at 414. 
1847 Kupreškić et al., at 243. 
1848 Brđanin, at 67. 
1849 In addition, the impossibility of reconsidering an appellate judgment constitutes an important limitation of 
the Appeals Chambers’ inherent powers. As this limitation is relevant to the post-appeal phase, it will not be 
discussed further. See: Introduction, Chapter 1. 
1850 Muvunyi I, at 170 (footnote 382). 
1851 E.g., Blaškić, at 648; Stakić, at 38; Krajišnik, at 318; Milošević, at 40. 
1852 E.g., Kupreškić et al., at 386-388; Krstić, at 216, 222, 227, 229, 269; Gatete, at 265. 
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principle relates to indications of erroneous exercises of sentencing discretion by Trial 
Chambers.1853 The ICTR Appeals Chamber has also specified that this principle is germane to 
an order for retrial. In this regard, it has held that “given that the order for retrial originated in 
the appeal by […] [the accused], the Appeals Chamber considers that the principle of fairness 
demands that in the event that a new Trial Chamber was to enter a conviction for the 
respective charge, any sentence could not exceed the” original sentence.1854 
 
10.1.4. Prosecutorial Appeals 
Whereas the Ad Hoc Tribunals’ Statutes equate the rights to appeal held by the convicted 
person and the Ad Hoc prosecutors,1855 the powers of the Ad Hoc Tribunals to impose a final 
conviction instead of a first instance acquittal or irrevocably aggravate a first instance 
sentence have been mired in normative ambiguity and practical uncertainty. 
 
10.1.4.1. Views 
In one of the very first cases before the Ad Hoc Tribunals, the ICTY reversed various 
acquittals pronounced at first instance and imposed convictions instead. 1856  Beyond a 
declaration by one of the judges that “no general principle of law can be drawn from domestic 
practice” concerning the non bis in idem principle (or the Common Law variation of double 
jeopardy), 1857  the ramifications regarding the right to appeal of the accused were not 
examined. The Ad Hoc Appeals Chambers have, thereafter, routinely substituted acquittals 
for non-appealable convictions or aggravated sentences imposed at first instance.1858 Even so, 
an intense debate on the compatibility of such convictions and sentences with the right to 
appeal guaranteed in international human rights law developed between individual judges. 
 
Judge Pocar has vehemently argued that non-appealable convictions imposed in favour of 
acquittals violate the right to appeal contained in Article 14(5) ICCPR. He has supported this 
position with four arguments: (i) the statement in the Secretary General Report that “the right 
of appeal should be provided for under the Statute” as it is a “fundamental element of 
individual civil and political rights and has, inter alia, been incorporated in the” ICCPR; (ii) 
                                                 
1853 E.g., Bralo Sentencing Appeal, at 85; Martić, Separate Opinion of Judge Schomburg on the Individual 
Criminal Responsibility of Milan Martić, at 1; Brđanin, at 505. 
1854 Muvunyi I, at 170. 
1855 Part III, Chapter 4.1. 
1856 Tadić, at 327. 
1857 Tadić, Declaration of Judge Nieto-Navia, at 8. 
1858 Also: Part III, Chapter 10.1.1.2. 
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the adoption of the ICCPR as “a resolution by the General Assembly”, on the basis of which 
“[i]t would […] have to be assumed that the Security Council, as a U.N. body, would act in 
compliance with that declaration of principles”; (iii) the statement of the ICTY Appeals 
Chamber that “Article 14 […] [ICCPR] reflects an imperative norm of international law to 
which the Tribunal must adhere”; and (iv) the principle that, “in case of doubt as to whether a 
particular right exists, such a doubt must operate in favor of the accused”.1859 Academic 
commentators have, in majority, subscribed to this point of view.1860 
 
On the other side of the spectrum, Judge Shahabuddeen has argued that the “special 
circumstances” of the Ad Hoc Tribunals justify a departure from the highest standards of the 
right to appeal developed in international human rights law.1861 The first argument, which 
consists of two parts, posits that a more limited conception of the right to appeal applies to the 
Ad Hoc Tribunals. It has been said that the principles of the ICCPR should apply to the Ad 
Hoc Tribunals on the basis that they have been “given a benefit equivalent to the opportunity 
possessed by states to make reservations”.1862 Numerous domestic appellate systems allow for 
a conviction to be imposed for the first time on appeal without additional review and various 
States have appended concomitant reservations to Article 14(5) ICCPR. 1863  In addition, 
considering that other human rights instruments reject the reach ascribed to Article 14(5) 
ICCPR, such as Article 2 Protocol 7 ECHR, it has been claimed that the Ad Hoc Tribunals act 
“within the realm of permissible exceptions”.1864 The second argument is that the two-tier 
legal system of the Ad Hoc Tribunals necessarily prevents a further appeal and that the 
adoption of the HRC’s interpretation of Article 14(5) ICCPR could create an interminable 
                                                 
1859 Rutaganda, Dissenting Opinion of Judge Pocar, at 2-3. Also Dissenting and Partially Dissenting Opinions of 
Judge Pocar in: Mrkšić & Šljivančanin, at 1-13; Semanza, at 1-4; Setako, at 1-6; Gatete, at 1-5; and Popović et 
al., at 2. 
1860 E.g., L. Gradoni, ‘International Criminal Courts and Tribunals: Bound by Human Rights Norms … or Tied 
Down?’, 19(3) Leiden Journal of International Law 847 (2006), at 854-855; L. O’Neill and G. Sluiter, ‘The 
Right to Appeal a Judgment of the Extraordinary Chambers in the Courts of Cambodia’, 10 Melbourne Journal 
of International Law 596 (2009), at 625-626; M. Maystre, ‘Controversial and Inconsistent Practice of the ICTY 
and ICTR Appeals Chamber with Respect to the Right to Appeal’, in R. Kolb and D. Scalia (eds.), Droit 
International Pénal 483 (Basel: Helbing Lichtenhahn, 2012), at 503. 
1861 Rutaganda, Separate Opinion of Judge Shahabuddeen at 1-40; Semanza, Separate Opinion of Judge 
Shahabuddeen and Judge Güney, at 1-9. Judge Ramaroson has defended a similar position, but she has not 
invoked human rights considerations. See: Šainović et al., Opinion Dissidente du Juge Ramaroson, at 5. 
Furthermore, Judge Schomburg has also stated, without any analysis, that “[t]here is no provision in the Statute 
or in the Rules of Procedure and Evidence that would bar the Appeals Chamber from augmenting a sentence 
handed down by a Trial Chamber”. Galić, Separate and Partially Dissenting Opinion of Judge Schomburg, at 3. 
1862 Rutaganda, Separate Opinion of Judge Shahabuddeen, at 21. 
1863 Part II, Chapter 2.3.4. 
1864 Rutaganda, Separate Opinion of Judge Shahabuddeen, at 28. 
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circle of appeals and remands, resulting in the waste of scarce judicial resources.1865 Some 
support for this position exists in literature as well.1866 
 
Despite their initial reticence, the Ad Hoc Appeals Chambers provided some reasoning as to 
their power to impose such convictions towards the final stages of their life spans. In this 
regard, the ICTR Appeals Chamber has held that “it is established jurisprudence that a new 
conviction may be entered at the appeal stage” and, in the accompanying footnote, it has 
referred to its implicit acceptance of this approach in preceding judgments.1867 The ICTY 
Appeals Chamber has adopted a similar line of reasoning1868 and referred, in addition, to its 
statutory powers to “affirm, reverse or revise the decisions taken by the Trial Chambers”.1869 
However, this justification is primarily based on the evolving practice of the Ad Hoc 
Tribunals, which has never explicitly addressed the basis of the powers of the Ad Hoc 
Appeals Chambers to convert acquittals into irrevocable convictions in the first place. Even 
more strikingly, it omits any reference to international human rights law. 
 
10.1.4.2. Practical Application 
Besides normative uncertainty, the adjudication of prosecutorial appeals has yielded an 
inconsistent application of the Ad Hoc Appeals Chambers’ powers. 
 
First, the Appeals Chambers have adjudicated contentious issues of facts in disparate manners 
in relation to prosecutorial appeals. On the one hand, the Appeals Chambers have exhibited 
significant restraint in respect of factual matters raised in connection with such appeals. For 
instance, when reversing an acquittal, the ICTY Appeals Chamber specifically noted that the 
crime in question “was clearly charged in the Indictment and that the Trial Chamber made 
explicit findings on each element of the crime”, which entailed that it “is thus able, if 
appropriate, to enter new convictions for this crime based solely on the findings of the Trial 
Chamber”.1870 Even more explicitly, the ICTY Appeals Chamber indicated that it was not in a 
                                                 
1865 Ibid., at 30-35. 
1866 B. Jia, ‘The Right of Appeal in the Proceedings before the ICTY and ICTR’, in G. Venturini and S. Bariatti 
(eds.), Individual Rights and International Justice – Liber Fausto Pocar 413 (Milan: Giuffre Editore, 2009), at 
425. 
1867 Gatete, at 265. 
1868 Gotovina, at 107 (footnote 314). 
1869 Đorđević, at 928; Popović et al., at 539. 
1870 Popović et al., at 539. Also: Gacumbitsi, at 124. The Appeals Chambers have also implicitly relied 
exclusively on the findings of Trial Chambers. See: Krnojelac, at 161-172, 176-180, 183-188, 192-207, 214-247; 
Rutaganda, at 569-585; Galić, at 455; Semanza, at 355-364, 367-371; Setako, at 256-262. Also: Gotovina & 
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position to make certain inferences itself. After establishing errors of law on the part of a Trial 
Chamber, it did not proceed to analyse the evidence with a view to entering convictions, 
because “it would have to analyse the entire trial record without the benefit of having directly 
heard the witnesses”.1871 On the other hand, despite their proclaimed limitations in relation to 
issues of fact, the Appeals Chambers have adopted new findings of fact based either on 
general considerations addressed by a Trial Chamber or on evidence not fully explored by it 
in the context of prosecutorial appeals. As to the former, the ICTR Appeals Chamber, for 
instance, has reviewed a “Trial Chamber’s factual conclusions and the evidence contained in 
the trial record” with the understanding that “the law should be applied to the factual findings 
of the Trial Chamber, taken as a whole”.1872 However, a dissenting judge has noted in this 
respect that the majority “consistently supplements the Trial Chamber’s findings with the 
testimony of witnesses simply because the ‘Trial Chamber found them to be credible’”.1873 An 
example of the latter category is reflected in the finding of the ICTY Appeals Chamber that 
“the only reasonable conclusion that can be drawn is” that the accused had formed the 
required mens rea for a charge levelled against him on the basis of a particular circumstance, 
even though the Trial Chamber had dismissed this possibility as “conjecture”.1874 
 
Second, differing outcomes have been attached to errors of law or fact in respect of a (partial) 
acquittal or the sentence imposed. As set forth in the preceding description,1875 the Appeals 
Chambers have prioritised their powers to conclusively settle questions of law and fact on 
appeal over the possibility of remitting a case to a Trial Chamber. Prosecutorial appeals form 
no exception in this regard. Accordingly, in the majority of situations, the Appeals Chambers 
have either imposed aggravated sentences following an erroneous exercise of sentencing 
discretion by a Trial Chamber or vacated acquittals in favour of convictions in combination 
with increased sentences as a result of an error of law or fact committed by a Trial 
                                                                                                                                                        
Markač, Dissenting Opinion of Judge Carmel Agius, at 87; Gotovina & Markač, Separate Opinion of Judge 
Patrick Robinson, at 3. 
1871 Stanišić & Simatović, at 124-125, 127. Similar: Delalić et al., at 313. Also: Kamuhanda, Separate and 
Partially Dissenting Opinion of Judge Mohamed Shahabuddeen, at 395-399. 
1872 Seromba, at 161-162. 
1873 Seromba, Dissenting Opinion of Judge Liu, at 11. 
1874 Mrkšić & Šljivančanin, at 61-62. Similar: Lukić & Lukić, Dissenting Opinion of Judge Morrison, at 29, who 
notes that the conclusions of the Majority “are based upon extracts taken from the Trial Chamber’s summaries of 
evidence contained in the Prosecution case, portions of evidence which were not subject to findings of the Trial 
Chamber”.  
1875 Part III, Chapter 10.1.1.2; Part III, Chapter 10.1.1.3; Part III, Chapter 10.1.1.4; Part III, Chapter 10.1.2. 
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Chamber,1876 although it has remitted such cases on occasion too.1877 Conversely, however, 
the Appeals Chambers have also resorted to less drastic measures. The primary manifestation 
of this current of the jurisprudence is reflected in the Appeals Chambers’ refusals to impose 
additional convictions, in spite of findings that an error of fact or law has been committed by 
a Trial Chamber.1878 Even though no reasoning had been provided at the outset, the ICTY 
Appeals Chamber subsequently considered that, in light of the reference to “may affirm, 
reverse or revise” in Article 25(2) ICTY Statute, its prerogatives are of a discretionary nature, 
which must “be exercised on proper judicial grounds, balancing factors such as fairness to the 
accused, the interests of justice, the nature of the offences, the circumstances of the case in 
hand and considerations of public interest […] on a case by case basis”.1879 
 
10.2. ICC 
Compared to the legal texts of the Ad Hoc Tribunals, the ICC Statute determines the powers 
of the ICC Appeals Chamber in a more explicit and extensive manner. It regulates the power 
to extend the remit of appellate proceedings concerning the sentence to include alleged errors 
affecting the merits of the trial judgment and vice versa,1880  to “[r]everse or amend the 
decision”,1881 to “[o]rder a new trial before a different Trial Chamber”,1882 to “remand a 
factual issue to the original Trial Chamber” or to “itself call evidence to determine” a factual 
issue”,1883 and to “vary the sentence”.1884 After discussing these powers, the status of the 
inherent powers of the ICC Appeals Chambers and its indications as to a possible approach to 
successful prosecutorial appeals will be assessed. 
 
10.2.1. Remit of Appellate Proceedings 
The ICC Statute explicitly permits the ICC Appeals Chamber to extend the remit of its 
proceedings.1885 It stipulates that, “[i]f on an appeal against sentence the Court considers that 
                                                 
1876 E.g., Krnojelac, at 161-172, 176-180, 183-188, 192-207, 214-247, 263-264; Mrkšić & Šljivančanin, at 61-
103, 419; Galić, at 455-456, p. 187; Semanza, at 355-364, 367-371, p. 130; Seromba, at 161-191, 240; 
Gacumbitsi, at 124, 207. 
1877 Part III, Chapter 10.1.1.4; Part III, Chapter 10.1.2. 
1878 E.g., Aleksovski, at 153; Karemera & Ngirumpatse, at 713; Šainović et al., at 1604, 1766. 
1879 Šainović et al., at 1604 (footnote 5269), 1766 (footnote 5752). 
1880 Art. 81(2)(b)-(c) ICC Statute. 
1881 Art. 83(2)(a) ICC Statute. 
1882 Art. 83(2)(b) ICC Statute. 
1883 Art. 83(2) ICC Statute. 
1884 Art. 83(3) ICC Statute. 
1885 R. Roth and M. Henzelin, ‘The Appeal Procedure of the ICC’, in A. Cassese, P. Gaeta, and J. Jones (eds.), 
The Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court: a Commentary 1535 (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 
2002), at 1546-1547; P. De Cesari, ‘Observations on the Appeal before the International Criminal Court’, in M. 
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there are grounds on which the conviction might be set aside, wholly or in part, it may invite 
the Prosecutor and the convicted person to submit grounds […] [of appeal], and may render a 
decision on conviction […]”.1886 This procedure also applies “when the Court, on an appeal 
against conviction only, considers that there are grounds to reduce the sentence”.1887 These 
powers have not been applied in the early jurisprudence of the ICC Appeals Chamber. 
 
Whereas the second aspect must undoubtedly operate in the favour of the accused, on account 
of the reference to “reduce the sentence”,1888 there is some disagreement among scholars on 
the first aspect. It has been argued, on the one hand, that the extension of a sentencing appeal 
to the grounds underlying the conviction “seems to grant the [ICC] Appeals Chamber the 
discretion […] to review the verdict itself – even if this should prove detrimental to the 
accused”,1889 which “might happen, e.g. if the Trial Chamber has passed a separate verdict on 
each item of the indictment”.1890 On the other hand, although no specific reasoning has been 
set out, it has been maintained that the prohibition of reformatio in peius extends to this 
aspect of the ICC Appeals Chamber’s powers too.1891 The former view appears to be based on 
the reference to the ICC Appeals Chamber’s power to “render a decision on conviction”,1892 
upon proprio motu review. Although the provision’s drafting is unfortunate, the latter view is 
to be preferred. This power does not envisage the reversal of an acquittal into a conviction. 
An acquittal obviously does not entail a sentence and, therefore, an appeal from the sentence, 
as required by the relevant provision of the ICC Statute, is impossible. Moreover, read in 
context, the power to “render a decision on conviction” only applies where the ICC Appeals 
Chamber deems “that there are grounds on which the conviction might be set aside”.1893 This 
                                                                                                                                                        
Politi and G. Nesi (eds.), The Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court: a Challenge to Impunity 225 
(Aldershot: Ashgate, 2001), at 229. 
1886 Art. 81(2)(b) ICC Statute. 
1887 Art. 81(2)(c) ICC Statute. 
1888 R. Roth and M. Henzelin, ‘The Appeal Procedure of the ICC’, in A. Cassese, P. Gaeta, and J. Jones (eds.), 
The Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court: a Commentary 1535 (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 
2002), at 1546-1547. Also: C. Staker and F. Eckelmans, ‘Article 81’, in O. Triffterer and K. Ambos (eds.), 
Commentary on the Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court. Observers’ Notes, Article by Article 1915 
(München: Verlag C.H. Beck, 2016), at 1921. 
1889 R. Roth and M. Henzelin, ‘The Appeal Procedure of the ICC’, in A. Cassese, P. Gaeta, and J. Jones (eds.), 
The Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court: a Commentary 1535 (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 
2002), at 1546. 
1890 Ibid., at footnote 50. 
1891 C. Staker and F. Eckelmans, ‘Article 81’, in O. Triffterer and K. Ambos (eds.), Commentary on the Rome 
Statute of the International Criminal Court. Observers’ Notes, Article by Article 1915 (München: Verlag C.H. 
Beck, 2016), at 1921; W. Schabas, The International Criminal Court: A Commentary on the Rome Statute 
(Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2010), at 955. 
1892 Art. 81(2)(b) ICC Statute (emphasis supplied). 
1893 Ibid. (emphasis supplied). 
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qualifier prevents proprio motu adjustments of the grounds underlying a conviction to the 
detriment of the accused in the context of an appeal from the sentence. 
 
10.2.2. Appeal from Conviction or Acquittal 
The principal powers of the ICC Appeals Chamber are to “[r]everse or amend the decision” or 
[…] [o]rder a new trial before a different Trial Chamber”.1894 This provision of the ICC 
Statute further stipulates that, “[f]or these purposes, the [ICC] Appeals Chamber may remand 
a factual issue to the original Trial Chamber for it to determine the issue and to report back 
accordingly, or may itself call evidence to determine the issue”.1895  
 
As a preliminary issue, it may be noted that, contrary to the Ad Hoc Tribunals’ Statutes,1896 
the power to “affirm” a decision of conviction or acquittal has not been explicitly set forth in 
the ICC Statute. However, this power forms an implicit part of the relevant appellate 
provisions, in a manner similar to the Ad Hoc Tribunals. First, the ICC Appeals Chamber has 
explicitly “confirm[ed]” impugned decisions in its early jurisprudence where grounds of 
appeal were found to lack merit.1897 Second, alike the Ad Hoc Tribunals, even where an error 
has been established, but the ICC Appeals Chamber does not find “that the proceedings 
appealed from were unfair in a way that affected the reliability of the decision or sentence, or 
that the decision or sentence appealed from was materially affected by error of fact or law or 
procedural error”,1898 the powers to “[r]everse or amend the decision” remain dormant and the 
logical outcome is that the decision of conviction or acquittal is affirmed. Indeed, the ICC 
Appeals Chamber has found that procedural, legal, and factual errors had not “materially 
affected” judgments of conviction and acquittal in its early jurisprudence.1899 
                                                 
1894 Art. 83(2)(a)-(b) ICC Statute. 
1895 Art. 83(2) ICC Statute. 
1896 Part III, Chapter 10.1.1.1. 
1897 Lubanga, at 529; Ngudjolo, at 296. 
1898 Arts. 81(1), 83(2) ICC Statute. 
1899 In respect of a procedural error, the ICC Appeals Chamber has, e.g., found that, “the Trial Chamber’s failure 
[…] may indeed have substantially affected the Trial Chamber’s observations concerning the witness’s 
demeanour and many contradictions in his testimony”, but that, ultimately, the Trial Chamber’s rejection of the 
witness’ “testimony as unreliable was based on other findings of the Trial Chamber that were independent of its 
observations on the witness’s demeanour”. See: Ngudjolo, at 291. With regard to an error of law, the ICC 
Appeals Chamber has concluded that an impugned decision of conviction was not materially affected by an error 
of law, considering that the remainder of the Trial Chamber’s findings was legally unimpeachable. See: 
Lubanga, at 340. In respect of errors of fact, the ICC Appeals Chamber has confirmed that the most obvious 
example of an error of fact that has not “materially affected” the decision in question is where the impugned 
finding continues to be supported by other evidence. See: Lubanga, at 362, 433. Furthermore, based on the 
jurisprudence of the Ad Hoc Tribunals, the ICC Appeals Chamber has applied an analogous distinction in 




10.2.2.1. Reverse or Amend 
As to the power to “[r]everse”, the ICC Appeals Chamber has, similarly to the Ad Hoc 
Tribunals, 1900  indicated a willingness to directly resolve contentious issues of fact. For 
instance, after finding that a Trial Chamber had not addressed a relevant issue, it referred to 
the underlying evidence itself and concluded that the Trial Chamber’s finding was 
unreasonable.1901  Had the ICC Appeals Chamber been minded to apply a more cautious 
approach, it might have considered a remittal in light of the absence of a finding of fact.  
 
With respect to the power to “amend”, which corresponds to the power to “revise” in the Ad 
Hoc Tribunals’ Statutes,1902 it has been remarked that “[i]t is an open question whether the 
ICC Appeals Chamber may change the legal characterisation of the facts pursuant to 
regulation 55 of the [ICC] Regulations of the Court”.1903 This position corresponds to a literal 
interpretation of the ICC Statute, similar to the Ad Hoc Tribunals’ Statutes.1904 
 
However, the ICC Appeals Chamber will have to decide on the distinct issue of whether it 
may derive a power to adjust the sentence from its powers to “[r]everse or amend” or whether 
the case ought to be referred back for sentencing. The ICC Statute appears to be more inclined 
towards a direct adjustment of the sentence by the ICC Appeals Chamber than towards a 
remittal.1905 It mentions that the power to “[r]everse or amend” applies to both the “decision 
or sentence appealed from”,1906 whereas it separately sets forth that, “in an appeal against 
sentence”, the ICC Appeals Chamber “may vary the sentence”.1907 The repeated references to 
an appeal from a sentence engender a lack of clarity. However, it seems more appropriate to 
                                                                                                                                                        
the Prosecutor to prove the guilt of the accused”, the ICC Appeals Chamber has also found that a convicted 
person must establish reasonable doubt as to his guilt and the prosecutor must demonstrate that all reasonable 
doubt has been eliminated. See: Ngudjolo, at 25-26. 
1900 Part III, Chapter 10.1.1.2.2. 
1901 Lubanga, at 358-360. However, it subsequently concluded that the error had not materially affected the 
impugned decision. See: ibid., at 362. 
1902 Part III, Chapter 10.1.1.3. 
1903 C. Staker and F. Eckelmans, ‘Article 83’, in O. Triffterer and K. Ambos (eds.), Commentary on the Rome 
Statute of the International Criminal Court. Observers’ Notes, Article by Article 1965 (München: Verlag C.H. 
Beck, 2016), at 1967. As noted, the Ad Hoc Appeals Chambers have mainly invoked this power to revise modes 
of liability entered by Trial Chambers. See: Part III, Chapter 10.1.1.3. 
1904 Part III, Chapter 10.1.1.3. 
1905 Similar: C. Staker and F. Eckelmans, ‘Article 83’, in O. Triffterer and K. Ambos (eds.), Commentary on the 
Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court. Observers’ Notes, Article by Article 1965 (München: Verlag 
C.H. Beck, 2016), at 1970. 
1906 Art. 83(2)(a) ICC Statute. 
1907 Art. 83(3) ICC Statute. 
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read the reference to the “sentence appealed from” in respect of the powers to “[r]everse or 
amend” as establishing a power to adjust the sentence following a successful appeal against 
the merits of a decision of acquittal or conviction. This interpretation gives effect to the 
distinct expression “sentence appealed from” and recognises, at the same time, the 
independent application of the power to “vary the sentence” in an appeal specifically 
instituted against a sentence imposed at first instance. 
 
10.2.2.2. New Trial 
The power to “[o]rder a new trial” is formulated in the alternative to the powers to “[r]everse 
or amend”,1908 which is not dissimilar from the legal texts of the Ad Hoc Tribunals.1909 
Moreover, like the Ad Hoc Tribunals’ texts, the ICC Statute does not regulate when the ICC 
Appeals Chamber should resort to its powers to “[r]everse or amend” and when it should put 
its power to “[o]rder a new trial” into effect.1910  
 
10.2.2.3. Remand Factual Issues or Call Evidence 
Although the powers of the ICC Appeals Chamber to “remand a factual issue” or to “itself 
call evidence” appear to be more broadly formulated than those of the Ad Hoc Appeals 
Chambers, the differences are minimal in practice. As noted, the Ad Hoc Appeals Chambers 
have repeatedly called evidence themselves to determine factual issues on appeal.1911  In 
addition, whereas they have not remanded particular issues of fact, they have, in a similar vein, 
ordered new trials on distinct counts.1912 
 
10.2.3. Appeal from Sentence 
Contrary to the Ad Hoc Statutes,1913 the ICC Appeals Chamber has been afforded the explicit 
power to “vary the sentence” in an appeal from the sentence.1914 Although the ICC Statute 
does not explicitly set forth the power to “confirm” a sentence, this power is, as with appeals 
from decisions of acquittal or conviction, 1915  implicit in the relevant provision. 1916 
                                                 
1908 Art. 83(2)(a)-(b) ICC Statute, which refers to “or”. 
1909 Part III, Chapter 10.1.2. 
1910 R. Roth and M. Henzelin, ‘The Appeal Procedure of the ICC’, in A. Cassese, P. Gaeta, and J. Jones (eds.), 
The Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court: a Commentary 1535 (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 
2002), at 1556. 
1911 Part III, Chapter 8.1.2; Part III, Chapter 9.1.1.2.2.1. 
1912 Part III, Chapter 10.1.2. 
1913 Part III, Chapter 10.1.3. 
1914 Art. 83(3) ICC Statute. 
1915 Part III, Chapter 10.2.2. 
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Furthermore, the ICC Statute does not expressly permit a new trial to be ordered for the 
pronouncement of a new sentence. Construed strictly, this omission may be seen as the 
complete exclusion of such a possibility. However, construed more broadly on account of the 
permissive language of the relevant provision, which indicates that the ICC Appeals Chamber 
“may vary the sentence”,1917 a retrial for sentencing purposes would remain a possibility. 
 
As referred to previously,1918 the relevant provision of the ICC Statute is mired in ambiguity. 
In addition to the power to “vary the sentence”, it also refers to the power to “[r]everse or 
amend […] the sentence” in the context of an appeal against a decision of acquittal or 
conviction.1919  The ICC Appeals Chamber has not clarified the interrelationship between 
these bases and has referred to both of them interchangeably in its early jurisprudence.1920 
However, it is submitted that a distinction is preferable. As discussed,1921 the better reading is 
to construe the power to “[r]everse or amend […] the sentence” as referring to the prerogative 
to alter the sentence once an appeal against the merits of a decision of acquittal or conviction 
has been granted. Specific appeals from the sentence would, accordingly, fall within the remit 
of the ICC Appeals Chamber’s power to “vary the sentence”. This particular provision refers 
directly to the disproportion between the sentence and the crime,1922 which is the specific 
ground of appeal relative to appeals from a sentence,1923 whereas the reference to “[r]everse or 
amend […] the sentence” does not invoke this ground of appeal.1924 Furthermore, in contrast 
to the latter power, the power to “vary the sentence” is to be exercised on the basis of Part 7 
of the ICC Statute,1925 which is entitled “Penalties”, and, thus, directly extends the Trial 
Chambers’ concomitant powers to the ICC Appeals Chamber. 
 
  
                                                                                                                                                        
1916 Where one or both conditions for a successful appeal from a sentence – i.e. the establishment of the 
disproportion between the sentence and the crime and that the sentence has been materially affected by the error 
in question - have or have not been demonstrated, the only logical outcome for the ICC Appeals Chamber is to 
confirm the sentence. Indeed, the ICC Appeals Chamber has done so in its early jurisprudence. See: Lubanga 
Sentencing Appeal, at 119.  
1917 Art. 83(3) ICC Statute (emphasis supplied). 
1918 Part III, Chapter 10.2.2. 
1919 Art. 83(2)(a) ICC Statute. 
1920 Lubanga Sentencing Appeal, at 38-42. 
1921 Part III, Chapter 10.2.2. 
1922 Art. 83(3) ICC Statute. 
1923 Art. 81(2)(a) ICC Statute. 
1924 Art. 83(2)(a) ICC Statute. 
1925 Art. 83(3) ICC Statute. 
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10.2.4. Inherent Powers 
The ICC Appeals Chamber has not invoked any inherent powers in its early jurisprudence. 
However, a power classified as inherent by the Ad Hoc Appeals Chambers1926 has been 
expressly regulated in the ICC Statute. The aforementioned power of the ICC Appeals 
Chamber to extend the remit of its appellate proceedings may “merely give expression to 
what would in any event fall within the inherent powers of the [ICC] Appeals Chamber”.1927 
This is also the case for the main limitation to the Ad Hoc Appeals Chambers’ inherent 
powers.1928 In this regard, the ICC Statute provides that, “[w]hen the decision or sentence has 
been appealed only by the person convicted, or the Prosecutor on that person’s behalf, it 
cannot be amended to his or her detriment”, 1929 which extends, as discussed, to the power of 
the ICC Appeals Chamber to extend the remit of appellate proceedings too.1930 
 
10.2.5. Prosecutorial Appeals 
A combined reading of the relevant provisions of the ICC Statute permits, in principle, the 
unassailable aggravation of the position of the accused on appeal. As discussed, the ICC 
Statute has established a two-tier institutional structure,1931 allows for appeals by the ICC 
prosecutor against decisions of acquittal or conviction and against the sentence, 1932  and 
authorises the ICC Appeals Chamber to “[r]everse or amend” a decision and to “vary the 
sentence”, in respect of which the possibility of “[o]rder[ing] a new trial” is expressed as an 
alternative to instantaneous appellate resolution.1933 Indeed, the ICC Appeals Chamber has 
held that it may order a “new trial or […] reverse the acquittal and enter a conviction”.1934 
 
Even so, the ICC Appeals Chamber has not been in a position to provide specific indications 
as to the approach to successful prosecutorial appeals, since it has rejected such appeals in its 
early jurisprudence.1935 Even so, it appears to be cautiously inclined in this regard. In the 
context of its discussion on the requirement that a decision must be “materially affected” by 
                                                 
1926 Part III, Chapter 10.1.3. 
1927 C. Staker and F. Eckelmans, ‘Article 81’, in O. Triffterer and K. Ambos (eds.), Commentary on the Rome 
Statute of the International Criminal Court. Observers’ Notes, Article by Article 1915 (München: Verlag C.H. 
Beck, 2016), at 1921. 
1928 Part III, Chapter 10.1.3. 
1929 Art. 83(2) ICC Statute. 
1930 Part III, Chapter 10.2.1. 
1931 Part III, Chapter 2.1.1. 
1932 Part III, Chapter 4.1. 
1933 Part III, Chapter 10.2.2. 
1934 Ngudjolo, at 284 (emphasis supplied). 
1935 Lubanga Sentencing Appeal, at 119; Ngudjolo, at 296. 
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an error, it has found that “this requirement is explained by the fact that a Trial Chamber’s 
decision, at the end of what will often have been a lengthy trial, should not be disturbed 




10.3.1. Appellate Conviction Revoking Acquittal 
The aforementioned debate with respect to the question of irrevocable appellate convictions 
essentially entails a bifurcated choice. The Ad Hoc Tribunals should either adhere to the 
relevant interpretation afforded to Article 14(5) ICCPR or they should have the leeway to 
apply the more limited version of the right to appeal, as embodied in Article 2(2) Protocol 7 
ECHR.1937 However, this dichotomy should be rejected. 
 
Two reasons militate against the adoption of Article 14(5) ICCPR (and Article 8(2)(h) ACHR) 
as the guiding norm concerning vacated acquittals in favour of irreversible convictions before 
the Ad Hoc Tribunals and the ICC. First, as discussed, there is insufficient support for the 
HRC’s interpretation of Article 14(5) ICCPR and, on this basis alone, the current state of 
international human rights law does not establish a clear-cut obligation for the Ad Hoc 
Tribunals and the ICC to provide further appellate review upon substituting an acquittal for a 
final conviction.1938 Second, even if this argument were rejected, the supporting claims of 
Judge Pocar provide an insufficient foundation for the application of Article 14(5) ICCPR in 
this context. According to Judge Pocar, the preceding considerations are irrelevant, 
considering that the Security Council has adopted the Secretary General Report without 
departing explicitly from the relevant language concerning the right to appeal.1939 In other 
words, Article 14(5) ICCPR, including the relevant views of the HRC, has become part of the 
internal law of the Ad Hoc Tribunals and exerts binding force on this basis.1940 However, the 
underlying claims are either too indeterminate or even explicitly depart from the relevant 
interpretation of Article 14(5) ICCPR. Commencing with the former, the finding of the ICTY 
Appeals Chamber that “Article 14 […] [ICCPR] reflects an imperative norm of international 
                                                 
1936 Ngudjolo, at 284 (emphasis supplied). 
1937 Part III, Chapter 10.1.4. 
1938 Part II, Chapter 6.2.2. 
1939 Rutaganda, Dissenting Opinion of Judge Pocar, at 2-3. 
1940 L. Gradoni, ‘International Criminal Courts and Tribunals: Bound by Human Rights Norms … or Tied 
Down?’, 19(3) Leiden Journal of International Law 847 (2006), at 854-855. 
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law” has arisen in the context of a contempt case in which the ICTY Appeals Chamber has 
acted as a court of first instance.1941  Accordingly, the reference to Article 14(5) ICCPR 
concerned the matter whether a right to appeal, as such, should be provided and it was, 
therefore, disconnected from the question whether an appellate conviction replacing a first 
instance acquittal triggers a right to additional review. Furthermore, and more importantly, the 
Secretary General Report, in fact, departs from the need to provide such review. It explicitly 
accords a right to appeal to the prosecutor, which is a necessary pre-condition to convert an 
acquittal into an appellate conviction, and it notes that Appeals Chamber judgments “[…] 
revising the judgement of the Trial Chamber would be final”, which prevents a further appeal 
against an appellate conviction.1942 As discussed, the Ad Hoc Appeals Chambers’ powers of 
remittal are merely discretionary and do not detract from their powers to conclusively 
determine matters of law and fact.1943 These indications suffice to dispel doubt as to the rights 
of the accused in respect of this element of the right to appeal. 
 
However, this conclusion does not entail a resort to the position of Judge Shahabuddeen or the 
more general position of the full Ad Hoc Appeals Chambers, even though this position 
coincides, in essence, with the aforementioned rejection of Article 14(5) ICCPR as a basis for 
this element of the right to appeal at the Ad Hoc Tribunals and the ICC. First, the supporting 
arguments advanced by Judge Shahabuddeen are unconvincing. The equivalent benefit to 
enter reservations, which would accrue to the Ad Hoc Tribunals, is inapplicable as 
“international organisations […] cannot be regarded as direct addressees of” human rights 
instruments and, even if they could, “reservations can only be made at the point of expression 
of consent to be bound by that treaty”. 1944  Moreover, besides the question of whether 
logistical considerations may serve as a basis to limit standards of international human rights 
law,1945 the argument that, in the Ad Hoc Tribunals’ two-tier structure, there is no higher body 
to hear further appeals ignores the fact that, in international human rights law, the element of 
“a higher court” is encapsulated by the requirement to provide appellate review of sufficient 
                                                 
1941 Appeal Judgement on Allegations of Contempt against Prior Counsel, Milan Vujin, Prosecutor v. Tadić, 
Case No. IT-94-1-A-AR77, ICTY, Appeals Chamber, 27 February 2001. 
1942 U.N. Security Council, Report of the Secretary-General Pursuant to Paragraph 2 of Security Council 
Resolution 808 (1993), S/25704, 3 May 1993, at 117-118 (emphasis supplied). 
1943 Part III, Chapter 10.1.2. 
1944 M. Fedorova and G. Sluiter, ‘Human Rights as Minimum Standards in International Criminal Proceedings’, 
3(1) Human Rights & International Legal Discourse (2009), at 36-37. 
1945 Nyiramasuhuko et al., at 376. 
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scope. 1946  Second, this position suffers from two fundamental shortcomings. It attaches 
insufficient weight to the risk of error in the judicial process. In the context of international 
criminal law, factual errors may result from, inter alia, the scope and complexity of the issues 
at stake and the temporal and physical distance between the occurrence of the alleged crimes 
and the production of the evidence, whereas the emerging state of the law may occasion legal 
errors. The risk of error is compounded by the fact that the Ad Hoc Tribunals and the ICC 
operate in a legal vacuum. Therefore, legal and factual evaluations are not subject to review 
by a court of third instance, as is the case in many domestic systems of criminal procedure,1947 
and elementary fair trial issues may not be brought before an external mechanism, such as the 
HRC or the ECtHR. Moreover, this view underrates the exigencies imposed by international 
human rights law. It mechanically resorts to a more limited conception of the right to appeal, 
as reflected, primarily, by Article 2(2) Protocol 7 ECHR, according to which acquittals may 
be unreservedly converted into convictions on appeal. It, therefore, fails to take account of the 
continued applicability of Article 6 ECHR to appellate proceedings and the additional 
safeguards demanded in respect of appellate convictions imposed in favour of acquittals.1948 
In this regard, it is striking that some of these safeguards have been applied by the Ad Hoc 
Appeals Chambers in an analogous situation, i.e. the alteration of convictions.1949 
 
Therefore, the Ad Hoc Tribunals powers to “reverse” an acquittal in favour of a final 
conviction are, in principle, not contrary to an aggregate view of the relevant standards of 
international human rights law. 1950  This conclusion necessarily extends to the associated 
power to impose a new sentence.1951 However, it also entails that the Ad Hoc Tribunals and 
the ICC are under an obligation to apply the safeguards pertaining to the possibility of a final 
conviction imposed first on appeal.1952 Considering that the ICC Appeals Chamber has not put 
its corresponding powers to effect in its early jurisprudence, no conclusion can be reached in 
this regard. The Ad Hoc Tribunals, on the other hand, have not applied the necessary 
compensatory safeguards accompanying such a power, albeit to differing degrees. 
 
                                                 
1946 Part II, Chapter 5.1.3.2. 
1947 Part III, Chapter 2.1.1. 
1948 Part II, Chapter 6.2.2. 
1949 Part III, Chapter 10.1.1.3. 
1950 Part III, Chapter 10.1.1.2. 
1951 Part III, Chapter 10.1.1.4. 
1952 Similar: Šainović et al., Opinion Dissidente du Juge Ramaroson, at 3-4. 
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In general, first instance acquittals have been converted into appellate convictions without a 
sufficient degree of appellate scrutiny. As discussed, the appellate processes of the Ad Hoc 
Tribunals consist, in the main, of written submissions.1953 However, in a situation as intrusive 
as an unreviewable conviction imposed instead of a first instance acquittal, appellants must be 
enabled to more intensely challenge the legal and factual basis that may engender such a 
conviction, as established supra. Even though the Ad Hoc Appeals Chambers possess, in 
principle, far-reaching powers,1954 they have not wielded such powers so as to sufficiently 
broaden the remit of their appellate proceedings. Instead, they have based such convictions on 
the Trial Chambers’ findings, supplemented by the parties’ submissions.1955  
 
Moreover, a final conviction pronounced for the first time by the Ad Hoc Appeals Chambers 
has failed to provide sufficient notice to the person concerned and/or has been grounded in 
elements extrinsic to the original charges on at least one occasion. A Trial Chamber had not 
entered into an assessment of certain matters of fact, dismissing them as “conjecture”, and 
acquitted the accused on this count.1956 However, on the basis of these considerations, the 
ICTY Appeals Chamber has drawn an inference as to a critical legal element and has 
proceeded to reverse the acquittal in respect of this count.1957 Upon an application for review, 
the ICTY Appeals Chamber has had to concede that it had entered a “new factual finding” in 
this regard,1958 which reveals that this element had not been litigated. 
 
10.3.2. Aggravation of Sentence 
As discussed, the state of international human rights law is better defined in respect of the 
possibility of entering an aggravated sentence on appeal vis-à-vis the ability to quash an 
acquittal in favour of an unreviewable conviction. Contrary to Judge Pocar’s position, the 
HRC has, in fact, determined that, barring a far-reaching characterization of the underlying 
offence, Article 14(5) ICCPR has not been considered violated in respect of appellate 
confirmations of inferior convictions accompanied by aggravated sentences. 1959  It is 
unsurprising that the exception foreseen in Article 2(2) Protocol 7 ECHR regarding appellate 
                                                 
1953 Part III, Chapter 8.1. 
1954 Part III, Chapter 10.1. 
1955 Part III, Chapter 10.1.4.2. 
1956 Mrkšić & Šljivančanin, at 61-62. 
1957 Ibid. 
1958 Review Judgement, Prosecutor v. Šljivančanin, Case No. IT-95-13/l-R.1, ICTY, Appeals Chamber, 8 
December 2010, at 4, 32. 
1959 Part II, Chapter 5.1.1.3.3; Part II, Chapter 6.1. 
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convictions following an acquittal has been extended to similar circumstances.1960 There is, 
accordingly, a significant degree of overlap between these instruments, seeing that neither 
legal basis is considered violated if, within the aforementioned perimeters, an appellate court 
aggravates a final sentence.1961 Accordingly, although the ICC has not employed its power to 
“vary the sentence” in this manner in its early jurisprudence,1962 the few instances in which 
the Ad Hoc Tribunals have augmented sentences without adjusting the underlying conviction 
or irrespective thereof, are not, as such, contrary to international human rights law.1963 
 
10.3.3. Alteration of Conviction 
The HRC and the ECtHR have adopted a similar interpretation of the corresponding 
provisions of the ICCPR and the ECHR, namely Article 14(3)(a) ICCPR and Article 6(3)(a) 
ECHR, in relation to the powers of appellate courts to irrevocably alter the basis of a 
conviction. Such a power is not contrary to the commonly shared norm “[t]o be informed 
promptly and in detail […] of the nature and cause of the charge”,1964 provided that any type 
of requalification is appropriately communicated to the person concerned and a sufficient 
opportunity to respond to a possible requalification is afforded.1965 Thus, whereas the Ad Hoc 
Tribunals and the ICC are not barred from invoking their respective powers to “reverse” or 
“amend” in this manner, these bases establish a clear-cut obligation to refrain from employing 
these powers in so far as they deny sufficient notice of the charges. 
 
Whereas the ICC Appeals Chamber has not brought its power to “amend” into play in its 
early jurisprudence, the Ad Hoc Appeals Chambers have done so frequently. Even so, they 
have, in general, remained within the permissible boundaries established by human rights law. 
Although the specific reasoning has differed, the Ad Hoc Tribunals have, to a larger degree in 
comparison with the application of their power to “reverse”, considered whether their resort to 
the power to “revise” has entailed fair trial considerations, including the right “[t]o be 
informed promptly and in detail […] of the nature and cause of the charge”.1966 
 
                                                 
1960 Part II, Chapter 3.3.5; Part II, Chapter 5.1.1.3.3. 
1961 Part II, Chapter 5.1.1.3.3. 
1962 Part III, Chapter 10.2.3. 
1963 Part III, Chapter 10.1.1.3. However, see: Part III, Chapter 11. 
1964 This formulation is employed in Article 14(3)(a) ICCPR. Article 6(3)(a) is slightly differently worded, which 
does not alter the scope of the protection provided. 
1965 Part II, Chapter 5.1.4.5; Part II, Chapter 6.1. 
1966 Part III, Chapter 10.1.1.3. 
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This conclusion entails that the corresponding powers to adjust the sentence of the Ad Hoc 
Tribunals,1967  and possibly the ICC,1968  fall in line with human rights standards as well. 
Although the human rights monitoring bodies and courts have not confirmed so in an outright 
manner, this may be deduced from the fact that both the HRC and the ECtHR have not found 
fault with the adjustment of a sentence on appeal, either upward or downwards, where a first 
instance conviction had been altered in conformity with the right “[t]o be informed promptly 
and in detail […] of the nature and cause of the charge”.1969 
 
10.3.4. Regulation of Appeals Chambers’ Powers 
The regulation of the powers of the Appeals Chambers of the Ad Hoc Tribunals and the ICC 
must, arguably, comply with the outer limits of the discretion to regulate the appellate process 
recognised in international human rights law as well.1970 
 
Whereas the fledgling jurisprudence of the ICC has not revealed severe forms of 
inconsistency in respect of the application of the powers of the ICC Appeals Chamber,1971 the 
practical application of several aspects of the powers of the Ad Hoc Appeals Chambers has 
fluctuated considerably. Three such aspects stand out. First, in respect of errors of law 
established by the Ad Hoc Appeals Chambers, it has remained unclear whether they should 
apply an autonomous or detached standard of review and whether they are constrained by the 
evidence considered by the Trial Chambers or may invoke evidence not directly assessed by 
them.1972 Second, it remains highly uncertain when the Ad Hoc Appeals Chambers should 
resort to conclusive determination and when to remittal to a Trial Chamber. 1973  Finally, 
prosecutorial appeals have been approached in varying manners. In respect of factual issues, 
the Ad Hoc Appeals Chambers have either been constrained by the findings of the Trial 
Chamber or adopted additional findings.1974 Furthermore, the outcomes of such appeals have 
varied, ranging from conclusive adjudication and remittal to alternative approaches that 
acknowledge errors but attach no consequences to the convicted or acquitted person.1975 
 
                                                 
1967 Part III, Chapter 10.1.1.4 
1968 Part III, Chapter 10.2.2.1. 
1969 Part II, Chapter 5.1.4.5. 
1970 Part II, Chapter 5.1.3.1; Part II, Chapter 6.1. 
1971 Part III, Chapter 10.2.2; Part III, Chapter 10.2.3. 
1972 Part III, Chapter 10.1.1.2.1. 
1973 Part III, Chapter 10.1.2. 




The application of these aspects of the powers of the Ad Hoc Appeals Chambers falls short of 
the requirement of a reasonable degree of clarity/foreseeability. These inconsistencies have 
not been incidental, but have recurred in the jurisprudence on numerous occasions. Yet, no 
reasons have been provided by the Ad Hoc Appeals Chambers in relating to their vacillating 
approaches. In these circumstances, appellants have not been in a position to envisage the 
outcome of appellate proceedings in relation to these issues with a reasonable degree of 
certainty. What is more, some appellants have had their appeals conducted and adjudicated in 
a substantially diverging manner in comparison with similarly situated appellants. 
 
11. Appellate Judgments 
 
11.1. Ad Hoc Tribunals and ICC 
 
11.1.1. Reasoned Opinion 
The RPE of the Ad Hoc Tribunals stipulate that an appellate judgment must “be accompanied 
or followed as soon as possible by a reasoned opinion in writing […]”.1976 Contrary to the 
first instance, a reasoned opinion in writing provided at the second instance does not enable a 
further right to appeal, considering that the Ad Hoc Tribunals operate a two-tier legal system. 
It, therefore, exclusively expresses the accused’s right to be provided with reasons concerning 
determinative conclusions adopted in his or her criminal case.  
 
However, the Ad Hoc Appeals Chambers have indicated that this aspect requires adjustment 
in the context of appeal proceedings. The ICTY Appeals Chamber has found that “[t]here is a 
significant difference from the standard of reasoning before a Trial Chamber”.1977 It has held 
that the ICTY Statute “does not require the Appeals Chamber to provide a reasoned opinion 
such as that required of the Trial Chamber” and that only the RPE call for a “reasoned opinion 
in writing”.1978 It has further considered that “[t]he purpose of a reasoned opinion under […] 
the Rules [of Procedure and Evidence] is not to provide access to all the deliberations of the 
Appeals Chamber in order to enable a review of its ultimate findings and conclusions”.1979 
Therefore, pursuant to the jurisprudence of the ECtHR, “[t]he Appeals Chamber must indicate 
                                                 
1976 Rule 117(B) ICTY RPE; Rule 118(B) ICTR RPE. 
1977 Kunarac et al., at 42. The ICTR Appeals Chamber explicitly adopted these standards soon thereafter. See: 
Rutaganda, at 19. 
1978 Kunarac et al., at 42. 
1979 Ibid., at 42. 
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with sufficient clarity the grounds on which a decision has been based”, which “cannot be 
understood as requiring a detailed response to every argument”.1980 
 
It is, thus, unsurprising that judgments of the Ad Hoc Appeals Chambers frequently feature 
reasoning of a limited scope. The Appeals Chambers’ assessments often constitute no more 
than bare conclusions without supporting analysis. For instance, in response to a ground of 
appeal that the Trial Chamber would have erred in finding a witness credible, the ICTY 
Appeals Chamber merely noted that the appellant failed to demonstrate that “the Trial 
Chamber erred in holding that this witness’ account of the events […] was credible”, “that its 
explanation was unreasonable”, and “how the Trial Chamber’s reliance upon [the] Witness [in 
question] and its conclusion with regard to the testimony of [a] Defence Witness […] were 
unreasonable”.1981 In a similar vein, the Appeals Chambers have often reiterated the relevant 
reasoning of the Trial Chamber and concluded, on this basis, that no error has been 
demonstrated. For instance, after reproducing the relevant findings of a Trial Chamber, the 
analysis of the ICTY Appeals Chamber was limited to a remark that the appellant “does not 
show that the Trial Chamber erred in relying on this evidence”.1982 
 
However, the reasoning underlying the Appeals Chambers’ approach to a reasoned opinion 
has also incurred disapproval. A judge of the Appeals Chamber has noted that the Trial 
Chambers’ Statutory obligation to provide a “reasoned opinion in writing” is reiterated in the 
RPE of the Ad Hoc Tribunals, which is transferrable, mutatis mutandis, to the Appeals 
Chambers.1983 This assessment is further supported by the fact that the obligations in the RPE 
and the Statutes are worded identically. Accordingly, dissenting judges have criticised the 
lack of reasoning concerning particular findings made by the Ad Hoc Appeals Chambers.1984 
 
With regard to the ICC, the ICC Statute appears to impose a lower obligation on the ICC 
Appeals Chamber vis-à-vis ICC Trial Chambers. Whereas a judgment of the ICC Appeals 
                                                 
1980 Ibid., at 42. 
1981 Naletilić & Martinović, at 416. Similar: Vasiljević, at 60; Kupreškić et al., at 370; Brđanin, at 72. 
1982 Milošević, at 153. Similar: Limaj et al., at 238-237, 240-241, 249-250, 252-253, 257-258, 260-261, 265, 
272-273; Ntakirutimana & Ntakirutimana, at 275-276; Munyakazi, at 152-154; Blagojević & Jokić, at 55; 
Karera, at 127, 239. 
1983 Stanišić & Simatović, Separate and Partially Dissenting Opinion of Judge Carmel Agius, at 3 (footnote 13). 
1984 E.g., Stanišić & Simatović, Separate and Partially Dissenting Opinion of Judge Carmel Agius, at 3 (footnote 
13), 10; Gotovina & Markač, Dissenting Opinion of Judge Fausto Pocar, at 14. 
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Chamber “shall state the reasons on which it is based”,1985 ICC Trial Chambers are obliged to 
provide “a full and reasoned statement of the […] findings on the evidence and 
conclusions”.1986 Indeed, the ICC Appeals Chamber has also limited the scope of the right to a 
reasoned opinion in the context of appellate proceedings, at least on particular occasions. 
Alike the Ad Hoc Appeals Chambers, it has offered bare conclusions without supporting 
analysis1987 and reiterated the Trial Chamber’s analysis without independent analysis.1988 
 
11.1.2. Public Pronouncement 
According to the RPE of the Ad Hoc Tribunals, an appellate judgment shall “be pronounced 
in public”.1989 The RPE further indicate that the pronouncement of the judgment and the 
delivery of a reasoned opinion may be separated, as an appellate judgment must “be 
accompanied or followed as soon as possible by a reasoned opinion in writing […]”.1990 
Indeed, in the initial stages, the Ad Hoc Appeals Chambers delayed the production of a 
reasoned opinion in writing, after allowing or declining grounds of appeal at the oral 
hearing.1991 Thereafter, however, the Appeals Chambers have generally proceeded to provide 
a reasoned opinion in writing, or at least a summary thereof, simultaneously with the 
pronouncement of the judgment on appeal. Finally, the RPE enshrine the accused’s right to be 
present at the pronouncement of the appellate judgment,1992 although they also specifically 
permit the Appeals Chambers to deliver their judgments in the absence of the accused.1993 
 
In a similar fashion, the ICC Statute mandates that “[t]he judgement of the [ICC] Appeals 
Chamber […] shall be delivered in open court”1994  and that it may be delivered in “the 
absence of the person acquitted or convicted”.1995 
 
  
                                                 
1985 Art. 83(4) ICC Statute. 
1986 Art. 74(5) ICC Statute. 
1987 E.g., Lubanga, at 351. 
1988 E.g., Lubanga, at 162-163, 427-430. 
1989 Rule 117(D) ICTY RPE; Rule 118(D) ICTR RPE. 
1990 Rule 117(B) ICTY RPE; Rule 118(B) ICTR RPE. 
1991 E.g., Aleksovski, at 4 (the Appeals Chamber further reserved its judgment on two of the prosecution’s 
grounds of appeal); Serushago Sentencing Appeal, at 3; Kayishema & Ruzindana, at 2 (also: ibid., Annexe A, 
Procedure en Appel, at 31). 
1992 Rule 117(D) ICTY RPE; Rule 118(D) ICTR RPE. 
1993 Rule 118(B) ICTY RPE; Rule 119(B) ICTR RPE. 
1994 Art. 83(4) ICC Statute. 





11.2.1. Reasoned Opinion 
The relevant standard in international human rights law requires sufficient or meaningful 
consideration of the core issues before an appellate body.1996 The general practice of the Ad 
Hoc Appeals Chambers and, arguably, the ICC Appeals Chamber, according to which a 
detailed response to every appellate argument is not required, complies with this norm. 
 
However, whereas the ICC Appeals Chamber has not done so in its early jurisprudence, the 
Ad Hoc Appeals Chambers have, in certain judgments, failed to provide sufficient or 
meaningful consideration to determinative issues. This may be illustrated by the following 
example.1997 When increasing a twenty year sentence to a sentence of life imprisonment, the 
ICTY Appeals Chamber limited its reasoning to a single operative sentence: the “crimes were 
characterized by exceptional brutality and cruelty, […] [the accused’s] participation was 
systematic, prolonged and premeditated and he abused his senior position”.1998 It did not, 
however, indicate how it had established these characterisations or how they would 
specifically support the conclusion that the Trial Chamber had underestimated the gravity of 
the accused’s conduct. Although it could be maintained that the replication of the relevant 
findings of the Trial Chamber provided the necessary reasoning, the ICTY Appeals Chamber, 
in fact, concluded that the former had not erred in adopting these findings or setting out the 
relevant law.1999 As correctly noted by a dissenting judge, the reasoning was confined to 
“conclusory statements”.2000 Since the increased sentence was based on this assessment, more 
extensive reasoning was required, especially in view of its irreversible nature. Even so, 
considering the relatively infrequent occurrence of such violations, this does not detract from 
the conclusion that, in general, the Ad Hoc Appeals Chambers reason their judgments in 
accordance with the requirements established in international human rights law. 
 
  
                                                 
1996 Part II, Chapter 6.2.4. 
1997 Also: e.g., Stanišić & Simatović, Separate and Partially Dissenting Opinion of Judge Carmel Agius, at 3. 
1998 Galić, at 455. 
1999 Ibid., at 455. 
2000 Ibid., Separate and Partially Dissenting Opinion of Judge Meron, at 13. 
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11.2.2. Public Pronouncement 
International human rights law permits forms of publicity falling short of the public 
pronouncement of an appellate judgment. 2001  Nevertheless, the practice of the Appeals 
Chambers of the Ad Hoc Tribunals and the ICC is, arguably, in accordance with the most 
stringent interpretation of this guarantee in international human rights law. On the basis of 
their internal legal frameworks, the public pronouncement of an appellate judgment is a 
mandatory component of the appellate process and, in practice, the Appeals Chambers of the 
Ad Hoc Tribunals and the ICC have read out summaries of their judgments in public. In 
addition, the Appeals Chambers of the Ad Hoc Tribunals and the ICC have not resorted to in 
absentia pronouncements of their judgments hitherto. 
 
                                                 




The research question of this study, i.e. “against which standards should the appellate 
proceedings of the Ad Hoc Tribunals and the ICC be assessed and have the Ad Hoc Tribunals 
and the ICC conducted and adjudicated appeals taken from first instance judgments and/or 
sentences in accordance with such standards?”, yields the following conclusion.  
 
First, the appellate processes of the Ad Hoc Tribunals and/or the ICC comply or, at least, do 
not display non-compliance, with norms of international human rights law concerning 
appellate fairness for the most part.  
 
In more specific terms, the following facets of the appellate proceedings of the Ad Hoc 
Tribunals and the ICC fall in line with such norms: (i) single-level appellate review; (ii) the 
general possibility of regulating the appellate process; (iii) the extension of the right to appeal 
to both the person convicted at first instance, including the possibility of waiving this right, 
and the Ad Hoc and ICC prosecutors; (iv) the right to a defence by means of legal assistance, 
which includes the possibility of being represented by counsel, the assignment of legal aid 
free of charge to the indigent, adequate legal assistance by counsel appointed under a legal aid 
scheme,2002 and the selection of privately retained counsel of one’s own choosing;2003 (v) the 
right to a defence by means of self-representation;2004 (vi) the requirement of superiority; (vii) 
the requirement of impartiality, which concerns, more specifically the general right to an 
impartial tribunal and, specifically regarding the ICC, the absence of impermissible 
accumulation of judicial functions in the pre-trial and appeal phases of the same case; (viii) 
the approaches to access to appellate review, which concern the “raise of waive” rule,2005 a 
reasoned opinion by Trial Chambers, time limits, word limits, and, specifically regarding the 
ICC, the form of written submissions on appeal; (ix) the requirement of orality;2006 (x) the 
requirement of presence; (xi) the scope of appellate review encompassing, on the one hand, 
the conviction and the sentence and, on the other hand, specifically regarding the ICC, 
questions of fact and law; (xii) the powers of the Appeals Chambers as regards both the 
                                                 
2002 This matter has not specifically arisen in the appellate process of the ICC hitherto. 
2003 This matter has not specifically arisen in the appellate process of the ICC hitherto. 
2004 This matter has not specifically arisen in the appellate process of the ICC hitherto. 
2005 This matter has not specifically arisen in the appellate process of the ICC hitherto. 
2006 However, the ICC Appeals Chamber has found that this is not an obligation of international human rights 
law, which could potentially raise human rights related issues in future proceedings. See: Part III, Chapter 8.1.2. 
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aggravation and alteration of first instance sentences and convictions;2007 (xiii) the right to a 
reasoned opinion;2008 and (xiv) the public pronouncement of an appellate judgment. 
 
Nevertheless, particular facets of the appellate processes of the Ad Hoc Tribunals fall short of 
the relevant yardsticks developed in international human rights law either as a result of 
outright non-compliance with the relevant norm or because of a transgression of the limits 
pertaining to the freedom to regulate the appellate process.  
 
These facets concern: (i) the involvement of the same judges in pre-trial and appellate 
adjudication in the same case or in separate, but interrelated, appellate cases involving the 
same accused; (ii) the approach to access to appellate review in respect of the form of written 
submissions on appeal; (iii) the scope of appellate review regarding questions of fact based on 
the trial record and sentencing appeals; (iv) the power of the Appeals Chambers to substitute 
first instance acquittals in favour of unassailable convictions without the required safeguards; 
and (v) the powers of the Appeals Chambers regarding the standard of review to be applied 
and scope of evidence to be considered after finding an error of law, the resort to either 
conclusive appellate determination or remittal, and to prosecutorial appeals. However, this 
conclusion does not apply to the ICC. In the early jurisprudence of the ICC, such challenges 
have either not specifically appeared or not demonstrated sufficient indications as to a lack of 
compliance with norms of international human rights law concerning appellate fairness. 
 
The following sections will identify the causes underlying the shortfalls of the appellate 
processes of the Ad Hoc Tribunals. Thereafter, proposals to repair these shortcomings2009 will 
be put forward. These proposals are directed at the ICC only. The mandates of the Ad Hoc 
Tribunals have either drawn (in the case of the ICTR) or are drawing (in the case of the ICTY) 
to a close and, what is more, the MICT, which operates an appellate framework similar to the 
Ad Hoc Tribunals, 2010  has undertaken to ensure normative continuity with the appellate 
                                                 
2007 These matters have not specifically arisen in the appellate process of the ICC hitherto. 
2008 Whereas the Ad Hoc Appeals Chambers have, on occasion, failed to provide a reasoned opinion in respect of 
determinative matters, this issue has not assumed a consistent character in the jurisprudence. See: Part III, 
Chapter 11.1.1. Accordingly, this aspect will not be assessed further. 
2009 As noted supra, in respect of certain matters, the practice of the Ad Hoc Tribunals has not been found to 
contravene international human rights law, but such matters have not arisen in the early jurisprudence of the ICC 
Appeals Chamber. In this regard, no specific proposals will be put forward, except that, as may be expected, the 
ICC Appeals Chamber emulate the approach of the Ad Hoc Appeals Chambers. 
2010 Art. 23 MICT Statute; Rules 131-145 MICT RPE. 
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practice of the Ad Hoc Tribunals.2011  Far-reaching adjustments cannot be made in these 
circumstances. At the same time, whilst the shortcomings affecting the appellate procedures 
of the Ad Hoc Tribunals do not apply to the appellate framework or the emerging 
jurisprudence of the ICC, as such, they may materialise in future proceedings before the ICC 
Appeals Chamber. As with the Ad Hoc Tribunals, the appellate phase of the ICC’s 
proceedings has been undertheorized in the preparatory work preceding the adoption of the 
ICC Statute,2012 as a result of which the essential function of the ICC Appeals Chamber 
suffers from a degree of ambiguity. ICC appellate proceedings have, thus, been labelled as 
“perhaps the most clearly inquisitorial aspect of the Court’s procedural regime”, 2013 
maintaining “more of a common law character”,2014 and displaying “extreme flexibility”.2015 
In addition, the general similarity of its appellate procedure vis-à-vis the Ad Hoc Tribunals 
and/or, as developed infra, indications in the early jurisprudence of the ICC Appeals Chamber 
suggest the possibility of a comparable approach concerning certain shortcomings. The 
proposals are further limited in that recommended adjustments involving an overhaul of the 
entire configuration of international criminal justice (such as “a wholly new super-appellate 
jurisdiction that acts as the appeals court to all existing and future international criminal 
courts and tribunals”2016) or an extensive refashioning of the ICC’s legal texts (such as “a 
second layer of appeal”2017) will not be contemplated. The practical focus of this study 
compels proposals confined to mechanisms within the existing legal framework of the ICC or, 
if necessary, calling for comparatively limited adjustments to the ICC’s legal texts. 
 
  
                                                 
2011 Ngirabatware, at 6. 
2012 Part III, Chapter 1. 
2013 K. Heller, ‘The Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court’, in K. Heller and M. Dubber (eds.), The 
Handbook of Comparative Criminal Law 593 (Stanford: Stanford Law Books, 2011), at 600. 
2014 G. Boas, J. Bischoff, N. Reid, and B. Don Taylor III, International Criminal Law Practitioner Library: 
International Criminal Procedure (Volume 3) (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2011), at 424. 
2015 R. Roth and M. Henzelin, ‘The Appeal Procedure of the ICC’, in A. Cassese, P. Gaeta, and J. Jones (eds.), 
The Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court: a Commentary 1535 (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 
2002), at 1539. 
2016 G. Boas, ‘The Case for a New Appellate Jurisdiction for International Criminal Law’, in G. Sluiter and S. 
Vasiliev (eds.), International Criminal Procedure: Towards a Coherent Body of Law 417 (London: Cameron 
May International Law & Policy, 2009), at 420-421. Similar: G. Boas, J. Jackson, B. Roche, and D. Taylor III, 
‘Appeals, Reviews, and Reconsideration’, in G. Sluiter, H. Friman, S. Linton, S. Vasiliev, and S. Zappalà (eds.), 
International Criminal Procedure - Principles and Rules 939 (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2013), at 1013-
1014. 
2017 L. Carter, ‘The Importance of Understanding Criminal Justice Principles in the Context of International 
Criminal Procedure: The Case of Admitting Evidence on Appeal’, in G. Venturini and S. Bariatti (eds.), Liber 
Fausto Pocar: Individual Rights and International Justice 125 (Milano: Giuffre Editore, 2009), at 142. 
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1. The Shortfalls Explained 
As discussed, the design of the appellate phase of international criminal trials has been 
characterised by a general lack of rigour.2018 Whereas the state of international human rights 
law evolved significantly after the preparatory work relevant to the Ad Hoc Tribunals had 
concluded,2019 certain facets of the right to appeal (most notably the possibility of a final 
appellate conviction revoking an acquittal and the scope of appellate review) were squarely 
raised and, yet, sufficiently well-defined resolutions were not supplied. 2020  Furthermore, 
notwithstanding generic references to the right to appeal,2021 other aspects of the right to 
appeal or relevant facets of the right to a fair trial have been invoked highly infrequently in 
the jurisprudence of the Ad Hoc Tribunals. In these circumstances, norms of international 
human rights law concerning appellate fairness have been undervalued. 
 
Indeed, certain facets of the appellate processes of the Ad Hoc Tribunals have mainly been 
developed out of practical considerations without (sufficient) regard for applicable norms of 
international human rights law. In relation to the rotation principle, it has been noted that 
“nearly all the judges wished to be appointed to the appeals chamber, which was viewed to be 
the more prestigious assignment” and that, “[a]s a compromise, the judges agreed that 
assignments would be for an initial period of one year and subject to ‘rotat[ion] on a regular 
basis’ thereafter”. 2022  In this regard, an Expert Group has recommended “a permanent 
separation […] between both ICTY and ICTR Trial and Appeals Chambers […] to […] 
[overcome] disqualification problems”.2023 In response, the ICTY and the ICTR relaxed the 
distinction between pre-trial judges and trial judges and left the possibility of involvement of 
the same judge in pre-trial and appeal proceedings in the same case unaffected, in order to 
provide for more flexibility in the composition of the Chambers.2024 Even so, the international 
                                                 
2018 Part III, Chapter 1.1. 
2019 Part II. 
2020 Part III, Chapter 1.1. 
2021 Part III, Chapter 1.1; Part III, Chapter 2.1.1. 
2022 M. Scharf, ‘A Critique of the Yugoslavia War Crimes Tribunal’, 25(2) Denver Journal of International Law 
& Policy 305 (1996-1997), at 308. 
2023 Report of the Expert Group to Conduct a Review of the Effective Operation and Functioning of the 
International Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia and the International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda, U.N. Doc. 
A/54/634, 22 November 1999, at 106. 
2024 U.N. Secretary-General, Comprehensive Report on the Results of the Implementation of the 
Recommendations of the Expert Group to Conduct a Review of the Effective Operation and Functioning of the 
International Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia and the International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda, A/56/853, 
4 March 2002, at 15, 69. 
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human rights law implications of this approach were not considered.2025 Similarly, Judge 
Shahabuddeen has held that irrevocable appellate convictions in lieu of first instance 
acquittals are, inter alia, a necessary corollary of the lack of a third level within the judicial 
system of the Ad Hoc Tribunals.2026 An early warning sounded by two judges, who urged “the 
[ICTR] Appeals Chamber to thoroughly examine the issue of entering new convictions at 
appellate level which, at this stage, can no longer be appealed”2027 has never been heeded, in 
view of the fact that the Ad Hoc Tribunals only provided a justification based on internal law 
for such powers without reference to international human rights law.2028 Finally, regarding the 
approach to access to appellate review in respect of the form of written submissions on appeal, 
the aforementioned Expert Group suggested, in anticipation of “a significant increase in the 
number of appeals”, that the Ad Hoc Appeals Chambers, inter alia, “consider motions for 
summary dismissal in cases where it clearly appears that the appeal is frivolous”, which may 
be “considered expeditiously”.2029 The ICTY agreed with this recommendation,2030 without 
mention of international human rights law exigencies. 
 
What is more, the amorphous role of the Ad Hoc Appeals Chambers has created an unstable 
basis for the orderly development of the appellate process. It has been maintained that “the 
[ICTY] Statute visualised an appellate process as understood in adversarial systems”,2031 that 
the interplay between Common Law and Civil Law stretches into the appellate proceedings of 
the Ad Hoc Tribunals,2032 but also that the Ad Hoc Appeals Chambers are unique.2033 Such a 
lack of clarity has affected the appellate process in two primary manners.  
                                                 
2025 M. Scharf, ‘A Critique of the Yugoslavia War Crimes Tribunal’, 25(2) Denver Journal of International Law 
& Policy 305 (1996-1997), at 308; S. Zappalà, Human Rights in International Criminal Proceedings (Oxford: 
Oxford University Press, 2003), at 178–179; V. Tochilovsky, ‘Special Commentary: International Criminal 
Justice – Some Flaws and Misperceptions’, 22(4) Criminal Law Forum 593 (2011), at 606-607. 
2026 Rutaganda, Separate Opinion of Judge Shahabuddeen, at 30-35. 
2027 Rutaganda, Separate Opinion of Judges Meron and Jorda, at p. 1. 
2028 Part III, Chapter 10.1.4.1. 
2029 U.N. Secretary-General, Report of the Expert Group to Conduct a Review of the Effective Operation and 
Functioning of the International Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia and the International Criminal Tribunal for 
Rwanda, A/54/634, 22 November 1999, at 103. 
2030 U.N. Secretary-General, Comprehensive Report on the Results of the Implementation of the 
Recommendations of the Expert Group to Conduct a Review of the Effective Operation and Functioning of the 
International Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia and the International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda, A/56/853, 
4 March 2002, at 67. While the ICTY referred to this recommendation in the context of the right to appeal 
against preliminary motions and interlocutory appeals subject to leave to appeal, both Ad Hoc Tribunals have 
extensively applied the mechanism of summary dismissal in relation to appeals from convictions and/or 
sentences too. Part III, Chapter 7.1.5. 
2031 Kvočka et al., Separate Opinion of Judge Shahabuddeen, at 3. 
2032 E.g., UNICRI, ADC ICTY, and OSCE ODIHR, Manual on International Criminal Defence - ADC-ICTY 
Developed Practices (Turin: UNICRI Publisher, 2011), at 175; A. Orie, ‘Accusatorial v. Inquisitorial Approach 




As discussed, applications for appellate review are not decided by the full benches of the 
Appeals Chambers, but by benches composed of five out of a total of seven judges sitting in 
the Appeals Chambers.2034 Depending on the composition of a bench in a particular appeal, 
different majorities may be formed, which may conflict with each other on particular 
issues.2035 Indeed, the shifting compositions of the Ad Hoc Appeals Chambers have generated 
diverging approaches to the review of questions of fact based on the trial record and the 
regulation of certain powers of the Appeals Chambers. Thus, particular benches have 
emphasised a Civil Law style approach in respect of these matters. This is reflected in the 
current of “broad” appellate review of questions of fact based on the trial record as well as a 
comprehensive interpretation of the powers of the Appeals Chambers concerning the 
application of an autonomous review standard and/or assessment of evidence not directly 
invoked by Trial Chambers in relation to an error of law.2036 Other benches have displayed an 
inclination towards a Common Law approach to appellate review in respect of these issues. 
This is revealed by the strand of jurisprudence characterised by “narrow” appellate review of 
questions of fact based on the trial record as well as a predilection for a more confined take on 
aspects of the powers of the Ad Hoc Appeals Chambers, i.e. a deferential review standard 
and/or consideration of evidence relied on by Trial Chambers regarding an error of law.2037 
 
Furthermore, the combination of elements drawn from Civil Law and Common Law in 
international criminal procedure may, in and of itself, entail pitfalls concerning standards of 
international human rights law. It has been remarked that “there is a risk that by adopting a 
‘pick and mix’ approach, international courts and tribunals end up with a system that contains 
                                                                                                                                                        
ICC’, in A. Cassese, P. Gaeta, and J. Jones, The Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court: a 
Commentary 1439 (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2002) at 1490-1491. 
2033 C. Jorda and M. Saracco, ‘Le Rôle de la Chambre d’Appel du Tribunal Pénal International pour l’Ex-
Yougoslavie et pour le Rwanda’, in J.-P. Marguénaud, M. Massé, and N. Poulet-Gibot Leclerc (eds.), Apprendre 
à Douter: Questions de Droit, Questions sur le Droit, Études Offertes à Claude Lombois 583 (Limoges: Presses 
Universitaires de Limoges, 2004, at 587. Similar: L. Carter, ‘The Importance of Understanding Criminal Justice 
Principles in the Context of International Criminal Procedure: The Case of Admitting Evidence on Appeal’, in 
G. Venturini and S. Bariatti (eds.), Liber Fausto Pocar: Individual Rights and International Justice 125 (Milano: 
Giuffre Editore, 2009), at 139-140. 
2034 Part III, Chapter 6.1. 
2035 Two judges of the ICTY Appeals Chamber have warned that “[i]t should not happen that due to shifting 
majorities the Appeals Chamber changes its jurisprudence from case to case”. See: Kordić & Čerkez, Joint 
Dissenting Opinion of Judge Schomburg and Judge Güney on Cumulative Convictions, at 13. 




none of the checks and balances that bring order to a national system, instead ending up with 
a Frankenstein’s monster that fails to adequately protect the rights of the defence”.2038  
 
Indeed, such tendencies are clearly recognisable in international appellate proceedings with 
regard to final appellate reversals of acquittals, including the concomitant powers of the Ad 
Hoc Appeals Chambers, and the resort to either conclusive appellate determination or remittal. 
Commencing with the former, the rejection of prosecutorial appeals against acquittals in 
Common Law has been said to arise, inter alia, out of the need to protect the right to trial by 
jury. 2039  A reversal by judges would undermine the right to be tried by one’s peers, a 
fundamental notion of Common Law systems of criminal procedure. It is, then, claimed that 
this rationale does not find application in international criminal law, considering that there are 
no jury trials and that the proceedings are conducted by professional judges.2040 However, a 
simple resort, by process of elimination, to the Civil Law position fails to appreciate an 
essential safeguard. In comparison with Common Law systems, most Civil Law systems 
involve a continuous decision-making process, which entails that the establishment of facts 
persists throughout first instance and appellate proceedings. 2041  The more extensive 
assessment of facts on appeal establishes a more solid foundation for appellate reversals and 
generally allows the person concerned to additionally challenge the factual basis for a 
possible conviction. Be that as it may, the Appeals Chambers of the Ad Hoc Tribunals and the 
ICC operate, in the main, a corrective procedure, focusing on errors that the Trial Chambers 
may have committed,2042 which more closely resembles the appellate procedures of Common 
Law systems. Thus, even though international appellate proceedings incorporate the logic 
behind prosecutorial appeals against acquittals from Civil Law, they discount a vital safety 
device by reducing appellate review to a corrective appraisal borrowed from Common Law.  
                                                 
2038 R. Skilbeck, ‘Frankenstein’s Monster: Creating a New International Procedure’, 8(2) Journal of 
International Criminal Justice 451 (2010), at 452. Similar: M. Fairlie, ‘The Marriage of Common and 
Continental Law at the ICTY and its Progeny, Due Process Deficit’, 4(3) International Criminal Law Review 
243 (2004), at 292; P. Robinson, ‘Rough Edges in the Alignment of Legal Systems in the Proceedings at the 
ICTY’, 3(5) Journal of International Criminal Justice 1037 (2005), at 1040. Also: P. Wald, ‘The International 
Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia Comes of Age: Some Observations on Day-To-Day Dilemmas of 
an International Court’, 5(1) Washington University Journal of Law and Policy 87 (2001), at 90-91; E. 
O’Sullivan and D. Montgomery, ‘The Erosion of the Right to Confrontation under the Cloak of Fairness at the 
ICTY’, 8(2) Journal of International Criminal Justice 511 (2010), at 513. 
2039 G. Fletcher, ‘The Influence of the Common Law and Civil Law Traditions on International Criminal Law’, 
in A. Cassese (ed.), The Oxford Companion to International Criminal Justice 104 (Oxford: Oxford University 
Press, 2009), at 108. Also: Part I, Chapter 6. 
2040 Ibid., at 108. 
2041 Ibid., at 109. Also: Part I, Chapter 6. 




Such uncertainty has, arguably, also incurred a vacillating application of the corresponding 
powers of the Ad Hoc Appeals Chambers concerning prosecutorial appeals. The powers of 
the Ad Hoc Appeals Chamber to conclusively settle an appeal or to remit, amount to a wider 
variation of the approach to final appellate reversal of acquittals and, therefore, a similar 
observation applies. The Ad Hoc Appeals Chambers have overwhelmingly resorted to 
instantaneous appellate resolution instead of remittal, which is, overall, closer to the Civil 
Law approach to appellate review,2043 whilst the use of such powers is combined with a 
(predominantly) corrective approach to appellate review, which is more encountered in 
Common Law systems.2044 These features of the appellate processes of the Common Law and 
Civil Law systems stand in close relationship to each other. Instantaneous appellate resolution 
in Civil Law systems of appellate review is connected to the continuous decision-making 
process, which provides the necessary basis for the exercise of such powers by extensively 
testing the factual foundation of a judgment. The opposite tendency appears in Common Law 
systems, since the restrained approach to questions of fact warrants a more cautious exercise 
of appellate powers and, thus, prioritises remittal. This balance is lacking in the appellate 
proceedings of the Ad Hoc Tribunals, since the preference for instantaneous appellate 





Whereas the ICC’s legal texts explicitly exclude the involvement of the same judge in the pre-
trial and appeal phases in the same case,2045 ICC appeal judges could, in theory, partake in 
separate appellate cases affecting the same person. For instance, the ICC Appeals Chamber 
has determined that the Lubanga Trial Chamber had not erred in finding that Ntaganda, one of 
Lubanga’s alleged henchmen, had made use of children under the age of fifteen years as body 
guards,2046 which may amount to the war crime of “using them to participate actively in 
hostilities”.2047  However, at the time, first instance proceedings regarding the same (and 
                                                 
2043 Part III, Chapter 10.1.1; Part III, Chapter 10.1.2. 
2044 Part III, Chapter 9.1. 
2045 Regulation 12 ICC Regulations of the Court. Accordingly, no issues of international human rights law arise 
in respect of this matter. 
2046 Lubanga, at 396, 400, 405. 
2047 Art. 8(2)(b)(xxvi), 8(2)(e)(vii) ICC Statute. 
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related) charges were being conducted against Ntaganda himself.2048 If Ntaganda were to be 
found guilty on these charges and were to subsequently file an appeal, it is possible that some 
of the judges sitting on the Lubanga Appeals Chamber will also take part in the appellate 
proceedings in Ntaganda, since the composition of the ICC Appeals Chamber is largely fixed. 
 
The ICC, arguably, possesses the legal tools to prevent such intersecting appellate 
assessments. The ICC Statute demands the recusal of judges whose “impartiality might 
reasonably be doubted on any ground”, 2049  which is broad enough to accommodate 
applications for disqualification concerning the same judge pronouncing on the criminal 
responsibility of a person in an interrelated case and sitting on the appeal concerning the first 
instance judgment of the same person, as demanded by international human rights law. Where 
such applications are granted, the ICC Presidency retains the required flexibility, as it may 
temporarily appoint another judge to the Appeals Chamber.2050 
 
2.2. Screening Mechanism 
The variation in the approach to the form of written submissions on appeal of the ICC 
Appeals Chamber in its early jurisprudence is too limited to consider it to exceed the limits of 
the discretion to regulate the appellate process recognised under international human rights 
law.2051 Yet, as its jurisprudence matures, such fluctuation may come to approximate the 
degree of imprecision or lack of foreseeability encountered at the Ad Hoc Tribunals. 
 
It has been proposed, in the context of the Ad Hoc Tribunals, to introduce a division of the 
Appeals Chambers charged with screening the admissibility of written arguments presented 
on appeal.2052 Such a screening mechanism may ensure a more consistent approach to the 
concept of summary dismissal and streamline the ensuing appellate process of the ICC. It 
would, thus, ensure that defective arguments are more consistently identified and adjudged, 
while seeing to it that the ICC Appeals Chamber may concentrate on prima facie meritorious 
                                                 
2048 Decision Pursuant to Article 61(7)(a) and (b) of the Rome Statute on the Charges of the Prosecutor against 
Bosco Ntaganda, Prosecutor v. Ntaganda, ICC-01/04-02/06, ICC, Pre-Trial Chamber II, 09 June 2014, at 83-96. 
2049 Art. 41(2)(a) ICC Statute (emphasis supplied). 
2050 Regulation 12 ICC Regulations of the Court. 
2051 Part III, Chapter 7.1.5. 
2052 C. Jorda and M. Saracco, ‘Le Rôle de la Chambre d’Appel du Tribunal Pénal International pour l’Ex-
Yougoslavie et pour le Rwanda’, in J.-P. Marguénaud, M. Massé, and N. Poulet-Gibot Leclerc (eds.), Apprendre 
à Douter: Questions de Droit, Questions sur le Droit, Études Offertes à Claude Lombois 583 (Limoges: Presses 
Universitaires de Limoges, 2004, at 602. Also: M. Drumbl and K. Gallant, ‘Appeals in the Ad Hoc International 
Criminal Tribunals: Structure, Procedure, and Recent Cases’, 3(2) The Journal of Appellate Practice and 
Process 589 (2001), at 603. 
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claims. The ICC Statute could accommodate such a mechanism under the single judge 
provision, which allows “[t]he functions of the Pre-Trial Chamber […] [to] be carried out […] 
by a single judge” with respect to particular decisions2053 and may be invoked by the ICC 
Appeals Chamber. 2054  This avenue does not usurp the primary function of the Appeals 
Chamber, i.e. the delivery of an appellate judgment. However, if this option is not viable, 
considering that the ICC Statute expressly requires that “[t]he Appeals Chamber shall be 
composed of all the judges of the Appeals Division”2055 and the RPE are of a subordinate 
nature2056, a corresponding amendment to the legal texts could be introduced.2057 
 
2.3. Broad Appellate Review  
The inconsistency marking the appellate jurisprudence of the Ad Hoc Tribunals in respect of 
the scope of review regarding questions of fact based on the trial record and sentencing 
appeals, as well as the scope of review to be applied and type of evidence to be considered in 
connection with a finding that an error of law has been committed, may also make inroads 
into the corresponding approaches of the ICC in future proceedings. As discussed, there have 
been pleas for a wider approach to appellate review in the early jurisprudence of the ICC.2058 
In addition, the relatively short mandates of ICC judges2059 occasion altering formations of the 
Appeals Chamber, which may lead to alternating takes on appellate review. 
 
In this regard, calls for a narrowing of the scope of appellate review have been put 
forward.2060 However, it is submitted that the opposite outcome is to be preferred. More 
specifically, the ICC Appeals Chamber should recognise that the ICC Statute permits a 
widened approach to appellate review, which entails: (i) a decreased degree of deference to 
Trial Chambers in favour of the competence of the ICC Appeals Chamber to review factual 
matters in general and sentencing appeals;2061 and (ii) an interpretation of the “trial record” as 
                                                 
2053 Art. 39(2)(b)(iii) ICC Statute; Rule 7 ICC RPE. 
2054 Rule 149 ICC RPE. 
2055 Art. 39(2)(b)(i) ICC Statute. 
2056 Art. 51(4), (5) ICC Statute. 
2057 Art. 51(2) ICC Statute; Rule 3 ICC RPE. 
2058 Lubanga, Dissenting Opinion of Judge Anita Ušacka. 
2059 Art. 36(9) ICC Statute. 
2060 S. Zappalà, Human Rights in International Criminal Proceedings (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2003), 
at 179; S. Jayawardane and C. Divin, ‘The Gotovina, Perišić and Šainović Appeal Judgments: Implications for 
International Criminal Justice Mechanisms’, Policy Brief 13 The Hague Institute for Global Justice, September 
2014, at 8. 
2061 Similar in respect of questions of fact based on additional evidence: L. Carter, ‘The Importance of 
Understanding Criminal Justice Principles in the Context of International Criminal Procedure: The Case of 
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extending beyond the evidence considered in the trial judgment and encompassing the entire 
body of evidence admitted in the course of preceding proceedings.2062 Two reasons militate in 
favour of such an expansion.  
 
First, the proposed approach to appellate review possesses a stronger basis in the primary 
legal texts of the ICC and the tools available to the ICC Appeals Chamber. A narrow 
approach to appellate review reads the grounds of appeal too restrictively. The fact that the 
jurisdiction of the ICC Appeals Chamber is limited to various types of errors does not, as such, 
entail a rejection of a widened approach. As expressed by an ECtHR judge, “[l]egal issues 
cannot easily be separated from factual considerations”, since “the choice of the norm […] in 
relation to which the fact pattern is to be considered clearly determines which facts are going 
to be considered as legally relevant and which are not”.2063 Indeed, the Ad Hoc Appeals 
Chambers have struggled with this distinction, since they have, for instance, defined an extra-
Statutory category of “a mixed error of law and fact”,2064 adjudicated allegations of errors of 
law and errors of fact simultaneously,2065 and omitted to specify the type of error.2066 A 
widened approach, on the contrary, recognises the inherent interplay between these matters 
and explicitly recognises the mandate of the ICC Appeals Chamber to engage with questions 
of fact to an appropriate degree. What is more, as discussed,2067 the ICC Appeals Chamber is 
explicitly empowered to “call evidence to determine” a factual issue2068 and, since it has “all 
the powers of the Trial Chamber”,2069 it may, inter alia, “[o]rder the production of evidence in 
addition to that already collected prior to the trial or presented during the trial by the 
parties”2070 and request “the submission of all evidence that it considers necessary for the 
                                                                                                                                                        
Admitting Evidence on Appeal’, in G. Venturini and S. Bariatti (eds.), Liber Fausto Pocar: Individual Rights 
and International Justice 125 (Milano: Giuffre Editore, 2009), at 142. 
2062 Rule 151(1) ICC RPE. 
2063 Judgment, Hermi v. Italy, Application No. 18114/02, ECtHR, 18 October 2006, Dissenting Opinion of Judge 
Zupančič. Similar: X. Tracol, ‘The Appeals Chambers of the International Criminal Tribunals’, 12(2) Criminal 
Law Forum 137 (2001), at 146. 
2064 Strugar, at 252, 269. 
2065 E.g., Limaj et al., at 159, 222, 278, 318; Kajelijeli, at 29, 158-160, 182. Similar: Zigiranyirazo, at 51, 73; 
Blagojević & Jokić, at 300-303; Kalimanzira, at 186; Renzaho, at 319-320. 
2066 E.g., Gotovina & Markač, at 61 (also: Gotovina & Markač, Dissenting Opinion of Judge Carmel Agius, at 6; 
Gotovina & Markač, Dissenting Opinion of Judge Fausto Pocar, at 10); Tadić, at 183; Delalić et al., at 442-454, 
459; Kordić & Čerkez, at 355-360; Orić, at 47; Šainović et al., at 550; Mrkšić & Šljivančanin, at 61-62; 
Aleksovski, at 64. 
2067 Part III, Chapter 10.2.2.3. 
2068 Art. 83(2) ICC Statute. 
2069 Art. 83(1) ICC Statute. 
2070 Art. 64(6)(d) ICC Statute. 
287 
 
determination of the truth”.2071 In addition, seeing that audio-visual recordings are made of 
ICC hearings, the typical distinction between trial and appeal judges does not apply in full. 
That is, ICC appellate judges are not insulated from witness testimony as the testimony of 
witnesses may be reread and replayed.2072 It may be held, in opposition, that review of a 
recording is not the same as observing a witness on the stand. However, this advantage is not 
as pronounced in international criminal law as it may be in national proceedings. ICC judges 
hail from all over the world and are confronted with alleged crimes committed in foreign 
countries. The witnesses testifying to these events often speak a different language and have 
distinct cultural traditions and habits, which diminishes the ability of ICC trial judges to 
accurately assess the demeanour of witnesses to determine the veracity of their claims. 
Whereas a narrow approach to appellate review ignores these powers and tools, a widened 
approach embraces them as a necessary component of the ICC Appeals Chamber’s 
jurisdiction. In relation to sentencing appeals, the language of the Rome Statute suggests a 
broader type of review than for appeals from the merits of a trial judgment. The latter must be 
based on specific errors and, on this basis, the ICC Appeals Chamber has determined that its 
scope of appellate review is of a limited reach.2073 On the contrary, appeals from a sentence 
may be taken pursuant to a general claim on the “disproportion between the crime and the 
sentence”,2074 which, in the absence of a reference to the need to establish an error, suggests 
that the scope of appellate review concerning such matters must be construed broadly. Indeed, 
commentators have noted that the ICC Appeals Chamber has been afforded “full jurisdiction 
rather than ‘arbitrary’ powers” in sentencing appeals.2075  
 
Secondly, a widened approach to appellate review is more attuned to two fundamental 
characteristics of ICC proceedings. The ICC deals with extremely serious allegations in a 
legal vacuum. The possibility of an incorrect evaluation is not balanced by the possibility of 
recourse to a third appellate level or an external mechanism.2076 Furthermore, the discovery of 
                                                 
2071 Art. 69(3) ICC Statute. 
2072 The Ad Hoc Appeals Chambers have relied on audio-visual recordings to a limited extent. See: e.g., Delalić 
et al., at 620-650. However, overall, they have been reluctant to engage in such review. See: e.g., 
Hadžihasanović & Kubura, at 79; Nizeyimana, at 177. 
2073 Part III, Chapter 9.2.1. 
2074 Art. 81(2)(a) ICC Statute. 
2075 R. Roth and M. Henzelin, ‘The Appeal Procedure of the ICC’, in A. Cassese, P. Gaeta, and J. Jones (eds.), 
The Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court: a Commentary 1535 (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 
2002), at 1545 (emphasis in original). 
2076 U. Lundqvist, ‘Admitting and Evaluating Evidence in the International Criminal Tribunal for the Former 
Yugoslavia Appeals Chamber Proceedings. A Few Remarks’, 15(3) Leiden Journal of International Law 641 
(2002), at 643-644. 
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the material truth must be considered a paramount interest,2077 in light of the wider aims 
ascribed to international criminal law.2078 It is, thus, essential that relevant factual issues are, 
to the extent possible, explored sufficiently based on a widened approach. 
 
Opponents may argue that this proposal amounts to de novo review on appeal. This is not the 
case. A widened scope of appellate review does not entail a full rerun of the proceedings 
conducted at first instance. It involves a circumscribed broadening of appellate review, whilst 
adhering to the confines of the recognised grounds of appeal. It is, therefore, also limited to 
alleged errors committed by the Trial Chamber, but ensures that factual issues are 
appropriately scrutinised within such constraints. It may also be advanced that this approach 
to appellate review unduly prolongs proceedings generally marred by excessive delays. Such 
delays need not occur. The aforementioned screening mechanism would serve to weed out 
defective appellate arguments, which could streamline the appellate process and allow for 
more in-depth consideration of the merits of factual elements. 
 
2.4. Conclusive Appellate Determination 
Neither the legal texts of the ICC nor the early jurisprudence of the ICC formulate clear rules 
as to when the ICC Appeals Chamber is to conclusively determine a matter arising on appeal 
and when it is to remit an issue to the Trial Chamber, either in relation to questions of fact 
arising out of the trial record, additional evidence presented on appeal, or following a finding 
that an error of law has been committed.2079 The development of an approach that avoids a 
lack of precision or foreseeability to an unreasonable degree is, thus, of paramount import. 
 
In the literature, a clear preference for remittal exists in particular circumstances. For instance, 
it has been written that, if “there is no need to determine additional facts […], it may be 
appropriate for the [ICC] Appeals Chamber itself to amend the Trial Chamber’s Judgement” 
but, if “the final verdict depends only on one or more narrow issues of fact, it may be 
appropriate […] [to] either to call evidence itself or to remand those issues of fact back to the 
Trial Chamber” and, “if wide-ranging new fact-finding is necessary, a new trial may be more 
                                                 
2077 Part I, Chapter 1.1; Part I, Chapter 5.2.2.2. 
2078 J. Ohlin, ‘Goals of International Criminal Justice and International Criminal Procedure’, in G. Sluiter, H. 
Friman, S. Linton, S. Vasiliev, and S. Zappalà (eds.), International Criminal Procedure - Principles and Rules 
55 (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2013), at 55-68. 
2079 Part III, Chapter 9.2.1.2; Part III, Chapter 9.2.1.3; Part III, Chapter 10.2.2.2. Also: R. Roth and M. Henzelin, 
‘The Appeal Procedure of the ICC’, in A. Cassese, P. Gaeta, and J. Jones (eds.), The Rome Statute of the 
International Criminal Court: a Commentary 1535 (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2002), at 1556. 
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appropriate”.2080 Such an approach should be rejected. Pursuant to this logic, the approach of 
the ICC Appeals Chamber is contingent on the qualification of the matter at stake as either a 
question of law or fact. However, as discussed above, this distinction is too elusive to 
determine the appropriate course of action. In addition, the remittal of particular issues of fact 
and, especially, a new trial is likely to significantly protract proceedings, which may even run 
counter to the right to be tried without undue delay.2081 
 
It is, accordingly, proposed that, in conjunction with the aforementioned widening of the 
scope of appellate review concerning questions of fact, the ICC Appeals Chamber should, in 
principle, conclusively determine matters on appeal.2082 Such a construction appropriately 
balances the need to allow a first instance conviction and/or sentence to be challenged and the 
need to bring litigation to an end pursuant to the principle of finality. Nevertheless, such a 
power is limited by the rights of the accused. Indeed, this restriction has, in part, been 
recognised by the Ad Hoc Appeals Chambers concerning their powers to revise a first 
instance judgment. In this regard, it has been found that the basis for the revision of legal 
aspects of trial judgments should be pleaded adequately and/or sufficiently litigated on 
appeal.2083 This falls in line with the right to “be informed promptly […] and in detail […] of 
the nature and cause of the accusation” under international human rights law, although this 
right extends to amendments of the factual basis too.2084 In such circumstances, appellate 
proceedings would effectively be transformed into (partial) first instance proceedings without 
the essential safeguard of appellate recourse. Accordingly, where the ICC Appeals Chamber 
deems that the exercise of its power to “amend” amounts to a requalification of facts in legal 
terms or the adoption of a new finding of fact in a manner to contravene the aforementioned 
right to the accused, conclusive determination should yield to remittal to a Trial Chamber. 
                                                 
2080 C. Staker and F. Eckelmans, ‘Article 83’, in O. Triffterer and K. Ambos (eds.), Commentary on the Rome 
Statute of the International Criminal Court. Observers’ Notes, Article by Article 1965 (München: Verlag C.H. 
Beck, 2016), at 1969 (emphasis in original). Also: L. O’Neill and G. Sluiter, ‘The Right to Appeal a Judgment of 
the Extraordinary Chambers in the Courts of Cambodia’, 10(2) Melbourne Journal of International Law 596 
(2009), at 626; G. Boas, J. Jackson, B. Roche, and D. Taylor III, ‘Appeals, Reviews, and Reconsideration’, in G. 
Sluiter, H. Friman, S. Linton, S. Vasiliev, and S. Zappalà (eds.), International Criminal Procedure - Principles 
and Rules 939 (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2013), at 1013. 
2081 W. Jordash, ‘Guest Post: Merry-Go-Round Justice – The Retrial of Stanišić and Simatović’, Opinio Juris 
Blog, 4 January 2016, available at: http://opiniojuris.org/2016/01/04/guest-post-merry-go-round-justice-the-
retrial-of-stanisic-and-simatovic/. 
2082 Similar in respect of questions of fact based on additional evidence: L. Carter, ‘The Importance of 
Understanding Criminal Justice Principles in the Context of International Criminal Procedure: The Case of 
Admitting Evidence on Appeal’, in G. Venturini and S. Bariatti (eds.), Liber Fausto Pocar: Individual Rights 
and International Justice 125 (Milano: Giuffre Editore, 2009), at 142.  
2083 Part III, Chapter 10.1.1.3. 




This proposal may be implemented by analogy to the procedure concerning the prerogative of 
the Trial Chamber to requalify facts in legal terms. Such a prerogative is curbed by similar 
limitations, seeing that it must, inter alia, be ensured that it does not exceed “the facts and 
circumstances described in the charges and any amendments to the charges”.2085 Accordingly, 
it must be accompanied by “notice to the participants of such a possibility” and the provision 
of “the opportunity to make oral or written submissions” to the participants.2086 Considering 
that the Appeals Chamber may, pursuant to its authority to invoke the powers of the Trial 
Chamber,2087 “[r]ule on any […] relevant matters” 2088 and “adopt such procedures as are 
necessary to facilitate the fair and expeditious conduct of the proceedings”,2089 it may adopt 
comparable safeguards. Thus, where the ICC Appeals Chamber deems, after consulting the 
parties, that the conclusive determination of a question may contravene the right “[t]o be 
informed promptly and in detail of the nature, cause and content of the charge”,2090 it should 
remit the case to a Trial Chamber for renewed adjudication. 
 
2.5. Final Appellate Convictions Accompanied by Safeguards 
The ICC Appeals Chamber has, hitherto, not converted first instance acquittals into 
irrevocable convictions, but it has expressly indicated that it may do so, which comports with 
a plain reading of the relevant provisions of the ICC Statute.2091 
 
In this regard, it has been suggested that the ICC Appeals Chamber should “be required to 
remit the case to the judges of first instance”.2092 However, as discussed, the power to enter an 
                                                 
2085 Regulation 55(1) ICC Regulations of the Court. The practical application of this Regulation has engendered 
substantial controversy. See: Judgment Pursuant to Article 74 of the Statute, Prosecutor v. Katanga, Case No. 
ICC-01/04-01/07, ICC, Trial Chamber II, 7 March 2014, Minority Opinion of Judge Christine Van den 
Wyngaert, at 9-132. However, it is not inherently contradictory to international human rights law, seeing that the 
requalification of subordinate courts’ judgments by appellate courts have not been rejected by human rights 
courts and monitoring bodies, provided that fair trial rights are adhered to. See: Part II, Chapter 5.1.4.5. Also: 
Judgment on the Appeals of Mr Lubanga Dyilo and the Prosecutor against the Decision of Trial Chamber I of 14 
July 2009 entitled ‘Decision giving Notice to the Parties and Participants that the Legal Characterisation of the 
Facts may be Subject to Change in Accordance with Regulation 55(2) of the Regulations of the Court’, 
Prosecutor v. Lubanga, Case No. ICC-01/04-01/06, ICC, Appeals Chamber, 8 December 2009, at 85. 
2086 Regulation 55(2) ICC Regulations of the Court. 
2087 Art. 83(1) ICC Statute. 
2088 Art. 64(6)(f) ICC Statute. 
2089 Art. 64(3)(a) ICC Statute. 
2090 Art. 67(1)(a) ICC Statute. 
2091 Part III, Chapter 10.2.5. 
2092 G. Boas, J. Jackson, B. Roche, and D. Taylor III, ‘Appeals, Reviews, and Reconsideration’, in G. Sluiter, H. 
Friman, S. Linton, S. Vasiliev, and S. Zappalà (eds.), International Criminal Procedure - Principles and Rules 
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unassailable conviction for the first time on appeal is not contrary to the general corpus of 
international human rights law2093 and, what is more, conclusive determination on appeal is to 
be prioritised over remittal. 2094  Furthermore, a model has been proposed, “whereby the 
Appeals Chamber would be empowered […] to modify findings of law and fact […] but 
would not be able to change the substantive decision”.2095 This model would subvert the 
essential function of the ICC Appeals Chamber to comprehensively and finally determine the 
question of guilt or innocence of the person concerned.2096 Finally, the need for a “unanimous” 
decision has been put forward to justify such a conviction. 2097  This requirement has the 
unattractive corollary of distinguishing between appellate proceedings against conviction, 
which require a regular majority,2098 and would risk paralysing the ICC Appeals Chamber in 
the event that the judges are unable to reach an agreement. 
 
It is, therefore, proposed to, as discussed, fully recognise the statutory power of the ICC 
Appeals Chamber to impose a non-appealable conviction in lieu of a first instance 
acquittal,2099 whilst giving effect to the safeguards demanded by international human rights 
law.2100 Such an approach would, arguably, also thwart an inconsistent application of the 
powers of the ICC Appeals Chamber in respect of prosecutorial appeals.2101  
 
The following procedure may be envisaged in this respect. As with the previous matter, on the 
basis of the authority of ICC Trial Chambers to engage in legal recharacterisation, the ICC 
could provide notice to the parties of the possibility of a reversal and seek their input on this 
matter, pursuant to its powers to “[r]ule on any […] relevant matters” 2102 and “adopt such 
procedures as are necessary to facilitate the fair and expeditious conduct of the 
                                                                                                                                                        
939 (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2013), at 1013. This solution has occasionally been applied by the Ad 
Hoc Tribunals too. See: Part III, Chapter 10.1.4.2. 
2093 Part II, Chapter 6.2.2. 
2094 Conclusion, Chapter 2.4. 
2095 G. Boas, J. Jackson, B. Roche, and D. Taylor III, ‘Appeals, Reviews, and Reconsideration’, in G. Sluiter, H. 
Friman, S. Linton, S. Vasiliev, and S. Zappalà (eds.), International Criminal Procedure - Principles and Rules 
939 (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2013), at 1013. This solution has occasionally been applied by the Ad 
Hoc Tribunals too. See: Part III , Chapter 10.1.4.2. 
2096 Similar: Šainović et al., Opinion Dissidente du Juge Ramaroson, at 8. 
2097 G. Boas, J. Jackson, B. Roche, and D. Taylor III, ‘Appeals, Reviews, and Reconsideration’, in G. Sluiter, H. 
Friman, S. Linton, S. Vasiliev, and S. Zappalà (eds.), International Criminal Procedure - Principles and Rules 
939 (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2013), at 1013. 
2098 Art. 83(4) ICC Statute. 
2099 Part III, Chapter 10.2.5. 
2100 Part II, Chapter 6.2.2. 
2101 Part III, Chapter 10.2.5. 
2102 Arts. 64(6)(f), 83(1) ICC Statute. 
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proceedings”2103. Subsequently, it may implement the relevant safeguards by reference to its 
wide-ranging powers. The accused’s right “[t]o be informed promptly and in detail of the 
nature, cause and content of the charge”2104 requires the ICC Appeals Chamber to ensure that 
reversals of first instance convictions are not imposed without sufficient notice provided to 
the accused and that they are not based on elements extrinsic to the original charges. Where 
this requirement is not met, the ICC Appeals Chamber must, as indicated previously, remit 
the matter to a Trial Chamber.2105 If this threshold is met, oral hearings must be conducted to 
ensure that decisive issues have been sufficiently explored to justify a possible reversal, on 
the basis of any of the aforementioned prerogatives to “call evidence to determine” a factual 
issue,2106 “[o]rder the production of evidence in addition to that already collected prior to the 
trial or presented during the trial by the parties”,2107 or request “the submission of all evidence 
that it considers necessary for the determination of the truth”.2108 
 
                                                 
2103 Arts. 64(3)(a), 83(1) ICC Statute. 
2104 Art. 67(1)(a) ICC Statute. 
2105 Conclusion, Chapter 2.4. 
2106 Art. 83(2) ICC Statute. 
2107 Arts. 64(6)(d), 83(1) ICC Statute. 
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 Judgment, Prosecutor v. Haradinaj et al., Case No. IT-04-84-A, ICTY, Appeals Chamber, 
19 July 2010. 
 Judgment, Prosecutor v. Jelisić, Case No. IT-95-10-A, ICTY, Appeals Chamber, 5 July 
2001. 
 Judgment, Prosecutor v. Jokić (Sentencing), Case No. IT-01-42/1-A, ICTY, Appeals 
Chamber, 30 August 2005. 
 Judgment, Prosecutor v. Kordić & Čerkez, Case No. IT-95-14/2-A, ICTY, Appeals 
Chamber, 17 December 2004. 
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 Judgment, Prosecutor v. Kordić & Čerkez, Case No. IT-95-14/2-A, ICTY, Appeals 
Chamber, 17 December 2004, Separate Opinion of Judge Weinberg de Roca. 
 Judgment, Prosecutor v. Krajišnik, Case No. IT-00-39-A, ICTY, Appeals Chamber, 17 
March 2009. 
 Judgment, Prosecutor v. Krnojelac, Case No. IT-97-25-A, ICTY, Appeals Chamber, 17 
September 2003. 
 Judgment, Prosecutor v. Krstić, Case No. IT-98-33-A, ICTY, Appeals Chamber, 19 April 
2004. 
 Judgment, Prosecutor v. Kunarac et al., Case No. IT-96-23 & IT-96-23/1-A, ICTY, 
Appeals Chamber, 12 June 2002. 
 Judgment, Prosecutor v. Kupreškić et al., Case No. IT-95-16-A, ICTY, Appeals Chamber, 
23 October 2001. 
 Judgment, Prosecutor v. Kvočka et al., Case No. IT-98-30/1-A, ICTY, Appeals Chamber, 
28 February 2005. 
 Judgment, Prosecutor v. Kvočka et al., Case No. IT-98-30/1-A, ICTY, Appeals Chamber, 
28 February 2005, Separate Opinion of Judge Shahabuddeen. 
 Judgment, Prosecutor v. Kvočka et al., Case No. IT-98-30/1-A, ICTY, Appeals Chamber, 
28 February 2005, Separate Opinion of Judge Weinberg De Roca. 
 Judgment, Prosecutor v. Limaj et al., Case No. IT-03-66-A, ICTY, Appeals Chamber, 27 
September 2007. 
 Judgment, Prosecutor v. Lukić & Lukić, Case No. IT-98-32/1-A, ICTY, Appeals Chamber, 
4 December 2012. 
 Judgment, Prosecutor v. Lukić & Lukić, Case No. IT-98-32/1-A, ICTY, Appeals Chamber, 
4 December 2012, Dissenting Opinion of Judge Morrison. 
 Judgment, Prosecutor v. M. Nikolić (Sentencing), Case No. IT-02-60/1-A, ICTY, Appeals 
Chamber, 8 March 2006. 
 Judgment, Prosecutor v. Martić, Case No. IT-95-11-A, ICTY, Appeals Chamber, 8 
October 2008. 
 Judgment, Prosecutor v. Martić, Case No. IT-95-11-A, ICTY, Appeals Chamber, 8 
October 2008, Separate Opinion of Judge Schomburg on the Individual Criminal 
Responsibility of Milan Martić. 




 Judgment, Prosecutor v. Mrkšić & Šljivančanin, Case No. IT-95-13/1-A, ICTY, Appeals 
Chamber, 5 May 2009. 
 Judgment, Prosecutor v. Mrkšić & Šljivančanin, Case No. IT-95-13/1-A, ICTY, Appeals 
Chamber, 5 May 2009, Partially Dissenting Opinion of Judge Pocar. 
 Judgment, Prosecutor v. Mučić et al. (Sentencing), Case: No IT-96-21-Abis, ICTY, 
Appeals Chamber, 8 April 2003. 
 Judgment, Prosecutor v. Naletilić & Martinović, Case No. IT-98-34-A, ICTY, Appeals 
Chamber, 3 May 2006. 
 Judgment, Prosecutor v. Orić, Case No. IT-03-68-A, ICTY, Appeals Chamber, 3 July 
2008. 
 Judgment, Prosecutor v. Perišić, Case No. IT-04-81-A, ICTY, Appeals Chamber, 28 
February 2013. 
 Judgment, Prosecutor v. Popović et al., Case No. IT-05-88-A, ICTY, Appeals Chamber, 
30 January 2015. 
 Judgment, Prosecutor v. Popović et al., Case No. IT-05-88-A, ICTY, Appeals Chamber, 
30 January 2015, Partially Dissenting Opinion of Judge Pocar. 
 Judgment, Prosecutor v. Popović et al., Case No. IT-05-88-A, ICTY, Appeals Chamber, 
30 January 2015, Separate and Dissenting Opinion of Judge Mandiaye Niang. 
 Judgment, Prosecutor v. Šainović et al., Case No. IT-05-87-A, ICTY, Appeals Chamber, 
23 January 2014. 
 Judgment, Prosecutor v. Šainović et al., Case No. IT-05-87-A, ICTY, Appeals Chamber, 
23 January 2014, Opinion Dissidente du Juge Ramaroson. 
 Judgment, Prosecutor v. Simić, Case No. IT-95-9-A, ICTY, Appeals Chamber, 28 
November 2006. 
 Judgment, Prosecutor v. Stakić, Case No. IT-97-24-A, ICTY, Appeals Chamber, 22 
March 2006. 
 Judgment, Prosecutor v. Stakić, Case No. IT-97-24-A, ICTY, Appeals Chamber, 22 
March 2006, Partly Dissenting Opinion of Judge Shahabuddeen. 
 Judgment, Prosecutor v. Stanišić & Simatović, Case No. IT-05-88/2-A, ICTY, Appeals 
Chamber, 8 April 2015. 
 Judgment, Prosecutor v. Stanišić & Simatović, Case No. IT-05-88/2-A, ICTY, Appeals 
Chamber, 8 April 2015, Separate and Partially Dissenting Opinion of Judge Carmel Agius. 
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 Judgment, Prosecutor v. Strugar, Case No. IT-01-42-A, ICTY, Appeals Chamber, 17 July 
2008. 
 Judgment, Prosecutor v. Tadić (Sentencing), Case No. IT-94-1-A & IT-94-1-Abis, ICTY, 
Appeals Chamber, 26 January 2000. 
 Judgment, Prosecutor v. Tadić, Case No. IT-94-1-A, ICTY, Appeals Chamber, 15 July 
1999. 
 Judgment, Prosecutor v. Tadić, Case No. IT-94-1-A, ICTY, Appeals Chamber, 15 July 
1999, Declaration of Judge Nieto-Navia. 
 Judgment, Prosecutor v. Tolimir, Case No. IT-05-88/2-A, ICTY, Appeals Chamber, 8 
April 2015. 
 Judgment, Prosecutor v. Vasiljević, Case No. IT-98-32-A, ICTY, Appeals Chamber, 25 
February 2004. 
 Judgment, Prosecutor v. Zelenović (Sentencing), Case No. IT-96-23/2-A, ICTY, Appeals 
Chamber, 31 October 2007. 
 
4.1.2. Other Judgments, Decisions, and Orders 
 Appeal Judgement on Allegations of Contempt against Prior Counsel, Milan Vujin, 
Prosecutor v. Tadić, Case No. IT-94-1-A-AR77, ICTY, Appeals Chamber, 27 February 
2001. 
 Decision on Appeal against the Trial Chamber’s Decision on the Evidence of Witness 
Milan Babić, Prosecutor v. Milan Martić, Case No. IT-95-11-AR73.2, ICTY, Appeals 
Chamber, 14 September 2006. 
 Decision on Appellant’s Motion for the Extension of the Time-Limit and Admission of 
Additional Evidence, Prosecutor v. Tadić, Case No. IT-94-1-A, ICTY, Appeals Chamber, 
15 October 1998. 
 Decision on Application for Leave to Appeal (Provisional Release) by Hazim Delić, 
Prosecutor v. Delalić et al., Case No. IT-96-21-T, ICTY, Appeals Chamber, 22 
November 1996. 
 Decision on Momčilo Krajišnik’s Request to Self-Represent, on Counsel’s Motions in 
Relation to Appointment of Amicus Curiae, and on the Prosecution Motion of 16 February 
2007, Prosecutor v. Krajišnik, Case No. IT-00-39-A, ICTY, Appeals Chamber, 11 May 




 Decision on Momčilo Krajišnik’s Request to Self-Represent, on Counsel’s Motions in 
Relation to Appointment of Amicus Curiae, and on the Prosecution Motion of 16 February 
2007, Prosecutor v. Krajišnik, Case No. IT-00-39-A, ICTY, Appeals Chamber, 11 May 
2007. 
 Decision on Review of the Indictment, Prosecutor v. Boškoski & Tarčulovski, Case No. 
IT-04-82-I, ICTY, Reviewing Judge, 9 March 2005. 
 Decision on Strugar’s Request to Reopen Appeal Proceedings, Prosecutor v. Strugar, 
Case No. IT-01-42-Misc.1, ICTY, Appeals Chamber, 7 June 2007. 
 Decision on the Defence Motion for Interlocutory Appeal on Jurisdiction, Prosecutor v. 
Tadić, Case No. IT-94-1, ICTY, Appeals Chamber, 2 October 1995. 
 Decision on the Outcome of Proceedings, Prosecutor v. Delić, Case No. IT-04-83-A, 
ICTY, Appeals Chamber, 29 June 2010. 
 Decision on the Prosecutor’s Motion Requesting Protective Measures for Victims and 
Witnesses, Prosecutor v. Tadić, Case No. IT-94-1, ICTY, Trial Chamber, 10 August 1995. 
 Decision on Vujadin Popović’s Motion for Admission of Additional Evidence on Appeal 
Pursuant to Rule 115, Prosecutor v. Popović et al., Case No. IT-05-88-A, ICTY, Appeals 
Chamber, 20 October 2011. 
 Decision on Zoran Žigić’s “Motion for Reconsideration of Appeals Chamber Judgement 
IT-98-30/1-A Delivered on 28 February 2005”, Prosecutor v. Žigić, Case No. IT-98-30/l-
A, ICTY, Appeals Chamber, 26 June 2006. 
 Decision Terminating Appellate Proceedings in Relation to Milan Gvero, Prosecutor v. 
Popović et al., Case No. IT-05-88-A, ICTY, Appeals Chamber, 7 March 2013. 
 Decision, Prosecutor v. M. Stanišić, Case No.IT-08-91-A, ICTY, Registrar, 2 May 2013. 
 Decision, Prosecutor v. Ojdanić, Case No. IT-05-87-A, ICTY, Registrar, 20 March 2009. 
 Decision, Prosecutor v. Šljivančanin, Case No.IT-95-13/1-A, ICTY, Registrar, 22 January 
2008. 
 Judgment, Prosecutor v. Kunarac, Case No. IT-96-23-T & IT-96-23/1-T, ICTY, Trial 
Chamber, 22 February 2001. 
 Judgment, Prosecutor v. Kupreškić et al., Case No. IT-95-16-T, ICTY, Trial Chamber, 14 
January 2000. 
 Judgment, Prosecutor v. Stanišić & Simatović, Case No. IT-03-69-T, ICTY, Trial 
Chamber I, 30 May 2013. 
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 Order Appointing a Pre-Appeal Judge, Prosecutor v. Mučić et al., Case No. IT-96-21-A, 
ICTY, Appeals Chamber, 12 October 1999. 
 Order of the Vice-President for the Assignment of Judges to the Appeals Chamber, 
Prosecutor v. Mučić et al., Case No. IT-96-21-A, ICTY, Appeals Chamber, 20 January 
1999. 
 Order on Defence Motion to Disqualify Judge Wolfgang Schomburg from Sitting on 
Appeal, Prosecutor v. Martić, Case No. IT-95-11-A, ICTY, Vice-President, 23 October 
2007. 
 Order Re-Scheduling Appeal Hearing, Prosecutor v. B. Simić, Case No. IT-95-9-A, ICTY, 
Appeals Chamber, 5 May 2006, at 4.  
 Order Remitting Sentencing to a Trial Chamber, Prosecutor v. Tadić, Case No. IT-94-1-A, 
ICTY, Appeals Chamber 10 September 1999. 
 Order, Prosecutor v. Goran Jelisić, Case No. IT-95-10-A, ICTY, Appeals Chamber, 21 
March 2000. 
 Review Judgement, Prosecutor v. Šljivančanin, Case No. IT-95-13/l-R.1, ICTY, Appeals 
Chamber, 8 December 2010. 
 
4.2. International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda 
 
4.2.1. Judgments Appeals Chamber 
 Judgment, Prosecutor v. Akayesu, Case No. ICTR-96-4-A, ICTR, Appeals Chamber, 1 
June 2001. 
 Judgment, Prosecutor v. Bagilishema, Case No. ICTR-95-1A-A, ICTR, Appeals Chamber, 
3 July 2002. 
 Judgment, Prosecutor v. Bagosora & Nsengiyumva, Case No. ICTR-98-41-A, ICTR, 
Appeals Chamber, 14 December 2011.  
 Judgment, Prosecutor v. Bikindi, Case No. ICTR-01-72-A, ICTR, Appeals Chamber, 18 
March 2010. 
 Judgment, Prosecutor v. Bizimungu, Case No. ICTR-00-56B-A, ICTR, Appeals Chamber, 
30 June 2014. 
 Judgment, Prosecutor v. Gacumbitsi, Case No. ICTR-2001-64-A, ICTR, Appeals 
Chamber, 7 July 2006. 
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 Judgment, Prosecutor v. Gatete, Case No. ICTR-00-61-A, ICTR, Appeals Chamber, 9 
October 2012. 
 Judgment, Prosecutor v. Gatete, Case No. ICTR-00-61-A, ICTR, Appeals Chamber, 9 
October 2012, Partially Dissenting Opinion of Judge Pocar. 
 Judgment, Prosecutor v. Kajelijeli, Case No. ICTR-98-44A-A, ICTR, Appeals Chamber, 
23 May 2005.  
 Judgment, Prosecutor v. Kalimanzira, Case No. ICTR-05-88-A, ICTR, Appeals Chamber, 
20 October 2010. 
 Judgment, Prosecutor v. Kalimanzira, Case No. ICTR-05-88-A, ICTR, Appeals Chamber, 
20 October 2010, Partially Dissenting and Separate Opinions of Judge Pocar. 
 Judgment, Prosecutor v. Kambanda (Sentencing), Case No. ICTR 97-23-A, ICTR, 
Appeals Chamber, 19 October 2000. 
 Judgment, Prosecutor v. Kamuhanda, Case No. ICTR-99-54A-A, ICTR, Appeals 
Chamber, 19 September 2005.  
 Judgment, Prosecutor v. Kamuhanda, Case No. ICTR-99-54A-A, ICTR, Appeals 
Chamber, 19 September 2005, Separate and Partially Dissenting Opinion of Judge 
Mohamed Shahabuddeen. 
 Judgment, Prosecutor v. Kanyarukiga, Case No. ICTR-02-78-A, ICTR, Appeals Chamber, 
8 May 2012. 
 Judgment, Prosecutor v. Karemera & Ngirumpatse, Case No. ICTR-98-44-A, ICTR, 
Appeals Chamber, 29 September 2014.  
 Judgment, Prosecutor v. Karera, Case No. ICTR-01-74-A, ICTR, Appeals Chamber, 2 
February 2009. 
 Judgment, Prosecutor v. Kayishema & Ruzindana, Case No. ICTR-95-1, ICTR, Appeals 
Chamber, 1 June 2001.  
 Judgment, Prosecutor v. Mugenzi & Mugiraneza, Case No. ICTR-99-50-A, ICTR, 
Appeals Chamber, 4 February 2013. 
 Judgment, Prosecutor v. Muhimana, Case No. ICTR-95-1B, ICTR, Appeals Chamber, 21 
May 2007. 
 Judgment, Prosecutor v. Munyakazi, Case No. ICTR-97-36A-A, ICTR, Appeals Chamber, 
28 September 2011. 




 Judgment, Prosecutor v. Musema, Case No. ICTR-96-13-A, ICTR, Appeals Chamber, 16 
November 2001, Declaration Judge Shahabuddeen. 
 Judgment, Prosecutor v. Muvunyi (Muvunyi I), Case No. ICTR-2000-55A-A, ICTR, 
Appeals Chamber, 29 August 2008. 
 Judgment, Prosecutor v. Muvunyi (Muvunyi II), Case No. ICTR-2000-55A-A, ICTR, 
Appeals Chamber, 1 April 2011. 
 Judgment, Prosecutor v. Muvunyi (Muvunyi II), Case No. ICTR-2000-55A-A, ICTR, 
Appeals Chamber, 1 April 2011, Dissenting Opinion of Judges Liu and Meron. 
 Judgment, Prosecutor v. Nahimana et al., Case No. ICTR-99-52-A, ICTR, Appeals 
Chamber, 28 November 2007. 
 Judgment, Prosecutor v. Nahimana et al., Case No. ICTR-99-52-A, ICTR, Appeals 
Chamber, 28 November 2007, Partly Dissenting Opinion of Judge Shahabuddeen. 
 Judgment, Prosecutor v. Nchamihigo, Case No. ICTR-2001-63-A, ICTR, Appeals 
Chamber, 18 March 2010. 
 Judgment, Prosecutor v. Nchamihigo, Case No. ICTR-2001-63-A, ICTR, Appeals 
Chamber, 18 March 2010, Partly Dissenting Opinion of Judge Pocar. 
 Judgment, Prosecutor v. Ndahimana, Case No. ICTR-01-68-A, ICTR, Appeals Chamber, 
16 December 2013. 
 Judgment, Prosecutor v. Ndindabahizi, Case No. ICTR-01-71-A, ICTR, Appeals 
Chamber, 16 January 2007.  
 Judgment, Prosecutor v. Ndindiliyimana et al., Case No. ICTR-00-56-A, ICTR, Appeals 
Chamber, 11 February 2014.  
 Judgment, Prosecutor v. Niyitegeka, Case No. ICTR-96-14, ICTR, Appeals Chamber, 9 
July 2004. 
 Judgment, Prosecutor v. Nizeyimana, Case No. ICTR-00-55C-A, ICTR, Appeals 
Chamber, 29 September 2014. 
 Judgment, Prosecutor v. Ntabakuze, Case No. ICTR-98-41A-A, ICTR, Appeals Chamber, 
8 May 2012. 
 Judgment, Prosecutor v. Ntabakuze, Case No. ICTR-98-41A-A, ICTR, Appeals Chamber, 
8 May 2012, Joint Dissenting Opinion of Judges Pocar and Liu. 
 Judgment, Prosecutor v. Ntagerura et al., Case No. ICTR-99-46-A, ICTR, Appeals 
Chamber, 7 July 2006. 
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 Judgment, Prosecutor v. Ntakuritimana & Ntakuritimana, Case Nos. ICTR-96-10-A & 
ICTR-96-17-A, ICTR, Appeals Chamber, 13 December 2004.  
 Judgment, Prosecutor v. Ntawukulilyayo, Case No. ICTR-05-82, ICTR, Appeals Chamber, 
14 December 2011. 
 Judgment, Prosecutor v. Nyiramasuhuko et al., Case No. ICTR-98-42-A, ICTR, Appeals 
Chamber, 14 December 2015.  
 Judgment, Prosecutor v. Nyiramasuhuko et al., Case No. ICTR-98-42-A, ICTR, Appeals 
Chamber, 14 December 2015, Dissenting and Separate Opinion of Judge Agius. 
 Judgment, Prosecutor v. Nzabonimana, Case No. ICTR-98-44D-A, ICTR, Appeals 
Chamber, 29 September 2014.  
 Judgment, Prosecutor v. Renzaho, Case No. ICTR-97-31-A, ICTR, Appeals Chamber, 1 
April 2011. 
 Judgment, Prosecutor v. Rukundo, Case No. ICTR-2001-70-A, ICTR, Appeals Chamber, 
20 October 2010. 
 Judgment, Prosecutor v. Rutaganda, Case No. ICTR-96-3-A, ICTR, Appeals Chamber, 
26 May 2003. 
 Judgment, Prosecutor v. Rutaganda, Case No. ICTR-96-3-A, ICTR, Appeals Chamber, 
26 May 2003, Dissenting Opinion of Judge Pocar. 
 Judgment, Prosecutor v. Rutaganda, Case No. ICTR-96-3-A, ICTR, Appeals Chamber, 
26 May 2003, Separate Opinion of Judge Shahabuddeen. 
 Judgment, Prosecutor v. Semanza, Case No. ICTR-97-20-A, ICTR, Appeals Chamber, 20 
May 2005. 
 Judgment, Prosecutor v. Semanza, Case No. ICTR-97-20-A, ICTR, Appeals Chamber, 20 
May 2005, Dissenting Opinion of Judge Pocar. 
 Judgment, Prosecutor v. Semanza, Case No. ICTR-97-20-A, ICTR, Appeals Chamber, 20 
May 2005, Separate Opinion of Judge Shahabuddeen and Judge Güney. 
 Judgment, Prosecutor v. Seromba, Case No. ICTR-2001-66-A, ICTR, Appeals Chamber, 
12 March 2008. 
 Judgment, Prosecutor v. Seromba, Case No. ICTR-2001-66-A, ICTR, Appeals Chamber, 
12 March 2008, Dissenting Opinion of Judge Liu. 
 Judgment, Prosecutor v. Serushago (Sentencing), Case No. ICTR·98-39-A, ICTR, 
Appeals Chamber, 6 April 2000.  
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 Judgment, Prosecutor v. Setako, Case No. ICTR-04-81-A, ICTR, Appeals Chamber, 28 
September 2011. 
 Judgment, Prosecutor v. Setako, Case No. ICTR-04-81-A, ICTR, Appeals Chamber, 28 
September 2011, Partially Dissenting Opinion of Judge Pocar. 
 Judgment, Prosecutor v. Simba, Case No. ICTR-01-76-A, ICTR, Appeals Chamber, 27 
November 2007. 
 Judgment, Prosecutor v. Zigiranyirazo, Case No. ICTR-01-73-A, ICTR, Appeals 
Chamber, 16 November 2009. 
 
4.2.2. Other Judgments, Decisions, and Orders 
 Decision on Appellant Jean-Bosco Barayagwiza’s Motion Concerning the Scheduling 
Order for the Appeals Hearing, Prosecutor v. Nahimana et al., Case No. ICTR-99-52-A, 
ICTR, Appeals Chamber, 5 December 2006. 
 Decision on Appropriate Remedy, Prosecutor v. Rwamakuba, Case No. IT-98-44C-T, 
ICTR, Trial Chamber, 31 January 2007. 
 Decision, Prosecutor v. Barayagwiza, Case No. ICTR-97-19-AR72, ICTR, Appeals 
Chamber, 3 November 1999. 
 Decision, Semanza v. Prosecutor, Case No. ICTR-97-23-A, ICTR, Appeals Chamber, 1 
June 2000. 
 Order for Further Submissions and Severance, Prosecutor v. Ndindiliyimana et al., Case 
No. ICTR-00-56-A, ICTR, Appeals Chamber, 7 February 2014. 
 
4.3. International Residual Mechanism for Criminal Tribunals 
 Judgment, Prosecutor v. Ngirabatware, Case No. MICT-12-29-A, MICT, Appeals 
Chamber, 18 December 2014. 
 
4.4. International Criminal Court 
 
4.4.1. Judgments Appeals Chamber 
 Judgment, Prosecutor v. Lubanga (Sentencing), Case No. ICC-01/04-01/06, ICC, Appeals 
Chamber, 1 December 2014. 




 Judgment, Prosecutor v. Lubanga, Case No. ICC-01/04-01/06, ICC, Appeals Chamber, 1 
December 2014, Dissenting Opinion of Judge Anita Ušacka. 
 Judgment, Prosecutor v. Lubanga, Case No. ICC-01/04-01/06, ICC, Appeals Chamber, 1 
December 2014, Partly Dissenting Opinion of Judge Sang-Hyun Song. 
 Judgment, Prosecutor v. Ngudjolo, Case No. ICC-01/04-02/12, ICC, Appeals Chamber, 
27 February 2015. 
 
4.4.2. Other Judgments, Decisions, and Orders 
 Communication du Représentant Légal des Victimes Enfants Soldats Relative au Double 
Désistement d’Appel dans le Dossier Le Procureur c. Germain Katanga et Annexe 
Publique, Prosecutor v. Katanga, Case No. ICC-01/04-01/07, ICC, Le Représentant Légal 
des Victimes Enfants Soldats, 30 June 2014. 
 Decision of the Plenary of Judges on the Defence Application of 20 February 2013 for the 
Disqualification of Judge Sang-Hyun Song from the Case of the Prosecutor v. Thomas 
Lubanga Dyilo, Prosecutor v. Lubanga, Case No. ICC-01/04-01/06, ICC, Plenary of 
Judges, 11 June 2013. 
 Decision on Mr Ngudjolo’s Request for Review of the Registrar’s Decision regarding the 
Level of Remuneration during the Appeal Phase and Reimbursement of Fees, Prosecutor 
v. Ngudjolo, Case No. ICC-01/04-02/12, ICC, Appeals Chamber, 11 February 2014. 
 Decision on Sentence pursuant to Article 76 of the Statute, Prosecutor v. Lubanga, Case 
No. ICC-01/04-01/06, ICC, Trial Chamber I, 10 July 2012. 
 Decision on Sentence pursuant to Article 76 of the Statute, Prosecutor v. Katanga, Case 
No. ICC-01/04-01/07, ICC, Trial Chamber II, 23 May 2014. 
 Decision on the Participation of Victims in the Appeal against Trial Chamber II’s 
“Jugement Rendu en Application de l’Article 74 du Statut”, Prosecutor v. Ngudjolo, Case 
No. ICC-01/04-02/12, ICC, Appeals Chamber, 6 March 2013. 
 Decision on the Participation of Victims in the Appeals against Trial Chamber I’s 
Conviction and Sentencing Decisions, Prosecutor v. Lubanga, Case No. ICC-01/04-01/06, 
ICC, Appeals Chamber, 13 December 2012. 
 Decision Pursuant to Article 61(7)(a) and (b) of the Rome Statute on the Charges of the 
Prosecutor against Bosco Ntaganda, Prosecutor v. Ntaganda, ICC-01/04-02/06, ICC, Pre-
Trial Chamber II, 09 June 2014. 
308 
 
 Decision Replacing a Judge in the Appeals Chamber, Prosecutor v. Lubanga, Case No. 
ICC-01/04-01/06, ICC, Presidency, 7 September 2012. 
 Decision Replacing Judges in the Appeals Chamber, Prosecutor v. Katanga, Case No. 
ICC-01/04-01/07, ICC, Presidency, 19 March 2014. 
 Decision Replacing Judges in the Appeals Chamber, Prosecutor v. Ngudjolo ICC, ICC, 
Presidency, Case No. ICC-01/04-02/12, 20 December 2012. 
 Defence Notice of Discontinuance of Appeal against the ‘Jugement Rendu en Application 
de l’Article 74 du Statut’ rendered by Trial Chamber II on 7 April 2014, Annex A, 
Prosecutor v. Katanga, Case No. ICC-01/04-01/07, ICC, Defence, 25 June 2014. 
 Directions under Regulation 62 of the Regulations of the Court, Prosecutor v. Lubanga, 
Case No. ICC-01/04-01/06, ICC, Appeals Chamber, 21 December 2012. 
 Further Order regarding the Conduct of the Hearing of the Appeals Chamber, Prosecutor 
v. Lubanga, Case No. ICC-01/04-01/06, ICC, Appeals Chamber, 25 March 2014. 
 Judgment on the Appeal of Mr. Thomas Lubanga Dyilo against the Decision on the 
Defence Challenge to the Jurisdiction of the Court pursuant to Article 19 (2) (a) of the 
Statute of 3 October 2006, Prosecutor v. Lubanga, Case No. ICC-01/04-01/06, ICC, 
Appeals Chamber, 14 December 2006. 
 Judgment on the Appeals of Mr Lubanga Dyilo and the Prosecutor against the Decision of 
Trial Chamber I of 14 July 2009 entitled ‘Decision giving Notice to the Parties and 
Participants that the Legal Characterisation of the Facts may be Subject to Change in 
Accordance with Regulation 55(2) of the Regulations of the Court’, Prosecutor v. 
Lubanga, Case No. ICC-01/04-01/06, ICC, Appeals Chamber, 8 December 2009. 
 Judgment on the Prosecutor’s Application for Extraordinary Review of Pre-Trial Chamber 
I’s 31 March 2006 Decision Denying Leave to Appeal, Situation in the Democratic 
Republic of the Congo, Case No. ICC-01/04, ICC, Appeals Chamber, 13 July 2006. 
 Judgment Pursuant to Article 74 of the Statute, Prosecutor v. Katanga, Case No. ICC-
01/04-01/07, ICC, Trial Chamber II, 7 March 2014. 
 Notice of Discontinuance of the Prosecution’s Appeal against the Article 74 Judgment of 
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